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THE  CRISIS: 


OR, 

ESSAYS 

ON  THE 


OF  THE 

FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT. 

BY 

WOTS. 


Magna  est  veritas,  et prevalebit. 


“ Brdtds  had  rather  be  a villager, 

Than  to  repute  himself,  a son  of  Rome, 

Under  such  hard  conditions,  as  this  time 
Is  like  to  lay  on  us.” Julius  Ccesar. 


CHARLESTON: 
PRINTED  BY  A.  E MILLER, 


V 


No.  4 Broad-Street. 


N 


1827. 


70,  OH-8. 


“ All  policy  is  very  suspicious,  (says  an  eminent  statesman)  that  sacrifices  the  in- 
terest of  any  part  of  a community,  to  the  ideal  good  of  the  whole  ; and  those  Govern- 
ments only,  are  tolerable,  where,  by  the  necessary  construction  of  the  political  ma- 
chine, the  interests  of  all  the  parties  are  obliged  to  be  protected  by  it.  ” Here  is  a dis- 
trict of  country,  extending  from  the  Patapsco  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  from  the  Alle- 
ghany to  the  Atlantic  ; a district,  which,  taking  in  all  that  part  of  Maryland,  lying 
South  of  the  Patapsco,  and  East  of  Elk  river,  raises  five  sixths  of  all  the  exports  of  this 
country,  that  are  of  home  growth.  I have  in  my  hand,  the  official  statements  which 
will  prove  it,  hut  which  I will  not  weary  the  House  by  reading.  In  all  this  country  ! 
Yes,  Sir,  and  1 bless  God  for  it ; for  with  all  the  fantastical  and  preposterous  theories 
about  the  rights  of  man.  (the  theories,  not  the  rights  themselves,  1 speak  of)  there  is 
nothing  but  power  that  can  restrain  power.  I bless  God,  that  in  this  insulted,  oppressed, 
and  outraged  region,  we  are,  as  to  our  counsels  in  regard  to  this  measure,  but  as  one 
man  ; that  there  exists  on  this  subject,  but  one  feeling,  and  one  interest.  We  are  pro- 
scribed, and  put  to  the  ban  ; and,  if  we  do  not  feel,  and  feeling,  do  not  act,  we  are 
bastards  to  those  fathers  who  achieved  the  Revolution  : then  shall  we  deserve  to  make 
bricks  without  straw. 

There  is  no  case  on  record,  in  which  a proposition  like  this,  suddenly  changing  the 
whole  frame  of  a country’s  polity,  tearing  asunder  every  ligature  of  the  body  politic, 
was  ever  carried  by  a lean  majority  of  tw  o or  three  votes,  uidess  it  be  the  usurpation 
of  the  Septennial  act,  which  passed  the  British  Parliament,  by,  I think,  a majority  of 
one  vote,  the  same  that  laid  the  tax  on  Cotton  Bagging.  I do  not  stop  here,  Sir,  to 
argue  about  the  constitutionality  of  this  Bill.  I consider  the  Constitution  a dead  let- 
ter- I consider  it  to  consist,  at  thi-  time,  of  the  power  of  the  General  Government,  and 
the  power  of  the  States — (hat  is  the  Constitution.  You  may  entrench  yourself  in 
parchment  to  the  teeth,  says  Lord  Chatham,  the  sword  w ill  find  its  way  to  the  vitals 
of  the  Constitution.  I have  no  faith  in  parchment,  Sir;  I have  no  faith  in  the  Abra- 
cadabra of  the  Constitution  ; I have  no  faith  in  it.  I have  faith  in  the  power  of  that 
Commonwealth,  of  which  I am  an  unworthy  son  ; in  the  power  of  those  Carolinas , and 
of  that  Georgia,  in  her  ancient  and  utmost  extent  to  the  Mississippi,  which  went  with 
us  through  the  valley  of  the  shadow  of  death,  in  the  war  of  onr  independence.  1 have 
said,  lhat  I shall  not  stop  to  disruss  the  constitutionality  of  this  question,  for  that  rea- 
son, and  for  a better;  that  Ithere  never  was  a Constitution  under  the  sun,  in  which, 
by  an  unwise  exercise  of  the  powers  of  the  Government,  the  people  may  not  be 
driven  to  the  extremity  of  resistance  by  force;  For  it  is  not,  perhaps,  so  much  by  the 
assumption  of  unlawful  powers, as  by  the  unwise  or  unwarantable  use  of  those  which 
are  most  legal,  that  Governments  oppose  their  true  end  and  object;  for  there  is  such 
a thing  as  tyranny  as  well  as  usurpation.  If,  nnder  a power  to  regulate  trade,  you  pre- 
vent exportation  : if,  with  the  most  approved  spring  lancets,  you  draw  the  last  drop  of 
blood  from  our  veins  ; if ,secunilem  artem,  you  draw  the  last  shilling  from  our  pockets, 
what  are  the  checks  of  the  Constitution,  to  us  ? A fig  for  the  Constitution  ? When  the 
scorpion’s  sting  is  probing  us  to  the  quick,  shall  we  stop  to  chop  logic  ? Shall  we  get 
some  learned  and  cunning  clerk  to  say,  whether  the  power  to  do  this,  is  to  be  found  in 
the  Constitution,  and  then,  if  he,  from  whatever  motive,  shall  maintain  the  affirma- 
tive, like  the  animal  whose  fleece  forms  so  material  a portion  of  this  bill,  “ quietly  lie 
down  and  be  shorn!"  John  Randolph. 

[Extract  from  Speech,  delivered  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  on  the  Tariff  Bill,  April  lSth,  1 824?) 


J * 


? 7 3 j'6  / 


iC.r.  q»  ^ U ■ J 
,6  0 L 


O /? 


TO 


THE  PEOPLE 


OF 


The  “ Plantation  States 

THESE  ESSAYS 


ARE 


Betricatetr 

AS  A TESTIMONY  OF  RESPECT, 

For  their  Rights  of  Sovereignty, 


BY 


THE  AUTHOR. 


ID,  0 + 2. 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


THE  numbers  of  “ The  Crisis”  appeared  a few  weeks  since  in 
the  columns  of  the  “ Charleston  Mercury ,”  and  having  attracted 
more  attention  than  was  anticipated,  they  are  now  re-published, 
together  with  eleven  additional  numbers,  the  publication  of  which, 
was  prevented  from  a cause  not  now  necessary  to  be  noticed.  The 
new  numbers  are  No.  22  and  No.  24,  to  No.  33,  both  inclusive. 
The  two  numbers  signed  “ Philo-Brutus ,”  which  appeared  at 
the  same  time,  are  not  herewith  published.  They  were  not  writ- 
ten by  Brutus. 

The  Author  was  fully  aware  when  he  commenced  these  Essays, 
that  they  would  meet  with  the  marked  displeasure  of  certain  native 
gentlemen  of  Charleston,  and  he  has  not  been  mistaken.  These 
gentlemen  have  freely  bestowed  upon  them  the  harshest  epithets  ; 
but  as  their  influence  does  not  actually  extend  beyond  their  own 
little  coteries,  their  opinions  are  disregarded.  From  all  other 
quarters  of  the  State,  they  have  met  with  a reception  flattering  to 
the  Author.  Brutus  may  possibly  be  wrong  in  his  opinions.  If 
he  be  so,  let  him  be  corrected  by  fair  argument ; but  let  him  not 
be  abused  for  vindicating  the  rights  of  his  native  Southern  country 
to  which  he  is  attached  by  no  ordinary  ties;  and  in  which  his  dust 
is  likely  to  be  mingled  with  that  of  father,  mother,  children  and 
friends. 

He  regrets  that  an  idea  has  gone  forth,  that  he  has  received 
assistance  in  these  numbers ; and  fearing  that  the  odium  (which 
gome  have  attached  to  them)  might  fall  on  some  unoffend- 
ing and  innocent  person,  he  feels  it  to  be  his  duty,  distinctly  to 
state,  that  whatever  of  patriotism  or  of  treason,  of  merit  or  of  blame, 
moral  or  literary,  the  present  publication  may  be  supposed  to  con- 
tain, it  belongs  to  one  person  alone.  The  pieces  are  all  written 
by  Brutus.  Between  him  and  any  other  person  there  is  no  parti- 
cipation of  authorship,  and  particularly  as  regards  the  fifteenth 
number.  The  design,  the  research,  the  arrangement  and  the  ar- 
gument, all  belong  to  an  individual  who  has  no  pursuit  but  Agri- 
culture ; and  who,  if  he  has  a knowledge  of  his  own  heart,  has  had, 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end,  no  other  view  than  the  good  of  his 
country. 

Charleston,  22 nd  October,  1827. 


I 


Is 


Magna  est  veritas , et  prevalebit , 


1. 

It  is  amongst  the  invaluable  privileges  of  the  citizen,  as  secured 
to  him  by  the  Constitution,  that  he  has  the  right,  at  all  times,  to 
address  his  fellow-citizens,  on  the  subject  of  their  rights,  their  inter- 
ests, or  their  safety.  It  is  a right  which  has  been  freely  exercised 
since  the  foundation  of  the  government ; and  it  is  no  trifling  eulogy 
on  the  Constitution  itself,  and  on  the  attachment  of  our  citizens  to 
those  principles  of  civil  liberty  for  which  our  patriots  toiled  in  the 
Cabinet  and  bled  in  the  field,  that  in  almost  every  period  of  our  his- 
tory as  an  independent  nation,  no  attempt  has  been  made  by  Con- 
gress, or  any  disposition  manifested  by  the  people,  to  interrupt  or 
abridge  the  freedom  of  the  press.  The  sedition  law  of  the  elder 
Adams,  it  is  true,  was  a memorable  exception  ; and  to  this  might  be 
added  some  hasty  proceedings  on  the  part  of  the  people,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  Baltimore  mob  in  1812.  But  these  examples  were  of 
such  short  duration,  and  their  occurrence  so  odious  generally  to  the 
public  feeling,  that  they  rather  serve  to  strengthen  than  to  impair 
my  position  : that  freedom  of  the  press,  is  the  universally  recognized 
right  of  our  people,  and  that  in  the  uninterrupted  practical  enjoy- 
ment of  this  species  of  civil  liberty,  the  Uuited  States  stand  pre-emi- 
nently distinguished  above  all  the  nations  of  the  earth. 

Undoubted,  however,  as  is  the  right,  and  as  unlimited  generally 
as  has  been  its  exercise  in  our  happy  land,  yet  who  can  look  back 
upon  our  history,  and  not  deeply  lament  that  it  has  often  been  pro- 
ductive of  much  public  evil.  Under  the  dominion  of  the  press,  pri- 
vate character  has  been  wantonly  assailed;  the  purest  patriots  have 
been  denounced  as  traitors ; and  noisy  and  worthless  demagogues 
have  been  elevated  to  power.  But  these  were  evils  inseparable  from 
this  great  palladium  of  our  liberties;  and  amidst  the  devastation 
that  has  been  made  by  the  licentiousness  of  the  American  press,  it  is 
a consolation  to  reflect,  that  there  were  circumstances  in  some  periods 
of  our  history,  which  may  never  again  occur,  and  which,  whilst  they 
did  exist,  were  calculated  to  give  the  bitterest  character  to  political 
discussions. 

Happily,  however,  these  times  have  now  passed  away,  never  again 
to  return.  We  now  hear  of  no  odious  distinctions  between  one  set 
of  our  citizens  and  another.  The  second  war  with  Britain  had  the 
happy  effect  of  uniting  many,  who  before  were  divided,  and  at  the 
last  treaty  of  peace,  all  good  men  were  as  astounded,  as  they  were 

1 


6 


delighted,  at  the  unexpected  and  abundant  harvest  of  glory  which 
was  gathered  for  us  in  that  war,  and  party  and  political  animosity, 
in  the  aggravated  forms  in  which  they  once  existed,  to  the  reproach 
of  our  country,  has  ever  since  gradually  subsided  and  settled  down 
into  better  feelings.  The  last  Presidential  election  was  of  a charac- 
ter to  revive  and  to  excite  party  feeling,  and  the  approaching  one 
indicates,  that  there  will  be  abundance  of  it  brought  to  the  contest. 
But  yet  it  is  not  the  envenomed  feeling  which  once  divided  our  peo- 
ple; and  when  we  consider  the  magnitude  of  the  contest  and  the 
exalted  station  and  the  pre-eminent  honor,  we  ought  to  rejoice  that 
there  is  not  more  of  excitement.  To  us,  in  Soiith-Carolina,  it  is  an 
especial  cause  of  congratulation,  that  on  the  subject  of  the  last  and 
the  approaching  Presidency,  we  have  been  nearly  unanimous,  and 
that  we  are  able,  for  the  first  time  in  our  history  since  the  inaugura- 
tion of  Gen.  Washington  to  the  first  honors  of  the  Republic,  to 
view  men  and  measures  with  a dispassionate  and  an  unprejudiced 
eye.  The  present  is  an  era  amongst  us,  in  which  we  are  all  satis- 
fied to  forget  and  forgive  our  old  bitter  dissentions  as  Federalists 
and  Republicans,  and  to  regard  merit  and  long  services  as  the  only 
legitimate  claim  to  the  favour  and  patronage  of  the  people. 

It  is  in  this  delightful  and  comparatively  calm  state  of  the  public 
feeling,  as  calm  as  it  can  ever  be  expected  to  be,  consistently  with 
the  freedom  of  our  institutions;  when  we  are  in  the  full  enjoyment 
of  the  blessings  of  peace,  and  with  no  prospect  of  their  being  inter- 
rupted from  abroad  ; when  each  State  has  every  motive  to  attend  to 
its  own  local  concerns,  and  when  men  are  more  disposed  to  look 
rationally  and  dispassionately  into  every  subject  connected  with 
the  welfare  of  the  State  ; it  is  this  period  which  I seize  to  address 
you  on  subjects  of  most  vital  importance  to  you  as  citizens  of  South 
Carolina,  and  to  arouse  you  to  a just  and  lively  sense  of  the  dan- 
gers that  threaten  your  temporal  prosperity  and  your  domestic  quiet. 
And  in  so  doing,  I ask  of  ail  who  may  peruse  this  and  the  succeed- 
ing numbers,  to  believe  me  sincere  when  I say,  that  I am  not  hitched 
to  the  car  of  any  one  set  of  politicians.  At  the  last  ejection,  I was 
the  advocate  neither  of  Adams,  or  Crawford,  or  Claw,  and  when  I 
gave  my  free  and  unbiassed  vote  for  the  hero  of  New-Orleans,  it  was 
not  because  I thought  even  this  man,  who  has  so  “ nobly  filled  the 
measure  of  his  country’s  glory,”  as  likely  to  avert  the  dangers  that 
have  long  thickened  around  South-Curolina,  but  my  vote  was  on 
political  grounds  totally  distinct.  The  opinion  I then  held,  I enter- 
tain at  the  present  moment.  But  1 beg  in  the  outset  to  repeat,  that 
as  clear  and  as  distinct  as  is  my  preference  for  Gen.  Jackson,  yet  my 
honest  conviction  is,  that  it  will  make  no  difference  in  the  deplora- 
ble situation  and  prospects  of  the  Southern  States,  whether  Jackson 
or  Adams  shall  be  called  to  preside  over  us.  The  dangers  that 
threaten  us  are  not  attributable  to  Mr.  Adams.  They  come  from  a 
period  more  distant  than  the  recent  era  of  his  inauguration  into 
power.  They  are  dangers  which  will  approach  nearer  and  nearer 
to  us,  under  every  future  Administration,  and  unless  we  take  some 
decisive  measures  to  shield  ourselves,  they  must,  in  due  time,  bring 


7 


as  to  ruin.  In  my  remarks  on  this  subject,  I shall  fearlessly  speak 
the  truth  and  the  whole  truth — I have  no  motive  beyond  my  coun- 
try’s good.  I never  did,  nor  do  I now,  seek  office  or  honors.  My 
feelings,  I confess,  are  more  sectional  than  they  are  national.  “ Not 
that  I love  Caesar  less  but  that  I love  Rome  more."  Not,  because  I 
am  insensible  to  the  glory  and  the  proud  distinction  of  the  American 
name,  but  because  I believe  that  to  the  predominance  of  these  feel- 
ings above  all  others,  we  are  in  future  to  look  for  the  preservation  of 
Southern  interests  and  Southern  safety. 

3?0.  2. 

The  subject  which  ought  at  this  moment,  to  claim  the  attention  of 
every  South-Carolinian,  is  the  tendency  of  the  government  towards 
a.  fixxa. -consolidated  national  government.  This  is  no  idle  specu- 
lation. It  is  not  a phantom  which  exists  in  the  distempered  minds 
of  the  weak,  the  timid,  or  the  suspicious.  It  is  not  even  the  cry  by 
which  aspiring  demagogues  would  climb  into  popular  favour.  But 
it  has  been  for  years  past,  the  rational  and  the  well  settled  appre- 
hension of  sober  and  reflecting  men  amongst  us;  of  men  who  soar  far 
above  the  unworthy,  and  the  selfish  motives  of  office  hunters.  It  will 
be  found  to  exist  in  the  minds  of  some  of  our  best  and  wisest  men, 
and  daily  becomes  to  our  citizens  generally,  a source  of  much  in- 
quietude. Perceiving  that  the  Congress  claims  and  exercises  pow- 
ers, never  contemplated  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  they  are  alarmed,  and  justly  alarmed  for  the  situation 
of  the  Southern  country,  whose  safety  they  feel  to  consist  in  the  in- 
tegrity and  sovereignty  of  the  individual  States.  And  well  may  they 
be  alarmed.  Within  the  last  six  or  seven  years,  Congress  has  made 
more  rapid  strides  towards  consolidation,  than  in  the  thirty  previous 
years.  During  the  whole  period  of  the  Federal  Administrations, 
and  of  the  Administrations  of  Messrs.  Jefeerson  and  Madison,  no- 
thing ever  occurred,  of  a nature  similar  to  the  attempts  now  made, 
to  extend  the  powers  of  Congress,  to  almost  every  subject,  which  re- 
lates to  the  internal  order  and  government  of  the  States.  Anxious 
as  were  the  Federalists,  to  give  strength  and  efficiency  to  a govern- 
ment then  in  its  infancy,  and  to  diminish  the  embarrassment  which 
they  erroneously  thought  it  would  experience  from  the  State  sove- 
reignties, yet  no  decided  system  of  measures  was  ever  brought  for- 
ward, threatening  such  results  to  the  Southern  States,  as  those  now 
pursued  by  Congress.  When  the  Bill  to  establish  the  first  Bank  of 
the  United  States,  was  before  Congress  in  179!,  and  the  implied 
powers  of  Congress  in  relation  to  this  subject  considered,  there  was 
then  no  settled  design  amongst  its  friends,  to  lay  a foundation,  upon 
which  they  were  to  commence  and  continue  to  raise,  great  and  ex- 
tensive powers  to  the  government.  Had  there  been  any  such  de- 
sign, the  manner  in  which  the  subject  was  discussed,  and  the  great 
division  of  sentiment  in  Congress  and  in  the  Cabinet,  was  of  itself 
sufficient  to  forbid  a hope  of  continued  and  constant  success.  There 
were  specious  arguments  to  shew  the  expediency,  at  that  time,  of  a 
National  Bank,  and  the  necessity  of  such  an  institution,  as  a means 


8 


adapted  to  the  end  of  the  government  in  the  collection  and  distri- 
bution ot  its  revenue. 

The  decision,  however,  has  been  a most  unfortunate  one  for  the 
country  ; for  thus  was  the  foundation  laid  for  augmenting,  by  con- 
struction, the  powers  of  the  general  government,  and  upon  this  ex- 
ample, has  a superstructure  of  implied  powers  been  recently  com- 
menced, not  by  a Federal,  but  strange  to  say,  by  the  Republican  Ad- 
ministration of  Mr.  Monroe,  which,  if  continued  to  be  carried  on, 
with  the  spirit  and  the  industry  manifested  within  the  last  five  years, 
will  very  soon  place  our  National  Councils  on  an  eminence  of  pow- 
er, that  will  cause  the  Southern  States  to  tremble  for  their  safety. 

It  is  here  to  be  remarked,  that  in  the  long  interval  between  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  Bank,  and  the  accession  of  Mr,  Monroe  to  the 
Presidency,  there  were  occasionally,  exercises  of  power  by  Con- 
gress which  were  not  constitutional,  but  they  were  not  of  a nature 
to  alarm.  The  most  prominent  of  these  for  its  unconstitutionality, 
and  about  which  there  was  no  difference  of  opinion,  was  the  remark- 
able vote  of  $100,000  for  the  relief  of  the  distressed  inhabitants  of 
Caraccas,  after  its  earthquake.  No  man  would  now  rise  in  Con- 
gress, and  say,  that  this  appropriation  was  for  “ the  general  welfare 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States.”  The  truth  is,  that  it  was  done 
without  reflection,  and  sprung  from  that  laudable  warmth  of  feeling 
and  sympathy,  which  we  all,  in  and  out  of  Congress,  possessed  at 
the  time  the  news  of  such  an  overwhelming  calamity  reached  us. — 
There  were  also  in  the  Administrations  of  Mr.  Jefeerson  and  Mr. 
Madison,  appropriations  for  roads  in  the  Western  country  ; but  with 
the  exception  of  that  for  the  great  Cumberland  road,  these  appro- 
priations were  trifling.  Upon  the  last  mentioned  road,  upwards  of  a 
million  of  dollars  had  been  expended.  It  was  in  Mr.  Jefferson^s 
Administration,  that  this  road  was  proposed  to  be  opened,  but  the 
manner  in  which  that  measure  was  recommended  by  that  statesman, 
evinced  that  he  doubted  the  constitutional  power  of  Congres  to  con- 
struct it.  I pass  over  the  sedition  law — it  caused  the  downfal  of  the 
men  who  passed  it.  But  it  was  during  the  Administration  of  Mr. 
Monroe,  that  a bold  and  decided  system  was  determined  on  in  our 
country.  The  subjects  of  tariffs  and  internal  improvement  being 
earnestly  recommended  by  the  President  to  Congress,  and  that  body 
having  nearly  exhausted  all  the  ordinary  subjects  of  legislation,  for 
which  the  Constitution  had  provided,  and  having,  in  fact,  little  or 
nothing  to  do,  being  in  a state  of  peace  and  friendship  with  all  na- 
tions, was  glad  to  hear  of  new  subjects,  on  which  to  exercise  its 
powers,  and  at  length  resolved,  that  it  could  construct  military  and 
other  national  roads,  make  canals,  improve  inland  navigation,  pro- 
mote manufactures,  and  appropriate  money  to  any  extent,  for  the 
purpose  of  promoting,  what  they  would  call,  the  general  interests  of 
the  States.  A new  field  of  power  has  thus  been  opened  to  Congress, 
as  boundless  as  space  itself.  All  the  guards  which  the  framers  of 
the  Constitution,  and  the  State  Legislatures  had  cautiously  provided, 
to  keep  the  General  Government  within  its  prescribed  and  limited 
powers,  have  been  discovered  to  be  utterly  useless.  There  is  no 


9 


ineasure  which  concerns  the  general  welfare,  immediately,  or  most 
remotely,  which  Congress  does  not  feel  itself  at  liberty  to  adopt* 

To  many  it  may  appear  a remarkable  circumstance  in  our  politi- 
cal history,  that  when  these  discussions  on  the  constructive  powers 
of  the  government  first  commenced  in  Congress  in  1791,  the  oppo- 
sition was  not  confined,  as  at  present  it  is,  to  any  particular  section 
of  the  country.  The  solution,  however,  is  not  difficult.  The  new 
constitution  at  that  time,  had  not  long  been  in  operation.  Its  adop- 
tion, it  is  well  known,  had  been  most  zealously  opposed  in  every 
part  of  the  union,  and  particularly  by  the  largest  States  in  the  North 
and  in  the  South.  The  two  parties  which  had  divided  the  country 
on  the  question  of  the  constitution,  had  not  then  entirely  died  away, 
but  from  them  were  furnished  those  elements,  which,  in  connection 
with  the  effect  of  the  French  Rev  olution  upon  the  public  feelings  of 
our  citizens,  gave  rise  in  a very  short  time  afterwards  to  those  two 
political  parties,  the  Federalists  and  Democrats  of  the  United  States. 
Distributed  as  were  the  friends  and  adherents  of  one  or  other  of  these 
parties,  which  were  then  in  their  infancy,  but  which  afterwards  be- 
came so  distinct  and  tremendous,  and  whose  convulsions  we  all  re- 
member, it  was  natural  that  the  advocates  and  opponents  of  the  Bank, 
or  of  any  other  national  measure,  should  come  from  every  quar- 
ter of  the  Union.  But  now  that  these  political  parties  have  passed 
away,  and  the  people  of  each  State  begin  to  think  of  their  own  af- 
fairs, and  in  what  way  they  can  best  promote  their  local  prosperity 
by  improvements  amongst  themselves,  we  observe,  that  in  the 
Northern,  Eastern,  Middle,  and  Western  States,  the  people  have  no 
fears  whatever  from  the  exercise  of  the  implied  powers  of  Congress 
on  any  subject ; but  it  is  in  the  South  alone  where  uneasiness  begins 
to  manifest  itself,  and  a sensitiveness  prevails  on  the  subject  of  con- 
solidation. The  cause  is  obvious.  The  more  National , and  the  less 
Federal,  the  Government  becomes,  the  more  certainly  will  the  inte- 
rest of  the  great  majority  of  the  States  be  promoted,  but  with  the 
same  certainty,  will  the  interests  of  the  South  be  depressed  and  des- 
troyed. Seeing,  as  we  all  do,  the  subject  at  this  time,  not  through 
the  mists  of  prejudice  and  embittered  political  animosity,  but  through 
the  medium  of  truth,  we  must  perceive  at  a glance,  that  the  interests 
of  the  North  and  West,  are  diametrically  opposed  to  the  interests  of 
the  South,  and  that  to  this  cause  and  this  alone,  are  we  to  ascribe 
the  general  acquiescence  of  the  great  body  of  the  people  of  the  U. 
States,  in  the  alarming  progress  of  the  General  Government  to  con- 
solidation. 


TSQ.  3. 

With  all  the  advances  of  the  government  to  consolidation,  there 
is  no  man  who  at  present  apprehends,  that  it  would  venture,  in  our 
day,  to  encroach  upon  any  of  the  acknowledged  rights  expressly 
reserved  to  the  States.  It  would  not  presume  to  claim  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  officers  of  the  militia  ; or  the  authority  to  train  them  ; 
or  to  infringe  upon  the  right  of  the  people  in  any  state  to  bear  arms: 
or  to  make  any  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion,  or  pro- 


10 


hibiting  the  free  exercise  of  religion  ; nor  would  it  attempt  to  abolish 
the  trial  by  jury.  On  these  and  other  subjects,  which  they  are  for- 
bidden to  touch,  there  is  not  present  danger  of  encroachment.  The 
people  of  the  . \orth  as  well  as  of  the  South,  are  materially  interested 
in  the  preservation  of  all  these  essentials  of  liberty,  and  in  the  present 
state  of  society  and  of  public  opinion,  it  would  be  difficult  to  con- 
ceive that  the  government  could  even  feel  the  desire  to  encroach 
upon  the  rights  of  State  sovereignty,  expressly  reserved.  VThe  flame 
that  would  instantly  be  excited  from  one  end  of  the  Union  to  the 
other,  by  the  undivided  feeling  of  the  public,  is  the  surest  pledge  for 
the  security  of  all  these. 

But  far  different  will  be  the  public  feeling,  where  no  vital  princi- 
ple of  State  government,  or  individual  liberty,  is  involved  in  the 
measures  of  Congress,  however  clearly  unconstitutional  such  mea- 
sures may  be.  Should  it  happen  that  the  usurpation  of  the  govern- 
ment solely  operates  upon  great  and  important  pecuniary  interests, 
and  is  founded  on  no  open, palpable  breach  of  an  article  in  the  Con- 
stitution, forbidding  the  exercise  of  the  particular  power  claimed, 
but  claimed  merely  as  a power  naturally  incident  to,  and  necessa- 
rily resulting  from  other  powers  specially  granted,  the  public  feel- 
ing in  each  State  will  be  formed  and  fashioned  exactly  as  the  mea- 
sure shall  affect  its  puculiar  interests.  If,  by  the  usurped  power,  any 
new  stimulus  will  be  given  to  the  internal  commerce,  enterprise  or 
industry  of  any  one  State,  or  number  of  States,  or  great  local  inter- 
ests are  thereby  to  be  promoted,  their  statesmen  and  politicians  will 
not  be  astute  to  inquire,  whether  the  measure  will  be  in  strict  con- 
formity with  the  acknowledged  principles  on  which  the  compact  of 
the  States  was  founded,  or  within  the  clear  intent  and  meaning  of 
the  compact  itself,  but  will  rather  be  disposed  to  overlook  all  consi- 
derations of  the  kind.  The  States,  on  the  other  hand,  whose  pros- 
perity will  be  retarded  or  impaired  by  the  contemplated  measure, 
will  be  found  in  opposition  to  it. 

In  the  measures  of  the  Congress  for  many  years  past,  the  people 
in  some  sections  of  the  Union,  indeed  the  majority  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  have  perceived  a system  of  policy,  which  is  to 
give  active  employment  to  the  capital  and  industry  of  their  particu- 
lar States,  and  to  carry  them  forward  to  aggrandizement,  and  to 
wealth.  In  another  portion  of  the  country,  it  promises  to  dry  up 
the  sources  of  their  prosperity,  and  to  bring  on  premature  decay. 
For  a discordance  in  the  public  sentiment  so  unhappy,  and  in  a con- 
flict of  paramount  interests  so  serious,  I know  of  no  peaceable  rem- 
edy, unless  Congress  shall  magnanimously  retrace  its  steps  and 
consent  to  carry  on  the  government  in  future,  upon  the  principles, 
and  in  the  spirit  in  which  it  was  so  happily  formed. 

But  is  this  probable  ? Let  us  not,  my  fellow-citizens,  indulge  in 
a hope  which,  however  pleasing,  must  in  the  end  prove  fallacious. 
Let  us  only  look  to  things  as  they  are.  To  the  North  of  the  Poto- 
mac, and  to  the  East  and  West  of  the  Alleghany,  what  cause  have 
the  people  to  tremble  at,  or  what  possible  motive  to  change,  the 
measures  or  the  policy  of  the  government  ? What  constructive  power 


11 


can  Congress  claim  to  exercise,  which  can  possibly  affect  these  peo- 
ple to  their  inconvenience  or  their  injury  1 I can  conceive  none.  In 
domestic  manufactures  and. in  monopolies , they  .see  their  local  inter- 
ests cherished  and  fostered  by  the  protecting  and  the  powerful  in- 
fluences and  resources  of  the  whole  nation.  In  internal  improve- 
ments, they  see  that  obstructions  m their  rivers  are  about  to  be 
removed,  and  new  means  of  communication  proposed,  which  are  to 
open  to  the  Middle  and  the  Western  States  new  and  most  profitable 
channels  of  commerce,  and  the  cost  of  which  is  to  be  defrayed  from 
the  National  Treasury,  whilst  we  in  the  South,  who  furnish  such 
means  and  such  a revenue  to  the  government,  are  to  enjoy  from 
that  government  no  other  advantage  than  protection  from  an  exter- 
nal enemy. 

The  interest  of  the  North  and  West  consists,  therefore,  in  Usurpa- 
tion, and  a departure  from  the  social  compact.  The  interest  of  the 
South,  in  the  preservation  of  that  compact.  The  interest  of  the 
North  and  West,  is,  that  the  government  should  become  more  and 
more  National.  The  interest  of  the  South,  that  it  should  continue 
Federal.  The  North,  from  principles  of  expediency  and  self  inter- 
est, must  for  ever  support  every  inordinate  exercise  of  power,  on  the 
ground  of  cot  st  action  or  implication.  The  South,  from  conside- 
rations of  pi.m  try  interest  and  of  safety,  must  for  ever  oppose  the 
implied  powers  of  Congress.  But  the  North  and  the  West  consti- 
tute the  majority  of  the  nation.  That  majority  must  increase  with 
every  new  census,  and  with  the  prospect  of  its  being  at  some  future 
day  overwhelming,  where  shali  we  look  confidently  for  the  hope, 
that  the  government  is  to  be  arrested  in  the  unconstitutional  and 
arbitrary  exercises  of  its  power,  when  such  exercises  of  power  serve 
to  gratify  the  feelings  and  promote  the  interests  of  that  majority. 
In  the  claim  to  do  any  act,  which  in  the  opinion  of  Congress,  can 
“piomotc  the  general  welfare,”  can  it  be  conceived,  how,  or  in 
what  way,  the  general  government  can  ever  come  in  collision  with 
Northern  views  and  Northern  interests.  Not,  certainly,  by  a mode 
of  taxation,  by  which  we  in  the  South  are  to  look  to  no  customers 
but  themselves,  when  we  buy  or  when  we  sell.  Not,  certainly,  when 
their  rivers  are  to  be  opened,  and  canals  cut  in  every  direction 
through  their  States,  without  any  expense  to  themselves.  Not,  cer- 
tainly, by  the  enormous  expenditure  and  circulation  of  money,  which 
is  to  arise  from  the  appropriations  which  are  constantly  making  for 
some  new  purposes,  unknown  to  the  constitution.  Not,  certainly, 
by  any  interference  in  their  domestic  and  internal  policy,  to  which 
there  never  can  be  a possible  inducement. 

But  how  different  is  it  with  the  South.  We  hear  of  no  project  in 
Congress  to  tax  the  manufactures  of  the  North,  to  support  the  agri- 
culture of  the  South.  We,  indeed,  are  told  of  internal  improvements, 
but  to  witness  them  we  must  travel  Northwardly.  We  annually 
throw  into  the  Treasury  of  the  Nation  from  our  Custom  House, 
hundreds  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars,  to  be  distributed 
and  disbursed  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  States.  But  for  this  rich  re- 
mittance we  receive  nothing  in  return.  All  is  expended  Northward- 


12 


]y.  We  have  no  Navy  Yard  to  repair  the  smaller  vessels  of  the 
Navy,  to  which  we  contribute  so  much,  and  when  we  ask  for  one  it 
is  refused.  If  a ship’s  boat  is  to  be  built,  or  a sail  repaired,  neces- 
sity alone  would  cause  it  to  be  done  here  : all  must  be  done  in  Nor- 
thern ports.  We  know  the  general  government,  not  by  the  kind- 
nesses which  it  practises  towards  us,  but  by  the  taxes  and  the  tribute 
money  that  it  incessantly  demands  of  us.  Whilst  we  are  at  peace 
with  all  the  world,  and  with  no  rational  prospect,  that  there  ever 
can  be  madness  enough  again  in  any  foreign  power  to  meddle  with 
us,  we  are  told  of  the  preparations  and  measures  “ to  provide  for 
the  common  defence.”  We  are  reminded  by  Congress  of  the  facility 
which  ought,  in  case  of  war,  to  exist  for  the  transporting  of  troops 
and  munitions  of  war,  and  that  these  facilities  are  best  promoted  by 
great  National  and  Military  Roads  and  Canals.  If  we  cast  our 
eyes  upon  those  sections  of  the  United  States,  where  the  population 
is  compact  and  dense,  and  where  invasion  is  impracticable,  we  do 
indeed  see  United  States’  Engineers  every  where  at  work,  and  busy 
in  their  attempts  to  take  summit  levels,  even  on  the  Alleghany 
Mountains,  and  mighty  projects  are  every  where  on  foot.  But,  if 
we  turn  to  the  Southern  Border,  which  is  the  weak  and  the  vulne- 
rable point  of  attack  for  a foreign  enemy,  easiest  of  access  in  time 
of  war,  with  bad  roads,  and  no  facilities,  but  with  every  difficulty  as 
to  the  transportation  of  troops,  and  artillery,  and  heavy  ordnance : 
we  shall  there  see  no  Navy  Yards,  no  Military  Roads,  no  Canals. 

What  has  brought  about  all  this "?  The  answer  is — Usurpation 
and  Consolidation.  Congress  is  exercising  powers  which  belong 
not  to  it,  and  if  the  Southern  States  continue  to  acquiesce  as  they 
hitherto  have  done,  in  the  Tariffs,  Internal  Improvements,  and  other 
schemes  of  the  Northern  People  to  improve  their  country  at  our  ex- 
pense, we  shall  soon  find  that  we  shall  be  for  them  “ hewers  of  wood 
and  drawers  of  water,”  and  we  may  discover  that  under  the  phrase- 
ology of  the  term  “ general  welfare”  in  the  Constitution,  Congress 
may  be  propelled  by  the  public  opinion  of  the  North,  to  regulate  our 
domestic  policy.  Let  the  People  look  to  it.  This  is  not  fancy — 
The  idea  is  serious  with  many,  and  the  time  perhaps  is  not  very  dis- 
tant. It  rests  with  ourselves  only  to  place  it  at  what  distance  we 
please.  By  firmness  we  stand — by  concession  we  fall. 

3^0.  4. 

It  is  not  only  on  the  subject  of  Tariffs  and  Internal  Improvements 
that  the  people  in  the  four  great  divisions  of  the  United  States  are 
divided  in  sentiment.  It  is  our  misfortune  that  we  differ  on  points 
ten  thousand  times  ten  thousand  more  important,  than  all  that  has 
been  discussed  in  Congress.  We  are,  and  we  must  be,  in  perpetual 
conflict  with  our  Northern  friends,  on  a point  of  most  vital  impor- 
tance to  our  security  and  comfort  as  a society,  to  our  prosperity  as  a 
country,  and  to  our  existence  as  a State  ! To  believe  that  this  con- 
flict of  feeling  can  ever  cease,  is  egregiously  to  deceive  ourselves  ; 
and  to  conceal  our  opinions,  when  we  do  not  believe  it,  is  to  deceive 
others.  Nature,  interest,  education,  prejudice  and  feeling,  have 


13 


drawn  a strongly  marked  line  of  distinction  between  the  North  and 
the  South.  It  may  be  delightful  for  us,  to  talk  of  our  being  as  one 
family,  the  members  of  which  are  mutually  affectionate  and  kind. — 
The  patriot  may  dwell  with  extacy  on  the  thought,  and  our  orators 
and  poets  may  make  it  the  constant  subject  of  their  themes  and  of 
their  songs.  But  the  idea  exists,  only  in  the  imaginations  of  those 
who  love  to  indulge  in  the  pleasing  illusions  of  fancy.  It  is  not 
founded  in  truth.  We  are  an  united  people  it  is  true — but  we  are  a 
family  united  only  for  external  objects  ; for  our  common  defence, 
and  for  the  purpose  of  a common  commerce;  sharing,  in  common, 
the  dangers  and  privations  of  war,  and  the  glory  and  renown,  with 
winch  our  arms  have  been  crowned,  when  wielded  in  the  defence  of 
our  liberties  and  our  independence.  The  wise  framers  of  our  Con- 
stitution, never  designed  or  contemplated  more  than  this.  When 
they  met  together  in  convention,  they  brought  with  them  opposite 
sentiments,  and  they  represented  a people,  whose  pursuits,  occu- 
pations, and  interests  varied,  according  to  the  section  of  the  country 
in  which  rhey  lived.  They  were  aware  of  a substantial  distinction 
as  to  interest  between  the  States.  It  was  in  Convention  that  Mr. 
Madison  declared,  that  “the  great  danger  to  the  general  government, 
was  the  great  Southern  and  Northern  interests  of  the  continent  being 
opposed  to  each  other.  Look  to  the  votes  in  Congress,  and  most  of 
them  stand  divided  by  the  geography  of  the  country , not  according  to 
the  size  of  the  States.”  As  opposite  too  as  were  our  feelings,  yet  as 
regards  these,  we  were  then  in  our  Halcyon  days.  Though  our  sen- 
timents and  our  policy  tvere  not  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  our 
Northern  friends ; yet,  in  that  day,  there  was  nothing  of  that  fanata- 
cism,  that  morbid  sense  of  humanity,  or  that  vituperation  and  con- 
stant vulgar  abuse  of  Southern  institutions,  which  now  prevails. — 
Judging  of  the  future  by  the  past,  and  one  and  all  believing  that  the 
Constitution  would  bind  us  together  in  firmer  friendship,  and  cause 
us  to  approximate  in  kind  feeling,  rather  than  to  diverge,  we  con- 
sented to  the  Union  upon  terms,  which  time  and  experience,  and  the 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  daily  prove  to 
be  disadvantageous  to  us  in  the  extreme. 

We  have  been  deceived  in  all  our  expectations  on  this  head.  The 
good  feeling  upon  which  we  then  relied,  has  vanished.  Instead  of 
approximating  in  a friendly  and  liberal  feeling,  as  we  advance  in 
our  history,  we  approximate  only  for  conflict  and  collision.  Year 
after  year,  Congress  proclaims  its  omnipotence  by  some  new  usur- 
pation; year  after  year,  new  presses  vomit  forth  their  anathemas  a- 
gainst  our  systems,  and  their  reviews  and  periodical  journals,  edited 
by  the  first  talents  of  the  country,  denounce  in  the  most  angry  terms, 
our  policy.  Insurrectionary  doctrines  are  promulgated  in  a thou- 
sand ways,  even  from  the  Pulpits  of  the  Ministers  of  the  Gospel  of 
Peace. 

Our  jealousy  of  the  North  has,  iti  consequence,  been  augmented 
ten  and  an  hundred  fold  to  what  it  was;  and  considering  the  pre- 
sent state  of  the  world,  and  the  unceasing  extravagance  and  tenden- 
cy of  public  opinion,  to  interfere  with  the  policy  which  fetus  and  sus- 

2 ■ 


14 


tains  us,  who  regrets  that  there  is  such  a jealousy  1 What  can  pre- 
serve us  but  constant  jealousy  1 What  but  a sensitiveness  on  the 
subject  of  these  our  rights,  so  acute,  as  to  burst  forth  into  a general 
flame  of  excitement  and  indignation,  the  moment  these  rights  are 
touched  by  unhallowed  hands : what  but  this  can  save  us  from  the 
mighty  arm  of  such  a destroyer,  as  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
must  and  will  be,  with  no  other  limitation  to  its  powers  than  its 
will,  and  with  no  restraint  but  its  discretion  ? Will  confidence  in 
our  Northern  friends  give  us  peace  '(  Will  apathy  on  our  part  1 Will 
a tame  and  a quiet  submission  to  usurpation  upon  usurpation,  give 
us  any  claim  upon  Congress  1 Will  it  exempt  us  from  further  tri- 
bute money  ? Or  will  it  lessen  the  perpetual  disposition  which  ex- 
ists to  interfere  with  our  peculiar  policy,  as  evidenced  by  such  con- 
stant expression  of  the  public  sentiment  of  the  North,  in  and  out  of 
their  State  Legislatures  ? No,  my  fellow-citizens,  no!  It  is  the 
apathy  and  indifference  of  our  citizens,  on  the  subject  of  the  en- 
croachments of  Congress  on  the  rights  of  the  States,  which  has  in- 
vited the  aggressions  already  made  upon  our  rights  of  property,  and 
it  is  apathy  on  our  part,  which  will  strengthen  the  unceasing  efforts 
of  the  Northern  folks  to  tax  us  still  more,  and  in  due  course  of  time 
to  extirpate  from  the  body  politic,  what  is  regarded  by  them  as  a 
crying  evil  and  as  a canker.  It  is  apathy  that  will  tempt  them  more 
and  more  to  trample  to  the  dust  the  Federal  Constitution,  and  with 
i,t  the  hopes  and  the  safety  of  the  South.  It  is  our  apathy  hereto- 
fore which  has  fed  and  nourished  the  avarice  and  false  philanthropy 
and  fanatacism  of  the  North.  Apathy,  in  a word,  must  ultimately 
lead  to  events,  that  will  dissolve  the  Union  : but  firmness  and  con- 
stant jealousy  in  the  South  will  preserve  it. 

1 am  not  insensible  that  these  sentiments,  and  this  train  of  feeling, 
may  not  be  approved  by  all.  It  may  well  suit  such  passengers  on 
board,  as  have  no  interest  in  the  cargo,  and  whose  hopes  and  fears 
are  not  identified  with  the  perilous  ship,  to  rely  upon  their  own  ac- 
tivity, and  their  ability  at  any  time  to  seize  upon  the  boats,  and  se- 
cure their  safety.  It  may  suit  such  as  these,  not  to  be  alarmed  at 
the  present  aspect  of  affairs,  and  to  denounce  as  alarmists,  those  who 
would  warn  their  fellow-men  of  their  danger.  But  to  many  of  us, 
whose  property  and  whose  helpless  families  are  all  embarked,  and 
who  have  no  means  of  escape,  and  no  hopes  of  safety,  but  in  the  pru- 
dence and  skill  of  the  pilot,  it  is  natural  that  we  should  contemplate 
and  awfully  watch  the  coming  and  the  howling  of  the  tempest.  It 
is  the  misfortune  of  South-Carolina,  that  there  are  too  many  amongst 
us  already,  who  do  not  feel  on  this  subject,  as  the  crisis  demands  — 
too  many  politicians  who  feel  it  their  policy  and  their  interest,  to 
frown  down  any  thing  in  the  nature  of  sectional  feeling,  as  if  our 
existence  as  a State,  does  not  depend  upon  sectional  feeling  alone, 
and  that  of  the  most  ardent  kind. 

I am  not  one  of  those  desponding  mortals  who  think,  that  the  sys- 
tem of  the  South  must  ultimately,  and  as  a matter  of  course,  give 
way  to  the  daring  attacks  in  preparation  against  them  ; and  I envy 
not  those,  who  by  instilling  in  conversation  such  sentiments  into  the 


15 


common  mind,  would  unnerve  the  public  arm.  I fear  nothing  from 
without — the  enemy  is  amongst  ourselves,  and  let  us  only  discover 
and  remove  from  our  confidence  the  promulgators  of  such  opinions, 
and  I think  I know  enough  of  my  fellow-citizens  to  believe,  that 
when  the  time  shall  come,  to  test  their  devotion  to  their  common 
safety  and  their  dearest  interests,  our  neighbours,  the  people  of  the 
North,  will  discover,  that  we  are  not  like  dependent  West  India  Co- 
lonists, with  no  arm  to  lean  upon,  but  that  of  an  unnatural  parent — 
but,  that  we  are  amply  furnished  with  the  means  of  protecting  our- 
selves, and  of  perpetuating  our  policy  under  any  emergency,  and 
without  needing  any  assistance  from  them. 

NO.  5. 

We  have  seen,  that  the  people  of  the  North  and  the  South  are  in- 
fluenced by  interests  and  feelings  as  opposite  in  their  character  as 
the  two  poles  are  asunder,  and  the  motives  which  would  incline  the 
former  to  support  the  general  government  in  all  its  advances  to 
usurped  power  by  means  of  construction  or  implication,  must  com- 
pel the  latter  as  a matter  of  necessity  and  self-existence,  to  resist  it. 
The  idea  of  resistance  of  any  one  State,  or  number  of  States,  to  the 
acts  and  the  measures  of  the  government,  is  a measure  that  can 
never  be  contemplated  but  with  pain.  It  is  so  contrary  to  the  spirit 
in  which  the  Constitution  was  formed,  and  to  the  expectations  of 
the  patriots  who  founded  our  Republic ; so  repugnant  to  the  feel- 
ings of  every  lover  of  his  country,  and  of  every  friend  to  the  civil 
liberties  of  mankind,  which  seem  to  hang  upon  the  destinies  of 
these  States,  that  there  are  few  of  us,  who  would  not  be  willing  to 
exhaust  to  the  dregs,  the  cup  of  remonstrance  and  conciliation, 
rather  than  put  at  hazard  the  peace  of  the  Union,  if  by  reasonable 
concession  we  could  preserve  it. 

The  union  of  the  States  is  the  prosperity  and  safety  of  the  States. 
It  is  in  Union,  that  our  agriculture  flourishes,  and  our  commerce 
enlivens  and  whitens  every  sea — it  is  by  Union,  that  we  take  our 
high  rank  among  the  nations  of  the  earth.  In  Union  has  our  army, 
in  the  two  Punic  wars,  gathered  its  harvest  of  laurels ! and  in  Union 
has  our  star  spangled  banner  waved  our  fame  into  every  land,  and 
our  brave  tars  wrested  the  trident  from  the  proud  Mistress  of  the 
Seas.  In  Union  is  the  bright,  and  the  glorious  hope  of  perpetuat- 
ing those  principles  which  have  been,  and  will  continue  to  be  a 
light  to  lighten  mankind  to  their  rights  and  to  their  liberties.  But 
Union,  with  all  its  blessings  ; with  the  protection  it  gives  to  agri- 
culture ; with  the  riches  that  it  brings  to  our  commerce  ; with  the 
defence  it  provides  for  our  country ; and  with  the  deeds  that  it  re- 
cords, and  the  achievements  it  emblazons  on  the  proud  tablet  of  our 
history — these,  and  all  these,  cannot  be  dearer  to  us,  than  those 
great  and  fundamental  principles  of  American  liberty,  for  which  our 
fathers  toiled  and  bled.  The  usurpations  and  tyranny  of  Great- 
Britain  were  not  resisted,  that  the  Colonies  might  be  United  ; but 
that  the  Colonies  might  be  free.  A common  danger  inspired  the 
illustrious  Patriots  of  the  Revolution,  with  a common  and  a corres- 


1G 


ponding  feeling,  and  when  before  the  Supreme  Judge  of  the  world 
they  resolved  to  dissolve  the  political  connection  with  he  mother 
country,  they  solemnly  declared,  that  they  were  of  right,  and  ought 
to  be  free  and  independent  States.  The  Confederation  recognized 
each  State  as  “retaining  its  sovereignty,  freedom  and  indepen- 
dence and  in  entering  into  the  present  federal  Union,  great  as 
are  the  powers  delegated  to  the  Federal  Government,  yet  the  sove- 
reignty and  independence  of  the  States  is  stilt  preserved.  I:  has 
been  well  remarked,  that  the  present  Union  “ is  distinguished  front 
the  Confederation,  not  so  much  the  increase  of  powers  conferred  on 
it,  as  by  the  invigoration  of  those  before  possessed.”  With  the  ex- 
ception, indeed,  of  the  new  power  to  regulate  commerce,  there  is  no 
material  new  power  conferred  by  the  people  on  their  rulers. 

The  Confederation,  it  must  be  remembered,  had  been  formed  in  a 
time  of  war,  and  for  a state  of  war  and  danger.  No  fixed  principles 
of  Union  had  been  agreed  on  till  nearly  two  years  after  the  Decla- 
ration of  Independence.  The  defence  of  the  States  against  the 
common  enemy  at  that  time,  was  the  sole  motive  to  the  Union  of 
the  States.  With  the  old  Congress,  the  States  were  therefore  will- 
ing to  entrust  the  sword,  but  the  purse  was  substantially  withheld. 
It  had  no  revenue,  and  it  had  no  power  to  collect  one.  It  had  been 
proposed  that  the  Congress  should  be  invested  with  the  power  to 
lay  an  impost  of  5 per  cent,  on  foreign  merchandize,  and  this  fail- 
ing, it  was  content  to  ask  for  a grant  of  this  power  for  a limited 
period,  and  this  also  failed.  It  was  not  until  the  war  was  ended, 
and  the  great  object  of  the  Confederation  attained,  to-wit,  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  States,  that  its  inadequacy  to  the  proper  govern- 
ment of  the  country  in  a time  of  profound  peace,  became  evident. 
How  could  it  be  otherwise'?  There  was  no  system  of  general  reve- 
nue which  the  Congress  could  succeed  in  putting  into  successful 
operation.  The  public  debt  was  to  be  paid,  but  the  States  could  not 
agree  as  to  the  best  mode  of  apportioning  their  debt.  There  were 
importing  States,  and  there  were  consuming  States.  There  were  jar- 
ring interests,  which  in  various  ways  impeded  the  operations  of  the 
government,  and  the  consequences  were,  the  violation  of  the  public 
faith,  and  the  consequent  depreciation  of  the  public  debt. 

But  among  all  the  causes  which  in  those  days  embarrassed  the 
United  States,  there  were  none  which  brought  upon  the  country 
such  a deluge  of  evils,  as  the  obstructions  which  commerce  receiv- 
ed. To  commerce,  every  State  looked,  as  the  source  of  its  future 
and  its  permanent  prosperity.  But  there  was  no  common  head  to 
regulate  commerce.  Each  State  having  exclusively  the  right  to 
regulate  its  trade,  there  was  of  course  no  uniformity  of  action  as 
regarded  foreign  nations.  When  foreign  governments  laid  heavy 
restrictions  on  our  trade,  there  was  no  general  power  to  counteract 
the  effects  of  these  restrictions,  by  retaliatory  laws,  so  as  to  meet  the 
views  and  interests  of  all  the  States  ; and  when  to  this  was  added 
the  evil  of  the  consuming  States,  being  obliged  to  submit  to  the  ex- 
actions and  heavy  imposts  laid  on  foreign  goods  by  the  importing 
States,  the  distress  became  general.  Hence,  a general  anxiety  and 


17 


desire  for  a government,  which  should  regulate  and  protect  the  ge 
neral  commerce  of  the  country  in  a state  of  peace,  as  well  as  to 
defend  it  in  a time  of  war. 

Thus  arose  the  present  Union  of  the  States.  The  sole  motive  to 
this  Union  was  first  COMMERCE,  and  secondly,  the  COMMON 
DEFENCE.  The  Constitution  of  the  U.  States  never  would  have 
existed  had  it  not  been  that  the  States  sorely  felt  the  evil  ofnot  having 
a head  to  regulate  commerce.  The  old  Confederation  had  been  rapid- 
ly passing  away  by  the  disregard  of  many  of  the  States  to  its  recom- 
mendations. It  was  the  common  and  the  severe  pressure  of  an  ob- 
structed, ill-managed,  foreign  trade  upon  the  States,  which  was 
about  to  involve  the  whole  country  in  accumulated  distress  and 
ruin,  which  formed  the  great  inducement  for  a firmer  and  better 
Union;  and  it  is  not  hazarding  too  much  to  say,  that  had  it  not 
been  for  this  pressure  alone,  the  present  Federal  Government  would 
never  have  been  called  into  existence.  It  was  called  into  existence 
to  regulate  commerce.  This  is  no  speculation — it  is  history.  All 
who  lived  in  those  days  know  it;  and,  let  the  compact  itself  be 
looked  into ; let  it  be  analyzed  with  care ; let  the  proceedings  of 
the  Convention  be  referred  to,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  is  a government  of  specified  or  enumerated 
powers,  expressly  provided  not  for  internal,  but  for  external  objects, 
viz: — the  purposes  of  defence  and  commerce.  Any  construction, 
therefore,  which  would  extend  the  powers  of  the  government  to  the 
encouragement  of  domestic  manufactures,  and  the  construction  of 
national  roads  and  canals,  is  to  extend  its  sovereignty  to  objects 
which  are  not  within  the  proper  sphere  of  its  action,  and  therefore 
illegitimate,  and  all  the  acts  of  the  government  in  the  exercise  of 
these  powers,  is  Usurpation — and  must  be  put  down  by  the  Southern 
States,  if,  as  will  hereafter  be  seen,  it  is  not  their  determination  to 
be  put  down  themselves. 

MTO.  6, 

It  cannot  be  too  strongly  impressed  on  the  minds  of  our  citizens, 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  a Government  instituted 
for  external , and  not  internal  objects.  This  is  the  language  of  the 
Federalist,  which  is  the  best  commentary  on  the  Constitution,  and 
as  such,  its  authority  is  acknowledged  in  our  courts.  “ The  powers 
(says  the  Federalist)  delegated  by  the  Constitution  to  the  General' 
Government,  are  FEW  and  defined.  Those  which  remain  to  the  State 
Governments  are  numerous  and  undefined.  The  former  will  be  exer- 
cised on  external  objects,  as  war,  peace,  negotiation,  and  foreign 
commerce , with  which  last  the  power  of  taxation  will,  for  the  most 
part,  be  connected.  The  powers  reserved  to  the  States,  extend  to 
all  the  objects  which,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  affairs,  concern  the 
lives,  liberties  and  properties  of  the  people,  and  the  INTERNAL 
order,  IMPROVEMENT,  and  prosperity  of  the  State.” 

Thus  we  see,  how  exactly  this  exposition  of  the  Constitution,  coin- 
cides with  the  history  of  the  times,  in  which  it  was  framed,  as  noticed 
in  my  last  number.  The  sole  motive  to  the  present  Union  of  the 


18 


States,  as  I there  stated,  was  defence  and  commerce.  On  llioar,  pedeej 
negotiation,  and  commerce , (says  Mr.  Hamilton,)  the  few  and  the 
defined  powers  of  the  government  are  to  operate.”  But  do  they,  my 
fellow-citizens,  operate  on  these  subjects,  and  these  alone1?  Let  us 
look  at  the  government  as  it  has  been  administered  since  Mr.  Mon- 
roe’s accession  to  the  Presidency,  and  ask  ourselves,  if  Congress  has 
not  been  in  the  exercise  of  some  of  the  most  important  of  the  nume- 
rous and  undefined  powers,  which,  according  to  this  commentary,  are 
reserved  to  the  States  ? Has  it  not  extended  its  power  to  the  “ in- 
ternal order , improvement , and  prosperity  of  the  States  ? What  are  its 
roads  and  canals,  but  measures  of  internal  improvement  and  pros- 
perity of  particular  States  ? Are  they  called  at  Washington  by  any 
other  names  than  “ measures  of  internal  improvement  ?”  What  are 
its  tariffs  ? Are  they  measures  of  general  iuterest  to  all  the  States  ; 
or  are  they  schemes  for  employing  capital  to  revive  the  languishing 
industry  of  particular  States,  and  thus  promoting  the  “ internal  pros- 
perity of  those  States?  And  what  will  be  the  appropriations  out  of 
the  National  Treasury  for  the  Colonization  Society,  when  they  shall 
be  made,  of  which  there  can  be  no  doubt  ? Will  these  appropri- 
ations be  referred  to  the  objects  of  “ war,  peace,  negotiation,  and 
commerce  ?”  Or  do  they  naturally  belong  to  the  objects  \yhich  con- 
cern the  “ internal  order ” and  government  of  the  black  population  of 
the  United  States,  and  the  LIVES,  liberties  and  properties”  of  the 
WHITE  people  of  the  Southern  States  ? 

To  all  such  questions  there  is  an  easy  answer.  The  above  pic- 
ture given  us  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  as  it  was  in 
1787,  when  it  was  presented  to,  and  accepted  by  the  States,  is  pre- 
cisely the  reverse  of  that,  which  is  now  held  up  to  us  as  the  rule  and 
guide  for  our  conduct.  It  is  for  Congress  that  are  now  reserved, 
those  “ numerous  and  undefined  powers  which  concern  the  lives,  lib- 
erties, properties,  and  internal  order,  improvement,  and  prosperity 
of  the  States and  to  the  sovereign  individual  States,  belong  the 
few  and  the  defined  powers  of  legislating  on  all  subjects  of  ordinary 
interest,  as  long  as  such  legislation  shall  not  clash  or  interfere  with 
any  act  or  measure  which  Congress  shall,  at  its  discretion,  deem  as 
a means  most  immediately,  or  most  remotely,  connected  with  the 
regulation  of  commerce,  or  the  promotion  of  the  general  welfare  of 
the  United  States. 

And  is  this  state  of  things  to  continue  ? Are  the  great  and  vital 
interests  of  sovereign  States  to  be  in  danger  of  being  swept  from 
their  foundations  by  the  furious  tempests  of  construction  and  impli- 
cation, without  one  single  effort  to  save  them  ? Let  us  hope  not? — 
Let  us  believe  that  when  our  citizens  shall  see  the  subject  in  its  true 
light,  and  shall  test  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution,  by  the  plain 
rules  of  common  sense,  and  call  to  their  aid  all  the  circumstances 
which  are  connected  with  the  rise,  progress  and  perfection  of  the 
Federal  Constitution,  they  will  see  at  a glance,  that  the  government 
of  the  Union,  is  a government  for  defence  and  commerce,  and  that  it 
has  no  power  to  promote  this  or  that  particular  interest,  or  regulate 
this  or  that  branch  of  domestic  industry,  or  to  legislate  on  any  sub- 


19 


ject  whatever,  in  which  every  State  has  not  an  immediate  and  a direct  in- 
terest It  is  a government  instituted  expressly  to  do  that,  to  which  each 
State  is  separately  incompetent,  to  w’it,  the  regulation  of  trade  with  foreign 
nations  and  between  themselves,  for  their  mutual  benefit,  and  to  the  de- 
fence of  all  the  States  against  a common  enemy.  This  being  the  legitimate 
end  of  the  government,  any  act  passed  by  Congress,  which  is  not  naturally 
connected  with  the  defence  of  the  country,  or  the  regulation  of  its  trade, 
beneficially  for  every  part  of  the  Union,  is  (with  one  or  two  trifling  excep- 
tions, provided  for  by  the  Constitution)  an  usurped  power.  But  Congress 
is  not  at  liberty,  arbitrarily  to  assume,  as  a pretext  for  exercising  any  par- 
ticular power,  that  it  is  a means  adapted  to  the  proposed  end  of  the  govern- 
ment. If  the  connection  between  the  means  and  the  end,  be  not  a real  and 
a natural  connection,  it  is  still  an  usurpation  It  is  conceded  on  all  hands, 
in  and  out  of  Congress,  that  the  Federal  Government  is  a government  of 
limited  powers,  and  that  “ every  sovereign  power  not  delegated,  is  retained 
by  the  States  or  the  people.”  It  results  then,  that  before  Congress  can  ex- 
ercise any  great  substantive  powers,  it  must  place  its  finger  upon  that 
clause  of  the  act  of  enumerated  powers,  which  clearly  confers  the  grant  of 
power  contended  for,  or  it  must  shew,  that  the  particular  power  claimed  as 
incidental,  is  a mean  so  necessarily  and  so  properly  adapted  to  the  end,  for 
which  the  sovereign  power  was  given,  that  without  its  exercise,  the  grant 
itself  would  be  nugatory  and  void.  If  it  cannot  do  the  one,  or  the  other, 
it  usurps  the  power 

1 am  sensible  that  this  is  not  the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Couit  of  the 
United  States.  But  I hope,  in  its  proper  place,  to  support  this  opinion, 
and  to  shew  that  it  is  the  doctrine  of  plain  sense ; and  moreover,  that  this 
was  the  sense  of  those  who  framed  the  Constitution,  and  of  those  who  ac- 
cepted it  from  the  hands  of  the  Convention.  If  I can  satisfy  my  fellow- 
citizens,  as  to  the  true  and  unequivocal  intent  of  that  instrument  in  1787, 
my  purpose  will  be  answered,  for  the  meaning  of  the  people  of  these 
States,  as  collected  from  the  proceedings  of  the  Convention,  must,  and 
will  prevail,  over  tlte  sophistry  and  ingenuity  of  the  Bar,  or  the  metaphy- 
sical learning  of  the  Bench,  and  particularly  when  vital  interests  are  at 
stake. 

Where  can  Congress  look  for  the  power  to  construct  national  roads  and 
canals,  and  to  impose  upon  the  Agriculturists  of  the  South  perpetual  tri- 
bute and  extortion.  If  we  look  to  the  enumeration  of  power,  as  set  forth 
in  the  Constitution,  we  look  in  vain  for  powers  of  such  magnitude.  The 
power  to  tax  indefinitely  being  first  given,  there  is  not  one  of  the  seven- 
teen enumerated  powers,  with  the  exception  of  that  which  gives  Congress 
jurisdiction  over  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  that  of  the  power  to  give 
patents  and  copy  rights,  which  does  not  relate  either  to  commerce  or  de- 
fence; thus  confirming  my  position,  that  it  is  a government  for  External 
objects  alone.  Looking  at  this  list  of  specified  powers,  it  is  preposterous 
to  say,  that  in  any  other  wants,  than  the  necessity  of  a Federal  head  to  re- 
gulate our  commerce,  and  a Federal  arm  to  defend  us  in  time  of  war,  did 
the  present  government  originate.  It  is  absurd  to  say,  that  the  people 
ever  did  want,  or  ever  can  want  a general  government  for  any  other  pur- 
poses. These  are  the  only  wants  common  to  all  the  people  of  the  United 
States : In  Commerce,  we  are  all  equally  interested,  and  we  all  stand  in 
need  of  defence.  But  on  every  other  subject,  be  that  subject  what  it  may. 


20 


the  wants,  the  feelings,  and  the  interests  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
are  substantially  opposite  and  dissimilar,  and  to  the  end  of  time,  in  all  pro- 
bability, they  will  remain  so.  To  have  entrusted  Congress,  therefore, 
with  a power  to  legislate  at  its  discretion,  upon  any  subject,  which  it  might 
conceive  would  promote  the  general  welfare,  excepting  in  the  nodes  spe- 
cified, would  have  been  to  confer  on  it  a most  tremendous  power  of  legis- 
lation— such  a legislation  as  never  could  be  a safe  or  a just  one  in  their 
hands.  The  Sages  who  penned  the  Constitution,  were  aware  of  this. 
They  no  doubt  contemplated,  that  the  legislation  which  might  promote  the 
interests  of  one  section  of  the  country,  might  operate  to  the  injury  of  other 
States.  They  probably  were  aware,  that  the  time  would  come,  when  the 
surplus  capital  of  the  Northern  and  Middle  States  might  be  profitably  em- 
ployed in  Manufactures,  and  that  if  there  was  not  a limitation  to  the  power 
of  Congress,  the  people  of  those  States,  who  would,  in  time,  constitute  a 
great  majority,  would  promote  their  local  interests  at  the  expense  and  the 
ruin  of  the  Southern  States,  the  people  of  which  had  no  interest  but  that 
of  Agriculture  and  Commerce.  To  guard  therefore  against  any  species 
of  legislation,  in  which  all  the  people  had  not  an  undivided  interest,  was 
their  care  ; and  it  is  impossible  to  look  at  their  work,  (the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,)  without  being  struck  with  the  circumspection,  with 
which  power  is  dispensed  from  the  States,  and  from  the  people,  to  their 
rulers,  and  without  perceiving  with  what  a free  and  liberal  spirit,  they  dis- 
pense every  power  necessary  to  defence  and  commerce,  and  withholding, 
at  the  same  time,  every  thing  else.  And  yet  this  government,  whose  lim- 
its of  power  are  so  plainly  marked,  and  so  precisely  defined,  that  he  who 
runs  may  read  them,  is  now  in  the  exercise  of  some  of  the  greatest  powers 
that  belong  to  a Sovereign  unrestricted  in  his  views,  and  unlimited  in  his 
will. 

What  power,  I ask,  can  be  more  substantive , primary,  or  paramount, 
than  the  power  to  construct  national  roads  and  canals.  If  to  cut  up  the 
country  in  every  direction,  by  works  of  this  nature,  is  not  to  claim  sove- 
reign dominion  in  the  States,  I know  not  what  is  meant  by  dominion.  Can 
a power  which  involves  jurisdiction  over  the  territory  and  soil  of  our  citi- 
zens, be  claimed  as  incidental  to,  or  as  derivative  from  enumerated  pow- 
ers, none  of  which  are  greater  than  the  power  in  question  ? What  power 
again,  indicates  more  complete  sovereignty,  than  that,  by  which,  at  the 
will  of  the  Sovereign,  the  paramount  interests  of  one  part  of  an  Empire, 
can  be  prostrated,  in  order  that  extensive  immunities  and  monopolies 
should  be  conferred  on  particular  classes?  Can  it  be  possible,  that  the 
same  body  of  men,  who  seriously  and  soberly  thought,  that  a specific  grant 
of  power  was  necessary  to  enable  Congress  to  exercise  jurisdiction  over 
its  forts,  magazines  and  dock  yards,  could  intend  to  give  them  the  unlimit- 
ed jurisdiction  which  the  opening  of  roads  and  digging  canals  naturally 
confers  on  those  who  have  the  power  to  construct  them  ? Can  it  be  true, 
that  the  same  body  of  men,  who  believed,  that  Congress  could  not  “ pro- 
mote the  progress  of  science  and  the  useful  arts”  by  a patent  or  a copy 
right,  unless  there  was  an  express  grant  for  that  purpose  ever  contemplat- 
ed, that  they  should  promote  the  progress  of  manufactures,  which  rank 
foremost  amongst  the  “ useful  arts  ?”  Did  these  men  ever  dream  of  Con- 
gress having  its  committees  on  the  useful  arts,  its  committees  on  agricul- 
ture, and  on  manufactures,  or  that  it  would  contemplate  a colony  on  the 


21 


roast  of  Africa  ? No,  my  fellow-citizens  : No  mote  did  they  contemplate 
it,  than  that  Congress  should  establish  a national  university,  or  a national 
observatory,  or  have  its  academy  of  fine  arts,  or  its  gallery  of  paintings,  or 
its  own  national  museum.  These  subjects  were  before  the  convention, 
but  so  far  from  the  power  being  given,  it  was  refused.  All  the  late  mea- 
sures of  Congress,  therefore,  whether  in  the  shape  of  appropriations  for 
roads  and  canals,  or  in  the  still  more  odious  shape  of  tariffs,  are  neither 
more  nor  less  than  so  many  schemes  devised  by  the  people  of  the  North 
for  improving,  enriching,  and  aggrandizing  their  own  states  out  of  the  ge- 
neral treasury,  or  for  giving  employment  to  their  own  people  at  our  cost 
and  charges  They  are  the  devices  resorted  to  by  the  majority,  to  live  by 
the  labour  and  industry  of  the  minority.  They  are  the  acts  of  those,  whose 
interest  it  is  to  extend  the  government  beyond  the  limits  for  which  it  was 
created,  regardless  of  all  consequences  to  their  Southern  brethren.  A gov- 
ernment which,  in  the  days  of  its  purity,  never  has  been  as  protecting  and 
as  paternal  to  us  in  the  South,  as  we  had  a right  to  expect,  considering  the 
contributions  it  levied  upon  us,  but  which,  in  these  later  times  assumes  an 
undisguised  hostility  to  our  dearest  interests.  The  General  Govern- 
ment imparts  to  us  none  of  that  genial  warmth,  which  brings  into  life 
and  vigour,  the  industry  and  enterprise  of  the  merchants  and  agricultu- 
rists of  a country  ; but  it  is  about  to  dry  up,  by  the  scorching  fires  of  con- 
struction, all  those  sources  of  our  prosperity,  which,  under  any  other  sys- 
tem, would  make  us  a flourishing,  a great,  and  a happy  State.  Our  trade 
is  diminished,  real  property  is  depreciated  ; our  mechanics  are  without  em- 
ployment— many  of  them  emigrate  to  the  North.  Confidence  is  lost,  and 
despondency  and  gloom  universally  prevail.  With  resources  that  few 
countries  can  boast  of,  we  are,  nevertheless,  becoming  to  the  North,  what 
Ireland  is  to  England.  Capital  is  removed  from  us;  our  incomes  are 
spent  abroad,  and  our  great  export  trade  in  cotton  and  rice,  the  only  hope 
of  our  planters,  the  bread  that  is  to  sustain  us  all,  even  this  trade,  so  im- 
portant to  us,  to  protect  which  was  the  very  end  of  the  Union,  is  now 
first  to  be  interrupted,  and  next  to  be  annihilated,  that  the  Websters  and 
the  Everetts,  the  Tythe  men,  the  worse  than  Tythe  men,  the  Tariff  men 
of  the  North,  may  riot  and  fatten  upon  our  substance.  What  is  the  cause 
of  all  this?  It  is  consolidation — it  is  usurpation.  The  enemies  of  the 
confederacy  and  of  the  republic,  are  in  the  chair  of  state.  They  are  in 
the  chambers  of  the  senate  and  of  the  representatives,  and  will  continue 
there.  They  possess  the  entire  capitol. 

MO.  7. 

The  subject  of  the  constructive  powers  of  Congress,  is  one  of  intense; 
and  increasing  interest  to  the  people  of  the  Southern  States.  It  compre- 
hends, in  its  consequences,  not  merely  the  welfare  of  all,  but  the  safety  and 
existence  of  many  of  the  States.  To  South-Carolina,  and  to  the  othei* 
great  cotton  growing  States,  it  is  peculiarly  interesting,  and  speaks  its  own 
importance.  If  it  has  not  hitherto  occupied  our  serious  attention,  it  is  full 
time,  that  every  citizen  should  bestow  on  it,  that  share  of  his  thoughts  to 
which  it  is  so  justly  entitled.  Our  planters  especially,  may  be  assured^ 
that  they  cannot  be  better  or  more  profitably  employed,  than  in  contem- 
plating the  measures  of  the  General  Government,  in  all  their  bearings  and 
tendencies,  to  the  interests  of  Southern  agriculture,  and  to  seek  for  all  the 

3 


lights,  which  can  conduct  them  to  a proper  estimate  of  the  effects  of  these 
measuies  upon  the  entire  policy  of  the  State.  Fortunately,  the  subject  is 
not  without  its  lights.  It  has  been  discussed  with  ability,  in  and  out  of  the 
halls  of  Congress,  and  I do  not  know  that  1 can  refer  my  readers  to  a bet- 
ter defence  of  th<j  rights  of  the  States,  than  to  the  celebrated  report  of  Mr. 
Madison,  to  the  Virginia  Legislature,  in  1799,  and  to  that  of  Mr  Gii.es, 
to  the  same  body,  in  1 827-  If  the  reasonings  contained  in  these  reports, 
be  not  sufficient  to  satisfy  them,  that  < ongress  is  in  the  exercise  of  usurped 
powers  of  a most  dangerous  character  to  us,  I can  have  but  little  hope,  that 
the  views  which,  I may,  from  time  to  time,  add  to  what  are  there  so  lumi- 
nously given,  can  effect  any  change  or  conviction  in  their  minds. 

By  the  debates  in  Congress  at  different  periods,  and  other  discussions 
elsewhere,  it  would  seem  that  the  advocates  of  tariffs  and  internal  improve- 
ments, have  not  been  generally  agreed,  ns  to  what  clause  or  part  of  the 
constitution  it  is,  that  they  derive  the  authority  of  Congress  to  adopt  these 
measures.  Whilst  some  few  would  contend,  that  under  the  first  enume- 
rated power,  to  “raise  taxes,  to  provide  for  the  common  defence,  and  the 
general  welfare,”  &c.  an  authority  is  given  to  provide  for  the  general  wel- 
fare, as  well  as  to  raise  taxes,  and  that  Congress  can  accordingly,  adopt 
any  measure  of  genera!  interest,  to  which  there  is  no  express  prohibition  in 
the  Constitution  ; by  far  the  greater  portion  of  persons  more  cautiously 
maintain,  that  it  can  only  provide  for  the  general  welfare,  under  this  clause, 
as  far  as  an  application  of  money  can  promote  such  an  object,  and  no  far- 
ther. A third,  and  a numerous  class  of  persons  again  contend,  that  it  is 
under  the  power  “to  regulate  commerce  with  foreign  nations  and  between 
the  States,”  that  Congress  can  construct  roads,  and  make  canals  for  facili- 
tating commerce,  and  can  encourage  domestic  manufactures  by  protecting 
and  prohibitory  duties. 

The  first  of  these  opinions  is  so  absurd,  as  scarcely  to  need  a refutation.. 
The  second  was  asserted  by  Alexander  Hamilton,  in  his  celebrated  re- 
port on  manufactures,  in  1791.  The  same  doctrine  was  advanced  by  many 
Southern  members  in  Congress  in  1824,  and  even  by  some  of  our  own 
statesmen,  but  they  have  lived,  I hope,  to  see  the  error  of  opinions  most 
honestly  formed  at  the  time,  and  without  the  most  distant  expectation  that 
they  would  be  productive  of  the  abuses  which  have  followed  their  pro- 
mulgation. 

The  third  or  last  opinion,  was,  at  thp  same  time,  urged  by  Mr.  Clay, 
and  also  by  JVlr  M’Lane  ; who.  as  far  as  the  power  to  make  canals  was 
claimed,  agreed  with  Mr.  Clay  on  this  ground. 

But  we  cannot  turn  to  the  masterly  productions  of  Madison  and  Giles, 
without  being  forcibly  struck  with  the  facility  with  which  men,  wielding  the 
weapons  of  constitutional  rights  and  state  sovereignty,  can  put  down  their 
antagonists,  who  can  scarcely  agree  amongst  themselves,  as  to  the  parti- 
cular clause  in  the  Constitution,  which  gives  a power,  which,  in  its  ope- 
rations, is  about  to  destroy  the  Southern  States. 

It  is  in  the  celebrated  report  of  1799  that  the  Committee  demonstrate, 
that  any  other  construction  would  be  to  convert  the  States  into  a consoli- 
dated government,  the  inevitable  tendency  of  which  consolidation,  would 
be  to  transform  the  republican  system  of  the  United  States,  into  a monar- 
chy. And,  it  is  true.  Who  can  doubt  for  a moment,  that  when  the  Gene- 
ral Government  shall  go  on,  step  by  step,  in  its  exercise  of  that  greatest  o! 


23 


ail  powers — the  power  to  raise  money  for  any,  and  every  purpose, which  it 
sh  ill  pronounce  to  be  for  the  common  defence  or  the  general  welfare  it  will 
not  extend  the  sphere  of  its  legislation,  to  almost  eveiy  object  of  civil  gov- 
ernment— to  all  the  numerous  and  undefined  objects,  in  fact,  which  were 
reserved  for  the  States  to  act  upon — thus  making  the  individual  States,  as 
petty  corporations,  and  conservators  of  the  peace  in  their  respective  com- 
munities, and  repairers  of  parish  roads  and  bridges?  Who  can  say,  that 
with  the  patronage  such  a government  must  constantly  acquire,  by  its  ca- 
pacity. hereafter,  to  give  an  hundred  offices  where  it  now  gives  one — with 
its  army  and  its  navy  officers  and  contractors — with  its  custom  houses  and 
their  collectors,  clerks,  and  dependents — their  tax  collectors — their  excise- 
men— their  judges  and  clerks,  and  marshals — their  commissioners  of  bank- 
ruptcy— their  contemplated  colony  on  the  coast  of  Africa, with  their  colonial 
governors,  judges,  and  retinue  of  servants  and  dependents — their  brigade  of 
civil  and  military  engineers  and  surveyors — their  post  offices,  and  their 
thousands  of  contractors — their  land  offices — their  seminaries  of  literature — 
their  national  institutes,  and  their  universities — their  academies  of  the  arts, 
and  their  galleries  of  paintings — their  national  museum, and  Mr.  Adams’  light 
houses  in  the  skies,  their  national  observatories — their  military  and  naval 
schools — their  hundreds  of  professors — their  astronomers  royal,  and  their 
expeditions  to  the  poles — their  missions  to  Panama — their  public  institu- 
tions, rewaids  and  immunities  for  manufactures — their  pecuniary  bounties 
— their  premiums — their  splendid  honors,  and  allurements  held  out  as 
bribes  to  the  first  talents  of  the  counti  y — and  last  though  not  least,  their  com- 
mand of  the  American  Press,  that  shall  cry  out  sedition  and  treason,  and 
disunion,  and  come  down  as  with  a giant’s  blow  upon  the  patriot,  that 
shall  dare  to  maintain  the  cause  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  States,  of  the  re- 
public, and  of  the  world.  Who  can  say,  that  with  these,  and  a thousand 
such  means  of  pattonage,  that  the  Government  shall  not  attain  a moral 
power,  aye,  anil  that  soon,  and  put  out  such  roots  as  to  enable  it  to  with- 
stand all  efforts  to  keep  it  within  its  bounds.  This  is  no  exaggerated  pic- 
ture. The  limits  prescribed  to  the  legislation  of  Congress  are  passed.  A 
boundless  field  lies  open  before  it.  The  government  feels  itself  without  re- 
straint or  limitation.  It  has  dared,  even  in  our  day,  to  talk  of  putting  down 
a State,  by  the  bayonets  of  its  soldiers. 

But  we  are  told  by  the  Tariff  men,  that  under  every  Administration, 
Congress  has  acted  upon  that  construction  of  the  Constitution,  which  is  the 
basis  of  those  measures,  that  now  divide  public  opinion  in  these  States.  We 
will  examine  this — 

The  first  exercise  of  any  important  power  by  implication,  was  in  the 
case  of  the  Bank  in  1.7*91,  as  I have  already  stated  in  a former  number.  But 
this  power  was  not  pretended  to  be  derived  from  that  clause  in  the  Consti- 
tution, which  enables  Congress  to  appropriate  money  for  the  general  welfare. 
It  was  claimed  merely  as  incidental  to  some  enumerated  powers,  and  par- 
ticularly as  a means  of  collecting  and  distributing  the  revenue,  and  borrow- 
ing money  for  the  purposes  of  war  and  defence:  and  the  opponents  of  the 
Bill  resisted  it,  on  the  ground,  that  though  a convenient,  it  was  not  a neces- 
sary means,  and  therefore,  not  within  the  letter  or  spirit  of  the  Constitu- 
lion.  The  whole  ground  of  dispute  was  as  to  incidental  powers.  It  was 
Alexander  Hamilton,  as  I have  already  stated,  who  first  advanced  the 
doctrine,  that  as  far  as  an  appropriation  of  money  could  promote  it,  Con- 


24 


gress  could  provide  for  the  general  welfare,  in  any  way  it  pleased.  Upon 
the  belief  that  Congress  possessed  the  power  to  encourage  Manufactures, 
did  he  recommend,  what  our  Tariff  men  now  advocate,  to  wit — protecting 
and  prohibitory  duties  This  was  in  1791-  His  report,  however,  was 
never  acted  upon  in  any  way  by  Congress.  Certainly  no  vote  was  taken, 
and  no  opinion  ever  was  expressed  on  the  subject  of  this  report;  and  it 
does  seem  strange,  that  though  the  Federal  Administration  continued  until 
1800,  not  a word  was  ever  more  said  by  Mr  Hamilton,  or  his  fiiends. — 
His  report,  and  his  manufacturing  doctrines  and  opinions  went  to  sleep, 
and  remained  asleep,  until  they  were  roused  from  their  slumbers  by  the 
Tariff  men,  during  Mr.  Monroe’s  Administration.  As  I have  already 
stated  in  a previous  number,  there  were  some  other  occasional  abuses  of 
power  under  previous  Administrations,  but  they  are  not  worth  noticing. — - 
They  probably  passed  sub  silentio  : — As  no  vital  interest  of  the  States  was 
effected,  there  ptobably  was  little  or  no  opposition  to  them. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  with  the  exceptions  mentioned,  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  did  not,  within  the  first  thirty  years  of  its  existence,  make 
any  inroads  on  the  Constitution,  and  certainly  during  the  same  period,  no 
such  advances  to  usurpation,  as  seriously  to  affect  the  paramount  inte- 
rests of  particular  States.  It  was  reserved  for  Mr.  Monroe  to  commence 
that  system  of  policy,  which  the  present  Administration  is  now  pressing 
upon  the  Southern  States;  and  which,  if  perseveied  in,  will  convulse  this 
Union  to  its  very  centre.  It  was  during  Mr.  Monroe’s  Administration, 
that  a bold,  a decided,  and  a systematic  plan  of  constructive  and  usurped 
powers,  was  determined  on  by  Congress. 

It  was  then,  that  we  went  back  to  the  ultra  principles  of  Alexander 
Hamilton,  which  had  slept  in  their  graves  for  a third  of  a century,  and 
proclaimed  such  a devastating  and  such  an  overwhelming  doctrine,  as  that 
of  “ the  general  welfare .”  Did  the  Southern  advocates  of  this  system  re- 
flect, that  their  doctrines  would  serve  as  a foundation,  on  which  Congress 
would  build,  in  after  periods,  scheme  upon  scheme,  for  enlarging  its  legis- 
lation, increasing  its  occupation,  and  for  converting  sovereign  States  into 
petty  municipalities  ? Did  tliey  reflect,  that  in  less  than  five  years  from 
the  time  that  we  were  furnished  with  this  exposition  of  the  general  phrases 
in  the  Constitution,  that  even  the  American  Colonization  Society,  a disor- 
ganizing body  in  the  midst  of  the  States,  “ a nucleus  around  which,  are  daily 
forming  all  the  worst  elements  of  discord” — did  they  reflect,  that  this  Society 
too,  would  demand  the  aid  of  the  National  Treasury,  to  enable  it  the  better 
to  disturb  the  peace  of  the  Southern  States?  And  yet  such  are  amongst 
the  beginnings,  from  this  sweeping  doctrine  of  the  general  welfare.  This 
Abolition  Society  has  already  petitioned  Congress,  and  is  to  petition  again 
to  be  supported  from  the  Treasury,  and  their  President,  Judge  Washing- 
ton, of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  is  busy  with  his  printed 
circulars,  calling  upon  the  people  of  the  States,  to  send  memorials  to  Con- 
gress, to  promote  what  he  terms,  a “ national  interest.”  And  is  it  to  come 
to  this?  Was  it  for  purposes  like  these,  that  South-Carolina  entered  into 
the  Union,  and  gave  up  such  an  active  portion  of  her  sovereignty  ? Must 
her  Representatives  stand  by,  apd  see  Committees  from  Abolition  and 
Negro  Societies,  crowding  the  lobbies  of  the  House,  soliciting,  and  provok- 
ing the  discussion  of  subjects,  which,  to  us,  in  these  States,  will  be  produc- 
tive of  evils,  which  language  is  inadequate  to  describe  ? It  woplcf  be  bet- 


25 


ter,  my  fellow-citizens,  that  a foreign  army  should  invade  your  territory, 
and  take  you  unprepared,  than  that  you  should  permit  the  Congress  of  the 
U States,  to  touch  or  disturb  this  subj  ict,  without  regarding  them  at  once,  as 
“ Enemies  in  War,  and  ENEMIES  IN  PEACE.” 


KT®.  B. 

I now  propose  to  give  some  popular  views,  on  the  question  of  the  con- 
structive powers  of  Congress,  which,  in  my  humble  judgment,  are  not 
without  weight.  I am  aware,  that  they  are  opposed  to  the  opinions  of 
men  of  no  ordinary  minds,  and  that  they  are  even  repugnant  to  the  doc- 
trines of  the  highest  tribunal  in  our  land — the  Supreme  Courtof  the  United 
Stares.  This  ciicumstance,  however,  does  not  discourage  me.  I reve- 
rence as  much  as  any  man,  the  decisions  in  general  of  this  Court,  and  as 
far  as  these  decisions  determine  questions  of  ordinary  interest  between  one 
State  and  another,  or  between  a State  and  the  United  States,  I yield  to 
them  my  perfect  homage.  The  Supreme  Court  may  give  to  Congress  the 
power  to  have  a National  Bank  It  may  decide  that  the  insolvent  laws  of 
this  or  that  State,  interfere  with  the  general  power  of  Congress  on  tiie  sub- 
ject of  Bankruptcies;  or  it  mav  deny  to  a State,  the  power  of  g ving  to  its 
own  citizens,  the  exclusive  right  to  the  navigation  of  its  own  rivers  by  Steam 
Boats  Were  I to  differ  with  such  a Court,  on  these  and  other  subjects, 
yet  as  a good  and  virtuous  citizen,  I would  be  governed  by  their  opinions. 
By  so  doing,  I yield  none  of  my  privileges  as  a freeman.  No  vital  princi- 
ple of  individual  liberty  is  involved  in  the  decision — no  right  of  State  sove- 
reignty taken  away,  and  no  important  State  interests  impaired  or  destroy- 
ed. But  far  different  will  be  my  feelings,  when  the  question  becomes  one 
of  disputed  sovereignty;  and  the  contest  involves  the  great  interests,  and 
the  existence  of  States.  I should  then  feel  myself  at  liberty,  to  canvass 
the  opinions  of  these  Judges,  as  freely,  as  if  they  had  been  delivered  else- 
where, and  by  other  men.  I have  the  less  reluctance  too,  when  I consider, 
that  it  is  natural,  that  on  questions  of  disputed  powers  of  sovereignty,  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  an  individual  State,  the  Federal  Judges  should 
lean  towards,  and  support  the  authority  of  the  General  Government.  It  is 
the  General  Government  that  appoints  and  maintains  them,  and  to  that  Go- 
vernment they  must  look  for  their  promotion  and  their  honors.  To  expect 
that  such  a tribunal  will  not  extend  the  powers  of  the  Government,  where 
they  can  do  it,  without  a flagrant  violation  of  some  express  provision  in 
the  Constitution  to  the  contrary,  is  to  betray  an  ignorance  of  human  nature, 
and  of  what  has  been  passing  in  our  own  country  for  the  last  ten  years. 
To  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  it  is,  that  we  ate  to  look,  as 
the  source,  whence  the  extensive  implied  powers  of  the  Government  have 
flowed,  and  will  continue  to  flow.  It  is  the  Chief  Justice  of  that  Court, 
who  is  the  Master  Architect  of  the  extended  Government  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  he  who  has  already  built  up,  and  is  constantly  building  up,  a 
superb  national  Government  over  the  heads  of  our  citizens.  In  the  memo- 
rable words  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  “the  JUDICIARY  BRANCH  is  the 
instrument,  which,  working  like  gravity,  without  intermission,  is  to  press 
us  at  last,  into  one  CONSOLIDATED  mass.”  This  was  not  an  opinion 
pronounced  in  a period  of  embittered  political  feelings,  but  they  are  the 
sentiments  of  the  Sage  of  Monticello,  pronounced  in  his  retirement  from 


busy  life,  and  when  every  thing  that  came  from  him,  might  be  considered 
“ in  its  nature,  as  testamentary .” 

The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of  the  Bank,  would  have 
been  unimportant  to  us,  were  it  not.  that  the  principles  upon  which  that 
decision  is  founded,  must  encourage  the  government  to  believe,  that  it  can 
do  any  act  it  pleases,  which  it  is  not  expressly  forbidden  by  the  Constitu- 
tion to  do.  The  field  of  constructive  power  opened  to  Congress,  is  no 
longer  susceptible  of  definition.  The  talent  too,  the  incomparable  talent, 
displayed  in  this  decision,  a decision,  which  1 acknowledge  for  strength 
and  acuteness  of  intellect,  and  force  of  argument,  will  for  ever  remain  a 
master  piece  of  judicial  composition;  the  talent  i repeat  here  displayed,  is 
calculated  to  force  from  us,  at  first,  the  confession,  that  Congress  could 
establish  a corporation.  But  the  decision,  l maintain,  is  not  in  consonance 
with  the  views  of  those  men  who  framed  the  Constitution.  Sound  a*  is 
the  reasoning  of  the  Chief  Justice,  in  the  abstract,  it  is  nevertheless  clear, 
and  there  are  abundant  evidences  from  which  we  can  be  assured,  that  no 
such  construction  could  nave  been  anticipated  when  the  Constitution  was 
formed  If  I can  shew  this,  my  purpose  will  be  answered. 

When  States  differ  as  to  the  true  intent  of  a league  ©r  compact,  involv- 
ing a deep  question  of  important  sovereignty,  they  are  not  to  seek  for  the 
aid  of  black  letter  lawyers,  who  merely  look  at  the  instrument  as 
they  would  at  a deed,  but  they  must  go  into  all  the  motives  to  the  com- 
pact, and  collect  from  the  particulars  of  the  negociation,  what  the  objects 
and  views  of  the  contracting  parties  were.  It  is  from  the  history  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  Convention  which  formed  the  Constitution,  that  we  are 
to  expound  the  meaning  of  particular  clauses.  Fortunately  for  us,  such 
sources  of  safe  interpretation  are  within  our  reach.  These,  and  these 
alone,  are  to  be  resorted  to.  Should  the  parties,  with  all  these  advanta- 
ges, still  unfortunately  differ,  I know  of  no  tribunal  that  can  decide  between 
them.  When  the  States  agreed  to  that  article  in  the  Constitution,  which 
provides  that  the  Supreme  Court  should  take  cognizance  “ of  all  contro- 
versies to  which  the  United  States  is  a party,”  it  cannot  be  conceived, 
that  more  was  intended,  than  to  provide  a tribunal  to  decide  cases  of  ordi- 
nary interest,  or  cases  of  disputed  territory,  which  all  the  parties  might  be 
disposed  to  leave  to  such  a Court.  It  cannot  be  believed,  that  any  State 
would  submit  a question  of  vital  sovereignty  or  interest,  to  any  arbiter  on 
-earth.  No  sovereign  has  a right  so  to  do,  without  violating  his  obligations 
and  his  duties,  to  his  own  subjects.  Inherent  rights  upon  which  the  safety 
and  existence  of  the  people  depend,  are  not  to  be  put  at  hazard  in  this 
way.  They  must  be  adhered  to  under  all  circumstances. 

If  any  other  doctrine  than  this  were  admitted  in  South-Carolina,  what 
might  not  be  the  consequences.  Congress,  some  fifteen  or  twenty  years 
hence,  may,  for  aught  we  know,  think  proper  to  decide  that  the  gradual 
emancipation  of  the  slaves  in  the  United  States  ought  to  take  place,  as  es- 
sential to  “ the  general  welfare”  and  the  public  safety,  and  they  may 
begin  to  pass  laws  on  the  subject.  Is  there  any  son  of  the  South,  who 
would  be  willing  to  submit  to  any  judges,  much  less  the  judges  of  the 
United  States,  whether  such  a law  was  constitutional  or  not,  and  to  stand 
pledged  to  abide  by  their  judgment  ? It  would  be  madness.  The  deci- 
sion of  a bench  of  judges  might  be  by  the  casting  vote  of  a single  judge. 
What!  a single  judge  to  decide,  whether  the  fundamental  policy  of  our 


27 


State,  immemorially  established,  shall  be  altered  or  subverted  ? Shall  the 
voice  of  one  man — poor,  imperfect,  mortal  man,  decide  the  momentous 
question,  whether  we,  the  people  of  South-Carolina,  shall  remain  undis- 
turbed in  our  domestic  quiet,  according  to  the  usages  of  our  fathers,  or  be 
harassed  to  the  end^of  time,  by  the  interferences  of  the  National  Legisla- 
ture— a Legislature,  in  its  feelings,  as  decidedly  foreign  to  us,  in  a matter 
of  this  kind,  as  is  ;he  Parliament  of  England  ? But  some  may  say,  this  is 
an  extreme  case.  I reply  it  is  not  an  extreme — it  is  a probable  case.  The 
firebrand  resolutions  of  Rufus  King,  which  he  laid  on  the  table  of  the  Se- 
nate, some  few  years  since,  are  but  pioneers  to  other  propositions  which 
will  be  made,  if  no  resistance  is  anticipated.  But  if  the  case  be  possible, 
my  end  is  answered.  There  may  be  a case  then,  in  which  the  sword  alone 
shall  be  the  only  argument. 

But  let  us  take  the  instance  of  the  Tariff.  Our  citizens  generally  be- 
lieve, that  the  system  of  the  “American  policy,”  as  it  is  termed,  by  de- 
stroying our  foreign  trade,  and  prostrating  our  agricultural  interests,  will 
bring  ruin  upon  our  country,  if  it  is  persevered  in.  Who  is  there  then  that 
would  leave  it  to  any  judge  to  decide,  whether  Congress  can  impose  such 
a system  of  tribute  upon  our  citizens  ? L et  the  question  of  the  Tariff  come 
when  it  will  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  it  must  be  de- 
cided against  us  ! The  question  for  that  Court  will  not  be  whether  Con- 
gress can  “ promote  the  growth  of  domestic  manufactures,”  but  whether 
the  National  Legislature  can  pass  a law,  which,  however,  obviously  design- 
ed for  other  purposes,  yet  purports  in  its  name,  provisions  and  language, 
to  be  merely  a means  of  raising  a revenue.  The  Tariff  Bill  is  in  its  form 
and  colour , a revenue  bill.  In  substance , it  is  a bill  for  rendering  the 
South  tributary  to  the  North.  The  Supreme  Court  will  not,  and  cannot 
with  propriety,  inquire  into  the  motives  of  those  who  passed  the  bill,  and 
therefore  will  and  must  decide,  that  it  is  competent  for  Congress,  to  pass 
a law  “ imposing  additional  duties  upon  woollen  goods.”  But  to  us  it  is 
really  immaterial,  in  what  shape  such  a question  may  come  before  the 
United  States’  Courts.  Let  the  odious  measure  throw  off  the  garments  in 
which  it  is  disguised,  and  appear  in  its  true  and  proper  character.  Let  the. 
question  come  fairly  and  openly  before  the  federal  judges,  whether  Con- 
gress can  promote  domestic  manufactures,  and  the  probability,  the  certain- 
ty is,  that  it  will  be  decided  against  us.  The  Supreme  Court,  if  it  remains 
true  to  the  principles  it  has  already  promulgated  on  the  Bank  question, 
must  support  the  authority  of  the  National  Legislature  in  this  particular. 
Those  principles,  we  shall  see,  are  not  in  consonance  with  the  views  of 
those  who  framed  the  Constitution,  or  of  the  States  who  accepted  it  from 
the  hands  of  the  Convention,  and  therefore  ought  never  to  be  recognized 
by  a South-Carolina  Legislature. 


MO.  9. 

The  great  basis  upon  which  the  Supreme  Court  places  the  authority  of 
the  Federal  Government,  to  exercise  its  constructive  powers  to  the  utter 
destruction  of  State  rights,  is,  that  every  power  vested  in  the  United  States 
Government  by  the  people,  is,  in  its  nature,  sovereign , and  involves  a 
power  to  employ  “ all  the  means  which  are  appropriate,  and  which  are 
plainly  applicable  to  the  attainment  of  the  end  of  such  power,  and  which 
is  not  prohibited  by  the  Constitution  ; and  if  a certain  means  to  carry  into 


28 


effect  any  of  the  powers  of  the  government  be  appropriate,  the  degree  of 
its  necessity  is  a question  of  legislative  discretion,  and  not  of  judicial  in- 
quiry.” Let  us  examine  this  proposition.  It  is  a proposition,  I confess, 
which  at  first  rapidly  sweeps  away  the  mind  to  a conviction  of  its  undeni- 
able souddness.  But,  formidable  as  it  appears  in  the  abstract,  it  will  ne- 
vertheless be  found  to  fall  before  the  irresistible  power  of  truth  and  of  com- 
mon sense,  when  subjected  to  the  severe  test  of  the  plain  letter  and  spirit 
of  the  American  Constitution.  The  proposition,  if  it  means  any  thing, 
goes  the  length  (from  the  reasonings  of  the  Court)  to  establish  the  princi- 
ple, that  if  there  be  any  relation  whatever,  between  the  measure  and  the 
end,  the  discretion  of  the  Legislature  is  to  be  the  supreme  law,  and  the 
Court  will  not  interpose  its  authority,  and  thus  tread  upon  legislative 
ground. 

This  construction  of  the  instrument,  I conceive,  is  wholly  repugnant  to 
the  views  of  the  sages  who  framed  the  Constitution.  That  these  men 
never  designed  that  Congress  should  be  left  at  liberty  to  range  at  large 
into  the  boundless  fields  of  implied  powers,  is  evident  from  several  conside- 
rations, which  I shall  notice  in  this,  and  some  succeeding  numbers. 

In  the  first  place,  they  judiciously  restricted  the  National  Legislature  to 
the  enacting  of  such  laws  as  were  necessary  and  proper,  for  the  execution 
of  the  delegated  powers.  The  words  necessary  and  proper,  in  the  Con- 
stitution, have  a peculiar  force.  Ingenious  men  may  amuse  us  with  their 
nice  and  their  subtle  distinctions — Philologists  may  puzzle  us  with  their 
varied  criticisms — but  there  is  no  need  of  skilful  critics  or  refined  reason- 
ing, in  a matter  of  this  kind.  The  words  necessary  and  proper,  are  in 
constant  use  among  men.  They  have  a plain  and  obvious  import,  and  a 
popular  signification.  They  are  no  sooner  pronounced,  than  they  strike 
us  like  a sensation,  and  that  sensation  instantly  excludes  from  the  mind, 
the  idea  of  an  unlimited  choice  of  means.  The  means  to  be  adopted  by 
Congress,  must  not  be  simply  appropriate,  or  fit,  or  adapted  to  the  end, 
but  they  must  be  necessary,  as  well  as  proper.  The  words  are  not  ne- 
cessary or  proper,  but  necessary  and  proper  Had  it  been  the  intention 
of  the  Convention  to  have  given  Congress  unlimited  discretion  to  have  se- 
lected from  the  vast  mass  of  incidental  powers,  any  and  whatever  means  it 
might  decide  to  be  proper,  such  an  intention  to  confer  a choice,  might  have 
been  better  expressed,  and  would  have  been  expressed  in  other  words. — 
They  would  have  said, and  “to  use  and  exercise  all  other  powers  inciden- 
tal to  the  foregoing  powers.”  But  the  clause  as  it  stands,  is  clearly  a limi- 
tation on  the  implied  powers  of  Congress.  The  Chief  Justice,  however, 
thinks  not.  He  decides,  that  the  clause  is  sufficiently  explicit,  and  gives 
the  National  Legislature  the  most  ample  powers  to  accomplish  the  ends  of 
the  government,  by  any  means  which  have  a relation  to  the  objects  en- 
trusted to  its  management.  In  fact,  he  is  of  opinion,  that  this  power,  “ to 
make  all  laws,  which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper,  to  carry  into  execu- 
tion” their  other  powers,  was  designed  to  enlarge,  and  not  to  abridge,  the 
discretion  of  the  Legislature.  His  reasons  are, 

First — That  it  is  placed  amongst  the  powers,  and  not  the  limitations  of 
the  powers  of  Congress  : and,  secondly— That  its  terms  purport  to  en- 
large, not  to  diminish  the  powers  of  the  Government.”  No  reason,”  adds 
he,  “ has  been,  or  can  be  assigned,  for  thus  concealing  an  intention  to 
narrow  the  discretion  of  the  Legislature,  under  words  which  purport  to  en* 


29 

large."  These  are  the  words  of  the  decision  of  the  Suprerrie  Court 
of  the  United  States. 

Now,  let  us  see,  how  far  this  opinion  is  supported  by  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  Convention.  The  journal  of  these  proceedings,  it  is  well 
known,  has  been  published  under  the  authority  of  Congress,  since 
this  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  delivered,  and  published  no 
doubt,  with  the  intention  of  shewing)  the  “rise)  progress,  and  present 
condition  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.”  We  can,  there- 
fore, resort  to  no  higher  source,  nor  to  a more  indubitable  authority, 
for  expounding  ambiguous  passages  in  the  Constitution,  if  there  be 
any,  than  this  journal. 

What  then  is  the  history  of  the  clause  in  question  1 The  first  no-* 
tice  we  have  of  it,  is,  in  “ a proposed  draft  of  a Federal  Government,” 
submitted  to  the  Convention,  as  soon  as  it  was  ready  to  proceed  to 
business,  by  Mr.  Charles  Pinckney,  on  the  29th  May.*  The  clause, 
as  it  stands,  at  the  end  of  the  enumerated  powers,  in  Mr.  Pinckney’s 
draft,  reads  thus  : — “ And  to  make  all  Laws  for  carrying  the  fore- 
going powers  into  execution.” 

The  committee  of  detail , to  whom  this  draft  was  referred,  together 
with  Mr.  Randolph’s  plan  or  resolutions,  (after  those  resolutions  had 
been  the  subject  of  daily  debate  for  about  two  months,  in  committee 
of  the  whole  and  in  convention)  on  reporting  “a  draft  of  a Consti- 
tution,” agreeably  to  the  resolutions  as  amended,  on  the  6th  of 
August, f altered  this  clause  so  as  to  read — “ And  to  make  all  laws, 
that  shall  be  necessary  and  proper,  for  carrying  into  execution  the 
foregoing  powers,  and  all  other  powers  vested  by  this  Constitution, 
in  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  department,  or 
officer  thereof.”  Now,  if  the  addition  of  the  words,  “ necessary  and 
proper ,”  to  Mr.  Pinckney’s  clause,  did  not  abridge  the  discretion  of 
Congress,  there  certainly  is  no  meaning  in  the  English  language, 
or  in  the  acts  of  the  Convention.  Mr.  Pinckney’s  proposition  was 
as  unqualified  as  words  could  make  it.  It  was  a power  to  make  all 
laws  whatever.  The  amendment  of  the  committee,  is  to  make  “ all 
laws  that  shall  be  necessary  and  proper."  Does  not  every  man,  who 
is  blessed  by  his  Creator,  with  plain  good  sense,  perceive  at  a glance, 
that  the  words  “ necessary  and  proper,”  here  introduced,  control  the 
general  sentence ; that  they  are  altogether  used  in  a restrictive , 
and  not  an  enlarged  sense;  and  that  the  plain,  unequivocal  intention 
of  the  Convention,  by  their  alteration  of  the  clause,  was  to  narrow 
the  discretion  of  Congress,  as  to  the  selection  of  its  means  in  exer- 
cising  its  enumerated  powers.  Can  any  man  in  his  sober  senses,  be- 
lieve, with  the  Supreme  Court,  that  the  terms  of  this  clause,  “ purport 
to  enlarge,  undnot  to  diminish  the  powers  vested  in  the  Government,” 
or  that  it  was  not  “ a restriction  on  those  already  granted.”  In  the 
words  of  the  Supreme  Court,  I say,  “ it  is  too  apparent  for  contro- 
versy.” 

But  that  it  was  understood  in  Convention  as  a restriction,  is  evi- 
dent also,  from  this  circumstance : — The  draft  of  the  Constitution 

•Journals  71.  t Journals  216. 


4 


30 


reported  by  the  committee  of  detail,  was  the  subject  of  daily  debate 
from  the  6th  of  August  to  the  17th  of  September,  when  the  Conven- 
tion finished  its  work,  and  yet  this  clause,  as  amended  by  the  com- 
mittee, never  was  altered,  or  proposed  to  be  altered.  It  stands  this 
day  in  the  Constitution,  as  it  was  then  written.  It  cannot,  surely,  be 
believed,  that  if  any  one  man  in  the  Convention,  had  thought  with 
the  Supreme  Court,  that  this  clause  would  be  held  to  be  an  enlarge- 
ment of  the  powers  of  Congress;  or,  that  under  its  phraseology,  were 
lurking  all  those  powers  which  Congress  are  now  exercising,  to  the 
destruction  of  the  State  Governments,  and  which  it  calls  implied, 
though  some  of  them  are  as  great,  and  greater  than  any  of  the  speci- 
ally delegated  powers,  it  cannot,  I repeat,  be  believed,  that  there 
would  have  been  no  opposition  to  it.  The  jealousy  existing  in  the 
minds  of  the  members  from  the  small  States,  was  too  strong,  and  too 
sensitive,  to  admit  of  such  an  idea. 

But,  says  the  Chief  Justice,  “ This  power  is  placed  amongst  the 
powers  ofCongress,  and  not  the  limitations  on  those  powers.”  This 
remark  is  deprived  of  some  of  its  weight,  if  we  consider  that  in  Mr. 
Pinckney’s  draft,  in  which  the  clause  first  appeared,  the  powers  and 
the  limitations  on  the  pow  ers,  are  all  in  the  same  article—  his  Con- 
stitution being  divided  into  articles  alone.  But,  waving  this  view, 
upon  which  I place  but  little  reliance,  it  will  yet  be  seen,  that  the 
clause,  as  a restriction,  stands  exactly  where  it  ought  to  stand. 

It  seems  to  be  admitted  on  all  sides,  that  were  this  clause  entirely 
struck  out  of  the  Constitution,  that  the  power  to  pass  all  the  laws, 
which  might  be  requisite  to  carry  into  execution,  powers  conferred 
on  the  legislative  body,  would  have  resulted  to  that  body  by  ana- 
voidable  implication.  It  would  have  been  absurd,  to  create  a Gov- 
ernment with  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  powers,  if  the  Le- 
gislature could  not  make  laws  to  execute  the  pmoers  of  the  govern- 
ment. A power  to  lay  and  collect  taxes,  excises  and  imposts,  would 
be  nugatory,  if  it  did  not  involve  the  power  to  pass  laws,  to  appoint 
the  officers,  and  to  regulate  the  mode  of  collecting  those  taxes,  and 
to  punish  individuals  for  the  infraction  of  revenue  and  other  laws. 
All  this  is  too  plain  to  require  illustration.  The  insertion,  therefore, 
of  Mr.  Pinckney’s  clause,  “to  make  all  laws,”  &c.  was  not  an  act 
which  either  enlarged,  or  diminished  the  powers  which  preceded  it; 
it  was  simply  a declaratory  clause. — It  was  declaratory  of  that  au- 
thority, which  in  the  absence  of  such  a provision,  Congress  would 
have  possessed.  Congress  without  it,  would  have  had  precisely  the 
same  powers  which,  by  some,  the  clause  is  supposed  to  give.  Even 
Mr.  Hamilton,  in  his  Federalist,  (No.  33)  in  defending  this  part  of 
the  Constitution,  does  not  agree  with  the  Supreme  Court,  that  this 
clause  enlarges  the  powers  ofCongress.  Such  an  admission  would 
have  defeated  his  end.  He  considers  it,  and  calls  it  “ a declaratory 
clause,”  and  says,  “ that  the  introduction  of  it,  could  only  have  been 
done  for  greater  caution,  and  to  guard  against  all  cavilling  refine- 
ments in  those,  who  might  feel  a disposition  to  curtail  and  evade  the 
legitimate  authorities  of  the  Union.”  Mr.  Pinckney’s  clause  then, 
being  declaratory,  stood  in  its  proper  position  in  the  Constitution. 


31 


With  all  due  deference  to  the  Supreme  Court,  I maintain,  that  the 
proper  place  for  a clause,  declaring  the  sense  of  the  Convention,  as 
to  the  powers  which  are  to  result  from  other  powers,  expressly  and 
previously  given,  is  at  the  end  of  the  enumerated  powers  so  given; 
nor,  could  the  restricted  sense,  in  which  the  Convention  would  have 
its  views  expressed  in  such  a clause,  make  such  an  essential  differ- 
ence, as  to  have  warranted  the  transfer  of  the  clause  from  its  position, 
to  be  placed  amongst  the  limitations  on  the  powers  of  Congress — • 
some  of  which  limitations,  annihilate  their  powers  on  certain  sub- 
jects, The  design  of  the  clause  in  question,  was,  not  so  to  restrict , 
as  almost  to  annihilate  the  rights  of  the  National  Legislature,  as  to 
its  means  of  executing  its  powers,  but  simply  to  declare,  that  in  the 
choice  of  its  means,  it  must  prescribe  to  itself,  necessary  and  reason- 
able bounds.  The  clause  is  declaratory,  and  is  in  its  proper  place. 

Had  the  original  clause  of  Mr.  Pinckney  been  adopted  without 
alteration  or  amendment,  there  might  have  been  some  ground  for 
the  broad  principle  laid  down  by  the  Supreme  Court,  that  “ let  it 
[the  end]  be  legitimate,  and  within  the  scope  of  the  Constitution,  and 
certain  means  designed  to  be  used,  be  appropriate,  that  the  degree 
of  the  necessity  is  a question  of  legislative  discretion  alone.”  But, 
even  then,  I would  submit,  that  the  true  exposition  of  such  a clause, 
in  reference  to  certain  amendments  in  the  instrument,  and  to  the  pe- 
culiar circumstances  which  gave  rise  to  the  Constitution,  and  which 
are  anomalous  in  the  history  of  the  world,  would  have  been,  that 
Congress  could  only  pass  such  laws  as  had  a simple,  a direct , a na- 
tural, and  an  obvious  relation  to  the  subjects  on  which  they  were  to 
legislate ; a relation,  so  plain,  as  to  be  generally  acknowledged ; 
not  such  a relation  as  is  to  be  established  by  an  ingenious  construc- 
tion. It  cannot  be  conceived,  that  under  a general  authority,  to  pass 
laws  for  executing  certain  delegated  powers,  it  was  ever  designed, 
that  powers  should  be  used  as  means , between  which  and  the  end 
proposed,  there  is  a connection  it  is  true,  but  the  connection  distant 
and  not  immediate,  remote  and  not  simple  or  direct.  The  construc- 
tion must  be  such,  as  not  to  divest  the  States,  of  those  numerous  un- 
defined powers,  which  they  reserved  to  themselves,  when  they  entered 
into  the  compact. 

But  no  sooner  does  Mr.  Pinckney’s  proposition  come  from  the 
hands  of  the  committee  of  detail,  than  the  character  of  the  declara- 
tory clause  becomes  changed.  It  is  not  an  immaterial  change  in 
phraseology — it  is  not  a bare  transposition  of  words,  making  no  es- 
sential variation  in  the  sense  of  a paragraph,  that  is  here  introduced. 
It  is  an  alteration  in  substance.  It  alters  and  controls  the  sense  of 
the  whole  clause.  It  causes  that  declaration  which  might  have  been 
taken  in  an  unqualified,  to  be  used  in  a restricted  and  a qualified 
sense.  As  largely  as  Congress  might  before  have  claimed  the  liberty 
of  ranging  in  the  wide  and  extensive  fields  of  construction  and  im- 
plication, culling  and  gathering  for  the  use  or  the  ornament  of  the 
Government,  their  choicest  fruits  and  fairest  flowers,  yet,  now  it  is 
cautiously  forbidden  in  its  rambles,  to  touch  any  blit  those  which, 
whilst  they  are  essential  to  nourish  and  sustain  in  health,  the  great 


32 


body  politie  of  the  General  Government,  yet  do  not  diminish  the 
supply,  which  is  to  keep  up  the  same  healthy  action  in  every  indi- 
vidual member  of  the  confederacy.  The  Chief  Justice  admits,  that 
had  the  clause  been  in  another  place,  and  worded,  “ In  carrying  into 
execution  the  foregoing  powers,  and  ail  others,  &,c.  no  laws  shall  be 
passed,  but  such  as  are  necessary  and  proper,”  that  in  such  case,  the 
clause  would  have  unquestionably  been  restrictive  in  form , as  weii  as 
effect."  Now,  in  the  name  of  common  sense,  my  fellow-citizens, 
where  is  the  difference,  between  the  case  put  by  the  Chief  Justice,  and 
the  case,  as  it  actually  did  occur  in  the  Convention.  A.  in  the  Con- 
vention, proposes  that  Congress,  in  executing  its  powers,  “ shall 
pass  all  laws  whatever.”  B.  objects  to  it,  unless  the  words  necessary 
and  proper,"  be  substituted.  The  amendment  of  B.  is  adopted.  Is 
not  this  precisely  the  same  thing,  as  if  the  Convention  had  said*  in 
executing  your  powers,  you  may  pass  laws,  but  such  laws  must  be 
necessary  and  proper.  Let  us  not  quarrel  about  words,  but  look  to 
the  plain  intents  of  men,  as  evidenced  by  their  acts.  The  clause  is  a 
restriction,  both  in  form  and  in  effect.  If  there  be  any  distinction,  it 
is  a distinction  without  a difference.  The  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  in  this  view,  is  unsound.  If  the  rights  of  sovereign  States 
are  to  be  wrested  from  them,  and  the  supremacy  of  the  General  Go- 
vernment, to  rest  on  principles,  with  no  more  solid  foundation  than, 
those  promulgated  by  the  Supreme  Court,  there  is  an  end  of  the  Fe- 
ral Union.  If  Congress  can  create  so  great  a corporation,  and  so 
tremendous  a monied  engine,  in  the  hands  of  any  Government,  as  a 
National  Bank,  and  call  it  “ a necessary  and  a proper  law”  for  “ col- 
lecting tares,"  it  will  be  in  vain  for  us  to  say,  that  internal  improve- 
ments and  tariffs,  and  other  systems  of  extortion  and  tribute,  are  not 
necessary  and  proper  laws  “ to  regulate  commerce.”  if  our  people 
acquiesce  in  this,  as  sound  law,  there  is  no  course  left  for  us,  but  to 
submit  and  to  be  ruined. 


The  Supreme  Court,  in  contending  for  its  extended  construction 
of  the  Constitution,  would  draw  a distinction  between  that  instru- 
ment and  the  old  confederation,  which  certainly  cannot  be  main- 
tained on  the  grounds  it  assumes.  It  would  impress  upon  us,  that 
the  exclusion  of  the  word  “ expressly,"  in  the  one  compact,  and  the 
insertion  of  it  in  the  other,  included  or  excluded  in  either,  the  idea 
of  implied  powers.  The  words  of  the  10th  amendment  to  the  Con- 
stitution are,  “ The  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the 
Constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  States,  are  reserved  to  the 
States  respectively,  or  to  the  people.”  In  the  confederation,  it  is 
thus  expressed  : “ Each  State  retains  every  power,  jurisdiction  and 
right,  not  expressly  delegated  to  the  United  States.” 

Let  me  here  premise  the  distinction,  which  must  forever  exist  be- 
tween the  case  of  a people  emerging  from  a state  of  revolution, 
without  any  government,  and  assembled  to  form  one  ; and  a case, 
where  the  people  already  are  associated,  in  so  many  independent 
political  communities,  each  having  its  own  regular  government.  In 


33 


the  one  case,  it  is  intended,  ex  necessitate  rei,  that  all  powers  should 
be  vested  in  their  new  rulers,  with  certain  limitations.  What  is  not 
here  reserved  as  a bill  of  rights  to  the  people,  is  clearly  designed  to 
be  given.  But,  in  the  other  case,  where  the  people  are  governed  in 
so  many  distinct  sovereignties,  and  are  willing  to  divide  the  sove- 
reignty with  a common  head  to  direct  the  whole,  it  becomes  neces- 
sary to  state,  not  what  powers  are  ivithheld,  but  what  powers  are 
given.  In  the  first  case,  the  powers  given  are  general , with  certain 
exceptions — in  the  second  case,  the  powers  are  altogether  special. 
In  the  one  case,  every  thing  that  is  not  retained  is  actually  surrend- 
ered— in  the  other,  nothing  can  be  claimed  that  is  not  clearly  given. 
The  tenth  amendment,  therefore,  to  the  present  Constitution,  and 
the  second  article  in  the  confederation,  already  quoted,  were  only 
declaratory  Glauses.  To  the  States,  or  to  the  people,  were  reserved, 
as  a matter  of  course,  ail  powers  which  were  not  surrendered.  There 
is  no  need  to  distinguish  here  between  express  and  implied  powers. 
Where  any  power  is  surrendered  to  a legislative  body,  the  power  to 
make  the  laws  necessary  to  execute  that  power,  is  also  surrendered. 
To  these  positions  all  men  must  give  their  unqualified  assent. 

In  point  of  construction  then,  the  Supreme  Court  is  in  error  when 
it  supposes,  that  had  the  word  “ expressly ” been  inserted  in  the  tenth 
amendment  to  the  Constitution,  that  any  difference  whatever  could 
have  been  created  in  the  relative  rights  of  the  parties  to  that  com- 
pact ; and  in  point  of  fact  it  is  equally  and  most  egregiously  wrong, 
in  asserting  that  the  insertion  of  that  ivord  in  the  old  confederacy, 
caused  embarrassments  to  the  old  Congress  “by  excluding  inciden- 
tal or  implied  powers.”  The  Court  might  to  have  known,  that  the 
confederation  languished  from  time  to  time,  not  from  any  want  of 
power,  over  the  subjects  which  were  entrusted  to  it ; but  because  for 
the  execution  of  those  powers  in  practice,  it  was  made,  by  the  terms 
of  the  compact , to  depend  too  much  upon  the  individual  States. — 
Though  their  power  to  raise  money,  by  requisitions  upon  the  States, 
was  indefinite,  yet  they  had  no  power  to  enforce  their  requisitions, 
when  the  States  were  backward  in  complying  with  their  quotas, 
except  they  were  to  do  it  by  the  sword.  The  confederation  failed, 
not  because  it  was  deprived  of  power  by  implication , (for  the  fact  is 
otherwise)  but  because  it  had  no  power  of  direct  legislation  upon  the 
people. 

But  the  Old  Congress  did  possess  implied  powers,  (that  is  as  far 
as  language  could  convey  such  power,  and  exercised  them  too,) 
and  in  a much  greater  degree  than  is  given  to  Congress  under  th« 
present  Constitution.  It  had  the  “ sole  and  exclusive  right  and  pow- 
er” of  determining  on  peace  and  war : the  sole  and  exclusive  right 
and  power,  over  the  post-office,  and  over  the  regulation  of  coin,  and 
every  other  subject  confided  to  its  government,  without  one  single 
exception.  In  the  present  compact,  there  are  no  such  words  in  the 
enumerated  grants  of  power,  excepting  in  that  clause,  which  gives  to 
Congress  exclusive  legislation  at  the  Seat  of  Government,  and  over 
its  forts,  dockyards,  &c.  Were  it  not,  that  there  are  express  limi- 
tations on  the  power  of  the  States  in  other  articles  of  the  instrument, 


34 


who  can  doubt  but  that  the  power  of  the  States,  as  to  raising  armies 
in  peace,  issuing  coin,  and  laying  impost  and  export  duties  would 
have  been  concurrent  with  Congress,  on  account  of  the  grant  of 
power  in  these  cases  not  being  “ sole  and  exclusive.'’’  Even  Mr. 
Hamilton  does  not  doubt,  but  admits  it.  [Fed.  No.  32.]  The  power 
of  the  States,  at  this  moment,  to  tax  indefinitely,  by  excise,  by 
stamps,  or  by  any  other  duty,  ^provided  it  be  not  on  imports  or  ex- 
ports,) though  such  taxes  might  even  interfere  with,  and  greatly  em- 
barrass the  fiscal  operations  of  the  General  Government , is  according 
to  the  expositions  in  the  Federalist,  as  unimpaired  as  ever.  The 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  admits  that  there  is  a concurrent  ju- 
risdictioji  in  the  States,  in  the  article  of  taxation,  though  not  to  the 
extent  to  which  Mr.  Hamilton  is  understood  to  maintain  those  doc- 
trines. Mr.  Hamilton  tells  us  [Fed.  33]  that  “though  a tax  for  the 
use  of  the  United  States,  would  be  supreme  in  its  nature,  and  could 
not  legally  be  opposed  or  controlled  ; yet,  a law,  abrogating  or  pre- 
venting the  collection  of  a tax  laid  by  the  authority  of  a State,  (un- 
less upon  imports  or  exports,)  would  not  be  the  supreme  law  of  the 
land,  but  an  usurpation  of  a power  not  granted  by  the  Constitution.” 
The  State  of  Maryland  no  sooner  taxed  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  under  the  above  exposition,  than  the  Supreme  Court  decides 
it  to  be  unconstitutional. — A memorable  triumph  this  of  metaphysi- 
cal learning  over  the  plain  intent  of  the  Constitution. 

But  I am  digressing.  If  there  be  a difference  between  the  old 
and  the  new  compact,  the  difference  is  in  favour  of  the  confedera- 
tion, and  destructive  of  the  reasonings  of  the  Court.  The  confede- 
ration, I repeat,  had  implied  powers.  If,  for  instance,  a surrender 
of  the  “ sole  and  exclusive  right  and  power"  over  each  enumerated 
subject  of  power  in  this  compact,  did  not  deprive  the  States  of  a 
concurrent  power,  in  any  way,  over  such  particular  subject,  to  what 
intent  is  language  taught?  If  the  States  are  deprived,  from  the 
words  of  the  grant,  of  all  power  over  the  subject  matter,  do  not  the 
minor  or  implied  powers  go  from  them,  as  well  as  the  original  and 
substantive  powers'?  To  whom  else  could  the  minor  powers  belong, 
if  they  belonged  not  to  the  Old  Congress? — They  must  belong  to 
the  States  or  to  the  Congress.  To  the  States  they  could  not  belong; 
for  they  surrendered  all  jurisdiction  whatsoever  over  the  subject. — 
The  Congress,  on  the  contrary,  shews  a grant,  in  such  words,  as 
embrace  the  incidents  as  well  as  the  power  itself. 

Hence,  the  weakness  of  the  argument,  that,  because  the  States 
under  the  old  compact,  retained  every  jurisdiction  and  right  not  ex- 
pressly relinquished,  that  the  Old  Congress  had  no  implied  powers. 
The  Congress  could  pretend  to  no  implied  powers,  but  what  belong- 
ed to  subjects  acknowledged  as  within  its  sole  jurisdiction , and  the 
States  retained,  without  dispute,  all  implied,  as  well  as  original 
powers,  on  subjects  not  given  away  by  them.  But  the  Old  Con- 
gress did  exercise  implied  powers.  It  is  not  necessary  to  cite  the 
instances — one  will  be  sufficient.  It  created  and  incorporated 
the  Bank  of  North  America,  and  as  a measure  indispensably  neces- 
sary to  the  exigencies  of  the  Union  ; and  it  passed,  I believe,  with 


35 


but  one  dissenting  vote.  The  Supreme  Court  would  not  say  this 
was  not  an  implied  power ; nor  can  any  one  pretend  that  there  was 
not  a greater  necessity  for  it  than  the  present  Bank.  The  indubi- 
table fact  is,  that  the  Confederation  would  have  died  a quiet  and  a 
natural  death,  whether  this  magic  word  of  the  Supreme  Court,  this 
word  “ expressly”  had  been  omitted  or  retained.  In  all  the  addresses 
of  the  Old  Congress  to  the  States — in  all  its  appeals  to  their  pa- 
triotism for  a change  of  the  articles  of  Confederation,  (the  last 
appeal,  I believe,  was  in  April  1783,)  there  is  not  a hint  of  its  em- 
barrassment, or  its  difficulties,  as  proceeding  from  the  want  of 
implied  powers.  Its  powers  on  the  parchment,  were  as  great 
and  as  paramount,  as  it  could  desire  them  to  be  on  such  subjects. 
But  it  wanted  that,  which  gives  life  and  vigour  to  every  other 
power,  and  without  whieh  no  Government  can  go  on,  to-wit — the 
power  of  raising  money  by  taxing  the  people,  instead  of  depending 
upon  the  States  to  raise  its  ways  and  means.  This  power  of  tax- 
ing it  could  not  possibly  exercise  as  an  implied  power,  because, 
in  the  eighth  article  of  the  compact,  there  was  an  express  provision 
that  the  States  should  supply  the  National  Treasury.  It  was  the 
want  of  a power  to  lay  imposts  of  which  it  complained.  It 
had  no  power  to  regulate  commerce.  It  solicited  over  and  over 
again,  that  the  States  would  permit  it  to  lay  certain  imposts  for 
a limited  time,  so  as  to  produce  some  little  certain  revenue. — 
Some  consented,  and  others  fettered  their  grants  with  such  restric- 
tions ; New-York,  particularly,  as  to  make  the  power  useless.  It 
was  in  the  situation,  of  the  famous  Confederacy  of  1570  between 
the  United  Provinces,  or  rather  in  a worse  situation,  for  there  a small 
power  to  raise  imposts  was  given.  In  that  Confederacy,  the  States 
were  not  punctual  in  obeying  the  recommendations  of  the  Common 
Council.  Holland  bore  the  burthen  of  that  league,  and  so  here 
some  States  paid  three  or  four  times  their  quotas.  Two  States,  it 
was  said,  paid  nothing.  Holland  settled  her  business  in  part,  by 
marching  an  army  into  one  of  the  provinces  to  compel  payment. — 
Our  Old  Congress  had  not  the  power  of  settling  matters  by  the 
sword.  It  wanted  money,  and  it  had  no  power  to  tax ; and 
had  it  taxed,  it  would  not  have  been  paid.  The  want  of  a power 
to  regulate  commerce,  was  the  sole  cause  of  the  inefficiency  of  our 
old  Government,  and  not  the  want  of  implied  powers,  as  is  asserted 
by  the  Supreme  Court.  This  is  history,  and  this  is  fact. 

Why  then  does  the  Supreme  Court  say,  that  there  is  that  in  the 
articles  of  Confederation,  which  excluded  incidental  or  implied  pow- 
ers! And  why,  in  the  second  place,  does  it  assert,  that  it  is  the  omis- 
sion of  this  word  “expressly”  in  the  tenth  amendment  “ that  leaves 
the  question  open , whether  the  particular  power  which  may  become 
the  subject  of  contest,  has  been  delegated  to  the  one  government,  or 
prohibited  to  the  other!”  The  question,  I aver,  is  not  more  open 
by  the  omission,  than  it  would  have  been  by  the  insertion  of  the 
word.  The  Court  might  have  known,  that  even  if  the  powers  of 
the  Old  Congress  were  not  sole  and  exclusive,  and,  that  the  phrase 
the>e  might  have  been  so  expressed,  as  to  exclude  the  idea  of  implied 


36 


powers;  yet,  that  its  omission  in  the  present  compact,  could  not 
even  in  that  vieto,  give  to  the  present  Congress,  any  powers  which  it 
did  not  possess  without  it.  There  is  a distinction  which  is  mani- 
fest  upon  the  Court’s  own  view  of  the  subject.  In  the  present  Con- 
stitution, there  is  an  express  clause,  giving  to  Congress  the  power  of 
making  the  necessary  laws  to  execute  its  powers;  and  therefore  re- 
cognizes, thus  far,  implied  powers.  In  the  old  Confederation,  there 
is  no  such  express  provision.  How,  therefore,  the  Court,  which 
rears  its  whole  superstructure  of  implied  powers  upon  this  express 
elause  in  the  Constitution,  which  it  regards  as  designed  to  enlarge 
the  powers  of  Congress,  can  condescend  to  lay  any  stress  upon,  or 
even  to  notice  the  omission  of  a most  insignificant  word,  is  most  ex- 
traordinary. Could  such  a word,  if  it  were  inserted,  strip  the  gov- 
ern ment  of  its  powers,  when,  according  to  the  Chief  Justice’s  expo- 
sition of  the  phrase,  “ necessary  and  proper,"  the  Government  has  an 
unlimited  choice  of  means  under  an  express  power — unquestion- 
ably it  cannot. 

I have  said  that  the  word  is  insignificant.  It  is  a word  in  my 
view,  so  harmless,  that  whether  it  be  inserted  or  excluded  from  the 
tenth  amendment,  no  possible  alteration  can  be  produced  in  the 
rights  of  either  party.  For  A.  to  say  to  B.  “ The  power  I do  not 
give  you  is  retained  by  me,”  is  certainly  as  strong  and  as  express- 
ive for  all  purposes,  as  if  he  had  said,  what  I do  not  expressly  give 
you,  I retain — The  first  phrase  is  the  better  of  the  two — it  is  more 
simple  and  expresses  as  much.  In  a deed  of  conveyance  of  land, 
would  the  grantor  give  more,  or  the  grantee  receive  more,  by  using 
the  words  “ doth  absolutely  and  expressly , and  clearly , and  unequivo- 
cally grant,  bargain,  sell  and  convey,”  than  if  the  words  were,  “doth 
grant,  bargain,  sell  and  convey.” — It  is  too  plain. 

When  the  State  Legislatures  sent  in  their  ratifications  of  the 
Constitution,  and  proposed  their  amendments,  they  expressed,  their 
sense  as  to  implied  powers,  in  various  ways — Massachusetts,  New- 
Hampshire,  South-Carolina  and  Rhode  Island,  used  the  words 
“ all  powers  not  expressly  delegated” — Virginia  and  North-Carolina 
left  out  the  word — New- York  expressed  it  thus,  “all  powers  not 
clearly  delegated” — Rhode-Island  in  the  Bill  of  Rights  has  it,  “ not 
clearly  delegated ,”  and  in  the  amendments  proposed  by  the  same 
State,  we  find  the  word  “ expressly ” used.  As  soon  as  the  first  Con- 
gress was  convened  under  the  Constitution,  it  considered  all  the 
amendments  proposed  by  the  States — it  took  the  substance  of 
them,  and  made  out  from  the  whole,  twelve  amendments  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  State  Legislatures,  ten  of  which  were  accepted,  and 
two  rejected.  At  a subsequent  period,  two  more  were  proposed  and 
adopted,  and  thus  stand  the  twelve  amendments  to  the  Constitution. 
In  submitting  the  tenth  amendment  in  question,  it  was  submitted  as 
it  now  reads,  omitting  the  word  “ expressly.” — Amotion  was  made 
in  the  lower  House  of  Congress  to  reinstate  the  word,  but  lost — only 
seventeen  votes  in  the  affirmative.  A similar  motion  was  lost  in  the 
Senate.  The  omission  of  this  word  could  not,  and  did  not  make 
the  difference  of  a hair  in  the  rights  of  Congress  and  the  States; 


V 


37 

had  it  been  important,  the  motions  would  not  have  been  negatived 
by  large  majorities. 

From  all  that  has  been  said,  in  this  and  the  preceding  number,  it 
must  be  seen  by  all  who  are  not  wilfully  blind,  that  Congress  has 
no  means  of  executing  its  implied  powers,  but  what  it  derives  from 
an  express  grant  to  that  effect  in  the  Constitution.  Had  there  been 
no  express  grant,  it  might  have  had  some  ground  to  claim  by  impli- 
cation of  law,  the  liberty  of  ranging  at  large  into  many  incidental 
powers,  which  the  restrictive  terms  of  the  grant  decidedly  forbid. — - 
The  design  of  the  grant,  or  the  declaratory  clause,  with  the  restric- 
tive phrases,  was,  as  1 trust  I have  shewn,  to  forbid  Congress  from 
selecting  any  means  but  what  were  direct  and  simple.  Congress  has 
not  sovereign  means  for  executing  its  powers.  Sovereign  means  are 
the  means  ordinary  aud  extraordinary,  which  belong  to  complete 
and  undivided  sovereignty,  in  the  selecting  of  which,  there  is  no 
restraint,  as  to  the  free  use  of  any,  and  every  measure,  which  bare 
convenience  may  suggest,  and  where  the  unlimited  discretion  of  the 
sovereign  is  the  only  rule,  and  his  will  the  only  law— Congress  is 
not  that  sovereign.  The  principle  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  true  as 
a general  proposition,  that  the  grant  of  a sovereign  power  includes 
the  grant  of  all  sovereign  means,  applicable  to  the  end  of  such  pow- 
er— but  it  is  not  true  in  the  case  before  us.  A restriction  has  been 
placed  by  the  Convention,  upon  the  implied  powers  of  Congress.  It 
is  not  simply  a restriction  according  to  the  plain  and  obvious  import 
of  the  words,  but  it  is  a restriction  in  fact , the  evidence  of  which 
fact,  is  to  be  found  in  the  journals  of  the  Convention. 

What  then  becomes  of  the  decision  in  AT  Cullocli,  vs.  the  State  of 
Maryland.  The  ground  of  the  Supreme  Court,  that  the  declaratory 
clause  enlarges  rather  than  abridges  the  powers  of  Congress  has 
failed,  and  thus  must  fall  to  the  ground,  that  huge  pile  or  pyramid 
of  constructive  powers,  which  the  industry  of  the  Chief  Justice, 
with  the  aid  of  all  his  transcendant  powers  of  reasoning,  has  been 
rearing  to  throw  into  the  shade  the  sovereignty  of  the  States.  The 
Court,  too,  is  wrong,  decidedly  wrong,  when  it  pronounces,  tliat 
without  such  a liberal  construction  as  its  own,  to  the  clause  in 
question,  “ the  Constitution  would  be  a splendid  bauble.”  Expe- 
rience and  fact  boldly  contradict  this  assertion.  Abolish  the  Bank 
to-morrow,  as  it  was  abolished  once  before.  Call  in  the  bp.igade 
of  Civil  and  Military  Engineers,  who  have  been  taking  their  summit 
levels  all  along  the  great  Alleghany  ridge  of  Mountains,  with 
a view  to  defend  us  against  the  British.  Stop  all  further  ap- 
propriations for  Canals  and  other  National  works,  which  are  draw- 
ing the  life  blood  of  the  South,  and  enriching  the  North.  Leave 
the  great  Cumberland  road,  upon  which  upwards  of  a million  of 
dollars  have  been  expended,  to  be  hereafter  repaired  by  Maryland,  or 
by  Pennsylvania,  who  have  such  an  interest  in  it,  and  who  are 
struggling  for  the  trade  of  the  West.  Leave  the  American  Negro 
Colony  on  the  coast  of  Africa  to  take  care  of  itself,  or  to  be  eaten 
up  by  the  Savages.  Put  out  of  Congress,  all  the  petitions  and  me- 
morials of  Judge  Washington’s  Colonization,  or  Insurrection  Soci- 

o 


38 


ety.  Cast  into  the  waters  of  eternal  oblivion,  the  speeches  of  some 
of  our  own  Statesmen  on  Internal  Improvements  and  Military 
Roads;  and  all  the  ultra  and  sweeping  doctrines  of  the  “general 
welfare.”  Repeal  the  Tariff  Laws,  and  disclaim  all  pretence  to 
the  exercise  of  great  substantive  sovereign  powers,  under  the  flimsy 
pretence  of  their  being  implied  means  of  carrying  into  effect  other 
powers.  In  a word,  proclaim  from  Passanmquoddy  to  Cape  Flo- 
rida, that  the  “ means  to  an  end,”  and  the  whole  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court  is  an  absurdity — and  who  besides  the  Supreme 
Court  will  venture  to  say,  that  for  the  want  of  a power  to  do  all 
these  things,  our  Constitution  would  be  a bauble.  No,  my  fellow- 
citizens,  the  Government  for  thirty  years  was  respected  at  home  and 
respected  abroad.  Without  a National  or  other  Bank,  we  achieved 
our  independence.  Without  a Bank,  and  Military  Roads,  and  Ca- 
nals, and  Tariffs,  we  waged  a successful  war  a second  time  against 
the  greatest  power  in  the  world,  and  we  have  arrived  to  our  splend- 
id rank  amongst  the  nations  of  the  earth,  by  the  exercise  of  pow- 
ers, which  toe  all  agree  the  Government  possesses,  and  about  which, 
there  never  was,  at  any  time,  the  least  difference  of  opinion.  If  an 
adherence  in  good  faith,  to  the  true  principles  and  spirit  of  the  com- 
pact, (with  but  few  exceptions,)  from  the  foundation  of  the  Govern- 
ment, (to  the  accession  of  Mr.  Monroe,  and  the  introduction  of  the 
“AMERICAN  POLICY,”)  was  upon  that  construction  of  the  in- 
strument, which  would  make  it  a mere  bauble,  it  was  exactly  that 
sort  of  bauble,  which  of  all  others,  we  in  the  South  want,  and  ought 
to  have,  and  MUST  have. 

Take  away  all  the  powers  which  Congress  have  usurped  within 
the  last  eight  or  ten  years,  and  let  us  go  back  to  the  time  of  Mr. 
Jefferson,  and  so  far  from  the  Government  of  the  Union  being  em- 
barrassed in  any  way  by  the  safe  and  the  rational  construction  here 
contended  for,  against  that  of  the  Supreme  Court,  1 will  be  embold- 
ened to  say,  that  it  will  daily  become  more  and  more  firmly  rooted 
in  the  affections  of  the  people — the  peace  and  harmony  of  the  Union 
will  be  more  and  more  consolidated,  and  the  arm  of  the  country  for 
commerce  and  defence  more  strengthened,  and  invigorated;  whereas 
under  the  construction  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  importance  of  the 
States  will  be  daily  diminished,  as  the  patronage  and  power  of  the 
General  Government  shall  be  augmented,  and  their  sovereignty  and 
independence  will  be  endangered  and  finally  destroyed  ; and  thus 
will  perish,  perhaps,  the  best  hopes  of  the  friends  of  civil  liberty  in 
both  hemispheres. 


mo.  11. 

That  Congress  in  executing  its  delegated  powers,  was  not  to  pos- 
sess, all  the  diversified  means,  which  belong  to  sovereign  powers  ge- 
nerally, is  not  only  evident  from  the  restriction  imposed  on  their 
means,  as  already  noticed,  but  it  may  be  made  apparent  by  another 
consideration,  which  is,  that  had  such  a doctrine  been  entertained, 
many  of  the  provisions  in  the  Constitution,  would  have  been  rank 
surplusage,  and  from  such  a reproach,  I presume,  we  all  agree,  the 


39 


Convention  was  exempt.  But  the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
was  not  the  doctrine  of  17S7.  The  Constitution  speaks  no  such  lan- 
guage. On  the  contrary,  the  instrument  abounds  with  examples, 
which  clearly  indicate  an  opposite  purpose.  Where  can  it  be  mani- 
fested more  strongly,  than  when  it  confers,  as  distinctly  enumerated 
powers,  those  powers,  which,  throughout  the  world,  are  understood 
and  acknowledged,  as  only  means  for  executing  other  powers  already 
given. 

For  example  : — Let  us  take  the  power  “ to  make  war.”  Are  not 
the  “ raising  of  armies ,”  “providing  and  maintaining  a navy,"  and 
“ the  power  to  call  out  the  militia  of  the  United  States,”  all  incidental 
to  the  waging  of  war?  What,  in  the  language  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
can  be  more  requisite,  and  “ more  fairly  and  plainly  applicable  to 
the  end  of  war,”  than  the  means  just  stated  ? All  of  these  are  every 
where,  the  usual  and  acknowledged  means  of  war.  According,  then, 
to  the  decision  of  the  Court,  the  power  to  declare  war,  carried  with 
it  every  other  power  having  a relation  to  war.  But,  the  members  of 
the  Convention  did  not  think  so,  for  it  appears,  that  they  gave  a dis- 
tinctly enumerated  power — 1st,  to  raise  armies  ; 2dly,  to  provide  a 
navy;  and  3dly,  to  call  out  the  militia.  Again — let  us  take  the  two 
enumerated  powers  to  raise  an  army  and  a navy,  would  we  not  sup- 
pose that  such  powers  as  these,  would  give  also  the  power  to  dis- 
cipline the  army  and  navy?  Ynu  yet  the  Convention  give  a separate 
power  to  “ make  rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land 
and  naval  forces.”  What  makes  it  stronger,  is,  that  this  clause  was 
not  in  the  reported  draft  of  the  Constitution,  but  afterwards  solmnly 
introduced  as  a seventeenth  power.  Again — what  can  be  more  ine- 
cessary  to  war,  and  to  armies  and  navies,  than  for  the  Government 
which  possesses  the  sovereign  power  on  such  subjects,  to  possess,  at 
the  same  time,  “ exclusive  authority  over  its  forts,  magazines,  ar- 
senals, dock  yards,  &c.”  and  yet  the  Convention  did  not  think  that 
the  power  to  the  one,  necessarily  gave  the  power  to  do  the  other,  for 
it  confers  this  power  by  a separate  article.  Let  us  go  farther, 
and  take  the  power  “ to  coin  money.”  Would  not,  nine  men  out 
of  ten,  pronounce,  that  according  to  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  the  power  “ to  protect  that  coin  from  counterfeits,”  was  ne- 
cessarily and  naturally  implied;  but  the  Convention  did  not  think 
so,  for  it  gave  a distinct  power  “ to  provide  for  the  punishment  of 
counterfeiting  the  current  coin  of  the  United  States.”  Take  the 
power  to  “ borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States” — what 
power  is  there,  that  can  be  more  incidental  to  this  power,  as  a means 
to  an  end , than  to  protect  Government  securities  from  discredit  by 
forgery,  by  punishing  those  who  counterfeit  them.  Ask  the  Chief 
Justice,  if  the  Government,  which  is  so  sovereign  as  to  borrow  mo- 
ney, and  bind  the  people,  to  any  extent,  can  pass  a law  to  provide 
for  the  punishment  of  counterfeiting  the  securities  of  the  public  debt, 
and  he  would  smile  at  your  ignorance  ; and  yet,  the  sages  of  1787, 
were  so  ignorant,  that  the  one  power  naturally  gave  the  other,  that 
they  unnecessarily  provided  for  both.  Let  us  take  the  power  to  “ re- 
gulate commerce  with  foreign  nations,”  &c.  Here  is  a general 


40 


power  susceptible  of  an  extensive  definition,  if  we  choose  to  plunge 
head  and  hears  into  implication.  Few  of  us,  however,  can  cliff < r as 
to  what  was  really  meant  by  the  regulation  of  commerce.  Such  a 
power,  it  is  universally  admitted,  embraces  every  subject  connected 
with  the  arrivals  and  departures  of  vessels,  such  as  imports  and  ex- 
ports, navigation  laws,  tonnage,  pilotage,  light-houses,  (not  “of  the 
skies,”)  &c.  But  that  the  States  did  not,  by  the  power  to  regulate 
commerce  externally  and  internally,  intend  to  surrender  to  Congress, 
a legislation  over  every  subject  connected  with  commerce,  directly 
or  indirectly,  is  evident,  from  their  deeming  it  necessary,  to  confer 
distinct  powers  on  some  subjects,  which  are  manifestly  commercial. 
What  subject,  for  instance,  can  be  more  purely  commercial,  than  the 
subject  of  Bankruptcy.  But  that  the  States  did  not  consider  a Bank- 
rupt law  as  incident  to  the  regulation  of  commerce,  appears  by  their 
providing  for  such  a law,  by  a separate  power.  Coining  money, 
arid  regulating  its  value,  both  domestic  and  foreign —fixing  a stand- 
ard of  weights  and  measures — defining  and  punishing  piracies  and 
offences  against  the  law  of  nations — establishing  and  regulating  a 
post-office — laying  imposts — all  these  are  naturally  allied  to  the 
regulation  of  commerce  : and  yet,  there  is  to  be  found  in  the  Consti- 
tution, a separate  power  for  each.  Now,  who  can  doubt,  hut  that,  if 
none  of  these  last  enumerations  of  power  were  to  be  found  in  the 
Constitution,  and  the  Supreme  Court  had  been  called  on  to  decide, 
whether  under  the  great  sovereign  power  to  “ regulate  commerce  fo- 
reign and  domestic,”  Congress  could  establish  a post-office,  or  a 
Bankrupt  law,  or  have  a national  coin,  fix  a standard  of  weights  and 
measures,  or  punish  pirates, &c. : but  that  the  Chief  Justice  would  be 
astounded,  that  the  power  of  a Government  so  sovereign,  should  be 
doubted  in  these  instances.  If  I have  ten  grains  of  sense,  or  if  my 
readers  have  as  many,  they  must  forcibly  see,  that  a post-office,  or  a 
bankrupt  law,  or  a standard  of  weights  and  measures,  has  an  affinity 
to  the  regulation  of  “commerce  between  the  States,”  as  a means , 
fully  as  close  as  that  of  a Bank  to  the  “ collection  of  taxes,”  and 
for  a plain  reason.  Taxes  were  gathered  before  the  Christian  era; 
and  were  collected  in  our  country,  as  they  now  are  in  some  coun- 
tries, without  the  aid  of  Banks.  But  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  a 
country  strictly  commercial  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term,  in 
which  there  is  not  a bankrupt  law,  and  a post-office,  and  an  uni- 
formity in  weights  and  measures. 

To  say,  then,  that,  the  people  of  the  States,  when  they  were  con- 
ferring sovereignty  on  their  new  rulers,  entertained  the  opinion,  now- 
ascribed  to  them,  by  the  Supreme  Court,  viz  : — That  “ every  power 
given  by  them  was  intended  to  be  so  sovereign,  that  it  necessarily 
carried  with  it,  every  other  appropriate  power,  which,  in  the  discretion 
of  Congress,  it  should  regard  as  applicable  to  the  end  of  such  pow- 
er,” is  not  true.  Had  such  been  their  meaning,  there  would  not  be 
found  the  useless  provisions,  with  which,  in  such  a view,  the  instru- 
ment must  he  pronounced  to  abound.  Armies  and  navies,  and  forts, 
magazines,  and  dock  yards,  and  coining  arid  borrowing  money,  &c. 
are  all  the  acknowledged  means  of  making  war  upon  foreign  States, 


41 


and  as  such,  naturally  involved  in  such  a power.  And  yet  the  peo- 
ple made  these  and  others,  so  many  distinct  powers, thus  manifesting, 
as  clear  as  the  Sun  is  in  the  Heavens,  that  they  did  not  intend  the 
Federal  Government  to  exercise  any  important  power,  as  a means  to 
other  powers,  which  was  not  expressed  in  the  enumeration 

I am  not  sensible  that  the  foregoing  view  of  the  subject  can  be 
confuted,  unless  it  be  urged,  that  the  use  of  surplus  clauses,  or  lan- 
guage in  the  Constitution,  or  the  circumstance  of  giving  as  special 
grants  of  power,  those  which  necessarily  were  implied,  from  what 
was  already  given,  or  as  resulting  naturally  from  the  whole  mass  of 
powers,  ought  not  to  be  opposed  to  the  plain  axiom,  that  the  United 
States  Government  was  to  be  as  sovereign,  on  every  subject  entrust- 
ed to  it,  as  the  States  were  to  be,  as  to  what  was  retained.  The  an- 
swer is  this — it  would  be  idle,  worse  than  idle,  to  talk  of  surplus 
clauses  in  the  Constitution.  The  men  who  framed  it,  were  not  ig- 
norant or  illiterate  men,  who  in  expressing  their  intentions,  are  apt 
to  use  more  words  than  are  necessary.  On  the  contrary,  the  sages 
who  deliberately  discussed  and  considered  every  article  and  line  of 
this  charter,  were  fully  aware  of  the  import  of  words.  Amongst 
them,  were  unquestionably  the  first  Statesmen  and  Orators  of  our 
country.  Very  many  of  them  were  professional  men,  and  it  would 
be  a reproach  to  such  men,  assembled  as  they  were  for  months  and 
months,  to  mature  and  perfect  one  of  the  greatest  works  ever  en- 
trusted to  men,  to  imagine  that  there  is  in  that  instrument,  called  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  so  many  clauses,  that  were  not 
designed  to  have  a full  and  an  explicit  meaning.  If  there  be  any 
one  important  state  paper,  or  public  document,  in  the  world,  which, 
for  the  clearness  of  its  general  views,  the  minute  arrangement  of  its 
subjects,  and  the  exactness,  with  which  it  defines  the  power  which  it 
intends  to  confer,  is  more  distinguished  than  all  others,  that  docu- 
ment is  the  Federal  Constitution.  There  is  in  it,  nothing  of  redun- 
dancy, of  prolixity,  or  of  circumlocution.  For  brevity  and  perspi- 
cuity of  expression,  it  is  unrivalled  as  a composition.  There  pro- 
bably is  not  a sentence  in  it,  which  was  not,  amongst  the  members, 
the  subject  of  conversation  without,  or  the  theme  of  debate  within  the 
halls  of  the  Convention.  There  is  certainly  not  a clause  which  has 
been  retained,  in  which,  by  striking  it  out,  a material  alteration  might 
not  be  produced,  in  the  sense  and  meaning  of  those  who  penned  it. 

When,  therefore,  these  sages  were  so  precise  in  enumerating  the 
powers  they  designed  to  confer,  some  of  which  are  so  plainly  in- 
volved in,  or  incidental  to  others,  it  was  not  because  these  persons 
were  ignorant  that  armies,  and  navies,  and  a national  mint,  and  a 
national  debt,  were  the  most  obvious  means  of  war — it  was  not  be- 
cause they  believed,  that  the  power  to  coin  money,  and  to  borrow 
money,  did  not  carry  with  it  a power  to  protect  their  com  and  their 
securities  from  debasement  or  counterfeiting,  or  that  they  believed 
that  post-offices,  and  bankrupt  laws,  and  weights  and  measures,  were 
not  connected  with  commerce,  that  they  provided  separate  powers 
for  such  subjects — but  it  was,  because  they  wished  to  inculcate,  and 
to  have  it  clearly  understood,  that  they  designed,  that  no  power  should 


42 


be  exercised  for  which  there  was  not  a specific  grant.  They  designed, 
it  is  true,  that  all  the  necessary  and  proper  laws  should  be  passed,  to 
execute  those  powers  ; such  laws,  in  fact,  without  which  the  power 
would  he  nugatory,  and  they  added  a power  for  such  purposes:  But 
they  did  not  mean,  that  a power,  as  great  as  any  of  those  enume- 
rated, should  be  claimed,  under  the  poiver  to  make  necessary  laws. — 
Their  object  was,  to  leave  little  or  nothing,  to  construction ; and,  that 
there  should  be  no  necessity,  or  excuse,  on  the  part  of  Congress,  for 
passing  the  limits  of  power  assigned  to  it,  great  and  uncommon 
diligence,  seems  to  have  been  used,  not  to  omit  any  thing,  but  to  pro- 
vide every  power,  which  could  possibly  be  necessary,  to  regulate  the 
two  great  objects  for  which  the  Government  was  established,  to  Wit, 
COMMERCE  and  DEFENCE.  Had  they  been  less  precise,  they 
foresaw  that  the  Government  could  not  proceed  in  the  exercise  of 
some  of  the  most  necessary  powers , without  feeling  the  want,  of  an 
express  warrant  of  authority  in  the  Constitution,  and  that  it  would 
be  induced  to  resort  to  usurpation  from  necessity.  To  guard  against 
its  early  resorting  to  constructive  powers,  which  they  must  have 
dreaded,  and  to  which,  as  wise  men,  they  saw,  there  could  be  no 
end,  they  judiciously  conferred  on  Congress,  an  express  warrant  for 
every  material  power  which  the  Government  could  possibly  need,  in 
all  time  to  come,  out  of  mind,  for  the  happiness  of  the  American  peo- 
ple. And,  I ask  my  fellow-citizens — I call  upon  the  members  of  the 
Bar,  to  look  at  the  instrument,  and  to  designate,  if  they  can,  what 
power  it  is,  that  any  Government  can  want,  for  the  purposes  of  those 
great  objects,  WAR,  NEGOCIATION,  and  COMMERCE,  which 
has  been  withheld  from  the  Federal  Goverment  hy  the  States.  What 
power  is  there,  1 ask,  and  I ask  it  triumphantly,  the  want  of  which, 
to  render  us  an  happy  and  an  united  people,  is  not  to  be  found  writ- 
ten down  in  the  Constitution  ; or,  who  can  say,  that  this  Government, 
in  its  experience  of  forty  years,  (during  which  time  it  has  been  at 
war  twice,  and  in  peace  has  conducted  us  to  the  most  unexampled 
prosperity)  when  it  was  about  to  use  a power  for  objects,  in  which 
all  the  people  are  interested,  to  wit,  defence  and  commerce,  could 
ever  point  to  the  Constitution,  and  shew,  that  for  this  or  that  power 
so  about  to  be  used,  it  could  not  find  an  EXPRESS  WARRANT. 
No  man  can  say  it  ; and  this  circumstance  alone  evinces  the  wisdom, 
the  consummate  wisdom  of  the  men  who  framed  the  Constitution. 
Such  a fact  is  worth  a million  of  arguments  to  strengthen  my  po- 
sition, that  the  new  Government  was  never  to  be  carried  on  by  im- 
plied powers.  The  enumeration  of  so  many  powers,  which  are  but 
as  means  to  other  powers,  is  TOTALLY  JRRECQNCILEABLE 
with  the  principle,  upon  which  is  founded,  at  the  present  day,  under 
the  sanction  of  the  Supreme  Court,  all  those  implied  powers,  which 
are  now  exercised  by  Congress. 

Our  sages  having  thus  granted  every  necessary  power,  and  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Congress,  all  the  means  which  it  could  possi- 
bly need  to  administer  the  government,  to  the  happiness  of  the  peo- 
ple; and  having  withdrawn  every  pretext,  for  the  resort  to  usurpa- 
tion from  necessity,  which  would  have  been  the  case,  had  they  been 


43 


less  precise,  the  State  Legislatures  were  yet  not  satisfied.  The  first 
care  of  these  Legislatures  to  prevent  dispute,  was,  to  draw  around 
the  powess  of  Congress,  certain  boundaries,  beyond  which,  it  should 
never,  in  any  event,  pass.  “The  enumeration  of  certain  rights,” 
says  the  Constitution,  “ shall  not  be  construed  to  deny  or  disparage 
others  retained  by  the  people.”  And  again — “ The  powers  not  de- 
legated to  the  United  States  by  the  Constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it 
to  the  States,  are  reserved  to  the  States  respectively,  or  to  the  peo- 
ple.” 

What  is  the  meaning  of  these  clauses  in  the  Constitution,  con- 
nected with  the  enumeration  of  powers  and  the  history  of  the  times? 
It  is  this  : We,  the  people  of  thirteen  States,  desire  a Federal  HEAD 
to  regulate  our  commerce,  and  a Federal  ARM  to  protect  us.  On 
no  other  subject  are  our  wants  common,  or  our  interests  the  same. 
To  this  end,  and  this  end  alone,  we  need  a General  Government, 
and  for  these  two  purposes,  the  power  we  give,  shall  be  exclusive. 
The  sword  and  the  purse  we  give  you ; but  as  we  desigu  the  Gov 
eminent  for  an  especial  purpose,  so  we  shall  limit  you  by  special 
powers.  To  confer  power  on  you  in  general  terms,  would  be  to 
give  you,  with  the  sword  and  the  purse  in  your  hands,  power  to  de- 
stroy the  States,  and  to  consolidate  our  people  into  a nation.  In 
this  Charter  you  will  find  yourselves  called  upon  to  regulate  com- 
merce, and  provide  for  the  public  defence.  It  contains  every  sub- 
stantial power  which  you  can  possibly  need.  As  strange  as  it  may 
seem  to  you,  that  when  we  give  you  the  sovereign  power,  for  war 
and  foreign  negociation,  and  commerce,  we  should  specify  the  ob- 
vious means  which  such  powers  necessarily  involve  ; yet  we  have  a 
design  in  this — we  intend,  that  in  your  progress  onward  as  a Gov- 
ernment, you  shall  be  provided  with  means  for  your  journey,  and 
use  none  but  what  we  shall  give  you — and  that  you  may  not  reproach 
us  with  carelessness  or  negligence  in  the  supply,  we  have  made  it 
most  ample ; and  that  you  may  not  wander  from  your  path,  we 
have  prescribed  the  boundaries,  beyond  which  you  must  never  tread 
your  way. 

Is  not  the  idea  an  absurd  one,  that  the  same  men  who  deemed  it 
necessary  to  give  to  Congress  by  a special  grant , the  power  to  give 
a patent  for  an  improved  Cotton  Gin , should  intend  that  it  should 
exercise  powers,  not  only  not  named,  but  not  even  hinted  at — pow- 
ers which  belong  to  undivided  sovereignty  ? The  words  “ Canals” 
or  “National  Roads,”  or  “Internal  Improvements,”  are  not  to  be 
found  in  the  Constitution  ; or,  any  words  which  ingenuity  can  tor- 
ture to  mean  any  such  thing,  and  yet  Congress  is  projecting  national 
works,  which,  whether  we  regard  their  SCALE  and  immensity,  as 
to  the  territory  upon  which  they  are  to  be  spread — the  TIME  in 
which  they  may  he  executed,  or  the  COST  at  which  they  are  to  be 
completed,  would  not  shrink  in  a comparison  with  many  of  the 
great  enterprises  of  antient  and  modern  times.  Vast  extents  of 
roads  are  to  penetrate  our  forests — an  extensive  peninsula  is  to  be 
divided  in  twain — chains  and  chains  of  mountains  are  to  be  tra- 
versed with  canals,  and  all  the  elements  of  power  about  to  be  de- 


44 


veloped,  of  which  Imperial  Rome,  in  her  proudest  days  of  conquest 
and  dominion,  has  left  us  so  many  monuments — on  which,  even  a 
Napoleon  might  employ  his  genius  and  his  care — and  which  belong 
only  to  those  States  and  Kingdoms,  and  those  alone,  which  have 
exclusive  dominion  over  the  soil  and  territory , as  well  as  over  per- 
sons and  other  subjects,  which  are  the  objects  of  Civil  Government. 
It  is  too  monstrous,  that  a Government,  so  limited  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, that  it  cannot,  without  the  EXPRESS  consent  of  a State  pre- 
viously obtained,  purchase  and  exclusively  hold  land  for  its  Forts, 
Magazines,  Dock-yards,  &c. — shall  dare  to  claim  such  a para- 
mount authority,  as  to  have  national  roads  and  national  canals, 
which  involve  the  right  of  territorial  jurisdiction,  over  every  portion 
of  twenty-four  Sovereign  States. 

Against  such  doctrines,  and  such  foul  usurpations,  I protest.  As 
acute  as  may  be  the  intellects,  and  gigantic  as  are  the  reasoning  fa- 
culties of  those  who  sit  upon  the  judgment  seat  of  the  highest  tribu- 
nal in  our  land,  yet  I would  not  give  the  unsophisticated,  and  the 
patriotic,  and  the  honest  views  which  may  be  taken  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, for  all  their  decisions,  were  they  ten  times  as  learned  as  they 
are.  No  intelligent  man,  can  impartially  read  the  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  and  contemplate  the  proceedings  of  Congress  of 
late,  without  pronouncing  that  the  Constitution  is  A DEAD  LET- 
TER — It  may  mean  ANY  THING,  or  it  may  mean  NOTHING. 
If  my  views  of  the  subject  are  unsound,  and  my  fellow-citizens  shall 
pronounce  that  Congress  is  in  the  prescribed  limits  of  its  powers, 
adieu,  a long  adieu,  to  the  interests  and  the  SAFETY  of  South- 
Carolina. 


Let  us  continue  our  subject.  Amongst  the  enumerated  powers  in  the 
Constitution,  is  the  power  “ to  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United 
States.”  This  is  a power  unlimited  in  its  extent,  and  embracer  every  pos- 
sible mode  known,  or  to  be  known  amongst  nations,  for  raising  money  for 
the  exigencies  of  Governments.  To  have  affixed  any  limitation  of  such  a 
power,  would  be,  according  to  the  general  views  of  the  Supreme  Court,  to 
tie  down  Congress  to  provide  for  the  public  safety,  not  only  in  this,  but  in 
after  ages,  and  to  deny  to  them  a power  commensurate  with  the  great  ob- 
ject, to-wit,  the  liberty  of  accommodating  its  means  to  the  vicissitudes, 
which  are  constantly  taking  place  in  the  affairs  of  a country  Had,  there- 
fore, the  question  before  the  Supreme  Court  been  in  1819,  whether  Con- 
gress could  “ emit  bills  of  credit,”  or  in  other  wotds,  resort  to  the  11  paper 
emission”  of  the  revolutionary  war,  who  can  doubt,  hut  that  the  Supreme 
Court  would  have  then  decided,  that  the  Legislature  had  such  a power. — 
What,  “shall  a Government  (to  use  the  language  of  the  Court)  which 
has  the  great  powers  to  lay  and  collect  taxes;  to  borrow  money;  to  regu- 
late commerce ; to  declare  and  conduct  a war;  and  to  raise  and  support 
armies;  having  entrusted  to  its  government  the  sword  and  the  purse — all 
the  externa!  relations,  and  no  inconsiderable  portion  of  the  industry  of  the 
nation” — shall  it  be  pretended,  that  such  a Government,  (should  the  pub- 
lic exigencies  demand  it,)  has  not  the  power,  to  issue  continental,  or  paper 


45 


money  ? But  why  do  we  reason  about  it  ? On  such  a question,  had  it 
occurred  at  that  time,  I would  have  asked  no  favours  of  the  Court.  I would 
have  demanded  of  them  to  decide,  that  Congress  could  issue  continental 
money.  I would  have  adduced  to  the  judges,  the  case  of  McCulloch  vs. 
The  State  of  Maryland , where  they  decide,  that  a corporation  is  but  44  a 
means  to  an  end,”  and  that  a National  Bank  is  a means  necessary  and 
proper  to  the  44  collection  of  a tax  and  I would  have  insisted,  that  were 
such  a bank  an  appropriate  means  for  such  a purpose,  that  bills  of  credit , 
were  a still  more  appropriate  means,  and  more  plainly  applicable  to  the 
end  of  44  borrowing  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States.”  and  of  the 
power  to  declare  war,  and  other  enumerated  powers  in  the  Constitution. — 
That  the  one,  had  but  a distant  relation  to  its  object,  whilst  the  other,  had 
a direct,  and  an  obvious  connection — that  the  latter  had  been  the  means, 
by  which  we  had  conducted  a successful  war  for  our  liberties  and  our  in- 
dependence, and  that  it  is  a means,  to  which  every  government  must 
resort,  when  it  cannot  raise  money  by  other  expedients.  I would,  more- 
over, have  reminded  the  Court,  that  such  a power  must  have  been  intend- 
ed to  be  involved  in  the  other  powers,  inasmuch  as  an  express  limitation 
is  to  be  found  in  the  Constitution,  that  the  States  shall  not  emit  bills  of 
credit,  but  that  no  restriction  of  the  kind,  is  to  be  seen  amongst  the  limita- 
tions on  the  powers  of  Congress.  The  Court,  under  such  a view,  to  be 
consistent  with  itself,  must  have  decided,  that  Congress  could  issue  paper 
money. 

But  fortunate,  most  fortunate  is  it,  for  its  reputation,  that  such  a question 
never  came  before  the  Supreme  Court,  and  that  such  a decision  was  never 
made.  Had  there  been  a decision,  it  would  have  established  the  extraor- 
dinary fact,  that  the  Supreme  Court  gave  to  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  a power  which  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  had  determined, 
that  they  ought  not  to  possess.  The  fact  would  thus  appear. 

In  the  reported  draft  of  the  committee  of  detail,  presented  to  the  Con- 
vention, the  clause  in  question  stood  thus  : 44  To  borrow  money,  and  emit 
Bills , on  the  credit  of  the  United  States.”  On  the  16th  of  August,  when 
this  clause  was  under  consideration,  a motion  was  made,  to  strike  out  the 
words  44  and  emit  bills,”  which  motion  was  carried — nine  States  in  the 
affirmative,  and  two  against  the  motion.  Had  this  been  a mere  motion  to 
strike  out  these  words,  there  might  have  been  room  to  suppose,  that  the 
opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court,  prevailed  amongst  the  members,  to-wit  : 
that  the  major  power  necessarily  included  the  minor.  But  the  reverse  of 
this  is  the  conclusion.  Mr.  Luther  Martin,  from  Maryland,  and  others, 
urged,  44  that  it  would  be  improper  to  deprive  the  Congress  of  the  power 
to  issue  paper  money  ; that  it  would  be  a novelty  unprecedented,  to  es- 
tablish a government,  which  should  not  have  such  authority.  That  it  was 
impossible  to  look  forward  into  futurity,  so  far  as  to  decide,  that  events 
might  not  happen,  that  should  render  the  exercise  of  such  a power  abso- 
lutely necessary.”  I will  not  quote  the  rest  of  his  arguments  ; but,  says 
Mr.  Martin  to  the  Legislature  of  Maryland  : — “ A majority  of  the  Con- 
vention being  willing  to  risk  any  political  evil , rather  than  the  idea  of  a 
paper  emission , in  any  possible  case,  refused  to  trust  this  authority  to  a 
Government,  to  which  they  were  lavishing  the  most  unlimited  powers  of 
taxation,  and  to  the  mercv  of  which,  they  were  willing  to  trust  the  liberty 

6 


46 

and  property  of  the  citizens  of  every  State  in  the  Union,  and  they  erased 
that  clause  from  the  system.”* 

The  lesson  here  inculcated  is  a most  salutary  one.  It  ought  to  teach  all 
judiciary  tribunals,  and  particularly  the  Supreme  Court,  that  on  all  ques- 
tions of  constitutional  law,  unaided  by  the  journals  of  the  Convention,  or 
other  lights,  the  best  rule  of  interpretation  is  the  plain  letter  of  the  Consti- 
tution. That  to  travel  beyond  this,  is  to  enter  a boundless  field  of  conjec- 
ture, in  which  there  is  always  danger  of  giving  to  the  Constitution  a mean- 
ing, which  the  framers  not  only  never  had,  but  to  which,  perhaps,  they 
would  have  given  their  most  zealous  opposition.  In  the  instance  before 
us,  we  have  a most  illustrious  example.  In  the  history  of  the  clause  just 
referred  to,  there  is  the  most  abundant  evidence,  that  implied  powers,  as 
they  are  called,  were  never  in  the  contemplation  of  the  Convention.  The 
supporters  of  the  motion,  to  strike  out  the  power  to  issue  paper  money, 
must  have  been  well  assured,  in  their  own  minds,  (and  they  were  from  nine 
States,)  that  no  power,  not  included  in  the  list  of  enumerated  powers, 
with  the  exception  of  the  power  to  make  the  necessary  laws  to  exet  ute  the 
particular  power,  could  be  claimed.  Had  they  not  thought  so,  it  would 
be  difficult  to  account,  for  their  omitting  to  prohibit  Congress  from  the 
exercise  of  the  power  in  question,  by  adding  it  to  the  other  limitations,  on 
the  powers  of  Congress.  Their  not  providing  for  such  a limitation  in  ex- 
press terms,  is  conclusive,  that  they  deemed  it  unnecessary. 

It  is  much  to  be  lamented,  that  the  debates  of  the  Convention  preserved 
by  Chief  Justice  Yates,  do  not  extend  to  the  later  periods  of  the  session  of 
that  body,  when  the  enumerated  powers  were  under  discussion,  as  in  that 
case,  we  should  have  known  distinctly  the  views  of  members,  as  to  the  in- 
sertion and  rejection  of  particular  passages.  Mr.  Yates  and  Mr.  Lan- 
sing, both  deputies  from  New-York,  left  the  Convention  in  disgust,  as 
soon  as  the  great  outlines  of  the  Government  had  been  agreed  on.  The 
journals  of  the  Convention,  however,  furnish  us  with  some  important  ma- 
terials, as  to  the  rise  and  progress  of  some  of  the  powers  of  Congress. 

The  first  step  taken  by  the  Convention  was,  as  to  the  outlines  of  the 
Government ; for  the  members  had  no  sooner  met,  than  it  was  discovered 
that  there  were  amongst  them  three  parties  of  opposite  views.  The  first 
party,  Mr.  Martin  informs  us,  wished  to  annihilate  all  State  Govern- 
ments, and  to  establish  a General  Government  in  nature  of  a limited  mon- 
archy. This  party  was  small,  but  several  belonged  to  it  who  did  not 
openly  avow  their  sentiments.  The  second  party  was  “ not  for  the  abo- 
lition of  the  State  Governments,  nor  for  the  introduction  of  a monarchical 
Government  under  any  form  ; but  they  wished  to  establish  such  a system 
as  would  give  their  own  States  undue  influence  over  the  ether  States.”  A 
third  party  “ was  truly  Federal  and  Republican,  and  nearly  equal  in  num- 
ber with  the  other  two,” 

In  order  to  test  the  opinions  of  members,  as  to  what  the  new  Govern- 
ment should  be,  Governor  Randolph,  of  Virginia,  very  early  offered  his 
fifteen  resolutions,  and  upon  these  resolutions,  did  the  members  debate  and 
differ,  in  committee  of  the  whole,  and  in  convention,  for  about  two  months: 
when,  together  with  Mr.  Pinckney’s  draft  of  a Constitution,  also  early 
submitted  to  the  Convention,  though  not  taken  up,  they  were  both  referred. 


* Yates’  Debates,  page  57. 


47 


to  a committee  of  detail,  to  report  a Constitution,  agreeably  to  the  reso- 
lutions as  amended. 

There  is  no  need  for  our  purpose,  to  refer  to  any  of  these  resolutions  as 
amended  by  the  Convention,  excepting  the  sixth,  as  it  is  this  resolution 
alone,  in  which  we  are  to  look  for  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  legislative 
powers  to  be  vested  in  Congress.  It  is  in  these  words  : — “Resolved,  That 
the  National  Legislature  ought  to  possess  the  legislative  rights  vested  in 
Congress  by  the  Confederation  ; and  moreover,  to  legislate,  in  all  cases,  for 
the  GENERAL  interests  of  the  Union;  and  also,  in  those,  to  which  the 
States  are  separately  incompetent,  or,  in  which  the  harmony  of  the  United 
States  may  be  interrupted  by  the  exercise  of  individual  legislation.” 

This  resolution  was  the  basis,  to  which  the  enumerated,  and  other  pow- 
ers of  Congress,  were  to  be  conformed  by  the  committee  of  detail.  “ The 
general  interests  of  the  Union,”  was  not  a new  phrase.  It  is  used  in  the 
5th  article  of  the  old  Confedeiation,  and  is  there  synonimous  with  the  term 
“ general  welfare”  used  three  times  in  that  instrument,  to  wit,  in  the  third, 
eighth,  and  ninth  articles.  The  committee,  therefore,  could  be  at  no  loss 
to  understand  what  was  meant  by  the  term  “ general  interests.”  It  did 
not  mean  such  interests,  as  a majority  of  the  States  might  possess,  as  con- 
tra-distinguished from  different  and  opposite  interests,  possessed  by  other 
States,  which  composed  the  minority,  for  it  was  not  used  in  that  sense  in 
the  Confederation,  that  body  having  no  specified  power  on  any  subject 
whatever,  in  which  one  State  was  not  equally,  and  directly  interested  with 
another. 

The  subjects  upon  which  the  Confederation  operated,  were  those  of 
WAR,  PEACE,  INDIAN  TRADE,  and  Foreign  NEGOCIATION. 
The  old  Congress,  could  not  meddle  with  the  navigation  interests  of  the 
New  England  States,  nor  with  the  great  agricultural  interests  of  the  South. 
These  were  the  local  interests  of  the  States,  over  which  they  had  no  pow- 
er, by  any  grant  from  the  States,  general  or  special.  They  had  the  charge 
only  of  general  interests,  strictly  and  truly  so  called.  But  there  was  one 
general  interest,  on  which  the  Confederation  could  not  legislate,  and  that 
interest  was  commerce  with  foreign  nations.  This  was  a paramount  gene- 
ral intetest  of  the  whole  Union,  not  an  interest  of  a majority  of  the  States, 
but  the  direct  interest  of  every  State — and  the  want  of  a common  head  to 
direct  which  in  each  State,  was  about  to  involve  the  whole  in  distress  and 
ruin.  The  meaning  of  the  word  “ general  interests  of  the  Union,”  becomes 
now  to  be  obvious  to  the  reader.  The  committee  of  detail  understood  the 
phrase.  The  path,  | rescribed  for  them,  in  drawing  up  the  Constitution, 
was  plainly  marked.  Their  enumeration  of  powers,  was  to  embrace,  ac- 
cording to  the  resolution.  first — The  powers  granted  to  the  old  Confede- 
ration, already  referred  to.  Se  ondl  v — The  general  interests  of  the  Union, 
amongst  which,  foreign  commerce  stands  pre-eminent.  In  fact,  it  com- 
prises almost  every  other  general  interest,  not  provided  for  in  the  Confe- 
deration. Thirdly — The  cases,  to  which  the  States  are  separately  incompe- 
tent to  legislate  with  effect.  Amongst  these,  is  the  power  to  grant  patents 
and  copy  rights ; defining  felonies  on  the  high  seas,  and  offences  against 
the  law  of  nations — for  which  the  articles  of  Confederation  had  made  no 
provision  Under  this  head,  may  properly  be  included,  the  power  to  de- 
clare the  law  and  punishment  of  treason,  and  some  others.  Fourthly — The 
cases,  in  which  the  harmony  of  the  States  might  be  interrupted  by  indi- 


48 


vidual  legislation  ; such  as,  the  regulation  of  the  intercourse  between  the 
States;  a national  coin;  naturalization  and  bankrupt  laws.  For  these 
powers  also,  the  Confederation  had  not  provided. 

The  reported  draft  of  the  Constitution,  by  the  committee  of  detail,  it 
will  be  seen,  is  in  consonance  with  the  sixth  resolution,  and  with  the  out- 
line of  power,  fixed  by  the  Convention. 

That  the  committee  of  detail  did  not  regard  Agriculture,  or  Manufac- 
tures, or  Internal  Improvements,  as  a general  interest  of  the  Union,  appears 
from  their  reporting  no  specific  power,  in  relation  to  these  objects — nor  are 
the  words  to  be  found  either  in  the  reported,  or  amended  draft  of  the  Consti- 
tution Indeed,  how  could  they  provide  for  the  interests  of  Agriculture — 
Though  each  State  had  its  own  agriculture : yet,  in  those  days,  the  States 
designated  as  the  Agricultural  States,  were  the  Southern  States,  whose  in- 
terests were  diametrically  opposite  to  the  growing  Navigation  interests  of 
the  Northern  and  Eastern  States.  It  would  have  been  as  wrong  to  pro- 
vide for  Agricultural,  (there  were  then  no  Manufacturing  classes)  as  for 
Navigation  interests — But  as  Navigation  interests  might  be  promoted,  un- 
der the  general  power  of  “regulating  commerce,”  it  became  the  care  of 
the  committee  to  provide  a limitation  on  this  general  power,  and  hence  a- 
rose  that  clause  in  the  reported  draft,  which  says,  that  “ No  Navigation 
Act  shall  be  passed  without  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  pre- 
sent in  each  House.”  This  clause  was  afterwards  stricken  out — by  which 
erasure,  the  great  Eastern  Navigation  interest,  which  is  decidedly  a local, 
and  not  a general  interest  of  the  Union,  is  the  only  local  interest  which 
Congress  can,  at  this  day,  promote,  under  the  Constitution.  It  has 
the  unlimited  and  the  undoubted  power.  The  manner  in  which  this  local 
interest  came  to  be  protected,  is  this — The  staple  and  commercial  States,  as 
the  Southern  States  were  then  called,  wished  to  retain  this  clause,  “ lest 
their  commerce  should  be  placed  too  much  under  the  power  of  the  Eastern 
States — but  which  these  last  States  were  as  anxious  to  reject.  The  East- 
ern States,  however,  notwithstanding  their  aversion  to  Slavery,  were  very 
willing  to  indulge  their  Southern  brethren  with  a temporary  liberty  to  pro- 
secute the  Slave  Trade,  provided  the  Southern  States  would,  in  their  turn, 
gratify  them  by  laying  no  restriction  on  Navigation  Acts.”  The  matter 
being  difficult  to  adjust,  it  was  referred  to  a large  committee,  consisting 
of  a member  from  each  State,  and  it  resulted  in  this  compromise — Slaves 
were  not  to  be  prohibited  to  be  brought  into  the  United  States  by  Congress, 
before  1808 — and  the  above  restrictive  clause  relative  to  Navigation  Acts, 
was  to  be  omitted.  (See  Yates’  debates.)  Thus  it  is,  that  an  Eastern  and 
a local  interest,  is  in  the  power  of  Congress  to  promote — But  it  can  foster 
and  encourage  no  other,  under  the  Constitution. 


mo.  13. 

The  report  of  the  committee  of  detail,  as  connected  with  the  basis  previ- 
ously fixed  by  the  Convention,  on  which  the  enumeration  of  powers  was  to 
be  made  out,  is  worthy  of  considerable  notice,  and  I may  be  pardoned,  if  I 
dwell  longer  on  the  document, even  if  I be  chargeable  with  some  repetition. 
It  is  conclusive,  I aver,  to  shew,  that  they  considered  the  “ general  inte- 
rests of  the  Union”  precisely  in  the  sense  in  which  I have  used  it,  to  wit, 
interests,  in  which  each  State  directly  participates,  and  not  those  interests, 
IB  which  a majority  of  the  States,  or  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  are 


49 


solely  or  principally  concerned,  and  in  which  others,  at  the  same  time, 
have  no  share.  The  evidence  of  this  their  construction,  is  very  ample  in 
their  own  work,  submitted  to  the  Convention.  In  reporting  the  subjects, 
or  cases  for  national  legislation,  there  is  not  one , which  is  not  undeniably 
as  much  an  object  of  general  concern  in  the  South,  as  well  as  in  the  North; 
in  New-Hampshire,  as  well  as  in  Georgia.  All  wanted  a disciplined  mi- 
litia, an  army,  a navy,  a national  coin  and  currency,  public  credit,  and 
other  means  of  defence — all  were  directly  interested  in  foreign  commerce, 
and  in  foreign  negociation — all  needed  some  provision  to  regulate  the  in- 
tercourse, and  to  preserve  harmony  in  legislation,  between  the  States.  If 
there  be  in  the  reported,  or  the  amended  draft,  a single  subject  for  their 
legislation,  w hich  is  not  strictly  a “ general  interest,”  in  our  sense  of  the 
term,  (except  it  be  the  power  to  pass  navigation  laws,  now  included  in  the 
commercial  power,  which  we  have  seen  was  agreed  to  by  compromise)  let 
the  advocates  for  an  extended  government  point  it  out.  It  cannot  be  shewn. 
It  would  have  been  unwise  and  dangerous  to  invest  Congress,  with  a pow- 
er to  legislate  on  subjects,  in  which  eight  States  might  be  interested,  and  in 
which,  the  other  five  might  have  no  interest,  directly  or  indirectly,  it  would 
have  put  the  minor  States  in  the  power  of  the  larger ; it  would  have 
invested  Congress  with  a power  to  legislate  unequally  upon  the  States, 
a species  of  dangerous  legislation,  upon  which  the  Convention  designed  to 
exclude  it.  Nature,  in  forming  these  States,  has  not  been  blindly  partial 
to  any  one.  If  she  has  conferred  upon  the  Smith,  the  capacity  to  raise 
rich  and  valuable  products,  she  has  not  been  wanting  in  her  magnificence 
to  the  North.  They  have  their  advantages  too,  which  are  obvious  to  all. — 
To  put  it  in  the  power  of  Congress  to  legislate  upon  any  subject,  in  which 
there  is  not  an  interest  in  common,  between  North  and  South,  would  be  to 
suffer  the  majority  to  enjoy  all  the  blessings  given  them  by  nature,  and  to 
take,  by  their  influence  and  their  power,  from  their  weaker  neighbours,  all 
others,  so  as  to  aggrandize  and  build  up,  the  prosperity'  of  the  larger  States, 
upon  the  ruins  of  the  weaker. 

The  whole  scheme  and  theory'  of  the  Constitution,  is  directly  opposed  to 
this,  and  the  construction  that  would  put  five  States,  or  a smaller  number, 
so  much  in  the  power  of  the  other  nineteen,  as  to  force  them  to  contribute 
by  money,  or  otherwise,  to  foster  and  raise  up  a manufacturing,  or  other 
prominent  interest,  of  those  nineteen  States,  is  the  construction  of  a TY- 
RANT and  an  usurper.  There  is  no  warrant  for  this  in  the  Constitution. 
In  the  reported  draft,  the  words  “ common  defence  arid  general  welfare,” 
are  not  attached  to  the  “ taxing  power,”  nor  are  such  words  to  be  found  in 
any  part  of  the  draft.  How  they  came  to  be  inserted,  will  be  hereafter  ex- 
plained. 

In  the  Committee’s  draft  of  a Constitution,  the  word  “ canal  or  military 
roads,  or  manufactures,”  is  not  mentioned,  though,  as  will  be  seen,  in  due 
time,  these  words  were  in  familiar  use  at  the  time,  in  the  Convention. — 
Even  the  word  “ post  roads,”  is  omitted  in  this  draft.  It  stands,  “to  es- 
tablish post  offices,”  not  “ Post  Offices  and  Post  Roads,”  as  it  now  reads. 
This  is  the  more  extraordinary,  as  in  Mr.  Pinckney’s  draft,  referred  to  the 
Committee,  there  was  a power  “to  establish  Post  and  MILITARY  Roads,” 
and  also,  a power  “ to  establish  and  provide  for  a NATIONAL  Univer- 
sity, at  the  seat  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States.”  But  the  Com- 
mittee reported  against  Post  Roads,  Military  Roads,  and  against  the  Uni- 


50 


versity.  How  could  they  do  otherwise.  The  construction  of  Roads  was 
a matter  to  which  the  States  were  separately  competent ; though  they  were 
not  so  for  a Post  Office.  The  establishment  of  an  University,  was  for  the 
interests  of  science.  This  formed  no  motive  for  the  States  to  enter  into 
Union,  and  to  give  up  so  much  of  their  sovereignty  In  fact,  these  propo- 
sitions did  not  fall  within  the  meaning  of  Mr.  Randolph’s  sixth  resolution. 
The  power  to  establish  Post  roads,  was  afterwards  restored,  six  States  in 
favor,  and  five  in  the  negative.  If  considered,  it  is  an  harmless  power. — 
Probably,  the  opposition  arose  from  the  fear  that  it  might  be  regarded  as  a 
power  to  construct  roads,  and  such  actually  has  been  the  case.  Mr.  Clay 
and  others,  are  of  this  opinion.  But  the  construction  is  a wrong  one.  To 
establish  a post  road,  is  nothing  more  than  to  designate  the  towns,  or  the 
route , by  which  the  mail  is  to  be  carried.  If  there  be  any  doubt  on  the 
subject,  the  acts  of  Congress,  relative  to  Post  Roads,  from  the  foundation 
of  the  Government  to  this  day,  incontrovertibly  establish  this  construction. 
When  Congress  usurped  its  powers  in  making  the  Cumberland  and  other 
National  Roads,  the  phraseology  used  in  the  acts,  was  peculiar. — 
It  is  remarkable.  In  the  one  case,  the  title  of  the  act  is,  “An  act  to  estab- 
lish certain  Post  Roads.”  The  enacting  clause  is,  “ The  following  Post 
Roads  shall  be  established,  viz.  from  Passamaquoddy,  in  the  District  of 
Maine , to  St.  Mary’s,  in  Georgia,  by  the  following  route  and  then  fol- 
low the  names  of  cities,  towns,  and  villages — thus  establishing  the  princi- 
ple, that  to  establish  a post  road,  is,  to  fix  upon  the  posts,  where  the  mail 
is  to  be  stopped  and  opened.  But  when  the  national  roads  were  ordered, 
the  titles  of  the  acts  are  different,  and  the  words  are,  to  make  and  open 
roads,  and  money  is  appropriated  for  the  work.  There  being  no  appro- 
priation when  the  acts  passed,  “to  establish  certain  post  roads,”  and  up- 
wards of  a million  of  dollars,  when  the  national  roads  were  opened,  >hews 
the  substantial  difference  between  establishing  a road,  and  constructing  a 
road.  Congress  itself,  having  admitted  this  distinction,  by  its  own  acts, 
and  thus  shewn  its  own  sense  of  the  meaning  of  the  power  to  “establish 
roads,”  it  would  be  a waste  of  time  in  me,  to  say  more  on  this  point. 

The  University  was  several  times  proposed.  First,  by  Mr.  Pinckney, 
in  his  draft,  but  never  reported  on,  and  at  last,  finally  rejected  in  Conven- 
tion, on  the  14th  September,  on  a motion  to  insert  a power  for  the  pur- 
pose. The  proposition  for  “ military  roads,”  was  never  renewed.  When 
the  Post  Roads  were  only  squeezed  in  by  one  vote,  there  could  be  no  hope 
of  military  roads  being  acceptable.  The  proposition  was  put  to  sleep,  by 
the  committee  of  detail;  but,  after  a lapse  of  some  thirty  years,  the  dan- 
gerous elements  of  power,  buried  by  the  Convention  in  1787,  are  all  care- 
fully disinterred  ; and,  to  provide  for  their  removal,  in  due  and  solemn 
state,  they  are  placed  in  that  splendid  sarcophagus,  the  memorable  report 
of  Mr.  Calhoun,  the  then  Secretary  of  War,  “ on  Roads  and  Canals.” 

If  there  are  amongst  us,  those  who  take  any  delight  in  grand  Military 
Roads  through  our  country,  which  the  Government  may,  from  time  to 
time  project  and  construct,  let  them  be  told,  that  these  roads  will  only 
augment  the  patronage  of  the  Government,  and  diminish  that  of  the  States, 
and  that  they  must  be  constructed  at  an  enormous  expense,  the  principal 
burthen  of  which  we  must  bear,  and  that  the  day  may  possibly  come, 
though  not  in  this  generation,  when  these  roads  and  canals,  may  become 
the  means,  as  they  will  the  monuments,  of  the  subjugation  of  the  South. 


51 


The  vestiges  of  ancient  roads  in  many  parts  of  Europe,  are  the  monu- 
ments which  record  the  universal  empire  of  the  Romans.  For  my  part, 
feeling  and  speaking  as  a Southerner,  and  situated  as  we  now  are,  if  I have 
any  wish  on  the  subject  of  roads,  it  would  be,  that  the  great  Alleghany 
Ridge  should  diverge  from  our  North  Western  limits  Westwardlv,  until  it 
should  intersect  the  Western  boundary  of  Louisiana,  thence  along  that 
boundary  until  it  reaches  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  ; and  that  it  should  again  be 
extended  with  its  spurs  along  our  Northern  boundary,  until  it  reached  the 
Atlantic ; that  the  five  plantation  or  cotton  growing  States,  those  States 
which  are  bearing,  and  are  yet  to  bear,  the  brunt  of  the  evils  of  a consoli- 
dated and  an  usurped  Government/  might  be  the  SEA  and  MOUNTAIN 
girt  States  of  the  Confederacy.  We  want  no  military  roads  from  North 
to  South.  If  the  roads  will  enable  the  North  Carolina  and  Tennessee  men 
to  bring  us  their  cotton,  and  their  hogs,  and  their  corn  and  bacon,  I shall 
be  satisfied.  As  to  enemies,  Europe  has  no  motive,  to  meddle  in  any  way 
with  the  plantation  States.  We  are  not  its  rivals  in  agriculture,  trade,  or 
manufaetures.  Now,  that  we  are  independent,  Nature  has  bound  us  toge- 
ther in  cords  of  perpetual  friendship.  We  raise  the  raw  material,  and  they 
manufacture  it  for  us.  It  is  the  people  of  the  NORTH,  1 fear.  When 
their  industry  begins  to  languish  from  the  competitors  they  have  in  Eu- 
rope, they  would  invoke  us  in  their  disputes,  arising  from  competition, 
this  prolific  source  of  wars  and  contention,  and  they  would  make  us  the 
ASS  that  is  to  bear  all  the  burden  and  expense  of  the  contest.  It  must 
not — it  cannot  be  endured. 

The  power  to  create  a corporation , is  not  in  the  reported  draft  of  the 
Constitution.  It  would  have  been  a departure  from  the  outline  agreed 
upon.  It  was  not  in  the  enumerated  powers  of  the  Confederation.  It  was 
not  a case  of  “ general  interest,”  nor  was  it  “ a case  of  legislation  to 
which  the  States  were  separately  incompetent.”  So  far  from  it,  the  States 
had  always  exercised  this  power  ; and  who  can  say,  that  the  exercise  of 
such  a power,  by  a State,  is  a case  in  which  the  harmony  of  the  Union  can 
be  interrupted  by  State  legislation.  But  there  were  not  wanting  efforts,  to 
give  to  Congress  this  power,  for  on  the  18th  of  August,  amotion  was 
made,  to  add  to  the  enumerated  powers,  a power  “ to  grant  charters  of 
incorporation  in  cases  where  the  public  good  may  require  them,  and  the 
authority  of  a single  State  may  be  incompetent.”  Another  proposition 
was  general,  and  made  on  the  same  day,  to  grant  charters  of  incorpo- 
ration.” If  the  powers  to  establish  a National  Bank  was  not  the  design  of 
these  propositions,  and  seen  through  by  the  opponents  of  the  measure,  why 
were  they  introduced,  and  particularly  the  first.  That  corporation  could 
be,  for  no  other  than  a national  purpose ; to  the  creation  of  which,  so  as 
to  answer  all  its  purposes,  u the  authority  of  a single  State  would  be  in- 
competent.” That  is  precisely  the  case  of  a National  Bank.  A State 
might  create  a Bank,  and  upon  a most  extensive  scale  as  to  capital ; but  a 
State  could  not  direct  that  its  notes  should  be  received  for  taxes,  or  duties 
out  of  its  own  limits.  No  State  could  create  a Bank  to  answer  the  exigen- 
cies of  the  General  Government,  as  well  as  a Bank  created  under  the  au- 
thority of  such  a Government.  The  United  States,  upon  an  emergency, 
might  restrain  a Bank  of  its  own  creation  from  paying  out  specie.  It  might 
possess  many  advantages,  of  which  it  would  be  deprived,  if  confined  to  the 
Use  of  a local  Bank.  Under  this  power  to  create  corporations,  might  be  in- 


52 


eluded  the  erection  of  a great  East-India  or  West-India  Company,  or  a 
Company  to  promote  manufactures.  But  what  was  the  fate  of  these  pro- 
positions ? They  were  referred  to  a committee,  but  never  reported  on 
favourably.  On  the  14th  of  September,  when  the  Constitution  had  been 
revised,  and  almost  ready  for  engrossing,  the  subject  was  again  renewed 
by  a motion  to  introduce  amongst  the  enumerated  powers,  a power  “to 
grant  letters  of  incorporation  for  canals,’"  &c.  which  motion  was  negatived, 
eight  States  to  three. 

Here  we  have  a FACT,  and  an  INFERENCE,  which  no  ingenuity 
can  pul  aside.  The  fact  is.  that  a proposition  was  made  to  add  to  the 
enumerated  powers  of  Congress,  a power  to  create  corporations  for  na- 
tional, purposes,  which  proposition  was  rejected.  The  inference  is,  that 
the  Convention  was  opposed  to  a National  Bank  in  any  shape;  for  a Na- 
tional Bank  is  most  prominent,  amongst  corporations  for  national  pur- 
poses. 

With  such  evidence  as  we  have  on  this  subject,  it  would  be  but  a poor 
reply  to  say,  that  the  Convention,  like  the  Supreme  Court,  regarded  a cor- 
poration as  a means  to  an  end , and  not  a substantive  power — and  that  this 
consideration  alone  might  have  caused  its  rejection.  The  reasoning  in  my 
eleventh  number  forbids  this  idea.— What  a solecism  in  politics,  that  an 
assemblage  of  the  wisest  men  in  the  nation,  should  be  giving  away,  by  se- 
parate and  express  grants,  little  odds  and  ends  of  power,  and  that  they 
should,  at  the  same  time,  intend  that  powers  ten  tunes  as  great,  should  be 
used  as  means  to  other  powers.  A National  Bank,  with  a capital  of  one 
hundred  millions  of  dollars,  is  a means  to  “collect  a tax,”  and  a West- 
India  Company  by  charter,  may  also  be  means.  The  present  British  East 
India  Company,  I believe,  keeps  in  pay  250,000  troops — decent  means 
these , with  a vengeance  ! This  doctrine  of  a “ means  to  an  end”  may  be 
the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  of  the  Manufacturers  at  Washing- 
ton, but  it  will  as  certainly  be  a means  to  the  END  OF  OUR  PROSPE- 
RITY in  the  South,  as  that  the  sparks  will  fly  upwards. 

The  word  Bank  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  journals  of  the  Convention, 
nor  in  the  secret  debates.  Canals,  and  military  roads,  and  manufactures, 
universities  and  seminaries  of  knowledge,  all  were  thought  of:  Even  a 

power  “ to  pass  sumptuary  laws”  was  not  forgotten,  but  proposed — and 
yet  no  one  proposed  a Bank  by  that  name.  Can  any  one  believe,  that  a 
National  Bank  was  not  as  much  in  the  minds  of  the  members  as  a National 
University — doubtless  it  was.  It  was,  designed  to  be  concealed  in  the  pro- 
posed power  to  create  corporations — and  the  reason,  probably,  of  its  not 
being  introduced  more  openly,  was  the  conviction  that  such  a proposition, 
would,  with  certainty,  be  rejected  by  the  People,  if  not  by  the  Convention. 
In  the  state  of  jealousy,  which  existed  in  the  Convention,  and  out  of  doors, 
on  the  subject  of  the  powers,  which  were  to  be  conferred  on  the  new  Gov- 
ernment, there  is  no  saying,  what  the  consequences  would  have  been,  had 
such  an  engine  in  the  hands  of  government,  as  a National  Bank  was  con- 
sidered to  be  by  the  people  at  large,  been  added  to  their  powers — As  it 
was,  such  was  the  difference  of  opinion  in  the  Convention,  as  to  the  extent 
of  the  powers  of  Congress,  that  at  one  time,  in  the  language  of  Mr.  Luther 
Martin,  “they  were  for  near  two  weeks,  on  the  verge  of  dissolution, 
scarcely  held  together  by  the  strength  of  an  hair , though  the  public  papers 


53 


were  announcing  their  extreme  unanimity.”  Had  the  Convention 
not  debated  secretly,  we  never  should  have  had  the  present  Govern- 
ment. 

We  are,  however,  wise  beyond  the  Convention.  We  have  discov- 
ered, by  the  keys  furnished  us  by  the  Supreme  Court — powers, 
which  these  men  never  dreamed  of  our  possessing.  There  was  a 
time,  when  Congress  traced  its  steps  on  the  ground  of  usurpation, 
with  considerable  caution.  There  is  a remarkable  instance  of  this 
in  their  usurped  power  in  opening  roads.  When  the  first  Act  passed 
to  open  the  great  Cumberland  Road,  there  was  an  express  provision 
that  on  the  surveys  being  completed,  and  the  expence  estimated,  the 
President  should  not  commence  the  work,  without  first  obtaining 
the  consent  of  the  States  through  which  the  road  Was  to  pass.  But, 
becoming  bold  by  impunity,  these  folks  now  direct  roads  to  be  open* 
ed,  and  they  have  been  opened  under  acts  of  Congress,  in  which 
there  is  no  stipulation  for  the  previous  consent  of  the  States.  They 
open  roads  now  without  leave  or  license. 

It  might  be  gratifying,  if  we  could  compare  the  cost  of  the  nation- 
al roads  and  canals  on  the  North,  and  to  the  South  of  the  Potomac. 
But,  after  all,  what  are  these  roads  and  canals  to  us!  What  is  it  to 
us  whether  the  Androscoggin  and  other  streams  be  examined  or  not 
examined,  with  a view  to  a communication  with  the  St.  Lawrence  I 
Will  a market  that  shall  thus  be  opened  for  some  of  the  most  valu* 
able  productions  of  the  State  of  Maine  benefit  us  ? What  is  it  to  us 
whether  the  great  Cumberland  Road  be  kept  in  repair  or  not! — 
whether  the  Sandusky  Turnpike,  and  the  other  Road  Companies 
fail  for  want  of  funds  or  not!  What  is  the  Delaware  and  Chesa- 
peake Canal  Company  to  us,  that  the  money  of  the  Nation  should 
be  appropriated  to  aid  that,  and  the  many  other  schemes,  for  enrich- 
ing the  citizens  of  the  North,  at  our  expense.  Has  the  Government 
subscribed  to  our  SANTEE  CANAL  COMPANY  ? Think  ye,  that 
they  will  ever  open  a Canal  from  Winyaw  Bay  to  Wando  River,  or 
aid  a company  for  that  purpose!  Will  they  ever  dig  this  Canal — a 
Canal,  that,  in  time  of  war,  would  be  so  important!  Do  we  hear  of 
their  extending  our  State  Road  through  the  Saluda  Mountain,  to 
the  Western  country,  which  will  benefit  five  States!  Is  not  this  as 
much  national,  as  the  improvement  of  the  navigation  of  the  Ohio 
and  Mississippi  rivers  ! It  is  only  the  other  day  that  the  Governor 
of  Boston  asked  the  Secretary  of  War  for  the  United  States  Engi- 
neers, to  assist  in  surveying  the  Canal  from  Boston  to  the  Hudson; 
but  the  answer  is,  they  are  all  so  busily  employed,  that  they  cannot 
be  spared.  Where  are  they  employed  ! Are  they  in  South-Caro- 
lina,  or  are  they  located  North  of  the  Potomac,  or  again  on  the  Al- 
leghany Ridge,  for  FURTHER  DEFENCE  AGAINST  THE 
BRITISH  1 Why  not  augment  them,  to  three  or  four  brigades  of 
Engineers,  and  thus  empty  the  National  Treasury  into  the  laps  of 
the  Northerners  ? 

We  are  not  yet  sufficiently  fleeced.  The  GREAT  SOUTHERN 
GOOSE  will  yet  bear  more  PLUCKING. 

7 


54 


mo.  14. 

We  do  not  find  in  the  proceedings  of  the  Convention,  the  word 
“Manufactures,”  or  any  motion  relative  to  the  encouragement  of 
them,  until  the  18th  of  August.  The  Convention,  having  at  that 
time,  disposed  of  most  of  the  clauses  in  the  reported  Constitution,  as 
far  as  the  end  of  the  enumerated  powers,  many  additional  powers, 
were  on  that  day  proposed  to  be  vested  in  Congress.  Amongst  them, 
was  a power  “to  establish  public  institutions,  rewards  and  immunities, 
for  the  promotion  of  AGRICULTURE,  Commerce, Trades,  and  MA- 
NUFACTURES.” On  the  20th  of  August,  another  proposition  was 
made,  to  wit,  “that  a Council  of  State  should  assist  the  President,  to 
be  composed  of  the  Chief  Justice,  and  five  Secretaries,  to  wit,  of 
State , War,”  &.e.  The  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  DOMESTIC  af- 
fairs, was,  “ to  attend  to  matters  of  general  police,  the  state  of 
AGRICULTURE  and  MANUFACTURES,  the  opening  of  ROADS 
and  NAVIGATION,  ( internal  improvements)  and  the  facilitating  com- 
munications throughout  the  United  States,  and  to  recommend  such 
measures  and  establishments,  as  might  tend  to  promote  such  objects .” 
I do  not  discover  in  the  journals,  any  thing  else  relating  to  Manu- 
factures, eo  nomine,  excepting  the  above.  Both  of  the  above  propo- 
sitions having  failed,  we  might  reasonably  conclude,  that  the  Con- 
vention, refused  to  give  to  Congress  the  power  to  promote  Domestic 
Manufactures,  as  well  as  internal  improvements.  But  it  is  not  from 
the  mere  failure,  to  have  these  clauses  inserted  in  the  Constitution, 
that  we  would  infer  a clear  and  unequivocal  intention,  that  to  the 
States  alone,  were  to  be  left  the  regulation  of  the  different  branches 
of  internal  industry.  There  are  other  considerations  which  estab- 
lish the  fact  beyond  doubt. 

The  above  propositions,  made  on  the  18th  and  20th  of  August,  it 
seems,  were  referred  to  the  committee  of  detail,  together  with  sundry 
others;  some  relating  to  public  seminaries  of  learning;  some  to  the 
unappropriated  lands  of  the  United  States  ; some  to  the  government 
of  the  new  States  to  be  created  ; some  to  authorize  the  President  to 
hold  landed  property  for  the  use  of  forts  and  magazines  ; and  last, 
and  not  least,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  was  a proposition  to  restrain 
Congress  from  establishing  a perpetual  revenue  under  its  taxing 
power.  On  the22d  of  August,  the  committee  made  a short  report, 
proposing,  inter  alia,  that  a seventeenth  enumerated  power,  be  added  to 
the  sixteenth  clause,  in  these  words,  “ and  to  provide,  as  may  be- 
come necessary,  from  time  to  time,  for  the  well  managing  and  se- 
curing, the  common  property,  and  general  interests  and  welfare  of  the 
United  States,  in  such  manner,  as  shall  not  interfere,  with  the  gov- 
ernments of  individual  States,  in  matters  which  respect  only  their 
internal  police,  or  for  which  their  individual  authority  may  be  com- 
petent.” Our  readers  may  construe  this  report  as  they  please,  but 
one  thing  is  clear,  that  under  so  general  a power  to  provide  for 
the  general  welfare,  Manufactures  could  as  well  be  promoted,  as 
could  any  other  act  be  done,  for  which  there  was  no  previous  pro- 
vision. This  part  of  the  report,  however,  was  not  acted  upon,  and 
on  the  3lst  of  August,  we  find,  that  all  such  reports  as  had  been  post- 


55 


j»oned,  “ and  such  parts  of  reports  as  had  not  been  acted  upon,” 
were  referred  to  a committee,  to  be  composed  of  a member  from  each 
State.  The  next  day,  the  1st  of  September,  this  grand  committee 
“ reported  partially ,”  but  did  not  touch  the  subject  of  science,  trades, 
canals,  or  manufactures.  On  the  4th,  the  committee  again  “ reported 
partially ,”  but  said  nothing  of  manufactures.  On  the  5th,  the  com- 
mittee “reported  further  and  finally,"  recommending  alterations  and 
additions, in  live  instances.  The  last  is, to  insert  this  clause — “To  pro- 
mote the  progress  of  SCIENCE  and  the  USEFUL  ARTS,  by  secur- 
ing, for  limited  times,  to  authors  and  inventors,  the  exclusive  right  to 
their  respective  writings  and  discoveries.”  I ought  to  have  mentioned, 
that  in  their  report  of  the  previous  day,  to  wit,  of  the  4th,  this  same 
committee  did  propose  to  add  to  the  taxing  power,  these  words  : “ to 
pay  the  debts,  and  to  provide  for  the  common  defence  and  general 
welfare,  it  was  necessary  that  they  should  make  some  report  on 
this  head,  because  many  motions  had  been  previously  made,  as  will 
be  seen  hereafter,  to  restrain  the  taxing  power,  one  of  which  was  so 
rigorous,  as  to  confine  it  to  the  debts  and  the  necessary  expenses  of 
the  United  States.  I hope  to  shew  in  my  next,  that  these  words 
were  intended  as  a limitation,  and  not  an  enlargement  of  the  appro- 
priating power.  The  above  clause,  “ to  promote  the  progress  of 
science  and  the  useful  arts,”  was,  as  I conceive,  a report  of  the  grand 
committee  against  manufactures. 

I am  not  couscious,  that  in  any  exposition  of  the  Constitution,  this 
clause  has  been  relied  on,  as  restraining  the  power  of  Congress,  on 
the  subject  of  Manufactures.  In  my  view,  it  is  very  important.  It 
is  important,  if  considered  in  the  abstract , but  when  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  above  proceedings  of  the  Convention,  I do  regard 
it  as  conclusive. 

And  first,  let  us  consider  the  clause  as  it  stands  in  the  Constitu- 
tion. What  does  it  amount  to?  It  is  a power  to  promote  science 
and  the  useful  arts.  What  are  the  useful  arts  ? They  are  those  arts 
or  occupations,  which  are  carried  on,  with  a view  to  profit  in  contra- 
distinction to  such  as  are  pusued  for  pleasure,  which  are  called  the 
liberal  or  polite,  arts.  Are  manufactures  to  be  classed  among  the 
useful  arts?  Throughout  the  civilized  world,  Agriculture  and  Ma- 
nufactures, stand  at  the  head  of  the  useful  arts.  All  men  must  assent 
to  this.  Here  then,  is  a clear  power  vested  in  Congress  by  the  Con- 
titution,  to  promote  Agriculture  and  Manufactures.  But  is  it  a gen- 
eral, or  limited  power  ? It  is  a limited  power.  How  is  it  limited  ? 
It  is  limited,  inasmuch,  as  the  mode  by  which  these  arts  are  to  be 
encouraged,  is  not  left  to  construction,  but  is  expressed  in  words, 
which  have  a clear  and  a definite  meaning.  They  shall  promote  the 
useful  arts,  BY  securing  to  ingenious  men  patents  for  their  inventions.''' 
Now,  if  a power  to  promote  a specific  object,  by  a prescribed  mode, 
does  not  exclude  the  power  to  promote  it  by  a different,  or  other 
mode,  there  is  no  truth  in  the  law  maxim,  “ expressio  unius  est  ex- 
clusio  alterius."  Let  us  familiarly  illustrate  this. 

When  the  old  Congress  found  itself  inadequate  to  carry  on  the 
Government  for  the  want  of  a direct  legislation  on  the  people,  it  re- 


56 


peatedly  and  earnestly  solicited  the  States,  at  different  times,  for  a 
power  to  raise  a revenue  by  small  imposts,  to  be  limited  in  amount, 
as  well  as  duration.  Had  an  amendment  been  made  to  thi  Confe- 
deration, and  a power  been  granted  to  that  Congress,  “to  regulate 
commerce  by  the  imposition  of  certain  duties  on  West  India  pro- 
duce, surely  no  one  couid  contend,  that  the  words  of  the  grant, 
would  not  exclude  the  power  to  regulate  commerce,  by  duties  on 
European  goods,  and  by  the  various  modes  practised  by  the  present 
Government,  whose  power  over  commerce  is  exclusive.  So,  a pow- 
er to  raise  a revenue  by  a capitation  or  other  direct  tax,  would  cer- 
tainly exclude  the  power  to  lay  imposts,  or  to  come  at  a revenue  by 
any  means,  but  a direct  tax.  In  the  clause  before  us,  as  in  the  in- 
stances just  cited,  the  mode  of  expression  is  indubitably  exclusive. 
Manufactures  are  to  be  encouraged,  but  they  are  to  be  promoted  in 
one  way  only,  to  wit — bv  the  reward  of  an  exclusive  right,  to  the  use 
of  a new  machine  or  invention. 

The  grant  of  power  in  question,  is,  what  lawyers  would  term  an 
AFFIRMATIVE  PREGNANT,  that  is,  an  affirmance  of  one  thing, 
and  a denial  of  another;  an  affirmance  of  the  power  of  Congress,  to 
promote  the  progress  of  science  and  the  arts,  by  patents  and  copy 
rights,  and  a negation  of  their  authority,  to  encourage  them  in  any 
other  way.  There  are  in  the  Constitution,  other  articles  of  a nature 
allied  to  this.  For  instance — Congress  shall  have  power  “ to  define 
and  punish  felonies  on  the  high  seas.”  The  power  here  given  to  de- 
fine a felony  at  sea,  implies  an  admission,  that  if  such  a power  were 
not  given,  Congress  would  be  excluded  the  use  of  the  power  alto- 
gether ; and  it  further  implies,  that  the  power  of  defining  felonies  on 
land,  solely  and  exclusively  belongs  to  the  States.  There  are,  it  is 
true,  two  cases  in  which  it  can  define  or  punish  felonies  on  land; 
but  in  these  cases,  there  are  two  special  grants  of  power,  by  two  se- 
parate clauses  in  the  Constitution.  It  can  “ provide  for  the  punish- 
ment of  counterfeiting  its  current  coin  and  securities  and  it  has 
“ the  power  to  declare  the  punishment  of  treason.” 

In  the  Constitution,  will  be  found  NEGATIVES  PREGNANT, 
as  well  as  affirmatives  pregnant.  The  prohibition  to  the  States  lay- 
ing any  “ duties  on  imports  or  exports,”  is  one  of  this  kind.  The  re- 
striction which  prevents  them  laying  any  “ duty  on  tonnage,”  is 
another.  The  prohibition  to  their  keeping  troops  or  ships  of  war  in 
a time  of  peace,  is  a third.  The  prohibition  of  any  interference  as 
to  the  slave  trade,  is  a fourth.  In  all  these  cases,  though  the  restric- 
tions amount  to  a negation  to  do  the  particular  acts  mentioned,  yet 
there  is  an  affirmance  of  the  authority  of  Congress  in  the  last  in- 
stance, to  prohibit  the  slave  trade  after  1808  ; and  in  the  first  instan- 
ces, of  the  States  to  lay  a land  tax,  an  excise,  a stamp  duty,  or  any 
other  tax,  (provided  it  be  not  an  impost  or  export  duty,  or  duty  on 
tonnage);  and  there  is  the  same  authority  to  levy  troops  or  equip 
frigates,  during  a period  of  war.  In  these  positions,  we  must  all 
agree. 

The  clause  for  promoting  manufactures  by  patents,  is  then  clearly 
an  affirmative  pregnant.  Under  its  peculiar  mode  of  expression,  it 


57 


cannot  be  conceived,  that  the  Convention  could  deem  it  necessary 
to  give  Congress  the  power  to  promote  the  arts  by  a particular  mode,  , 
if  it  designed  to  give  the  liberty  of  adopting  any,  and  all  other 
modes,  of  effecting  the  same  object.  If  the  meaning  tvas  not,  to 
exclude  Congress  from  any  general  power  of  encouraging  the  art* 
and  sciences,  why  mention  the  words  at  all.  There  certainly  was 
no  necessity  for  it.  These  words,  are  not  to  be  found  in  any  of  the 
propositions,  which  were  submitted  on  the  subject  of  patents  and 
copy-rights.  One  proposition  was,  “to  secure  to  literary  authors 
their  copy-rights  for  a limited  time.”  A second,  “to  grant  patents 
for  useful  inventions.”  A third,  “to  secure  to  authors,  exclusive 
rights  for  a certain  time.”  It  would,  therefore,  have  been  sufficient 
for  every  purpose,  to  have  reported  the  amendment  to  read,  “to  se- 
cure for  limited  times,  to  authors  and  inventors,  the  exclusive  rieffit 
to  their  respective  writings  and  discoveries,”  leaving  out  the  first 
part  of  the  sentence  “ to  promote  the  progress  of  science  and  the 
useful  arts. 

But  the  reason  of  the  committee’s  using  the  words  last  mentioned, 
is  manifest.  Manufactures  and  the  sciences  had  been  talked  of— 
various  propositions  in  relation  to  them,  were  before  the  committee  ; 
and  a previous  committee,  had  reported  a specific  power,  to  provide 
for  the  general  welfare,  so  as  to  reach  these  cases.  The  report  was 
not  acted  upon,  and  the  subject  afterwards  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  present  committee,  it  became  their  duty  to  report  for  or  against 
science  and  manufactures.  They  do  report,  and  recommend  a power 
for  this  purpose — not,  however,  by  seminaries  of  learning — not  by 
public  institutions,  rewards,  or  immunities*  as  proposed,  but  simply 
by  encouraging  inventions  to  facilitate  labor — as  well  as  literary 
works  to  augment  the  stock  of  human  knowledge.  To  promote  the  arts 
and  sciences,  in  this  way,  was  to  confer  a benefit,  not  upon  one  portion, 
but  upon  every  part  of  the  Union.  It  is  for  the  benefit  of  each,  and  there- 
fore, to  the  advantage  of  all  the  States,  that  authors  and  ingenious1 
mechanics,  should  receive  in  this  way,  the  patronage  of  the  Govern- 
ment : But  to  give  premiums  and  pecuniary  bounties,  or  to  prohibit 
the  export  of  any  material  of  manufactures — or  to  restrict  the  great 
import  trade,  of  which  the  Southern  States,  even  at  that  day,  were  so 
jealous,  was  not  the  intention  of  the  Convention  ; it  did  not  choose 
to  leave  the  question  open,  whether  Congress  should  do  what  it  is 
now  doing,  to  wit — to  restrict  our  trade  by  Tariff  duties,  almost 
amounting  to  prohibition.  As  the  subject  was  before  the  Conven- 
tion, the  members  of  that  body,  took  the  opportunity  to  express 
themselves,  that  they  were  averse  to  any  national  encouragement  of 
science  or  manufactures,  except  by  patents  or  copy-rights.  The 
clause  speaks  no  other  language. 

That  the  friends  of  science  in  the  Convention,  considered  this 
clause,  as  exclusive  of  any  power  to  promote  science  in  general — and, 
that  they,  moreover,  could  not  afterwards  seek  for  it,  in  the  appro- 
priating power  “ for  the  general  welfare,”  would  appear,  by  their  so- 
licitude upon  the  subject.  On  the  i4th  of  September,  as  the  Con- 
stitution was  about  to  be  finished  and  engrossed,  the  motion  was  re- 
newed for  the  third  time,  to  add  a power,  to  establish  an  University, 


58 


"which  motion  was  lost,  six  States  to  four,  and  one  divided — there 
not  being  in  the  Convention,  the  same  interest  for  manufactures,  as 
there  was  for  science — there  being  no  calico  printers  or  tooollen  weav- 
ers, occuping  the  benches  of  the  Convention,  as  is  the  case  in  the 
present  Congress  ; the  Convention,  in  fact,  being  composed  of  men, 
more  literary  than  they  were  avaricious,  is  probably  the  reason,  why 
the  manufacturers,  like  the  University  men,  did  not  come  again  to 
the  charge,  and  renew  their  propositions  for  manufactures.  They, 
however,  did  not.  They  quietly  submitted  to  that  article  in  the 
Constitution,  which  limits  the  national  protection,  only  to  patents 
and  copy-rights. 

Three  clear  propositions  result  from  what  has  been  said  : First — 
That  there  was  an  attempt  made  in  Convention,  to  give  Congress, 
power  to  promote  science,  agriculture,  and  manufactures.  Second- 
ly— That  a committee  reported,  a specific  power  for  that  purpose, 
to  be  added  to  those  already  enumerated — which  report  was  not  a- 
greed  to.  And  thirdly — That  an  express  provision  was  made,  to  pro- 
tect these  objects,  but  only  to  a limited  extent.  These  propositions  be- 
ing established,  upon  what  grounds,  can  a general  power  over  the  sub- 
ject of  manufactures , be  assumed"?  “ Prohibitory ” duties  by  Congress , 
was  a word  not  mentioned  in  Convention.  The  only  encouragement 
asked  for,  was,  public  rewards  and  immunities  Had  they  proposed 
protection  by  prohibitory  duties,  the  Southern  States  would  have 
taken  the  alarm,  and  expressed  the  same  desire  for  a positive  limi- 
tation on  the  powers  of  Congress,  as  they  did  for  the  navigation  in- 
terests of  the  Eastern  States:  a great  manufacturing  interest  to  rise  up 
in  the  States,  was  in  truth,  not  much  thought  of  in  those  days.  But 
the  navigation  interests  of  the  Eastern  people,  were  before  their  eyes. 
It  was  this  growing  interest  in  the  Colonies,  of  which  England  was 
so  jealous,  and  her  restrictions  on  which,  no  doubt,  contributed  to 
the  revolution,  more  than  any  other  cause.  These  local  interests 
we  have  seen,  by  a former  number,  the  Southern  States  consented 
to  be  provided  for,  by  a special  compromise. 


It  appears  by  the  acts  of  the  Convention,  that  though  it  was  deem- 
ed unadvisable  to  entrust  Congress  with  a power  to  promote  any 
great  local  interest  of  particular  States,  yet,  that  it  was  considered, 
that  there  would  be  a manifest  impropriety,  in  depriving  any  one 
State,  which  misrht  choose  to  encourage  its  own  Manufactures,  of 
the  means  of  doing  so.  The  usual  mode,  by  which  Domestic  Ma- 
nufactures are  encouraged,  we  all  know,  is  by  premiums,  pecuniary 
bounties,  and  prohibitory  duties;  but  all  other  modes  are  inexpedient 
and  inefficient,  when  compared  with  prohibition.  If  Congress  eould 
not  lay  prohibitory  duties,  except  for  the  general  purposes  of  the 
•Government,  and  the  States  could  not  impose  them,  to  protect  Ma- 
nufactures, one  great  motive  to  the  Union,  would  have  been  defeat- 
ed, which  was,  that  the  States  should  not,  as  regarded  their  internal 
relation,  or  their  power  to  regulate  their  own  industry,  be  in  a worse 
situation  than  before.  Hence,  it  became  necessary,  that  the  States 


59 


should  not  be  deprived  of  the  power  of  laying  prohibitory  duties  fof 
the  convenience  of  their  imports  or  exports,  or  for  the  purpose  of 
protecting  their  own  Manufactures.  When,  therefore,  that  clause 
in  the  Constitution  came  to  be  considered,  which  restricts  the  States 
from  laying  duties  on  imports  or  exports,  the  subject  of  Manufac- 
tures directly  came  into  discussion. 

As  this  clause  originally  stood  in  the  reported  draft  of  the  Con- 
stitution, the  restriction  was,  only  as  to  imposts , not  exports — “No 
State,  without  the  consent  of  Congress,  shall  lay  imposts  or  duties 
upon  imports.”  By  this  partial  restriction,  each  State  still  possess- 
ed the  power,  to  encourage  its  own  manufactures,  by  duties,  to  pro- 
hibit the  exportation  of  its  wool,  or  other  raw  material.  On  the 
28th  of  August,  a motion  was  made  to  extend  the  prohibition  to  ex- 
ports, which  was  carried ; six  States  to  five,  a bare  majority.  The 
discussion  on  this  article,  brought  forth  Luther  Martin,  the  deputy 
from  Maryland,  who  strenuously  opposed  the  article  in  all  its  shapes; 
but  he  could  not  succeed.  So  determined  was  the  Convention,  that 
the  power  of  the  States,  as  to  import  and  export  duties,  should  not 
be  concurrent  with  that  of  Congress,  and  that  the  General  Govern- 
ment should  exclusively  possess  this  source  of  taxation,  that  instead 
of  softening,  it  was  disposed  to  make  the  prohibition  more  rigo- 
rous. On  the  same  day,  therefore,  an  additional  restriction,  was 
introduced  into  the  clause,  nine  States  to  four,  that  even  with  the 
consent  of  Congress,  imports  and  exports  were  not  to  be  taxed  by 
the  States,  but  “for  the  use  of  the  treasury  of  the  United  States.” 
Thus  stood  the  clause  in  the  revised  draft  of  the  Constitution,  pre- 
sented to  the  Convention,  on  the  12th  day  of  September,  five  days 
before  its  adjournment.  On  the  13th,  an  amendment  was  proposed 
and  carried,  “ that  no  State  should  be  restrained  from  imposing  the 
usual  duties  on  produce,  exported  from  such  State,  to  pay  the  char- 
ges of  inspecting  that  produce.”  But,  on  the  15th,  a substitute  was 
moved,  and  after  two  other  motions  for  amendment,  the  substitute 
was  put  aside,  and  the  clause  finally  agreed  to  as  follows  : — “ No 
State  shall,  without  the  consent  of  Congress , lay  any  imposts  or  du- 
ties on  imports  or  exports,  except  what  may  he  absolutely  necessary 
for  executing  its  inspection  laws  ; and  the  nett  produce  of  all  duties 
and  imposts  laid  by  any  State,  on  imports  or  exports,  shall  be  for 
the  use  of  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  and  all  such  laws,  shall 
be  subject  to  the  revision  and  controul  of  the  Congress.” 

Were  an  hundred  men,  to  read  this  clause  in  the  Constitution,  I 
would  venture  to  say,  that  ninety  and  nine  for  a while,  would  be 
ignorant  of  the  true  design  of  its  introduction.  The  question,  had 
over  and  over  again  occurred  to  my  mind,  what  could  the  Conven- 
tion intend?  Mr.  Hamilton,  in  his  Federalist,  is  almost  silent  on 
the  subject.  His  reason  may  be  conjectured  from  what  is  to  follow. 
That  the  framers  of  the  Constitution,  who  disputed  so  much  as  to 
the  phraseology  of  this  clause,  intended  something  more,  than  to 
give  the  States  the  power  to  impose  trifling  duties  to  execute  then- 
inspection  laws  for  cotton,  tobacco,  &c.  is  too  evident ; because,  in- 
dependently of  the  power  to  lay  duties  for  their  inspection  laws, 


60 


Which  may  be  done,  without  the  consent  of  Congress  previously  ob-* 
tained,  there  is  a clear  and  a distinct  provision,  that  the  States  may, 
on  applying  for,  and  obtaining  such  consent,  impose  import  and 
export  duties  for  other  purposes.  What  purposes  can  these  be?  Can 
it  be,  to  give  the  States  i.ovv  and  then,  a chance  of  some  little  reve- 
nue. The  clause  itself,  decidedly  gives  the  answer.  The  produce 
of  the  duties,  when  laid,  is  to  go  into  the  National , and  not  into  a 
State  Treasury.  Then,  what  does  it  mean  1 Abstractedly  consi- 
dered, it  is  inexplicable,  and  to  me,  and  perhaps  to  others,  would 
have  remained  so,  had  not  the  subject  of  domestic  manufactures, 
come  into  discussion.  The  design  of  the  clause  is  now  at  once 
seen.  A satisfactory  explanation  is  instantly  within  our  reach.  It 
was  inserted,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  such  States  as  were  desirous 
of  protecting  their  oton  manufactures , either  by  export  duties  on  their 
raw  materials,  or  by  imposts  on  foreign  fabrics  introduced  into 
their  limits,  TO  DO  SO,  WITH  THE  CONSENT  OF  CON- 
GRESS. No  other  solution  is  admissible.  If  this  was  not  the  in- 
tent of  the  provision,  I defy  the  Supreme  Court  or  any  expositor  to 
explain  it.  In  any  other  view,  it  is  an  useless  and  a stupid  clause  of 
the  Constitution. 

It  is,  however,  most  fortunate  for  us,  that  the  debates  of  the  Con- 
vention, are  at  hand,  to  rescue  us  from  further  doubt,  or  difficulty 
on  the  point.  Let  us  hear  Mr.  Martin,  bitterly  complaining  to  his 
own  State  of  the  total  injustice,  in  his  view,  of  this  clause.  “ By 
this  same  section,”  says  he,  “ every  State  is  also  prohibited  from 
laying  any  imposts  or  duties  on  imports  and  exports,  without  the 
permission  of  the  General  Government.  It  was  urged  by  us,  that 
there  might  be  cases,  in  which  it  would  be  proper,  for  the  purpose  of 
encouraging  manufactures , to  lay  duties,  to  prohibit  the  exportation  of 
raw  materials  ; and  even  in  addition  to  the  duties  laid  by  Congress, 
on  imports  for  the  sake  of  revenue , to  lay  a duty,  to  discourage  the 
importation  of  particular  articles  into  a State,  or  to  enable  the  manu- 
facturer here , to  supply  us  on  as  good  terms , as  they  could  be  obtain- 
ed from  a foreign  market.  But  the  most  we  could  obtain,  was,  that 
this  power  MIGHT  BE  EXERCISED  by  the  STATES  with,  and 
only  with  the  consent  of  Congress,  and  subject  to  its  control.  And 
so  anxious  were  they,  to  seize  on  every  shilling  of  our  money  for  the 
General  Government,  that  they  insisted,  even  the  little  revenue  that 
might  thus  arise,  should  not  be  appropriated,  to  the  use  of  the  re- 
spective States  where  it  was  collected,  but  should  be  paid  into  the 
Treasury  of  the  United  States  ; and,  accordingly,  it  is  so  determin- 
ed.” (Secret  debates,  page  71.) 

Thus,  we  have  all  our  doubts  dissipated  as  to  this  otherwise  sin- 
gular provision  in  the  instrument ; and  thus  too,  we  have  a fresh 
instance  of  the  wisdom  of  the  Convention.  A mode  has  been  pro- 
vided, by  which,  at  any  time,  the  people  of  any  one  State  or  number 
of  States,  may  protect  their  manufactures,  without  charging  the  cost 
of  such  protection,  to  the  neighbouring  States.  Indeed,  if  we  reflect 
upon  the  previous  acts  of  the  Convention,  we  must  confess,  that  it 
could  not  have  done  otherwise,  than  to  make  the  provision  referred 


61 


to.  To  have  confined  the  import  and  export  duties,  to  be  laid  by 
the  States,  to  the  simple  purpose  of  executing  their  inspection  laws, 
would  have  been  extreme  injustice.  Congress  had  previously  been 
prohibited,  from  promoting  manufactures,  excepting  by  patents;  and 
as  Congress  could  not,  for  this  purpose,  lay  a protecting  or  prohi- 
bitory  duty,  what  would  become  of  the  States,  desiring  to  encourage 
their  manufactures,  if  they  also,  in  no  event,  could  keep  foreign 
fabrics  out  of  their  limits,  if  it  was  their  policy  so  to  do,  in  order  to 
protect  their  own.  Such  a provision  then  was  indispensable,  and 
the  qualification,  put  upon  the  restraint  on  the  power  of  the  States 
to  lay  imposts,  was  most  judicious,  both  for  the  States  and  for  Con- 
gress. As  the  clause  stands,  the  manufacturing  States,  may,  at  any 
time,  ask  for  the  permission  of  Congress,  to  lay  duties  to  protect 
their  fabrics:  but,  they  are  properly  excluded  the  power  of  impos- 
ing these  duties  at  pleasure,  and  to  take  the  proceeds,  as  under  the 
pretext  of  protecting  their  manufactures,  they  might  collect  a reve- 
nue, or  otherwise  interfere  with  the  resources  of  the  General  Gov- 
ernment. But  there  is  an  inference  to  be  deduced  from  this  clause 
which  is  irresistible — and  that  is,  that  had  the  Convention  believed, 
that  in  any  of  the  enumerated  powers,  which  it  had  immediately 
before  conferred  on  Congress,  there  was  included  a general  power  to 
promote  Manufactures , there  never  would  have  been  held  out  to  the 
States,  that  in  any  event,  they  could  lay  an  import  or  export  duty, 
except  for  the  purpose  of  their  inspection  laws.  On  Mr.  Martin’s 
urging  the  necessity  that  might  arise  at  a future  day,  for  the  States 
to  protect  their  Manufactures — and  that  a power  ought  to  be  at  hand 
for  such  an  emergency,  the  prompt  answer  would  have  been,  the 
General  Government  is  already  provided  with  the  power — and  the 
Convention  would  have  erased  from  the  clause  the  words,  “ without 
the  consent  of  Congress ,”  and  thus  have  restricted  the  power  to  the 
simple  purposes  of  inspection.  But  the  clause  remaining  with  these 
words,  I maintain,  is  conclusive  to  shew,  that  there  was  no  idea,  of 
any  general  power  having  been  given  to  Congress,  over  Manufac- 
tures.— Nothing  but  a necessity,  which  could  not  have  been  avoid- 
ed, could  ever  have  induced  the  Convention,  to  consent  to  the  States 
imposing,  in  any  event,  duties  on  imports.  The  members  of  the 
Convention  were  nearly  unanimous  on  this  point ; they  were  uni- 
formly opposed  to  any  concurrence  of  authority  respecting  this 
fruitful  source  of  revenue.  It  was  early  decided,  that  the  ENTIRE 
Custom-House  should  belong  to  the  Congress. 

The  course  prescribed  by  the  Constitution,  for  the  protection  of 
Manufactures,  being  thus  plainly  marked,  Congress  is  the  more  in- 
excusable for  usurping  the  power  in  question.  If,  after  the  duties, 
which,  previous  to  1816,  had  been  laid  for  revenue,  and  which,  at 
the  same  time,  encouraged  Manufactures,  it  was  found  that  the  in- 
fant Manufactures  of  any  one  State,  stood  in  need  of  any  further 
protection,  the  Legislature  of  that  particular  State,  ought  to  have 
applied  to  Congress,  for  leave  to  impose,  in  all  its  ports,  the  same 
duties  on  British  goods,  which  are  specified  in  the  Tariffs  of  1816, 
1830,  and  1824.  To  such  an  application,  Congress  might  have  as- 

8 


62 


seated,  as  the  duties  would  still  have  been  paid  into  the  National 
Treasury  ; and  I am  certain,  the  Southern  members  of  Congress  in 
those  three  different  years,  would  cheerfully  have  indulged  these 
folks,  and  will  still  indulge  them,  with  a protection  in  this  way,  as 
long  as  it  will  not  too  seriously  affect  the  revenue.  Whether  Con- 
gress will  now,  or  at  any  time  hereafter,  give  up  to  the  States  the 
least  atom  of  their  power  over  imposts,  I know  not:  But  this  1 do 
know,  that  in  refusing  to  give  to  the  States,  a chance  now  and  then, 
of  protecting  their  Manufactures  in  this  way,  (if  the  States  choose 
to  ask  it,)  Congress  would  not  honestly  execute  the  trust,  reposed  in 
it  by  the  Constitution. — That,  however,  would  not  be  our  look  out. 

I am  not  ignorant,  of  the  difficulty  that  would  arise  in  getting  the 
majority  of  the  people  of  any  one  State,  New-York  for  instance,  to 
join  in  any  such  application  ; for,  whilst  such  a scheme  would  suit 
the  Manufacturers,  it  would  interfere  with  other  important  interests: 
All  persons  in  such  a State,  connected  with  commerce,  such  as 
merchants  and  traders,  shipwrights,  cordwainers,  sail-makers,  &c. 
would  be  seriously  injured.  The  importation  of  British  goods  into 
New-York  would  be  diminished,  on  account  of  the  high  and  double 
duties,  and  the  Custom-Houses  of  Charleston,  and  other  ports,  where 
only  the  national  duties  were  to  be  exacted,  would  be  filled  to  over- 
flowing, to  say  nothing  of  the  ruinous  effects  upon  the  overgrown 
commerce  of  New-York,  to  be  produced  in  various  ways,  and  parti- 
cularly by  the  British  taxing  their  produce,  and  exempting  ours. — 
But  the  manufacturers  will  say,  what  then  are  we  to  dor  Are  we 
to  have  no  protection,  except  we  pay  for  it  on  these  terms!  The 
answer  must  be  the  same,  as  we  would  give  to  a man,  who  com- 
plains, that,  whilst  his  neighbour,  who  carries  on  like  himself,  the 
wholesale  trade  in  dry  goods,  has  always  all  the  retailers  of  the  city 
dealing  with  him,  he  is  without  a single  applicant.  For  this  case, 
there  is  no  remedy,  but  to  quit  the  employment,  or  to  bear  the  disap- 
pointment. It  would  not  be  just  to  say  to  the  retailers,  that  they 
are  to  buy  where  they  buy  dearest.  But  to  cease  with  familiar  il- 
lustrations, there  certainly  does  arise  from  this  view  of  the  subject, 
a position  which  is  impregnable,  to-wit : — If  in  any  one  State,  or  any 
number  of  States,  in  which  there  is  a clamor  for  protection,  there 
can  be  such  a diversity  of  opinion  or  of  interest,  that  the  manufac- 
turers, cannot  in  any  one  instance,  (which  I do  firmly  believe  to  be 
the  case)  succeed  in  a Legislative  application  to  Congress,  for  leave 
to  lay  imposts,  and  thus  to  avail  themselves  of  that  article  in  the 
Constitution,  expressly  provided  to  enable  such  State  or  States,  to 
protect  their  fabrics,  it  would  incontestibly  prove,  that  in  such  State 
or  States,  the  MANUFACTURING  interest  is  not  the  predominant, 
or  PARAMOUNT  interest.  If  it  were  paramount,  its  influence 
would  prevail.  If  then,  manufactures,  be  not  a paramount  interest 
in  any  one  State,  where  there  is  a cry  for  protection , and  the  promo- 
tion of  them,  would  injure  other  interests  in  such  State,  fully  as  im- 
portant, A FORTIORI  the  promotion  of  manufactures,  must  injure 
in  a greater  degree,  the  interest  of  States,  in  which  there  are  no  ma- 
nufacturers. It  is  only  on  the  ground,  of  its  being  a general  inter- 


»st  in  the  United  States,  that  a National  protection  can  be  advocated 
and  maintained.  What  is  not  a general , or  a paramount  interest  in 
any  one  State  of  the  Union,  cannot,  by  any  process  of  reasoning,  be 
decided  to  be  a general  interest  of  the  twenty-four  States. 

This  provision  of  the  Convention,  to  give  the  States  an  opportu- 
nity, of  protecting  their  own  manufactures,  is  in  exact  accordance 
with  the  immutable  principles  of  justice.  To  suffer  Massachusetts, 
for  instance,  to  promote  the  success  of  her  manufacturing  establish- 
ments, by  means  of  a National  Tariff,  would  be  neither  more  nor 
less,  than  to  give  to  her,  greater  advantages,  and  greater  power  too, 
than  she  could  have  had,  if  she  had  not  entered  into  the  Union.'  If 
Massachusetts  were  to  separate  from  the  Union  to-morrow,  and 
were  to  decide,  that  manufactures  was  a general  interest  in  the 
State,  and  ought  to  he  promoted,  what  would  be  her  course  of  po- 
licy ? She  would  have  to  do,  what  all  other  nations  have  done  be- 
fore her.  She  would  have  to  compel  her  citizens  to  wear  the  home 
made  fabrics,  by  imposing  high  duties,  so  as  to  exclude  the  rival 
foreign  articles.  She  could  not  think  of  demanding,  that  we  in 
South-Carolina,  who  would  be  independent  of  her,  should  wear  her 
fabrics,  any  more,  than  that  England  can  demand  of  France,  to  use 
British  manufactures.  In  England,  the  entire  nation  is  enriched  by 
manufactures,  but  who  is  it,  that  pays  the  cost  and  charges,  by 
which  the  aggregate  of  British  wealth,  and  prosperity  is  attained  ? 
Do  not  the  English  themselves,  pay  for  these  great  advantages  of 
protection  1 Upon  what  principle,  is  it  then,  that  under  a Govern- 
ment, which  is  not  a consolidated  one,  but  a confederacy  of  States, 
the  Eastern  man  should  not  only  have  the  protection,  but  have  it 
without  scarcely  any  cost  to  himself.  What  State  is  there,  that 
would  not  rapidly  acquire  riches,  if  it  could  thus  lay  its  neighbours 
under  contribution,  to  support  its  various  branches  of  internal  in- 
dustry. If  Massachusetts  then,  will  have  manufactures,  Massachu- 
setts must  be  content  to  have  them  upon  the  usual  terms.  Her  own 
citizens  must  pay  the  cost,  whether  it  be,  directly , by  taxes  for  pre- 
miums, or  pecuniary  bounties,  or  indirectly,  by  a tax  upon  consump- 
tion of  the  home  fabric.  To  suffer  any  other  mode  of  encourage- 
ment, would  be,  to  violate  the  Constitution,  and  to  license  a system 
of  ROBBERY  upon  the  South.  If  Massachusetts,  is  not  content, 
to  have  the  full  power,  to  adopt  the  same  measures,  which  she  could 
take,  were  she  sovereign  and  independent  of  the  whole  world,  she  has 
no  right  to  complain.  She  must  not  be  permitted  to  tax  her  neigh- 
bours. The  interest  she  desires  to  have  promoted  at  the  expense  of 
the  nation,  is  a LOCAL  interest,  not  half  so  important,  as  the  Cot- 
ton Planting  interest  of  the  South,  in  which  there  is  a far  greater 
capital  embarked,  than  there  is  in  manufactures.  Congress  cannot 
promote,  the  great  Cotton  Planting  interest  of  South-Carolina,  nor 
can  it  encourage  the  manufacturing  interest  of  the  North.  And 
why! — Because  these  are  local  interests  of  the  States,  and  not  the 
gewerannterests  of  the  Union.  Congress  can  lay  its  imposts  for 
revenue,  and  if  in  laying  these  imposts  for  revenue,  it  can  at  the 
same  time  encourage  this,  or  that  branch  of  local  or  internal  indus- 


64 


try,  giving  at  one  time  a little  advantage  to  the  Sugar  Planters  of 
Louisiana,  and  at  another  time,  aiding  the  manufacturers  of  the 
North,  there  is  no  harm  in  this.  As  the  impost  must  be  laid  for  re- 
venue, there  is  no  tax  here  imposed  upon  one  section  of  the  Union, 
more  than  upon  another.  On  this  principle,  manufactures  were  ju- 
diciously encouraged,  till  1812,  inclusive.  Commerce,  thereby,  was 
not  shackled  or  interrupted.  But,  since  1812,  all  the  Tariffs  have 
been  gross  usurpations  of  power  by  Congress. 

HO.  16. 

I proceed  to  say  something  on  the  subject  of  those  general  phrases  in 
the  ( onstitution  which  constitute  in  the  hands  of  the  General  Government, 
the  great  lever  by  which  the  State  Sovereignties  are  ultimately  to  be 
subverted  from  their  foundations.  Congress  it  seems,  has  power  “ to  lay 
and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts  and  excises,  to  pay  the  debts,  and  pro- 
vide for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  of  the  United  States  ” It 
is  from  these  words,  “ general  welfare,”  that  a power  is  claimed  to  open  navi- 
gation between  the  States,  to  dig  canals,  to  construct  roads,  and  from  time,  to 
impose  Tariffs,  to  the  extent  of  a total  prohibition  of  the  valuable  commerce 
of  the  Southern  States.  It  is  under  cover  of  these  words  that  the  Coloniza- 
tion Society,  with  Judge  Washington  at  its  head,  with  the  sanction  of 
some  State  Legislatures,  and  with  the  prayers  of  many  Societies  and  Con- 
ventions, is  to  march  to  the  Capitol  in  Decembor  next,  and  to  demand  the 
aid  of  the  Government  for  our  flourishing  and  favorite  Negro  Colony  at 
Liberia.  It  is  under  these  same  words,  as  the  present  President  contends, 
that  Congress  can  adopt  any  measuie  whatever,  which  it  shall  judge  ne- 
cessary to  promote  the  general  welfare.  And  also  under  this  exposition 
is  it,  that  the  ultra  fanatics  and  abolitionists  of  the  North  contend,  that 
Congress  can  alter,  whenever  it  pleases,  the  whole  domestic  policy  of 
South-Carolina. 

In  this  view  of  the  subject,  these  words  c:  general  welfare”  are  becom- 
ing every  clay  more  and  more  important  to  the  folks,  who  are  now  so 
peaceably  raising  their  cotton  and  rice,  between  the  Little  Pedee  and  the 
Savannah.  The  question,  it  must  be  tecollected,  is  not  simply,  whether 
we  are  to  have  a foreign  commerce.  It  is  not  whether  we  are  to  have 
splendid  national  works,  in  which  we  have  no  interest,  executed  chiefly  at 
our  cost,  and  with  a view  to  circulate  money  in  the  North.  It  is  not 
whether  we  are  to  be  taxed  without  end  It  is  not  whether  we  are  to  have 
our  Northern  brethren,  as  our  task  masters,  and  to  make  bricks  for  them 
without  straw.  But  the'still  more  interesting  question  is,  whether  the  in- 
stitutions of  our  forefathers,  those  institutions  under  which  we  have  been 
born,  and  under  which  all  of  us,  bondmen  as  well  as  free,  have  enjoyed  in 
the  whole,  as  much  of  happiness  as  generally  fails  to  the  lot  of  any  one 
nation  on  earth,  are  to  be  preserved  according  to  ancient  usage,  free  from 
the  rude  hands  of  innovators  and  enthusiasts,  and  from  the  molestation  or 
interference  of  any  legislative  power  on  earth  but  our  own  ? Or  whether, 
like  the  weak,  the  dependant,  and  the  unfortunate  colonists  of  the  West- 
Indies,  we  are  to  drag  on  a miserable  state  of  political  existence,  constant- 
ly vibrating  between  our  hopes  and  our  fears,  as  to  what  a Congress  may 
do  towards  us,  without  any  accurate  knowledge  of  our  probable  fate,  and 
without  a hope  of  successful  resistance  ? 


65 


This,  my  fellow-citizens,  is  an  awful  question,  but  awful  as  it  is,  it  is  a 
question  on  which,  sooner  or  later,  we  must  all  pass  a final  judgment  — 
We  deceive  ourselves  if  vve  think,  that  there  can  be  any  evasion.  The 
time  advances  and  advances  apace,  when  we  must  either  be  content  to  go 
as  supplicants,  and  prostrate  ouiselves  before  the  Councils  of  the  nation, 
soliciting  their  forbearance  and  their  mercy,  or  we  must  there  appear  as 
freemen,  demanding  a recognition  of  our  rights,  with  a firm  and  an  un- 
alterable resolution  to  maintain  them.  There  is  no  middle  course: — 

Let  us  examine  the  grounds  upon  which  the  enemies  of  the  republic 
would  impoverish  and  destroy  our  happy  country.  As  far  as  manufac- 
tures are  implicated,  it  is  immaterial  what  construction  is  given  to  the  words 
“general  welfare ;”  for,  if  I am  correct  in  the  position  1 took  in  the  two 
preceding  numbers,  that  Congress  is  prohibited  from  giving  any  protec- 
tion excepting  by  patents  for  new  inventions,  the  power,  of  coutse,  cannot 
be  claimed  under  this  clause. 

No  clause  in  the  Constitution,  in  my  view,  has  been  more  perverted  in 
its  meaning  than  this.  But  it  is  not  surprising.  When  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  solemnly  adjudges  that  the  power  given  to 
Congress  to  pass  the  “ necessary  and  proper  laws,”  to  execute  its  enume- 
rated powers,  is  an  enlargement,  and  not  a limitation  of  those  powers, 
(the  contrary  of  which  I have  demonstated  to  be  the  fact,  from  the  jour- 
nals of  the  Convention,)  is  it  to  be  wondered,  that  the  same  mistake, 
should  occur  in  the  interpretation  of  the  clause  in  question  ? The  term 
“ general  welfare,”  I contend,  was  inserted  in  this  clause,  to  confine  the 
appropriating  power  of  Congress  to  the  enumerated  objects.  Should  I 
fail  in  my  proof,  I hope  I shall  have  given  as  good  reasons  for  my  con- 
structions, as  those  on  the  opposite  side,  can  for  theirs.  If  1 adduce  facts, 
which  even  render  the  interpretation  either  way,  as  not  conclusive,  I 
shall  have  rendered  some  service  to  my  country.  South-Carolina  is  not 
to  pay  tribute  money,  or  have  her  domestics  insubordinate,  under  a dis- 
puted, and  doubtful  construction  of  the  Constitution. 

When  the  cl  i a ft  of  the  Constitution  was  reported  to  the  Convention,  on 
the  6th  of  August,  it  was  generally  understood,  as  being  in  conformity 
with  the  outlines  agreed  upon  in  the  amended  resolutions  of  Mr.  Randolph. 
If  the  committee  did  deviate,  from  the  letter  or  spirit  of  the  outlines  so 
given,  it  could  only  be,  from  misconception  of  their  instructions.  It  does 
not,  however,  appear,  that  they  did  in  any  one  instance,  misunderstand 
them.  In  their  enumeration  of  powers,  they  were,  by  their  instruc- 
tions, to  provide  inter  alia,  a special  power  for  every  subject  of  general 
interest  They  did  so  as  well  as  they  could.  What  escaped  their  notice, 
was  afterwards  provided  for,  by  additional  enumerated  powers.  That 
this  committe  ever  intended,  that  the  legislation  of  Congress  should  extend 
over  any  subject,  which  was  not  particularly  provided  I'or  in  their  enumera- 
tion of  powers,  is  contradicted  by  the  important  fact,  that  they  used,  in 
their  reported  draft,  no  general  phrases,  under  which  might  be  concealed 
a single  latent  power.  The  words  “ common  defence,”  or  “general 
welfare,”  or  any  words  of  similar  import,  are  not  to  be  found  in  any  part  of 
the  reported  draft  of  the  Constitution,  not  even  in  its  preamble;  and  it 
appears  further,  that  those  words  are  not,  up  to  that  date,  in  any  part  of 
the  journals,  neither  in  Mr.  Pinckney’s  draft,  nor  in  Mr.  Randolph’s 
resolutions.  In  the  Constitution  reported  by  the  committee  of  detail,  the 


66 


taxing  clause  stood  thus:  “The  Legislature  of  the  United  States,  shall 
have  the  power  to  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts  and  excises.”  In 
Mr.  Pinckney’s  draft,  referred  to  the  committee,  the  words  are  the  same. 

When  this  clause,  on  the  1 6th  of  August,  was  in  its  turn,  called  up  for 
consideration,  a motion  was  made  for  a proviso  “ to  restrain  Congress 
from  taxing  the  exports  of  a State.”  The  consideration  of  the  proviso 
was  postponed,  almost  unanimously.  It  was  an  unnecessary  amendment, 
because  there  was  already  amongst  the  limitations  on  the  power  of  Con- 
gress, the  same  provision.  Be  this  as  it  may,  we  may  presume,  that  the 
clause  required  consideration,  and  that  this  may  have  been  one  reason  for 
its  postponement  On  the  18th,  we  find  this  motion,  “ that  a clause  or 
clauses  be  prepared  to  restrain  the  Legislature  of  tin-  United  States,  from 
establishing  a perpetual  revenue,"  the  meaning  of  which  I understand  to 
be,  that  no  money  should  be  raised  by  taxes,  unless  it  should  be  needed  for 
the  common  purposes  of  the  government.  Here  then  we  perceive,  an 
intention  to  limit , and  not  to  extend  the  appropriating  power  of  the 
government.  The  committee,  to  whom  this  proposition  was  referred, 
must  have  understood,  that  there  was  a disposition  in  the  Convention,  to 
limit  the  appropriating  power,  for  on  the  22d,  they  report,  that  the  clause 
should  read — to  lay  taxes,  &c.  for  the  payment  of  the  debts,  and  necessary 
expenses  of  the  United  States,  provided,  that  no  law  for  raising  any  branch 
of  revenue,  except  it  be  specially  appropriated  for  the  payment  of  in- 
terest on  debts,  or  loans,  shall  continue  in  force  more  than years.” 

This  limitation  of  the  committee,  it  is  true,  was  not  finally  agreed  to;  but 
I introduce  it  to  shew,  that  there  was  a jealousy  in  the  Convention,  as  to 
the  power  of  raising  taxes,  without  specifying  the  purposes , for  which  they 
were  intended.  It  was  to  guard  against  useless  taxation,  which  might  be 
followed  by  waste  and  extravagance  in  the  public  expenditure. 

Between  the  time,  however,  that  the  taxing  clause  was  first  called  up  for 
consideration,  to  wit,  on  the  16th,  and  the  time  the  committee  of  detail  re- 
ported as  above,  on  the  22d,  Mr.  Rutledge,  the  chairman  of  that  com- 
mittee, had  moved,  that  “ Congress  should  consider  the  necessity,  and  ex- 
pediency of  the  debts  of  the  several  States,  being  assumed  by  Congress,” 
and  a committee  of  eleven  was  appointed  for  this  purpose.  This  com- 
mittee of  eleven  had  reported  on  the  2 1st,  “that  the  Legislature  shall 
have  power  to  fulfil  the  engagements,  which  had  been  entered  into  by  Con- 
gress, and  to  discharge  as  well  the  d bts  of  the  United  States,  as  the  debts 
incurred  by  the  several  States  during  the  late  war,  for  the  common  defence 
and  general  welfare This  is  the  first  time  (the  2 1 st  of  August)  that  the 
words  “ common  defence  and  general  welfare ,”  appear  on  the  journals  of 
the  Conventions;  and  no  doubt  it  was  this  report,  as  to  a provision  for 
the  public  debt,  which  caused  the  other  committee,  in  their  reports  on  the 
22d,  to  which  we  have  just  referred,  to  propose  to  add  to  the  taxing  clause 
the  words,  “ to  pay  the  debts  and  necessary  expenses  of  the  United 
States,”  &c.  In  this  same  report,  on  the  22d  of  August,  was  the  specific 
power  proposed,  as  a seventeenth  enumerated  power,  (alluded  to  in  a pre- 
ceding number)  to  enable  Congress  to  provide  for  the  general  welfare , &c. 
which  report  I considered  as  made  in  favour  of  manufactures,  but  was 
never  agreed  to.  This  is  the  second  time  (the  22d)  that  the  words  “ ge 
neral  welfare,”  are  mentioned.  On  the  23d,  when  the  taxing  power  was 
again  called  up,  a motion  was  made  to  amend  it,  so  as  to  read,  “ The 


67 


Legislature  shall  fulfil  the  engagements,  and  discharge  the  debts  of  the 
United  States,  and  shall  have  the  power  to  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties, 
imposts  and  excises.”  This  motion  was  carried.  On  the  25th  it  was  re- 
considered, and  a motion  was  made  to  amend  it  by  saying,  “ for  toe  pay- 
ment of  the  debts,  and  for  defraying  the  expenses  that  shall  be  incurred  for 
the  common  defence  and  general  welfare;”  which  motion  was  lost.  Thus 
the  limitation  voted  for  on  the  23d  remained.  But  on  the  4th,  the  com- 
mittee made  a report,  and  amongst  other  things  recommended  that  the 
clause  should  read,  “ to  pay  the  debts  and  provide  for  the  common  defence 
and  general  welfare  of  the  United  States;”  and  it  was  thus  finally  agreed 
to. 

If  there  be  one  inference  clearer  than  another,  from  the  foregoing  state- 
ment of  facts,  it  is,  that  there  existed  in  the  Convention  a clear  ini ention, 
not  to  suffer  the  appropriating  power  of  the  government,  to  remain  sub- 
ject to  the  possibly  perverted  construction,  that  it  was  to  be  indefinite  as  to 
purpose,  as  well  as  illimitable  as  to  amount.  Let  us  recapitulate : The 
amendment  of  the  18th  was  a limitation  on  the  power  to  tax  unnecessarily. 
It  was  to  provide  against  raising  a revenue  which  might  not  be  needed. 
The  proposition  of  the  22d  was  a severe  limitation  as  to  pupose,  confining 
the  appropriation  to  necessary  expenses.  In  that  of  the  23d.  the  purpose 
is  first  expressed,  to  wit,  “ to  fulfil  the  engagements  and  discharge  the 
debts ;”  and  then  follows  the  power  to  tax.  Here  was  a clear  limitation 
again  as  to  purposes.  On  the  25th,  the  taxes  are  to  be  laid  to  pay  “ the 
expenses  that  shall  be  incurred  for  the  common  defence  and  general  wel- 
fare.” This  again  is  a limitation  as  to  purpose. 

If  such  of  the  proposed  amendments  as  limit  the  appropriating  power 
as  to  its  purposes,  be  attentively  considered,  it  will  be  seen,  that  they  aie 
all  more  or  less  objectionable,  and  therefore  were  properly  rejected  by  the 
Convention.  Forinstance — 1st.  To  confine  the  appropriation  tothe“«eces- 
sary  expenses”  of  the  government,  would  be  too  rigorous.  Every  government 
must  have  some  latitude  of  discretion,  as  to  its  expenditures  for  its  enume- 
rated, or  legitimate  objects.  2ndly.  To  have  limited  the  expenditure  to 
the  “ engagements  and  debts  of  the  United  States,”  would  have  excluded 
the  debts  of  the  old  Confederation,  and  the  assumption  of  the  debts  of  the 
individual  States.  There  existed  moreover,  another  objection  to  this 
phraseology.  The  taxes  here,  are  made  the  means  of  executing  this  par- 
ticular power,  whereas  the  taxing  power  must  be  the  great  means  of  exe- 
cuting all  the  powers.  3dly.  To  have  limited  the  appropriation  to  the 
tc  expenses  that  shall  be  incurred  for  the  common  defence  and  general  wel- 
fare,” might  possibly  imply  a doubt,  whether  Congress  ought  to  lay  its 
taxes  prematurely,  or  before  the  wants  of  the  Government  should  be  ascer- 
tained. These  last,  are  the  words  in  the  old  Confederation.  I do  not 
recollect  what  the  practice  was  in  the  old  Congress — but  I do  suspect,  that 
the  States  were  never  called  upon  for  their  supplies  in  money,  or  in  flour, 
&c.  until  the  expenses  were  ascertained,  and  the  quota  of  each  Slate  ad^ 
justed.  However,  be  the  objection  to  this  last  amendment  what  I have 
stated  or  not,  we  must  all  agree,  that  if  the  words,  now  used  in  the  Article, 
be  words,  shewing  the  restrictive  sense  of  the  Convention,  as  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  appropriating  power,  the  clause  is  better  expressed 
than  it  would  have  been,  under  any  of  the  amendments.  As  it  now 
reads,  it  gives  Congress  the  necessary  power  to  lay  its  taxes  at  its 


68 


pleasure,  by  anticipation  or  otherwise — but  judiciously  confines  the  pro- 
ceeds, to  the  general  purposes,  for  which  the  Government  was  establish- 
ed, the  public  debt  being  provided  for,  by  a separate  article. 

Those  who  reject  this  rational  constiuction,  that  the  words  “general 
welfare”  were  intended  to  restrict  the  appropriating  power  of  Congress, 
to  the  enumerated  objects,  will  find  themselves  reduced  to  the  awkward  di- 
lemma, of  maintaining  a very  absurd  position,  to  wit — that  when  a power 
is  given  to  raise  money,  without  any  expression  of  limits,  as  to  amount , or 
as  to  purpose , it  is  an  augmentation  of  such  a power,  as  soon  as  the  pur- 
poses of  the  appropriation  are  expressed.  The  case  before  us  is  precisely 
of  this  kind. — Mr.  Pinckney  proposed,  by  his  draft,  to  give  Congress  a 
power  “ to  raise  taxes,  duties,  impost  and  excises.”  The  Committee  re- 
port a simi'ar  power — This  power,  though  apparently  illimitable,  as  to 
purpose  or  amount,  was  not  so  in  fact.  Under  a general  power  to  raise 
taxes,  Congress  can  no  more  appropriate  money,  to  any  purpose  foreign 
to  the  wants  of  the  Government,  than  any  trustee  who  has  an  unlimited 
power  to  raise  money  by  loans  or  otherwise,  can  legally  appropriate  the 
money  when  borrowed,  to  any  other  than  the  purposes  of  the  trust  which 
are  expressed  in  the  deed  which  confers  the  money  raising  power. 

But,  let  us  give  the  opposite  argument  every  advantage. — Here  is  a 
power  reported  by  the  Committee,  which  is  indefinite  every  way.  It  must 
occur  to  every  mind,  that  to  make  any  addition  to  a power  to  raise  money, 
which  already'  is  so  expressed,  as  possibly  to  be  construed  to  be  unlimited 
as  to  the  purpose,  as  well  as  to  the  amount  of  the  appropriation,  is  in  fact 
to  limit  that  power.  That  which  apparently  is  already  unlimited,  needs 
no  additional  words  to  strengthen  it ; every  amendment  is  likely  to  weaken 
it  considerably.  The  history  of  the  clause  in  question,  shews  this  to  be 
the  case.  In  all  the  trials  to  which  it  was  exposed,  it  was  always  weak- 
ened— sometimes  more,  sometimes  less,  according  to  the  proposed  amend- 
ments. As  the  clause  originally  stood,  who  can  doubt,  but  that  Congress 
might,  under  its  phraseology,  have  pretended  to  more  power  than  it  now 
claims — though,  substantially,  there  is  no  difference  between  the  two  claus- 
es. Under  such  an  unlimited  power  as  the  words  convey,  the  vote  for  the 
relief  of  the  distressed  emigrants  from  St  Domingo,  and  that  of  100,000 
dollars  to  the  inhabitants  of  Carracas,  might  have  been  said  to  be  justified. 
When  this  appropriation  was  voted,  it  was  unconstitutional,  because  it  was 
not  for  the  general  welfare  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  to  whb  h 
the  restriction  confines  the  appropriations  of  the  Government.  Under  the 
clause  too,  as  it  originally  stood,  a million  of  dollars  might,  under  some 
colour  of  authority,  be  given  to  the  Greeks;  as  much  more  to  the  South- 
American  Patriots  ; millions  might  be  voted  to  extend  Christianity  in 
heathen  countries,  or  to  civilize  that  quarter  of  the  globe  which  is  becom- 
ing so  very  interesting  to  an  American  Congress — the  continent  of  Africa. 
But  who  would  now  contend,  that  we  could  give  money  to  the  Greeks,  or 
to  the  South- American  Patriots.  And  how  is  it,  that  we  cannot  be  thus 
generous,  when  there  is  no  express  prohibition  in  the  Constitution — The 
answer  is  a plain  one.  It  is  the  additional  words  “general  welfare”  to  the 
original  clause.  If  then  it  is  the  amendment  to  the  original  taxing  clause, 
that  prevents  Congress  from  now  doing,  what  it  might  have  had  a pretext 
to  do,  before  such  an  amendment  was  made — that  amendment,  must  of 
necessity  be  a limitation  on  the  appropriating  power.  It  is  the  limitation 


is  to  the  purposes  of  appropriation,  which  the  words  “general  wel- 
fare” have  affixed  to  a power,  which,  from  its  phraseology,  might 
have  been  assumed  to  be  unlimited,  that  restricts  Congress  to  such 
appropriations  only  as  can  be  referred  to  the  common  defence  and 
general  welfare  of  the  States.  If,  then,  the  words  constitute  a limi- 
tation in  this  sense,  they  cannot  enlarge  the  appropriating  power* 
What  is  intended  as,  and  operates  as  a limitation,  cannot  be  con* 
strued  into  an  additional  or  a new  power.  , 

The  words  “general  welfare,”  were  in  truth  added  to  the  clause, 
not  because  the  members  of  the  Convention  believed,  that,  without 
such  a clause,  the  money  appropriating  power  would  in  strictness  and 
in  truth,  be  without  limits  as  to  the  purposes  for  which  money 
might  be  voted  away.  They  could  not  have  thought  so,  for  there 
were  amongst  them  too  many  sound  lawyers.  They  could  not  be* 
lieve,  that  the  words  conferred  a right  to  give  away  money  except 
for  national  purposes.  The  words  were  inserted,  ex  abundante 
cautela.  The  same  extreme  caution  here  prevailed,  which  influenc* 
ed  them  to  give  a power  to  Congress  to  pass  the  necessary  laws  to 
execute  its  powers,  and  which  also  induced  them  to  give  as  sub- 
stantive powers,  those  which  were  incidental  to  the  execution  of 
other  powers.  There  was  a fear,  that  the  clause  would  be  liable  to 
misconstruction,  if  some  words  were  not  added  to  it,  to  shew  the 
restricted  sense  in  which  they  would  have  it  considered.  The  jour* 
nals  of  the  Convention  decidedly  shew  this.  Had  these  words  not 
been  inserted,  to  a certainty,  large  sums  of  money,  or  frigates,  would 
have  been  voted  to  the  Greeks  a few  years  ago,  when  there  was  such 
an  enthusiasm  on  the  subject  amongst  the  influential  members  of 
Congress.  And,  to  a certainty  also,  pecuniary  bounties  and  pre* 
miurns  would,  ere  this,  have  been  voted  away  by  Congress,  to  en- 
courage agriculture,  trade,  and  manufactures  ; and  even  money 
might  have  been  voted  for  State  purposes.  As  the  clause  noW 
stands,  no  appropriation  can  be  justified,  excepting  it  be  for  the  na* 
tional  objects  included  in  the  enumeration  of  powers. 


Mr.  M’Duffie,  who,  in  his  exposition,  of  the  general  phrases  iff 
the  Constitution,  agrees  with  Alexander  Hamilton,  and  who,  in 
the  debate  in  1824,  has  gone  so  very  far  in  his  ideas,  of  the  power  of 
the  Government,  as  to  internal  improvements,  seemed  to  regard  it 
as  a matter  of  considerable  triumph,  when  some  of  bis  adversaries  in 
the  debate,  had  incautiously  contended  fora  principle,  which  I agree 
could  not  be  maintained,  and  which  I regret  was  ever  advocated.**** 
He  thanked  them  for  the  admission,  that  the  words,  “ general  wel* 
fare,”  were  intended  to  limit  a power,  which,  otherwise,  would  have 
been  illimitable  without  them,  because  he  thought,  it  led  to  the  irre- 
sistible conclusion,  that  the  discretion  of  the  National  Legislature 
was  not  to  be  restricted  within  any  bounds,  short  of  the  “common 
defence  and  general  welfare.” 

Mr.  M’Duffie’s  argument  in  support  of  this  doctrine,  is  so  exces- 
sively refined,  that  it  is  always  unsafe  for  an  antagonist, who  is  not  his* 

9 


70 


compeer  in  metaphysics,  to  enter  the  field  of  controversy  with  him. 
The  danger  is,  that  he  may  be  blown  “ sky  high,”  from  the  ground 
that  he  occupies.  Like  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States,  he 
so  states  his  propositions,  that  they  seem  to  be  almost  self-evident. 
In  an  instant,  our  previous  impressions  vanish,  and  for  a while,  we 
acquiesce,  without  knowing  why  or  wherefore,  in  doctrines,  which 
our  mature  judgment  had  always  regarded  as  unsound.  The  prompt- 
ness too,  with  which  Mr.  M’Duffie  seizes  an  advantage,  incautiously 
given  him  by  his  adversary,  and  the  dexterity  with  which  he  man- 
ages his  subsequent  movements,  is  most  remarkable.  It  is  the  novelty 
of  his  plan  of  attack,  and  the  boldness  with  which  he  pushes  for- 
ward his  game,  that  gives  hitn  his  superiority  in  debate.  His  speech 
on  internal  improvements,  is  a master  piece  of  the  powers  of  rea- 
soning. It  is  by  far  the  greatest  effort  which  was  made  in  Congress, 
during  that  discussion,  and,  it  therefore  is  not  surprising,  that  this 
speech  should  have  been  so  long  considered,  as  settling  the  question 
in  favour  of  the  power  of  Congress  to  appropriate  money  for  roads 
and  canals.  But  Mr.  M’Dcfpie’s  doctrines,  like  those  of  the  Su- 
preme Court,  have  been  orthodox,  because  they  never  have  been  tho- 
roughly examined.  They  were  promulgated  at  a period,  when  it 
was  deemed  a kind  of  heresy,  not  to  fall  into  the  general  views  of 
our  politicians  at  Washington,  as  to  the  character  which  our  Gov- 
ernment ought  to  assume.  It  was  to  encourage  a selfish  and  sec- 
tional feeling,  to  think  of  differing  from  men,  who,  so  far  from  re- 
collecting, that  the  General  Government  was  designed  to  be  a Gov- 
ernment altogether  external  in  its  operations,  conceived  the  enlarged 
and  brilliant  scheme,  of  making  it  a most  splendid  edifice,  ivithin 
and  without , as  calculated  to  attract  notice  from  its  ornaments,  as 
well  as  its  utility. 

Had  Mr.  M’Duffie’s  antagonists  joined  issue  with  him  on  proper 
pleadings,  they  might  have  insured  for  themselves  a successful  com- 
petition : but,  as  it  was,  they  were  the  weak  in  the  hands  of  the 

strong.  They  did  not  meet  him  on  the  true  battle-ground,  or 
they  might  have  wounded  this  Achilles  in  the  debate,  in  more  places 
than  one.  The  campaign  was  badly  conducted,  both  by  his  friends 
and  his  adversaries.  Whilst  his  colleague,  Mr.  Clay,  was  employed 
in  contending,  that  the  power  over  Internal  Improvements,  might 
justly  be  referred  to  the  power  “ of  regulating  commerce,”  and  Mr. 
M’Lane  supported  the  construction,  that  to  “ facilitate ” commerce, 
was  substantially  to  regulate  it:  Whilst  some  would  deduce  the 
power  in  question,  as  a consequence  from  the  right  to  make  %oar, 
and  others,  from  the  “ right  to  establish  Post  Roads ;”  whilst  in 
fact,  all  his  colleagues  were  contending,  thai  Congress  could  make 
roads,  and  exercise  its  sovereignty  in  this  way  legitimately,  and 
whilst  they  were  all  occupying  positions,  from  which  they  could  ea- 
sily he  dislodged  : Mr.  Archer,  from  Virginia,  on  the  other  side,  in- 
stead of  contending  for  the  position  taken  in  the  preceding  number, 
that  the  words  “ common  defence  and  general  welfare,”  were  de- 
claratory, and  inserted  from  extreme  caution,  rather  to  shew  the  re- 
strictive sense  in  which  the  Convention  would  have  the  taxing 


71 


power  considered,  than  from  any  doubt,  that  in  fairness,  any  power 
could  be  claimed  to  appropriate  money,  except  for  the  enumerated 
objects,  most  unfortunately  admits,  that  if  the  words  had  been  omit- 
ted, the  taxing  power  would  have  been  unlimited  in  every  way. — 
The  eagle  eye  of  Mr.  M’Duffie,  who,  ere  this,  had  not  made  a sin- 
gle movement  to  the  right  or  to  the  left,  perceives  the  opening  in  the 
enemy’s  line,  and  it  is  at  this  critical  moment,  that  he  advances  with 
the  whole  force  of  his  mighty  intellect,  and  occupies  a new  position, 
only  hinted  at  by  his  prototype,  Alexander  Hamilton,  presenting 
himself  in  such  views,  as  to  strike  his  friends  and  his  adversaries 
with  amazement,  and  with  consternation.  “ As  the  power  under 
consideration,  would  have  had  no  limit  without  the  words  “ common 
defence  and  general  welfare,”  it  results  of  necessity ,”  says  Mr.  M’Duf- 
fie, “ that  we  must  look  to  these  words  alone , for  the  limitation  ” — 
He  therefore  sets  out  with  the  proposition,  that  the  discretion  of  the 
Legislature  is  within  its  bounds,  as  long  as  its  appropriations  are  for 
the  general  welfare;  and,  that  he  may  not  be  in  the  difficulties  of  his 
colleagues,  who,  if  they  should  fail  to  refer  the  exercise  of  sovereign 
power  contended  for,  to  some  or  other  of  the  enumerated  objects, 
must  surrender  at  discretion,  he  carefully  disclaims  all  pretensions 
to  construct  roads  and  canals,  as  an  exercise  of  sovereignty  : As  a so- 
vereign power,  he  considers  the  appropriating  power  as  ending  in  it- 
self. When  the  money  is  raised  and  appropriated,  sovereignty,  he 
says,  ceases  ; and  whatever  else  is  to  be  effected,  if  it  cannot  be  done 
by  the  agency  of  money  merely , it  cannot  be  done  at  all.  If  the  aid 
of  any  sovereign  power  be  at  all  necessary,  to  effect  the  object  to 
which  the  money  is  to  be  applied,  be  admits,  that  in  such  case,  the 
appropriation  cannot  be  made,  without  such  power  is  found  amongst 
the  enumerated  objects. 

Mr.  M’Duffie  accordingly  maintains,  that  the  spending  of  the  mo- 
ney, after  it  is  appropriated  by  law,  even  if  it  be  an  hundred  million 
of  dollars,  on  roads  to  be  opened  with  the  consent  of  States,  is  no 
more  an  act  of  sovereignty,  than  the  purchase  of  a horse,  fora  mes- 
senger of  either  house  of  Congress,  would  be  an  act  of  sovereignty, 
or  the  making  of  a road  through  a State  by  an  individual,  with  the 
consent  of  the  Legislature,  would  make  that  individual  a sovereign. 

Now,  to  a man  of  plain  sense,  it  would  seem  to  be  a matter  of 
some  consequence,  as  between  a State  and  the  United  States,  that 
when  Congress  opens  a road  through  such  a State,  with  its  consent, 
it  does  not  thereby  exercise  sovereignty,  in  that  particular  State,  be- 
cause no  State  would  permit  its  sovereignty  to  be  interfered  with; 
but  really  and  truly,  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  at  large,  it 
can  make  no  difference,  if  a hundred  million  of  dollars  is  to  be  ex- 
pended, whether  the  expenditure  of  this  vast  treasure  on  roads,  is, 
technically  speaking,  an  act  of  sovereignty  or  not,  because,  if  the 
appropriation  can  be  constitutionally  made,  the  money  must  come 
out  of  their  pockets,  if  it  be  forthcoming  at  all.  But  to  spend  a hun- 
dred millions,  under  a power  to  appropriate  it  for  the  very  purpose 
for  which  it  is  actually  expended,  is,  at  any  rate,  to  possess  a 
prodigious  influence,  even  if  it  be  not  sovereignty.  Mr.  M’Duf- 


72 


pie's  mode  of  stating  the  question,  is  therefore,  most  imposing  ; and 
those  who  desire  to  eombat  him  on  the  ground  of  metaphysics,  or 
who  would  not  yield  to  him  this  position,  that  to  effect  any  object, 
however  important,  by  money  merely,  even  if  it  be  an  hundred  mil- 
lions, is  not  to  exercise  sovereignty,  must  expect  to  be  hors  du  com- 
bat. We  must  meet  him  then  on  other  grounds. 

Let  us  say,  that  he  is  correct,  that  to  give  a million  of  dollars  to- 
wards a canal  in  a State,  and  with  the  consent  of  its  Legislature,  is 
not  an  exercise  of  sovereign  power  ; and  let  us  further  admit  his 
grand  position,  that  the  appropriating  power  has  no  limits,  but  the 
common  defence  and  general  welfare.  There  is  yet  more  than  one 
sophism  in  his  entire  argument.  The  first  sophism  consists  in  his 
supposing,  that  an  unlimited  power  to  raise  money  for  the  general 
welfare,  is  honestly  executed,  if  the  money  be  applied  to  the  pur- 
poses of  the  Government,  and  not  to  local  or  State  purposes.  The 
only  answer  to  this  argument  which  I have  met  with,  is  that  given 
by  Mr.  Legare,  in  his  speech  on  Mr.  Prioleau’s  resolutions,  in  our 
State  Legislature,  in  1825.  Mr.  Legare  demonstrates,  that  a Gov- 
ernment of  limited  powers,  has  no  greater  right  to  divert  the  funds 
of  the  Government,  beyond  the  enumerated  objects,  because  it  has  an 
unlimited  power  to  appropriate  for  the  general  welfare,  than  a trus- 
tee who  has  an  unlimited  power  by  deed,  to  raise  money  on  the  trust 
estate,  can  divert  those  funds  to  any  other  purposes  of  the  estate, 
than  are  expressed  in  the  different  trusts.  Every  lawyer  knows,  that 
a trustee  may,  under  a general  power,  in  a trust  deed  for  that  pur- 
pose, sell  part  of  the  trust  estate,  and  he  may  apply  the  proceeds,  to 
purposes  which  he  may  deem  generally  beneficial  to  the  estate.  In 
such  a case,  though  the  legality  of  the  sale,  and  the  appropriations 
could  not  be  disturbed,  yet,  in  equity,  the  trustee  would  be  adjudged 
to  have  departed  from  his  duty,  as  having  abused  the  trust,  and 
would  be  compelled  to  refund.  So  is  it  with  the  Government  of  the 
United  States.  It  is  a Government  of  sovereign,  but  of  limited 
powers,  These  powers  are  conferred  on  it,  to  enable  it  to  perform 
certain  trusts.  These  trusts  are  defined  with  the  utmost  precision, 
in  an  instrument  called  the  Constitution,  but  which  is  neither  more 
nor  less,  than  the  great  Trust  Deed  between  the  States  and  the 
United  Stales  The  General  Government  then,  is  a trustee,  and  the 
power  which  it  receives  from  the  States,  is  a power  coupled  with  a 
trust.  Would  any  lawyer  say,  that  in  construing  live  power  of  the 
Government,  unaided  by  other  lights  to  guide  us,  all  the  rules  for 
construing  powers,  coupled  with  a trust,  should  be  put  aside  ; those 
rules,  which  are  not  merely  the  rules  of  common  law,  but  of  com- 
mon sense.  I should  hope  not.  5s  it  reconcileable  with  common 
sense,  that  a power  given  by  deed,  bv  A to  B.  to  mortgage  the  estate, 
and  to  apply  the  proceeds  to  the  purposes  of  the  trust  estate,  could 
authorize  the  appropriation  to  purposes,  not  specified  or  referable  to 
auv  of  the  numerous  trusts,  with  which  the  deed  may  abound.  I 
should  say  not.  Then,  upon  what  principle,  can  a Government, 
instituted  to  effect  certain  national  objects,  which  are  clearly  de- 
fined, appropriate  the  general  means,  placed  in  its  hands,  for  a pur- 


73 


pose,  which  it  is  admitted  on  the  opposite  side,  has  no  relation  to 
any  of  those  objects.  Such  a Government  may  think  proper  to  as- 
sume the  principle,  that  the  Government  being  National,  it  may  ef- 
fect objects  which  are  National,  though  not  enumerated.  What  is 
this  but  to  say,  that  when  the  Convention  precisely  defined  the  pur- 
poses, for  which  we  should  be  National,  the  Congress  shall  under- 
take to  say,  we  shall  also  be  National  for  other  purposes. 

To  tax  the  people,  that  money  may  be  appropriated  beyond  the 
enumerated  objects,  is  a constitutional  exercise  of  power,  because 
the  taxing  power  is  unlimited.  So  is  the  sale  of  part  of  the  estate 
by  a trustee  legal,  because  a power  is  given  for  that  purpose.  In 
either  case,  the  money  once  appropriated,  must  remain  so  appropri- 
ated. But  equity  will  adjudge  the  misapplication  of  the  money,  as 
an  illegal  act.  It  is  an  abuse  of  the  trust.  It  would  be  no  answer 
in  Mr.  M’Duffie,  to  repeat  what  he  has  already  said,  “ that  construe 
the  C onstitution  as  we  will,  our  principal  security  must  depend 
upon  the  discretion  of  Congress,  and  that  we  are  not  more  exposed, 
by  Congress  appropriating  its  money-  at  its  discretion,  under  the  tax- 
ing power,  than  if  it  were  wastefully  expended,  with  reference  to  any 
of  the  enumerated  objects,  where  the  discretion  is  admitted  to  be 
unlimited.”  The  difference,  however,  is  essential.  A wasteful  ex- 
penditure of  money,  in  building  fortifications,  and  raising  armies 
and  navies,  when  there  may  be  no  need  of  them,  is  not  an  unconsti- 
tutional act,  any  more  than  it  is  an  illegal  act,  for  a trustee,  who  is 
appointed  to  take  care  of  an  infant,  to  allow  him  so  liberally,  as  to 
enable  him  to  run  through  his  estate,  and  to  come  to  ruin  before  he 
comes  of  age.  In  these  cases,  there  is  no  relief,  because  it  is  money 
expended  upon  the  objects  of  the  trust,  under  an  unlimited  discretion 
so  to  do.  The  manner  of  executing  the  trust,  is  here  matter  of  dis- 
cretion, But  very  different  is  the  case,  where  the  discretion  claimed 
to  be  exercised1,  is  not  as  to  the  quantity  of  money,  which  is  to  be 
applied  to  a specific  purpose,  demanding  such  an  application  of  mo- 
ney, hut  to  the  purpose  itself  of  the  application. 

Congress  cannot  promote  objects  which  are  not  enumerated,  even 
where  money  alone  can  effect  them.  It  is  repugnant  to  the  whole 
plan  and  spirit  of  the  Constitution  Ts  there  no  distinction  between 
a discretion  as  to  the  quantity  of  means,  or  money,  necessary  to  exe- 
cute a particular  trust,  and  a discretion  as  to  the  subject  or  trust,  upon 
which  money  is  to  operate  ? The  distinction,  in  my  mind,  is  most 
manifest.  The  Constitution  affords  many  examples  of  tiie  one,  but 
it  furn  ishes  none  of  the  other.  For  instance,  Congress  can  raise 
money  to  any  amount,  by  taxes  or  by  loans,  whether  the  public  exi- 
gencies require  it  or  not.  It  can,  in  time  of  peace,  as  well  as  of 
war,  raise  troops,  and  build  and  equip  frigates,  without  number. — It 
can  coin  money  without  end. — It  can  appoint  seven  or  seventy  Judges 
of  the  Supreme  Court. — It  may  ordain  and  establish  a hundred  new 
inferior  tribunals  of  Justice.  All  this  Congress  can  do.  But  in  doing 
all  these  things,  it  is  still  strictly  within  its  own  sphere.  It  may  do 
wrong,  but  it  does  so  at  the  expense  of  the  people  at  large,  considered 
as  its  constituents.  It  cannot  possibly  impinge  upon,  or  interfere  with, 


74 


or  affect  in  any  manner,  the  sovereignty  or  concerns  of  the  States, 
either  directly  or  indirectly.  Not  only  its  powers  are  exercised 
within  due  bounds,  and  directed  to  their  proper  objects,  but  its  infiu- 
cnce  too.  Members  of  Congress  are  not  forming  schemes  and  pro- 
jects to  meddle  with  the  concerns,  and  disturb  the  peace  of  their 
neighbours,  indirectly,  when  they  dare  not  do  so  directly.  In  short, 
the  General  Government,  in  thus  exercising  its  discretion,  remains 
what  it  was  created  for,  and  does  not  become  a pragmatical,  offen- 
sive, and  dangerous  power,  the  object  of  alarm  and  jealousy  to  the 
States.  Its  discretion  is  the  only  rule  of  its  conduct.  Such  a dis- 
cretion is  indispensable  to  it,  and  it  has  it  by  the  terms  of  the  grant. 
But  who  can  point  to  any  clause  in  the  Constitution,  which  gives  the 
least  discretion  whatever,  as  to  the  SUBJECT,  upon  which  the  na- 
tional legislation  is  to  operate.  The  bare  idea  of  the  Government, 
being  a Government  o i limited  powers  of  legislation,  one  would  sup- 
pose, would  be  a sufficient  discouragement  to  any  one,  from  under- 
taking so  arduous  a task.  If  we  look  at  the  instrument,  the  objects 
or  subjects  of  legislation,  are  all  enumerated.  The  very  specifi- 
cation of  the  objects,  on  which  the  legislative  power  is  to  operate,  ex 
vi  termini,  excludes  the  idea  of  discretion,  as  to  any  object,  not  in- 
cluded in  such  specifiation.  If  there  is  to  be  discretion,  the  very 
object  of  the  enumeration  is  defeated.  It  was  wisely  ordained  by 
the  Convention,  that  the  subjects  for  the  legislative  powers  of  Con- 
gress, should  be  fixed  and  settled,  and  that  there  should  be  no  dis- 
cretion in  Congress,  as  to  what  subjects  it  should,  or  should  not 
legislate  on.  For  what  is  discretion  l According  to  the  opinion 
of  one  of  the  greatest  men,  who  ever  sat  on  the  English  Bench, 
‘‘Discretion  is  the  law  of  TYRANTS.”  In  the  best  of  men,  it  is 
sometimes  folly,  oftentimes  caprice.  In  the  worst,  it  is  every  vice 
and  crime,  of  which  human  nature  is  capable.” 

But  our  Achilles  must  not  be  permitted  to  drag  us  along  in  tri- 
umph, as  he  would  a vanquished  Hector,  by  saying,  that  amongst 
the  specified  subjects  for  legislation,  there  is  one,  to  wit,  the  appro- 
priating power,  in  which,  from  its  peculiar  phraseology,  a discretion 
as  to  the  objects,  (as  well  as  to  the  amount)  is  implied,  for  that  would 
lie  to  say,  that  whilst  the  whole  instrument  clearly  manifests  a de- 
sign, and  studiously  perfects  a scheme,  to  exclude  all  subjects  for 
legislation,  which  are  not  particularly  specified,  giving  to  Congress 
the  few  defined,  and  reserving  to  the  State  the  numerous  undefined 
powers  of  legislation,  yet,  that  by  certain  doubtful  and  indefinite 
general  phrases,  the  like  of  which,  are  to  be  found  in  the  most  com- 
mon power  of  attorney,  a power  of  appropriating  money  shall  be 
claimed  by  implication,  which,  in  its  exercise,  shall  embrace  almost 
every  object  of  human  legislation.  What  is  this,  but  to  say,  in  the 
language  of  Mr.  Legap.e,  “ that  whilst  all  other  means,  necessary  and 
proper  for  executing  the  enumerated  powers  of  the  Government,  arc 
limited  by  the  nature  of  those  powers,  the  levying  and  disposing  of 
money,  the  UNIVERSAL  means,  is  to  be  restrained  by  no  other 
condition,  than  that  it  should  not  be  thrown  into  the  sea,  or  be- 
stowed on  individuals  who  have  no  claim  on  the  public.” 

Let  us  now  show  where  the  fallacy  of  this  part  of  Mr.  M’Duf- 
fje’s  argument  consists. 


75 


MO.  13. 

The  fallacy  of  Mr.  M’Duffie’s  argument  in  this  particular,  lies,  in  his 
Supposing,  that  the  promotion  of  the  “ common  defence  and  general 
welfare”  by  money  merely,  is  the  end  for  which  the  whole  first  clause  was 
insetted.  If  there  was  no  discretion,  he  thinks,  in  Congress,  as  to  the 
appropriation  of  its  revenues  beyond  the  specific  powers,  “ there  would 
have  been  no  necessity  for  an  express  delegation  of  power,  to  raise  and 
appropriate  money  ; because  every  one  of  the  enumerated  powers  would 
carry  with  it  as  an  incident,  the  power  of  appropriating  the  money  neces- 
sary to  its  execution,”  and  that,  adds  he,  “can  hardly  be  a just  construc- 
tion which  would  thus  convert  the  leading  clause  of  the  Constitution,  into 
mer.e  surplusage.” 

In  this  last  position,  we  perfectly  coincide.  The  construction,  which 
would  cause  any  one  of  the  enumerated  powers  in  the  instrument  to  be 
mere  surplusage,  I agree,  must  be  faulty  It  is  precisely  on  this  principle 
of  reasoning,  that  I have  protested  against  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  M’Culloch  vs  The  State  of  Maryland;  for  I have  shewn,  in  my 
eleventh  number,  that  not  one,  but  nearly  a dozen  of  clauses  in  the  Con- 
stitution, must  be  rank  surplusage,  if  the  position  taken  by  the  Court  in 
that  case,  be  a sound  one. 

But  whilst  we  so  perfectly  agree  in  a joint  protestation  against  a rule  of 
interpretation  so  unsound,  yet  1 must  now  turn  aside,  and  separately  pro- 
test against  our  own  statesman,  for  the  unsound  inference  which  he  has 
drawn,  to  wit,  that  had  the  intention  been,  to  limit  the  appropriations 
within  the  enumerated  powers,  the  necessity  of  an  express  delegation  of 
power  to  raise  money,  would  have  been  superseded.  With  such  an  inter- 
ference as  this,  it  is  not  be  wondered,  that  Mr.  M’Duffie  should  fall  into 
a snare.  Mr.  M’Duffie  is  now  to  be  informed,  that  so  far  from  the  gene- 
ral power  to  tax,  being  inserted  for  the  special  purpose  of  enabling  Con- 
gress to  appropriate  its  revenues  beyond  the  enumerated  objects,  the  clause 
stood  at  the  head  of  the  enumerated  powers  in  Mr.  Pinckney’s  draft, 
submitted  to  the  Convention  as  soon  as  it  was  organized  for  business, 
and  it  stood  also  in  the  reported  draft  of  the  Constitution,  long  before  the 
general  phrases  were  thought  of  or  suggested.  The  words  “common  de- 
fence and  general  welfare”  were  not  added  as  an  amendment  to  the  clause, 
until  the  4th  of  September;  and  then,  as  I aheady  have  stated  in  my  six- 
teenth number,  with  a view  to  express,  the  sense  of  the  Convention,  that 
the  appropriating  power  was  to  be  limited  to  the  enumerated  objects. 
The  taxing  clause,  was  a clause,  which  the  Convention  would  have  retain- 
ed above  all  other  clauses  in  the  instrument,  and  under  every  variety  of 
aspect,  of  which  its  intentions  might  possibly  be  supposed  to  be  susceptible. 
The  taxing  power  was  the  principle,  which  was  to  give  life,  and  health, 
and  vigour  to  the  new  Government.  It  was  the  want  of  this  vital  princi- 
ple, which  caused  the  old  Congress  to  possess  an  huge,  but  yet  an  useless 
mass  of  powers.  The  idea  is  perfectly  inadmissible  in  any  shape,  that  the 
Convention,  with  so  much  experience  before  its  eyes,  of  the  embarrass- 
ments which  had  been  felt,  for  the  want  of  this  active  and  living  power  to 
sustain  the  fabric  of  the  Confederation,  would  have  omitted  to  provide  by 
an  express  grant,  for  the  most  paramount  of  all  the  powers  which  can  be 
conferred  by  a people  on  its  rulers,  and  have  left  the  new  Government  to 
claim  the  money  raising  power,  by  implication  of  law. 


76 


There  is  yet  another  reason,  why  in  the  enumeration  of  powers,  such  d 
clause  could  not  be  dispensed  with — The  States  were  about  to  part  with  a 
considerable  portion  of  their  sovereignty,  and  confer  it  on  a Government, 
which,  for  certain  purposes,  was  designed  to  be  supreme,  To  avoid  a 
clashing,  or  repugnance  of  authority  in  laying  and  collecting  their  respec- 
tive revenues,  it  was  most  essential  to  state  the  subjects  of  taxation  over 
which  die  General  Government  should  possess  authority.  The  taxing 
power,  therefore,  became  of  the  utmost  consequence;  it  was  a subject 
which  was  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  the  members — and  it  was  a subject 
too,  which  did  not  admit  of  very  easy  arrangement.  The  Convention 
had  to  choose  between  two  modes;  one  of  which  was,  to  separate  the 
subjects  of  taxation,  so  as  to  give  some  to  the  Union,  and  the  remainder  to 
the  States ; whilst  the  other  plan  proposed,  was  not  to  separate  the  objects 
of  Revenue,  but  to  give  the  States  concurrent  jurisdiction,  in  general,  in  the 
article  of  taxation.  Mr.  Hamilton  in  his  Federalist  (No.  35)  justifies 
the  position  finally  taken  by  the  Convention,  “that  a concurrent  juris- 
diction in  the  article  of  taxation,  was  the  only  admissible  substitute,  for  an 
entire  subordination,  in  respect  to  this  branch  of  power,  of  State  authority 
to  that  of  the  Union.” 

We  now  perceive  the  indispensable  necessity  of  the  taxing  clause,  a 
clause  so  judiciously  constructed,  that  whilst  under  its  phraseology,  no  exclu- 
sive grant  of  sovereignty  over  subjects  of  revenue  can  possibly  be  claimed 
by  Congress — there  is  at  the  same  time  a reservation  of  State  sovereignty, 
under  that  NEGATIVE  PREGNANT  in  the  Constitution — to  wit:  the 
restriction  on  the  power  of  the  States  to  lay  duties  on  imports,  exports 
and  tonnaee.  Does  not  Mr.  M’Duffie  see,  that  a clause,  which  accord- 
ing to  Mr.  Hamilton,  has  the  “ merit  of  reconciling,  an  indefinite  Consti- 
tutional power  of  taxation  in  the  Federal  Government,  with  an  adequate 
and  independent  power  in  the  States  to  provide  for  their  own  necessities,”  is 
amongst  the  most  important  clauses  in  the  Constitution,  and  that  it  justly 
merits  the  position  it  now  occupies,  to  wit — at  the  head  of  all  the  other 
powers.  Must  he  not  confess  his  oversight,  when  he  did  not  perceive,  that  the 
taxing  power  was  indispensable,  as  the  great  sovereign  means  of  executing  a! 
the  other  powers,  and  that  he  was  greatly  in  error,  when  he  imagined,  that 
had  the  intention  been,  to  apply  the  proceeds  of  the  taxes  to  the  enumerated 

f towers,  “ there  would  have  been  NO  NECESSITY,  for  an  express  de* 
egation  of  power,  to  raise  and  appropriate  money.”  Had  Mr.  M’Duffie 
not  indulged  in  the  Utopian  scheme,  that  a fundamental  dissimilarity  of 
interests  between  twenty  four  States,  embracing  a portion  of  the  globe 
larger  than  Europe,  and  differing  so  much  in  climate,  soil,  and  productions, 
and  in  their  institutions  and  their  laws,  could  ever  be  altered  or  destroyed  ; 
but  have  contemplated  all  the  schemes  of  internal  improvement,  as  all  ra- 
tional men  do,  merely  as  calculated  to  add  influence  to  the  Supreme 
Government,  and  to  take  it  from  the  subordinate  sovereignty,  and  thus 
finally  to  merge  the  one  into  the  other;  had  he  looked  into  the  Constitu- 
tion, not  with  the  visionary  eye  of  an  ardent  enthusiast,  for  a splendid 
Government,  but  with  that  of  the  calm  and  philosophical  statesman,  he 
would  have  known,  that  it  is  a work  so  admirably  contrived,  as  to  bear 
upon  its  very  face  and  front,  the  irrefragable  evidence,  that  its  whole 
scheme  and  design  is  opposed  to  constructive  powers — thatjjthe  giving  away 
little  odd  parcels  of  power,  which  were  the  incidents  to  other  powers  be- 


77 


fore  given,  was  purposely,  to  impress  upon  the  minds  of  future  generations, 
that  nothing  was  to  be  claimed  which  was  not  given;  and  from  this  he 
would  have  learnt  what  I hope  I have  established  to  the  satisfaction  of  all; 
to  wit,  that  the  taxing  power  was  given,  not  as  he  believes,  to  accomplish 
the  particular  end  of  spending  money  towards  the  common  defence  and 
general  welfare,  beyond  the  enumerated  objects,  at  the  discretion  of  Con- 
gress ; but  that  it  was,  of  necessity,  given  for  other  and  higher  purposes, 
to  wit,  the  accomplishment  of  the  enumerated  objects,  for  which  the 
Government  was  instituted. 

The  fallacy  of  Mr  M’Duffie’s  argument  being  thus  shewn,  I pass  over 
those  observations  of  his,  in  which  he  would  shew,  that  if  his  view  of  the 
appropriating  power  of  the  Government  be  not  correct,  every  Congress 
has  been  guilty  of  habitual  violation  of  the  Constitution.  No  argument 
founded  on  precedents  can  have  weight,  where  the  question  at  issue  is, 
whether  the  Government  has,  or  has  not  usurped  its  powers.  Mr,  M'DuF- 
fie  cannot  seriously  believe,  that  in  the  instances  which  he  has  cited,  of 
the  appropriations  to  the  St.  Domingo  sufferers,  under  Gen.  Washing- 
ton’s administration,  and  of  that  to  the  inhabitants  of  Carracas  under  Mr« 
Madison’s,  there  was  an  application  of  money  to  the  ‘‘general  welfare” 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States.  These  were  remarkable  instances,  of 
the  triumph  of  generous  feelings,  over  sober  legislative  caution  But  there 
is  an  argument,  drawn  from  the  precedent  in  the  case  of  the  purchase  of 
Louisiana  by  Mr.  Jf.fferson,  which  does  merit  a particular  reply. 

Mr.  M’Duffie  would  here  exultingly  ride  over  his  opponents,  by  sup- 
posing them  to  take  a ground,  which,  in  my  view  is  wholly  indefensible.—* 
“It  will  be  said,”  says  he,  “ that  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  was  made  by 
virtue  of  the  Executive  power  to  make  treaties,  and  what  follows?  That 
there  is  an  unlimited  power  in  the  Executive  Government,  not  only  to  au- 
thorize Congress  to  appropriate  money,  but  to  impose  upon  it  all  the  obli- 
gation, which  can  grow  out  of  the  treaty,  to  make  the  appropriation.”— 
This,  Mr.  M’Duffie  triumphantly  exclaims  “ puts  an  end  to  the  argu- 
ment, which  limits  the  power  of  appropriating  money  to  the  other  specific 
grants  to  Congress  embraced  in  the  enumeration  of  its  powers;”  for,  says 
he,  “it  would  be  an  extraordinary  supposition,  that  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution  intended  to  limit,  by  the  most  jealous  restrictions,  the  power 
of  the  popular  branch  of  the  Government,  in  selecting  the  objects  calculat- 
ed to  promote  the  general  welfare,  and  at  the  same  time,  to  vest  in  the 
Executive  Government,  the  most  unlimited  discretion  on  the  same  sub- 
ject.” 

But  the  whole  of  this  is  a fallacc.  Mr.  M’Duffie  here  makes  up  a 
“ man  of  straw,”  that  he  might  tea'’,  him  into  pieces.  Who  would  contend, 
that  every  treaty  made  by  the  President,  and  ratified  by  the  Senate,  is  ob- 
ligatory upon  the  House  of  Representatives,  or  upon  the  States,  or  the 
people.  A treaty  stands  upon  no  better  footing  than  a law  of  Congress* 
In  either  case,  it  is  only  the  “ Supreme  law  of  the  Land,”  when  made 
“in  pursuance  of  the  Constitution.”  If  the  President  and  Senate  ratify  a 
treaty,  in  which  there  are  stipulations,  which  violate  any  express  article 
in  the  Constitution,  Mr.  M’Duffie  ought  to  know,  that  such  a treaty 
would  not  be  binding.  Suppose  a treaty  to  be  made  in  which  the  United 
States  ate  pledged  to  an  alliance  with  England  or  France,  offensive  and 
defensive , such  a treaty  would  be  void,  because  it  would  enable  the  Ease- 

10 


78 


cutive,  and  the  Senate  to  put  the  United  States  at  war  with  a foreign  pow- 
er, when  it  is  Congress  alone  in  which  the  power  is  vested.  “ to  declare 
war.”  Many  cases  might  be  put,  where  not  only  express  articles  of  the 
Constitution  might  be  violated,  under  such  a construction  as  this,  but  certain 
unalienable,  though  undefined  rights  of  the  States  may  be  impaired  and 
surrendered.  This  was  clearly  illustrated  some  years  ago,  in  a pamphlet 
called  “ Carolinirnsis In  the  debates  on  Mr.  Jay’s  treaty,  a treaty  in 
which  it  was  not  pretended,  that  there  was  any  violation  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, it  was  even  there  doubted,  whether  the  House  of  Representatives  was 
bound  to  carry  it  into  effect.  The  purchase  of  Louisiana,  is  not  then  to 
be  justified,  on  the  ground  of  its  being  made  by  virtue  ot  the  Executive 
power  to  make  treaties.  The  President  and  Senate  have  the  unquestion- 
able power  to  make  treaties,  as  far  as  those  treaties  relate  to  subjects,  w ith- 
in  the  scope  of  the  enumerated  objects,  for  which  the  General  Government 
was  established,  but  no  farther.  They  have  no  Constitutional  right,  to 
negociate  to  purchase  territory  for  the  United  States,  as  territory  inert  It/. 

Because  Louisiana  was  pmchased  by  Mr.  Jefferson,  Mr.  iVi’Di  ffie 
concludes,  that  the  purchase  was  justified,  under  his  favourite  doctrine,  of 
“ the  power  to  appropriate  money  for  the  general  welfare,  as  money  mere- 
ly ” I differ  totally  from  Mr.  M’Duffie,  since  the  purchase  of  (his  Ter- 
ritory, is  to  be  defended  on  the  proper,  and  the  only  ground  of  its  being  a 
war  measure — most  decidedly  a war  measure,  J can  well  reci  lleci  the 
causes  which  led  to  the  treaty  of  cession  : A right  of  deposit  was  denied  us 
at  New  Orleans,  by  the  Spanish  authorities,  and  there  arose  from  this  ag- 
gression, such  an  excitement  throughout  the  Western  country,  in  conse- 
quence of  this  violation  of  subsisting  treaties,  that  it  became  necessary, 
that  the  Government  should  adopt  immediate  measures  of  negotiation,  or 
war.  There  existed  a powerful  party  in  Congress,  who  were  for  taking 
New  Orleans  by  force,  at  the  head  of  which  were  many  distinguished  mem- 
bers, amongst  whom  was  Mr.  Ross,  from  Pittsburg.  In  this  critical  pos- 
ture of  affairs,  when  war  or  submission  was  unavoidable,  Mr.  Jefferson, 
whose  policy  was  that  of  peace,  conceived  the  sublime  project  of  purchas- 
ing it,  so.as  to  avoid  hostilities.  But  Spain,  in  the  mean  time,  transferred 
the  Pr  >vince  to  Fiance,  and  Mr.  Jefferson  being  still  unwilling  to  have 
a colliittm  with  Bonaparte,  and  being  given  to  understand,  that  it  might 
be  purchased,  the  purchase  was  accordingly  made.  Had  we  gone  to  war, 
and  acquired  Louisiana  by  conquest,  and  retained  it  after  a treaty  of  peace, 
no  one  would  have  doubted  our  right  to  hold  it,  nor  can  it  be  denied,  but 
that  it  would  have  cost  us  some  blood,  and  tlm  expenditure  of  treasure  fully 
equivalent  to  the  purchase  money.  It  would  be  refining  too  much  to  say, 
that  when  we  are  on  the  eve  of  war  with  a neighbouring  power,  and  nego- 
tiations are  entered  into,  and  on  the  one  side  a cession  of  territory  takes 
place,  and  an  equivalent  is  stipulated  on  the  other,  that  there  is  any  sub- 
stantial difference  between  such  a case,  and  that,  where,  after  actual  war, 
the  same  treaty  is  made.  1 conceive  the  money  expended  foi  Louisiana, 
as  much  applied  to  a purpose  strictly  national,  both  in  its  charactei  and 
its  consequences,  as  if  it  had  been  invested  in  the  armies,  or  fleets,  or  other 
warlike  preparations,  which  would  have  been  indispensably  requisite,  had 
not  the  cession  taken  place.  Instead  of  its  being  a cession,  in  a treaty  of 
peace,  after  an  expensive  war,  it  was  a treaty  before,  and  IN  SUBSTI- 
TUTION of  WAR.  It  was  a measure  having  a direct  and  natural  rela- 


79 


tion  to  war.  It  was  then  substantially  A WAR  measure.  It  was  clearly 
within  the  enumerated  objects  in  the  Constitution,  and  therefore  > 'onstiiu- 
tional.  1 will  close  this  | *art  of  my  examination  of  Mr.  M’Duffie’s  doc- 
trines, by  inserting  an  extract  from  Mr.  Madison’s  celebrated  report  of 
1799,  which  is  so  much  better  than  any  thing  i can  urge  to  the  same  point, 
that,  perhaps,  I merit  reproach  for  not  inserting  it  earl  er  Says  Mr.  ‘Ma- 
dison, “ Whether  the  phrases  in  question  be  construed  to  authorize  every 
measure  relating  to  the  common  defence  or  general  welfare  as  contended 
bv  some,  or  every  measure  only  in  which  there  might  be  an  application  of 
money  as  suggested  by  at  he  s.  the  effect  must  substantially  be  the  same, 
in  destroying  the  import  ami  force  of  the  phrases  in  the  Constitution.  For 
it  is  evident  that  there  is  not  a single  power  whatever  which  may  not  have 
some  reference  to  t l;e  common  defence  and  general  welfare;  nor  a power 
of  any  magnitude,  which  in  its  exeicise,  does  not  INVOKE  or  ADMIT 
an  application  of  money.  The  Government,  therefore,  which  possesses 
pow er.  in  either  one  nr  the  other  of  these  extents,  is  a Government  WITH- 
OUT THE  LIMITATIONS,  formed  by  a particular  ENUMERATION 
of  powers,  and  consequently  the  meaning  and  effect  of  this  particular  enu- 
meration is  destroyed  by  t lie  exposition  given  to  these  general  phrases. — 
The  true  and  fair  construction  of  this  expression,  both  in  the  original  and 
existing  federal  compacts,  appears  to  the  committee  too  obvious  to  be  mis- 
taken. In  both,  the  Congress  is  authorized  io  provide  money  for  the  com- 
mon defence,  and  general  welfare.  In  both,  is  subjoined  to  this  authority, 
an  enumeration  of  the  cases,  to  which  their  power  shall  extend.  Money 
cannot  be  applied  to  the  general  welfare,  otherwise  than  by  an  application 
of  it.  to  some  particular  measure  conducive  to  the  general  welfare.  When- 
ever. therefore,  money  lias  been  applied  to  a particular  measure,  a ques- 
tion arises,  whether  the  particular  measure,  be  within  the  enumerated  au- 
thorities vested  in  Congress.  If  it  be,  the  money  requisite  for  it  may  be 
applied  to  it.  If  it  be  not,  no  such  application  can  be  made.  This  fair 
and  obvious  interpretation  coincides  with,  and  is  enforced  by  the  clause  in 
the  Constitution,  which  declares  4 that  no  money  shall  be  drawn  from  the 
Treasury , but  in  consequence  of  appropriations  bv  law  ’ An  appropria- 
tion of  money  to  the  general  welfare , would  be  deemed  rather  A MOCK- 
ERY, than  an  OBSERVANCE  of  this  Constitutional  injunction.” 

19. 

Let  us  now  meet  Mr.  M’Duffie  on  the  true  ground,  upon  which 
this  controversy  must  finally  be  decided.  The  taxing  clause,  it  is 
said,  gives  the  power  to  Congress,  to  appropriate  its  revenues  at  its 
discretion,  “to  provide  for  the  common  defence,  and  general  welfare 
of  the  United  States.”  Be  it  so.  The  expenditures  of  the  Govern- 
ment must  still  be  applied  to  national  purposes,  and  to  no  other.  It 
cannot  be  pretended,  that  the  clause,  as  it  is  now  expressed,  means 
either  more  or  less  than  this.  Indeed,  Mr.  M’Duffie’s  reasoning 
completely  establishes  this  point.  But  here  the  question  obtrudes  it- 
self upon  us.  What  shall  we  call  a national  purpose?  for  until  we 
can  arrive  at  some  precise  definition  of  nationality,  it  will  be  in  vain 
to  carry  on  the  contest.  I will,  therefore,  give  my  view  as  to  what 
constitutes  a purpose  to  be  national  in  its  character,  as  distinguished 


80 


from  one  which  is  local , and  I hope  to  sustain  my  definition,  upon 
the  most  solid  of  all  grounds,  the  grounds  of  the  Constitution  itself. 

We  must  never  forget,  that  there  is  a distinction  between  the  term 
“national,”  as  it  may  be  used  in  general , and  the  sense  in  which  it 
must  be  understood,  with  reference  to  American  affairs.-  Were  all 
the  State  sovereignties  abolished,  and  the  people  of  the  United  States 
under  one  consolidated  Government,  there  could  not  possibly  be  a 
dift  erence  of  opinion,  as  to  what  is  meant  by  the  term,  “the  general 
welfare  of  the  United  States. ” But  it  is,  because  we  present  to  the 
world,  an  anomaly  in  politics  and  in  civil  government,  that  the  whole 
difficulty  arises.  We  understand  terms,  in  the  sense,  in  which  from 
time  immemorial,  we  have  been  accustomed  to  use  them,  forgetting 
that,  however  correctly  they  may  be  applied  in  such  a sense,  to  Gov- 
ernments in  general,  yet,  that  they  can  have  no  influence  as  regards 
a country,  where  has  been  introduced,  an  order  of  political  insti- 
tutions, totally  distinct  from  any  thing  that  ever  did,  or  probably 
ever  will  occur  again,  in  the  history  of  the  world.  In  England  there- 
fore, or  in  France,  the  term  “national,”  is  correctly  understood  to 
be  synonimous  with  the  words  “ public ” or  “ general."  There,  any 
undertaking  by  the  supreme  authority,  is  called  a national  under- 
taking, and  any  money  applied  to  public  purposes,  by  the  same  au- 
thority, consitutes  the  appropriation  to  be  “for  the  general  welfare.” 
The  general  welfare  of  the  f ritish  Isles,  is  the  national  welfare  of 
Great  Britain,  for,  let  the  public  acts  of  the  Imperial  Parliament,  be 
what  they  may,  they  operate  upon  the  English,  Irish  and  Scotch,  as 
one  entire  people,  and  are  properly  regarded,  and  felt  by  them,  as 
national  acts. 

But  when  we  come  to  speak  of  American  affairs,  where  the  same 
people  are  partly  governed  as  one  entire  nation,  and  partly, in  twenty- 
four  separate  sovereignties  or  nations,  terms,  which  hitherto  have  re- 
ceived an  undisputed  import,  now  begin  not  to  be  so  definite,  or  so 
easily  understood.  To  give  a character  of  nationality  to  a measure 
in  America,  something  more  is  requisite,  than  would  suffice  in  Eng- 
land. To  be  general,  or  public  as  to  its  effects,  throughout  the  United 
States,  and  to  proceed  from  the  supreme  authority,  the  Congress,  is 
not  of  itself,  sufficient.  It  must  also  be  adopted  by  that  authority, 
within  the  sphere  of  its  own  prescribed  poicers.  If  it  be  not  done  in 
the  exercise  of  its  lawful  sovereignty,  however  the  particular  mea- 
sure may  serve  to  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the  people,  yet,  in 
strictness  and  in  truth,  it  is  not  a measure  national  in  its  character. 
It  is  an  act  of  usurped  authority,  operating  beneficially  upon  the  great 
mass  of  the  people;  and  so  far,  is  a measure  for  the  public  and 
general  welfare  ; a case  which  sometimes  occurs.  A Despot  may  be 
so  kind,  and  impartial  to  all  his  subjects,  as  to  render  his  Govern- 
ment, a paternal  and  an  happy  one. 

The  only  mode  by  which  we  are  permitted  to  test  the  character  of 
any  measure,  as  to  nationality,  is  to  bring  it  to  the  standard,  pro- 
vided by  the  people  themselves.  That  standard  is  the  Constitution 
To  this,  and  this  alone,  we  must  all  come,  for  a DESCRIPTION, 
of  the  objects  and  measures,  which  are  national.  It  is  in  this  great 


81 


deed  of  covenant,  that  are  expressed,  the  sole  purposes,  for  which 
we  became  GIVE  ENTIRE  nation,  and  no  judiciary  tribunal  on 
earth,  by  any  ingenuity  of  construction,  can  lawfully  decide,  that 
the  people  of  these  States,  are  an  entire  nation,  for  any  other  ob- 
jects, than  the  deed  itself  specifies.  If  any  one  object,  can  be  deemed 
a national  object,  which  is  not  there  expressed,  any  other  may  be 
equally  deemed  to  be  national,  and  the  deed  itself,  becomes  a 
piece  of  useless  parchment.  To  abandon  the  description  of  the  ob- 
jects of  the  Federal  Government,  as  set  forth  in  the  Constitution, 
and  to  take  up  any  system  of  construction,  and  thence  to  deduce  ob- 
jects, and  to  call  them  national,  is  neither  more  nor  less,  than  to 
make  us  a nation,  not  for  the  purposes  agreed  upon,  but  for  any,  and 
every  purpose,  which  human  ingenuity  can  suggest ; for  who  can 
affix  limits  to  the  imaginations  of  men?  It  is  to  be  set  adrift,  on  a 
perilous  and  boundless  ocean,  without  a chart  ora  compass. 

We  are  now  making  seme  progress  towards  a sensible,  and  a cor- 
rect definition  of  nationality.  A measure  to  be  national,  must  then 
have  a reference  to  the  expressed  purposes,  for  which  the  United 
States  Government  was  created  as  a Supreme  Government.  If  there 
be  in  the  State  Legislatures,  ANY  CONCURRENCE  of  jurisdic- 
tion, or  authority  over  any  one  of  the  objects,  to  promote  which, 
Congress  has  power  to  legislate,  THAT  object  cannot  be  a national 
object.  To  constitute  any  one  object  of  civil  government,  in  these 
States,  to  be  national,  it  is  indispensably  necessary,  that  it  be  an  ob- 
ject, to  promote  which,  the  States  can  no  more  exercise  lawful  au- 
thority, than  could  France  or  England.  The  MERE  fact  of  the 
United  States  Government  not  being  supreme  as  to  that  object,  by 
the  terms  of  the  grant,  DECIDES  IT  TO  BE  LOCAL.  It  would 
be  a manifest  absurdity  to  maintain,  that  the  same  people,  could  de- 
sire to  exist  as  ONE  nation,  for  an  especial  or  a designated  object, 
and  at  the  same  time,  to  exist  as  TWENTY-FOUR  distinct  nations, 
for  the  self-same  object. 

I hope  I am  now  fully  understood.  EVERY  THING  is  national 
in  its  character,  over  which,  by  the  terms  of  the  Constitution,  the 
United  States  Government  can  exercise  exclusive  sovereignty  ; and 
NOTHING  is  national,  which  the  States  can  legitimately  make  the 
subject  of  their  legislation.  It  is  impossible  that  any  definition,  more 
accurate  than  this,  can  be  given  of  nationality.  It  is  a definition, 
which  results  from  the  very  nature  of  the  anomalous  structure 
of  our  civil  Government.  That  it  is  truth  itself,  may  be  thus  de- 
monstrated. 

There  is  no  one  object,  which  cau  be  mentioned,  which  we  all 
agree  to  be  decidedly  national,  for  which  there  is  not  a provision  in 
the  Constitution,  that  Congress,  as  to  that  particular  subject,  shall 
be  supreme  ; and,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  not  an  object  which, 
with  one  consent  in  the  States,  we  term  local,  over  which  the  States 
do  not  exercise  sovereignty,  by  the  terms  of  the  compact,  in  exclusion 
of  the  power  of  Congress.  I,  of  course,  exclude  the  subject  of  “ tax- 
ation," when  I am  considering  the  objects,  for  which  the  Federal 
and  State  Governments  were  created.  This  being  the  vital  princi- 


82 


pie  of  all  Governments,  must  be  possessed  by  the  one,  as  well  as  the 
other,  as  a means  to  promote  the  objects  of  each  ; and,  hence,  of  ne- 
cessity, there  must  be  a concurrence  oi  sovereignty  over  subjects  for 
taxation  in  general.  With  this  qualification  to  my  position,  which  I 
state  rather  to  prevent  caviiting,  than  from  any  fear,  that  any  candid 
reasoner  would  avail  himself,  of  what  might,  appear  to  be  an  over- 
sight, let  us  now  proceed  to  test  our  definition  of  nationality,  by 
citing  some  few  instances  on  each  side. 

In  “ declaring  war,"  we  constitute  one  consolidated  nation.  Why? 
Because  Congress  has  the  power  to  declare  war,  and  no  State  can 
even  “ engage  in  war,  unless  actually  invaded,  or  in  such  imminent 
danger  as  will  not  admit  of  delay.”  In  preparing  for  war , by  mili- 
tary and  naval  establishments,  we  are  an  entire  nation.  Why  ? Be- 
cause the  States  are  expressly  forbidden  by  the  compact,  to  raise 
troops  or  build  fleets,  except  in  actual  war.  In  “ coining  money,"  we 
are  a nation.  Why?  Because  amongst  the  limitations  on  the  power 
of  the  States,  it  is  said,  “No  State  shall  coin  money.'''  In  regzilating 
foreign  and  domestic  commerce , and  our  intercourse  with  the  Indian 
tribes,  we  are  one  nation.  Why  ? Congress,  under  the  Constitution, 
exclusively  possesses  the  right.  In  “ foreign  negociation,"  we  are 
one  nation.  Why  ? “ No  State  shall  enter  into  agreement  or  com- 

pact with  a foreign  power.”  In  the  regulation  of  coin,  foreign  and 
domestic,  in  establishing  uniformity  in  weights  and  measures , and 
in  bankrupt  and  naturalization  laws,  and  in  conferring  patents  and 
copy-rights,  we  are  one  nation.  Why  ? Because,  the  necessarily 
exclusive  nature  of  the  grants  on  the  subjects,  sweeps  away  the  whole 
power,  and  precludes  the  States  from  legislating  on  them. 

Thus,  we  see,  that  every  object,  universally  admitted  to  be  na- 
tional, coincides  with  the  definition  we  have  given  of  nationality, 
which  means  an  ENTIRE  subordination  of  the  subject,  to  the  undi- 
vided sovereignty  of  Congress,  by  the  terms  of  the  Constitution.  Let 
us  now  cite,  some  instances  on  the  opposite  side,  of  subjects,  which 
are  confessedly  local  in  their  character.  Let  us  begin  with  the 
numberless  capital  offences  against  the  peace  of  society. — Here  is  a 
subject  of  legislation  strictly  local.  Why  ? The  States  are  in  the 
constant  practice  of  this  species  of  legislation — and  Congress,  with 
the  exception  of  cases  provided  for  in  the  compact,  cannot  define 
and  punish  felonies  on  land,  its  jurisdiction  extending  no  further 
than  to  “define  and  punish  felonies  committed  on  the  high  seas.” 

Why  are  all  laws,  on  the  subject  of  free  schools,  descents,  sale 
and  transfer  of  property,  of  escheats,  executors  and  administrators, 
and  guardians,  and  a thousand  such — why  is  this  species  of  legis- 
lation local?  Because,  from  time  immemorial,  the  States  have  re- 
gulated all  such  objects,  and  Congress  has  no  specific  grant  of  any 
•such  power — but  on  the  contrary,  “ all  powers  not  delegated  to  the 
United  States  by  the  Constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  States, 
shall  be  reserved  to  the  States,  or  to  the  people,  respectively.” 

If  there  be  now,  one  single  object  of  Government,  universally  ad- 
mitted amongst  us  to  be  local,  or  national,  in  its  nature  or  charac- 
ter, which  will  not  readily  fall  in  with,  and  sustain  the  definition 


83 

herein  given,  of  nationality,  let  the  ingenuity  of  the  Bar  point  it  out. 

I cannot  imagine  it. 

When  L speak,  however,  of  what  is  necessary,  to  constitute  any 
measure  to  be  national,  I must  not  be  understood  to  mean,  that  the 
particular  measure,  must  be  written  down  in  the  Constitution,  as  a 
subject  for  the  exclusive  sovereignty  of  Congress — and  that,  if  it  be 
not  there  found,  it  is  not  national.  All  I mean  to  inculcate  is,  that 
the  measure  must  have  such  a simple , and  such  a direct  relation,  to 
some  one  of  the  enumerated  objects,  that  in  its  absence,  that  par- 
ticular object  of  the  Government,  could  not  well  be  accomplished. 
But  even  in  this  case,  it  is  indispensably  requisite,  that  the  particu- 
lar non- enumerated  measure  is  one,  on  which  the  States  cannot  act 
in  any  way  whatever.  For  instance  -The  UNITED  STATES  es- 
tablishment at  WEST  POINT,  is  a measure  national  in  its  charac- 
ter, though  no  power  for  such  an  establishment  is  to  be  found  in  the 
Constitution.  Why  is  it  national!  For  the  plain  reason,  that 
though  a State  can  promote  military  science,  yet  no  State  can  es- 
tablish a similar  institution,  conferring  military  rank,  pay,  and  sub- 
sistence, bona  fide,  with  a view  to  a regular  army,  without  violating 
that  part  of  the  Constitution,  which  forbids  the  States  from  keeping 
up  military  and  naval  establishments,  in  time  of  peace.  So  the  es- 
tablishment of  a NATIONAL  MINT  is  not  expressed  in  the  Con- 
stitution. But  it  is  national.  Why  1 Because  no  State  “ can  coin 
money.”  So  also,  all  legislation  on  the  subject  of  privateers,  fitting 
out  in  our  ports,  to  cruise  against  a belligerent  with  whom  we  are 
at  peace,  is  not  once  mentioned  in  the  Constitution.  But  it  is  never- 
theless, entirely  national.  But  what  gives  it  this  character  of  na- 
tionality ? It  is  the  alienation  of  State  sovereignty  on  the  same  sub- 
ject, under  that  clause  in  the  instrument,  which  gives  to  Congress, 
the  power  to  “ define  and  punish  offences  against  the  law  of  nations.” 
A power,  which,  if  it  were  left  to  the  States  to  exercise,  “ might  put 
it  in  the  power  of  any  indiscreet  member  to  embroil  the  confederacy 
with  foreign  nations.” 

This  is  one  of  the  cases,  in  which  an  authority  is  granted  to  the 
Union,  “ to  which,  a similar  authority  in  the  States,  would  be  abso- 
lutely and  totally  contradictory  and  repugnant ,”  and  which,  accord- 
ing to  the  Federalist,  is  sufficient  to  make  any  power  necessarily  ex- 
clusive in  its  character — an  exposition  undeniably  sound,  and  very 
properly  maintained  by  the  Supreme  Court.  It  is  on  the  same  prin- 
ciple, that  the  power  to  regulate  commerce,  to  establish  uniformity 
in  bankrupt  laws,  naturalization,  weights  and  measures,  &c.  is  ne- 
cessarily exclusive.  There  could  be  no  FNIFGRMITY  on  such  sub- 
jects, unless  one  Supreme  Government  is  to  prescribe  the  rule.  (See 
Federalist,  Nos.  31  and  42.) 

With  so  just,  and  so  unerring  a standard  before  our  eyes,  for  es- 
timating what  is  national,  and  what  is  local  in  its  character,  a stand- 
ard purposely  provided  in  the  Constitution,  the  question  can  now 
at  once  be  settled,  whether  CANALS,  in  general,  are  national  or 
local  in  their  character.  Who  is  he  that  now  hesitates  in  his  opin- 
ion I If  he  cannot,  after  what  has  been  said,  decide  in  an  instant. 


84 


he  never  can  decide.  Tell  him,  it  CANNOT  BE  NATIONAL, 
because,  so  far  from  their  being  any  grant  to  Congress,  of  a particle, 
of  sovereignty , much  more  of  exclusive  sovereignty  over  the  subject 
of  internal  improvement,  such  a power  was  proposed  to  be  given  to 
Congress,  and  refused.  Is  it  then  local?  UNQUESTIONABLY 
IT  IS  LOCAL,  because  the  States  have  hitherto  exercised  the  un- 
disputed power,  to  the  exclusion  of  Congress.  But,  without  the  aid 
of  our  unerring  test,  to  say  whether  canals  are  in  their  character, 
national  or  local,  we  might  long  since  have  agreed  with  Governor 
Giles  of  Virginia,  that  “The  peculiar  character  of  the  pow- 
er to  make  internal  improvements,  is  LOCALITY — locality  in 
its  MOST  LIMITED  form,  and  therefore  peculiarly  unsuited  to 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Geneial  Government,  which  is  GENERAL 
in  its  character,  and  peculiarly  suited  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State 
Governments,  whose  jurisdiction  is  intended  for  LOCAL  objects. 

I do  not  deny  to  the  Government  the  power,  even  to  construct 
roads  and  canals  under  peculiar  circumstances.  It  has  the  right 
flagrante  hello.  But,  the  digging  of  a canal  in  actual  war,  would 
no  more  make  this  a measure  national  in  its  character,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Constitution,  than  to  cut  down  trees  across  a road, 
or  to  burn  the  public  bridges,  or  to  inundate  a certain  district  of 
country  to  stop  the  ravages  of  an  enemy.  The  ground  of  justifica- 
tion on  which  such  acts  must  rest,  is,  that  they  are  as  much  the  law- 
ful means  of  war  at  the  time,  as  if  the  United  States’  troops  were  to 
take  possession  of  a man’s  plantation  or  house,  and  to  use  it  as  an 
entrenchment.  When  the  enemy  is  in  the  city,  the  first  thing  to  be 
done  is  to  drive  him  out.  Salus  populi  suprema  lex.  There  is  then 
no  time  to  talk,  of  this  or  that  power  under  the  Constitution.  Silent 
leges  inter  anna.  The  United  States’  troops  may  do  many  acts  in 
war,  which  they  could  not  do  in  peace,  without  being  violators  of 
the  public  peace. 

But,  I do  deny  the  right  of  the  Government,  to  make  a military 
road  or  canal,  in  time  of  peace,  and  for  the  unanswerable  reason, 
that  on  a power  to  make  military  roads,  and  also  canals,  being  pro- 
posed to  be  invested  in  Congress,  the  first  was  not  agreed  to,  and 
the  second  rejected  by  the  vote  of  the  Convention.  Independent, 
however,  of  this,  the  insertion  in  the  enumerated  powers,  of  all  the 
great  means  of  carrying  on  a war,  and  the  omission  of  the  single  one 
of  military  roads  and  canals,  would  of  itself  shew,  that  the  power 
was  not  designed  to  be  given.  And  the  power  was  most  properly 
withheld,  for,  as  undoubtedly  necessary,  as  military  roads  and  ca- 
nals may  be  in  Europe,  where,  if  it  were  not  for  their  fortified  towns, 
at  short  distances,  a kingdom  might  be  overrun  in  a few  days. — 
Yet,  in  a country  like  ours,  where,  in  most  parts,  every  tree  is  a for- 
tification, and  every  hunting  path  a military  road  for  our  militia,  it 
would  be  premature,  in  the  present  state  of  the  country,  it  would  be 
a waste  of  the  public  money  to  imitate  Europe  in  this  particular. — 
The  Convention  was,  no  doubt,  well  satisfied  that  the  extent  of  our 
country,  was  a security  against  a foreign  enemy,  and  that  the  prin- 
cipal points  of  attack,  would  be  the  sea  coast,  in  the  vicinity  of 


85 


which,  there  would  always  be  found  roads,  and  that  the  country 
could  be  sufficiently  defended  by  armies  and  navies,  forts,  &c.  trust- 
ing, that  as  the  settlements  extended,  and  the  country  became  more 
populous,  the  States  would,  from  necessity,  have  sufficient  roads  and 
canals,  for  commercial  purposes.  But,  the  material  objection  at 
that  day,  no  doubt  was  (and  a solid  objection  it  was)  that,  to  grant 
a power  to  make  roads  and  canals,  even  for  military  purposes,  would 
involve,  as  a matter  of  course,  a right  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  on 
Congress,  over  SOIL  and  TERRITORY,  which  the  States  were 
resolved  not  to  permit,  even  as  to  their  forts,  & c.  without  their  ex- 
press consent.  They  could  not  be  ignorant,  that  if  Congress  could 
construct,  thousands  and  thousands  of  miles  of  roads  and  canals,  it 
could  exact  tolis  thereon,  and  pass  laws  to  punish  persons  who 
should  wilfully  injure  the  public  works,  and  thus  exercise  local  do- 
minion in  the  States.  It  is  absurd  to  believe,  as  1 have  already 
shewn,  that  Congress  and  the  States,  can  be  copartners  in  Legisla- 
tion over  any  one  object  of  Civil  Government.  It  must  belong  en- 
tirely to  Congress,  or  not  at  all.  Who  can  read  the  Constitution 
and  say,  that  the  States  ever  intended,  that  Congress  should  have 
exclusive  jurisdiction,  excepting  at  the  Seat  of  Government,  and  in 
its  forts,  dock-yards,  &c.  ? But  the  making  of  necessary  military 
roads  and  canals,  in  actual  war,  is  a very  different  thing.  It  is  free 
from  all  these  objections.  At  the  conclusion  of  peace,  it  would  be 
as  strange  for  the  Government  to  claim  jurisdiction  over  such  roads 
and  canals,  as  it  prepared  for  the  passage  of  troops,  as  it  would  be 
for  it,  to  hold  jurisdiction  over  a citizen’s  plantation,  which  its  army 
occupied  the  whole  war,  as  an  entrenchment.  The  want  of  good 
roads,  which  was  felt  in  the  late  war,  as  to  the  operations  on  the 
Canada  frontier,  is  no  reason,  why  the  power  ought  to  be  claimed 
by  Congress.  Mr.  M’Duffie’s  argument  here,  if  it  means  any 
thing,  means  this.  That  wherever  an  occasion  has  occurred,  which 
proves,  that  the  Government,  in  any  of  its  operations  on  that  occa- 
sion, might  have  done  better,  if  it  had  possessed  certain,  or  more 
extensive  means,  that  such  means  necessarily  must  belong  to  it. — 
This  might  be  an  argument,  on  a motion  to  amend  the  Constitution, 
so  as  to  give  Congress  a power  to  make  military  roads ; but  it  can 
have  no  weight,  in  any  other  point  of  view.  Congress  has  limited 
powers.  The  power  to  make  military  roads  and  canals  is  as  SUB- 
STANTIVE a power,  as  that  of  raising  armies  and  navies.  A sub- 
stantive power  canuot  be  exercised  by  construction. 

If  the  propositions  herein  laid  down  be  true:  1st.  That  money 
cannot  be  appropriated  but  for  national  purposes ; and  2udly,  That 
no  measure  is  national  in  its  character,  which  refers  to  a subject 
over  which  the  States,  under  the  Constitution,  can  lawfully  exercise 
their  sovereignty,  it  will  be  for  Mr.  M’Duffif.  now  to  explain,  how 
Congress  can  legitimately  take  the  subject  of  internal  improvement, 
under  its  consideration.  The  error  into  which  Mr.  M’Duffie  has 
unhappily  fallen,  is,  that  he  has  not  been  careful  to  distinguish  those 
elauses  in  the  Constitution,  which  declare  the  PURPOSES  for 
which  the  people  exist  as  one  nation,  from  the  two  first  clauses  in 

11 


86 


the  enumeration,  which  simply  confer  the  POWER  to  execute  thosff 
purposes.  He  has  not  been  careful  to  distinguish  between  a POW- 
ER coupled  with  a TRUST,  and  A NAKED  power.  The  distinc- 
tion between  the  one  and  the  other,  is  in  equity,  most  marked  and 
obvious.  “ A mere  power  is  never  imperative.  It  leaves  the  act  to 
be  done,  at  the  will  of  the  party  to  whom  it  is  given,”  and  hence 
full  discretion  is  implied.  “ A trust  is  always  imperative,  and  is 
obligatory  upon  the  consciences  of  the  party  entrusted.”  But  where 
trusts  and  powers  are  blended,  as  where  a man  may  be  invested  with 
trusts  to  be  effected  by  the  execution  of  a power,  as  is  the  case  where 
a power  is  given  by  a will  to  trustees  to  sell  an  estate,  and  to  apply 
the  money  upon  trust,  here,  though  the  legal  estate,  until  the  execu- 
tion of  the  power  is  in  the  heir  at  law ; yet,  on  the  power  being  de- 
feated at  law,  by  the  death  of  the  trustees,  Equity  acting  upon  the 
trust,  will  compel  the  heir,  to  join  in  the  sale  of  the  estate  for  the 
execution  of  the  trusts.  (See  Sugden  on  Powers.)  Mr.  M’Buffie 
has  lost  sight  of  this,  and  strangely  regards  the  levying  and  appro- 
priating power  of  Congress,  as  one  of  the  purposes  or  trusts  for 
which  the  Government  was  created ; whereas  that  clause,  and  the 
succeeding  one,  that  of  “borrowing  money  on  the  credit  of  the  U. 
States,”  is  not  an  end,  but  simply  the  great  means,  by  which  all  the 
enumerated  objects,  or  trusts,  are  to  be  accomplished.  It  is  the 
Power  coupled  with  the  Trusts.  To  be  asked  to  demonstrate  this, 
is  as  if  we  were  called  upon  to  prove,  that  any  one  problem  in 
Euclid  is  true.  I will,  however,  endeavour  to  make  it  plain  to  those 
wffio  are  not  lawyers. 

The  distinction  between  the  levying  and  appropriating  power  of 
the  Government,  and  all  the  other  enumerated  powers,  is  most  man- 
ifest. In  the  other  enumerated  powers,  there  is  not  a single  clause, 
which  does  not  contain  within  itself,  some  one  of  the  many  definite 
purposes  for  which  Civil  Government  generally  exists  ; whilst  in 
the  two  money  raising  clauses,  there  is  no  definite  purpose  whatever 
expressed.  Nothing  is  easier,  or  more  natural,  than  to  imagine,  that 
a people  should  desire  to  constitute  ONE  nation  for  war,  for  foreign 
Negotiation  and  Commerce , (under  which  general  heads  all  the 
trusts  in  the  Federal  compact  may  be  included)  but  it  is  extremely 
difficult  to  make  a man  of  common  sense  believe , that  a people  al- 
ready associated  in  thirteen  regular  Governments,  should  desire  to 
be  consolidated  into  one  supreme  sovereignty,  merely  for  the  plea- 
sure of  BEING  TAXED ; and  to  possess  the  power  to  SPEND 
those  taxes.  The  laying  and  appropriating  power,  is  therefore  no 
more,  than  the  POWER  of  the  Government,  coupled  with  the 
TRUSTS.  It  is  only  a MEANS.  A means  cannot  be  a purpose , 
or  an  end,  nor  can  it  be  greater  than  an  end. 

Suppose  that  Mr.  M’Duffie,  as  a lawyer,  was  to  have  submitted  to  him 
a deed  from  A.  to  B.  in  trust  for  various  uses,  and  with  many  limitations 
therein  expressed,  and  his  opinion  was  solicited  as  to  the  real  intent  of  the 
donor  ; to  what  part  of  the  trust  deed  would  he  look,  for  the  purposes  for 
which  he  estate  was  created  ? Would  he  look  to  those  clauses  in  the  in- 
strument, declaring  the  trusts,  or  would  he  read  the  general  power  in  the 


87 


deed,  enabling  the  trustee  to  raise  money  without  limit,  for  the  general  bene- 
fit of  the  estate,  by  sale  or  mortgage  of  the  estate,  or  otherwise  ? The 
answer  is,  he  would  assuredly  look  to  the  trust  clauses,  as  the  only  means, 
by  which  he  could  come  at  the  objects,  for  which  the  estate  was  given  by 
A and  he  would  scarcely  cast  his  eye  on  the  general  power  to  raise  mo- 
ney, such  a power  being  a matter  of  course.  Precisely  the  same  must  it 
be  with  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  If  we  would  ascertain,  for 
what  purposes  we  exist  as  one  nation,  so  as  to  decide,  whether  any  parti- 
cular object  is  a national  object,  or  a local  one , it  would  be  as  useless  to 
look  fas  Mr  M’Duffie  does)  at  the  two  first  clauses,  giving  the  power 
“ to  raise  a revenue  by  taxes  and  loans,  and  to  appropriate  it  to  the  gene- 
ral welfare,”  as  it  would  be,  to  look  at  the  general  power  in  the  trust  deed 
above  referred  to.  These  two  clauses  in  the  Constitution  must  then  be 
put  aside.  They  actually  ought  to  have  no  more  influence  in  an  inquiry, 
as  to  the  purposes  which  are  meant  to  be  embraced  in  “ the  general  wel- 
fare,” than  that  clause  in  the  Constitution,  which  says,  that  “ each  House 
shall  be  the  judge  of  the  elections  of  its  own  members.”  Construe  these 
clauses  as  we  will,  they  speak  no  other  language  than  that  the  Government 
shall  raise  money  by  taxes,  and  by  loans — and  that  the  proceeds  shall  be 
applied  to  the  purposes,  for  which  we  became  a nation,  and,  to  no  other. 
Where  shall  we  seek  for  these  purposes — In  the  brains  of  ingenious  poli- 
ticians, or  in  the  enumeration  of  the  specific  objects  or  trusts.  In  the  lat- 
ter unquestionably.  Id  CERTUM  cst  quod  certum  REDDI  potest. 

No  part  of  the  foregoing  view  can  be  confuted,  unless  some  reasoner 
more  ingenious  than  sound,  should  insist,  that  the  words  to  lay  taxes  to 
pay  the  debts  and  provide  for  the  general  welfare  “ of  the  United  States ,” 
give  to  this  clause  a character  of  specification  as  to  purposes.  The  answer 
to  this  is  simple.  The  words  “ to  pay  the  debts ” here,  mean  no  more, 
than  to  pay  the  expenses  of  the  government,  or  debts  contracted  by  loans, 
&c.  to  carry  into  execution  the  specified  objects.  Referring  to  the  6th 
Article  of  the  Constitution,  we  shall  see  that  provision  is  expressly  made, 
that  the  new  Government  is  to  assume  all  the  debts  of  the  Confederation , 
and  thus  constitutes  those  debts,  as  one  of  the  trusts  to  be  executed.  The 
trust  being  already  created,  and  in  its  proper  place,  it  would  be  strange  to 
imagine  that  the  words  “ to  pay  the  debts”  mean  any  thing  more  than  the 
contracts  of  the  Government. 

We  are  now  to  consider  some  of  the  extravagances  and  absurdities,  to 
which  any  other  definition  of  “ nationality”  than  that  herein  given  may 
carry  us,  and  in  this  way  we  shall  see  the  real  difference  between  money 
applied  to  the  “ general  welfare,”  and  that  used  for  the  national  icel- 
fare. 

mo.  20. 

Mr.  M’Duffie,  it  must  be  remembered,  contends,  that  the  power  of 
Congress,  to  expend  money  for  the  general  welfare,  beyond  the  enume- 
rated objects , is  unlimited  As  he  cannot  conceive  “ upon  what  principle, 
the  judiciary  can  pronounce  any  road  unconstitutional ,”  even  if  Con- 
gress, “ under  the  pretext  of  making  military  roads  and  canals,  were  to 
make  them  for  purposes  not  military,”  though  he  admits  that  “such 
would  be  an  act  of  usurpation.”  we  are  therefore  to  have,  in  the  opinion 
of  Mr.  M’Duffie,  no  other  security  too,  against  appropriations  manifest- 


88 


ly  unconstitutional,  than  this,  “ that  the  conscience  of  every  member,  is 
to  be  the  tribunal  before  which,  he  must  justify  his  vote,  in  each  particular 
exercise  of  the  power  in  question. 

Let  us  see  how  this  doctrine  would  work.  Say  that  Congress  shall 
annual/)/  appropriate  a million  of  dollars,  to  tire  support  of  free  schools, 
in  every  Parish  of  the  United  States,  and  for  that  of  a < ollege  ir.  every 
State.  As  much  more  for  a deaf  and  dumb  institution,  and  a lunatic  asylum, 
in  the  capital  of  each  Slate.  The  same,  for  a splendid  hospital  for  in- 
valids, in  each  State,  upon  the  plan  of  that  in  Paris,  and  for  infirmaries 
for  the  diseases  of  the  eye,  and  the  ear.  A million  for  churches  and 
chapels,  from  Maine  to  Cape  Florida,  for  the  use  of  all  religious  denomin- 
ations, without  distinction.  A million  to  increase  the  funds,  and  stimu- 
late the  efforts  of  associations,  to  suppress  duelling,  and  of  societies  for 
the  suppression  of  gambling,  drinking,  profaning  the  Sabbath,  and  vice 
of  all  kinds.  As  much  more  to  philanthropic  societies,  whose  objects  are 
to  improve  prison  discipline,  and  to  restore  drowned  persons  to  life  : and 
then  an  appropriation  of  four  millions,  to  objects  of  general  concern, 
which  we  have  not  here  room  to  enumerate.  According  to  Mr. 
M’Duffte’s  exposition  of  the  Constitution,  all  these  appropriations,  can 
be  constitutionally  made  by  the  National  Legislature,  though  they  can- 
not be  referred  to  the  enumerated  objects  of  the  Government.  That 
they  are  all  measures,  which  promote  the  general  welfare  and  the  hap- 
piness of  the  people,  no  one  can  doubt;  and  if  we  regard  them,  as  to 
their  effects  upon  the  general  community,  they  are  unquestionably  na- 
tional in  this  point  of  view.  But  can  Congress  constitutionally  make 
these  appropriations  ? Let  those  who,  in  this  particular,  agree  with  Mr. 
M’Duffie  be  told,  that  they  maintain  this  most  extraordinary  of  all  po- 
sitions; that  amongst  the  MANY  purposes,  for  which  a people,  already 
governed  in  thirteen  regular  State  Governments,  covenanted,  to  become 
one  entire  people  under  a Supreme  Government,  ONE  GREAT  END 
to  be  promoted,  was,  that  ten  millions  of  dollars,  or  ten  times  that  sum, 
if  deemed  expedient,  should  be  annually  TAKEN  from  their  pockets, 
by  imposts  and  other  taxes,  with  no  other  view,  than  that  it  should  be 
RETURNED  to  them  again,  and  under  an  utter  imposibitify  of  their 
receiving  it,  in  the  same  proportion,  in  which  it  was  drawn  from  the 
several  States ; and  this  too  for  the  laudable  purpose  of  accomplishing 
objects,  to  which  the  States  were  SEPARATELY  COMPETENT,  if 
the  money  was  kept  at  home. 

Here  is  a most  wonderful  exposition  of  the  Constitution.  The  Con- 
vention, after  two  months  deliberation,  as  to  the  great  outlines  of  the 
Government,  solemnly  decides,  in  the  sixth  amended  resolution  of  Mr. 
Randolph,  that  Congress  is  to  possess  legislative  rights  in  cases  “to 
which  the  States  are  separately  incompetent .”  A committee  in  detail 
forms  a Constitution  under  these  instructions;  they  exclude  all  such  cases 
from  the  enumeration  of  the  legislative  powers  of  Congress.  An  effort 
is  made  to  “ give  additional  powers  to  legislate,  on  the  subject  of  agri- 
culture, manufactures,  science,  and  internal  improvements.”  Canals 
and  Universities  are  proposed.  All  efforts  to  give  jurisdiction  over  these 
subjects,  so  confessedly  local,  failed  in  the  Convention  ; and  yet  we  are 
told  AGAINST  the  internal  evidence  of  the  deed  itself,  AGAINST  the 
lights  of  the  public  journals  and  secret  debates  of  the  Convention,  and 


89 


AGAINST  the  written  statement  of  Luther  Martin,  who  may  be  well 
compared,  to  a witness  who  sits  at  the  bedside  of  a testator,  and  takes 
down  his  words  in  writing;  that  though  Congress  cannot  dig  a canal 
without  violating  the  compact  and  the  sovereignty  of  a State ; though,  it 
cannot  create  a great  manufacturing  company,  with  exclusive  privileges 
as  to  monopoly  ; though  it  cannot,  even  according  to  the  decision  of 
M’Cullock  vs.  The  State  of  Maryland , incorporate  and  take  under  its 
charge,  Free  Schools,  Deaf  and  Dumb  Institutions,  &c.  because  they  do 
not  refer  to  any  of  the  specified  objects,  which  Congress  are  to  regulate; 
yet,  that  the  great  ends  which  the  above  are  the  means  of  accomplishing, 
may  be  promoted  by  Congress  in  other  ways.  Monopolies  to  the  manu- 
facturers cannot  be  created  bv  an  act  of  Congress,  without  a departure 
from  the  Constitution,  and  yet  they  may  he  given  in  the  shape  of  protect- 
ing and  prohibitory  duties, because  Congress  “ has  the  power  to  lay  im- 
posts” Canals  cannot  be  dug  in  the  States,  or  military  roads  construct- 
ed, because  it  is  to  exercise  sovereignty  over  soil  and  territory,  and  yet 
money  may  be.  voted  for  the  same  objects,  because  Congress  can  promote 
the  “ general  welfare.”  National  establishments  of  Deaf  and  Dumb  in- 
stitutions, with  incorporated  powers,  are  unconstitutional — and  yet  all  such 
institutions  may  be  most  liberally  endowed  out  of  the  National  Treasury. 
What  is  all  this  but  to  say,  that  Congress  shall  be  permitted  to  approach 
indirectly , a subject  for  its  legislation,  which  it  is  admitted  it  has  no 
power  to  approach  directly,  contrary  to  that  most  excellent  maxim  of  the 
law — ilQuando  aliauid  prohihetur  fieri  Ex  D1RECTO,  prohibetur  per 
OBLTQUUM ” 

The  evils  of  such  a construction  as  Mr.  M’Duffie  gives  to  the  appro- 
priating power,  may  be  most  tremendous.  For  instance — The  writers  in 
the  Monthly  Journal  of  the  Colonization  Society,  admit,  that  a power  in 
Congress  “ to  emancipate  and  remove  Slaves  within  the  limits  of  a State, 
would  be  a most  alarming  interference,  with  the  rights  of  a State,  and  of 
individuals,” — but  yet  they  contend,  (and  they  entrench  themselves  be- 
hind Mr.  M’Duefie’s  exposition)  that  an  authority  to  create  a fund,  as 
proposed  by  Mr.  Rufus  King,  to  aid  the  gradual  emancipation  and  re- 
moval of  the  Slaves  in  the  United  States,  would  be  constitutional — be- 
cause, say  they,  “ the  power  of  appropriation,  is  limited  only  by  the 
general  interests  of  the  country  ;”  and  the  removal  would  not  “ interfere 
with  the  rights  either  of  the  States  or  individuals.”  Not  interfere  ! The 
purchase  of  the  Slaves,  and  their  transportation  to  Africa,  would  not  mere- 
ly deprive  us  of  the  only  labourers,  who  can  cultivate  our  soil ; but  it 
would  have  the  effect,  of  altering  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
in  a most  material  point.  It  would  change  the  whole  representation  of 
the  Southern  States.  Remove  the  Slaves  fiom  South-Carolina — three- 
fifths  of  whom  are  represented  in  Congress — and  South-Carolina  instead 
of  sending  nine  Members  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  will  send  five , 
and  perhaps  not  two  from  depopulation — and  the  other  States  will  lose  in 
about  the  same  proportion. 

It  is  to  me  most  amazing,  that  Mr.  M’Duffie  should  freely  admit, 
“ that  in  determining  what  sovereign  powers  belong  to  Congress,  Con- 
gress has  NO  DISCRETION,  the  Constitution  being  the  inflexible  land 
mark;”  and  yet,  that  he  should  not  himself  perceive,  that  in  selecting  for 
the  appropriation  of  its  revenues,  any  object  whatever,  which  it  chooses 


90 


to  designate  as  an  object  of  4 general  concern,  Congress  does  thereby 
exercise,  that  high  sovereign  power,  not  included  in  its  grant  of  powers, 
to  wit:  of  legislating  indirectly  upon  subjects,  and  attaining  objects,  which 
belong  to  the  States  to  regulate,  and  which,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
subjects,  the  States  are  not  only  “separately  competent,”  but  more  com- 
petent to  manage,  than  the  General  Government.  There  is  a strange 
fallacy  in  that  reasoning,  which  would  say,  that  Congress  is  limited  as  to 
the  subjects,  upon  which  it  can  exercise  its  utmost  power  of  sovereignty, 
and  yet  unlimited  as  to  objects,  on  which  its  sovereignty  is  to  be  indirectly 
applied.  1 say  sovereignty  indirectly  exercised,  for  according  to  the 
Constitution,  the  purpose  for  which  money  is  given,  must  be  specified  in 
the  act  of  Congress,  and  this  act  of  legislation,  constitutes  the  sovereignty 
which  is  to  accomplish  the  object. 

It  seems  then,  according  to  this  exposition,  that  the  General  Govern- 
ment is  not  Supreme  within  the  sphere  of  its  own  powers,  and  when  it  is 
accomplishing  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  created.  If  I understand 
the  argument,  it  is  substantially  this.  There  are  TWO  kinds  of  purposes, 
for  which  we  consented  to  become  as  one  nation,  as  distinguished  from 
twenty-four  nations.  First;  those  which  are  agreed  upon,  and  particular- 
ly specified.  These  we  readily  comprehend.  And  secondly  ; those 
which  are  equally  agreed  upon,  but  not  enumerated  This  is  not  so  easy 
of  comprehension — it  requires  explanation,  how  a new  Government  is  to 
b«  created,  with  undefined  objects,  though  it  is  easy  enough  to  understand, 
that  undefined  powers  may  be  reserved  to  an  old  Government,  from  which 
some  powers  are  withdrawn.  For  the  enumerated  objects,  and  all  mea- 
sures thereto  appertaining,  it  appears,  that  Congress  is  a Supreme  Govern- 
ment. It  can  approach  its  objects,  honestly,  fairly  and  directly.  But 
for  all  the  undefined  (MOST  WISE)  purposes  for  which  we  act  as 
one  people,  and  which  purpose  are  embraced  in  the  appropriation  power, 
under  the  term  “ general  welfare,”  Congress  has  not  the  full  power  of  a 
nation,  over  a vast  variety  of  these,  which  it  may  choose  to  make  the 
subject  of  its  legislation.  For  instance — Roads  and  Canals.  Congress 
is  not  now  Supreme.  If  it  wishes  Roads  and  Canals,  it  cannot  construct 
them — it  is  nut  sovereign  enough  for  this,  but  it  can  bring  its  inlpi  rfiect 
sovereignty  (^something  new)  to  bear  upon  the  measure,  in  some  other  way. 
Whatever  is  now  to  be  accomplished,  must  be  done,  to  use  a vulgar  adage, 
by  whipping  the  Devil  round  the  stump,  unless,  says  Mr.  M’Duffie,  some 
“ other  sovereign  power  besides  that  of  appropriating  the  money  be  ne- 
cessary to  accomplish  the  particular  object,”  in  which  case,  I understand 
that  partial  sovereignty  must  not  be  resorted  to,  and  the  Devil  is  to  be  let 
alone,  and  the  purpose  cannot  be  accomplished. 

According  to  this  theory,  what  becomes  of  the  States  ? I always  heard, 
until  now,  that  there  were  State  Governments,  as  well  as  a Federal  Gov- 
ernment. That  we  existed  as  one  nation  for  certain  designated  purposes, 
and  that  for  all  other  purposes,  (and  these  are  few  enough,  God  knows) 
there  are  two  express  articles  in  the  Constitution,  which  say,  that  we  re- 
main tweDty-four  separate  nations.  But  it  seems  that  we  are  all  wrong. 
Congress  can  lawfully  take  what  belongs  to  it,  under  the  express  grant, 
and  it  may  constantly  be  cribbing  power  from  the  States,  by  imperfect 
sovereignty  without  committing  a gross  trespass  on  the  rights  of  the 
people.  There  is  no  boundary  line,  it  seems,  between  the  defined 


91 

powers  of  Congress,  and  many  of  the  undefined  purposes  of  Civil  Govern* 
ment,  reserved  to  the  States,  for  Congress  can  accomplish  both.  The  one 
by  direct,  and  the  other  by  indirect  sovereignty. 

The  only  two  great  safeguards,  which  we  are  permitted  to  have,  for  re- 
straining and  arresting  the  usurpations  of  the  Government,  and  preserving 
the  liberties  of  the  people,  “ are  the  positive  restrictions  upon  power; 
and  the  responsibility  of  those  who  exercise  power,  to  the  people  upon 
whom  it  operates.”  Our  security,  as  to  any  abuse  of  power  in  Congress, 
when  it  is  ranging  at  large,  and  seeking  its  employment  and  legislation,  in 
the  field  of  the  novel  and  undefined  purposes  of  the  Federal  Government, 
is  not  to  be  found,  even  in  th e judiciary  tribunals  of  the  United  States. — 
We  are  not  even  to  have,  the  slight  chance  of  a decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  our  favour.  According  to  Mr.  M’Duffie,  “the  conscience  of 
each  member  of  Congress,  is  to  be  the  tribunal  before  which,  a vote”  of 
an  hundred  millions  of  the  people’s  money  for  unenumerated  purposes,  is 
to  be  justified.  Says  Mr.  M’Duffie,  “ Shew  me,  in  any  of  the  subdivi- 
sions of  this  comprehensive  scheme  of  representative  Governments,  a pow- 
er operating  beyond  its  responsibility,  and  I will  shew  you  a power  un- 
known to  the  system.  A comet,  let  loose  from  the  power  of  gravitation, 
which  must  inevitably  destroy  the  planetary  harmony  by  which  that  sys- 
tem is  so  admirably  characterized.”  That  unknown  power,  I can  tell 
Mr.  M’Duffie,  does  exist!  It  is  a principle  wholly  unknown  to  our  sys- 
tem, which  distributes  power  between  one  common  head,  and  twenty-four 
subordinate  Governments,  that  there  should  be  no  other  security  against 
indirect  legislation,  and  the  consequent  IMPINGEMENT  upon  the  States, 
than  the  consciences  of  the  national  legislators.  It  is  wholly  unknown  to 
our  system,  that  the  General  Government  should  so  legislate,  as  to  gain  by 
a monied  influence,  what  it  cannot  lawfully  accomplish,  by  an  exercise  of 
lawful  power.  Influence  is  power,  and  whenever  the  State  sovereignties 
are  abolished,  it  will  be  accomplished  by  the  mass  of  influence,  which  the 
General  Government  will  ultimately  possess,  by  small  but  constant  acces- 
sions, in  the  exercise  of  its  constructive  powers.  As  to  political  responsi- 
bility of  public  servants,  as  a safeguard,  it  exists  but  in  the  imagination. — 
There  is  a responsibility,  it  is  true,  of  our  own  members  of  Congress  to  the 
people  of  South-Carolina.  But  these  men  can  do  no  more  than  their  duty. 
When  once  the  people  of  the  Northern  and  Western  States,  who  consti- 
tute the  majority,  shall  decide,  that  we  shall  pay  tribute  to  them,  what  be- 
comes of  that  safeguard  called  “ political  responsibility  ?”  Will  this  save 
us,  from  the  usurped  dominion,  of  the  men  of  Sagadohock,  or  of  the  Illi- 
nois ? No!  Mr.  M’Duffie  will  find,  that  for  relief  against  that  odious 
Tariff,  which  he  so  fearlessly,  so  zealously,  and  so  eloquently  opposed,  in 
common  with  the  rest  of  his  colleagues,  it  will  be  in  vain  ever  again  to  look 
to  the  ballot  boxes  of  any  elections  South  of  the  Potomac.  To  our  State 
Legislature  alone  must  we  look,  that  by  its  wisdom,  and  its  firm  purposes, 
it  may  avert  from  us  the  evils  which  encompass  us. 

On  this  subject  of  political  responsibility,  which  is  so  dazzling  in  its  the- 
ory, many  of  our  prominent  politicians  in  Carolina,  the  most  of  them  ex- 
cellent men  too,  have  been  running  into  the  wildest  extravagances.  Instead 
of  looking  at  the  Constitution,  with  the  eyes  of  statesmen,  and  with  a refe- 
rence to  the  peculiar  circumstances  which  attended  its  formation — instead 
of  bearing  in  mind,  that  so  far  from  there  being  any  desire,  in  the  great 


92 


body  of  the  people,  in  those  days,  to  have  a National  Government,  with 
plenary  and  indefinite  powers,  and  with  increased  and  increasing  inlluence, 
that  the  difficulty  ratiier  was,  to  get  a Government  at  all,  these  gentlemen 
take  up  the  compact,  and  examine  it  in  most  of  its  provisions,  as  lawyers 
would  a deed,  with  no  reference  to  such  a thing  as  equity.  Because  it 
professes,  in  its  preamble,  to  come  from  the  people,  and  operates  upon  the 
people,  it  is  peculiar  to  these  gentlemen  to  ascribe  the  existence  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, to  be  the  act  of  the  people  en  masse,  independent  of  the  State 
Legislatures,  and  of  its  being  responsible  to  the  people,  and  not  to  the 
State  Legislatures,  as  if  those  Legislatures  had  not  the  entile  agency  in  call- 
ing the  Convention,  and,  as  if  they  could  not  (had  they  so  willed  it)  have 
frustrated  all  the  hopes  of  that  Convention.  Hence,  it  is,  that  when  our 
Legislature  shall  raise  its  voice  against  any  usurped  act  of  the  Govern- 
ment, they  would  protest  against  any  such  expression  of  the  public  opinion, 
the  Legislature  not  being  the  proper  organ,  without,  at  the  same  time,  tell- 
ing us,  by  what  other  expedient,  the  General  Government  is  to  be  kept 
within  its  own  sphere  of  action  and  of  influence.  Should  that  day  ever  ar- 
rive, which  God  forbid,  that  it  shall  become  necessary  to  resist  the  usurped 
power  of  Congress,  how  will  the  people  be  able  to  act,  excepting  under 
the  authority  of  the  State  sovereignties  ? Can  the  people  act  of  them- 
| selves  ? The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is  not  a compact,  between 
the  people  of  the  United  States,  as  individuals.  If  it  were,  it  would  be  on 
the  plan  of  the  State  Governments.  There  would  be  no  enumeration  of 
powers.  As  is  usual,  in  all  such  cases,  nothing  would  belong  to  the  peo- 
ple, but  what  is  expressed  in  the  limitations  on  the  general  power,  or  in  a 
bill  of  rights.  But  it  is,  because  the  States,  in  their  corporate  capacities  as 
States,  are  parties  to  the  compact,  that  there  is  an  enumeration  of  objects 
for  the  Supreme  Government  to  operate  upon.  It  is  Mr.  Hamilton  who 
says,  “it  is  neither  a National  or  a Federal  Government,  but  a compo- 
sition of  both.  In  its  FOUNDATION  it  is  federal,  not  national.  In  the 
SOURCES  from  which  the  ordinary  powers  of  the  Government  are  drawn, 
it  is  partly  federal,  and  partly  national.  In  the  OPERATION  of  these 
powers,  it  is  national,  not  federal;  and  in  the  EXTENT  of  them,  it  is 
federal,  not  national.” 

The  very  Constitution  of  the  Senate,  and  the  mode  of  suffrage  there 
practised,  demonstrates  the  importance  of  preserving  the  State  Govern- 
ments ; for,  without  them,  the  Government  must  stop.  But  who  are  to 
preserve  the  State  Sovereignties,  but  the  State  Legislatures  ? The  fede- 
rative principle  is  not  destroyed.  Let  only  the  two  Senators,  from  each 
State,  represented  during  a session  of  Congress,  be  in  their  seats,  and  the 
result  of  the  votes  on  any  question,  is  precisely  the  same,  as  if  the  Sena- 
tors voted  by  States,  as  was  the  case  with  the  Old  Congress.  When  the 
States  have  not  their  veto  upon  every  act  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
in  the  same  manner  as  if  they  were  assembled  in  the  Common  Council  of 
a pure  Confederacy  of  States,  it  is  only,  when  some  one  State  is  deprived 
of  the  services  of  one  of  its  Senators,  by  sickness  or  absence  ; it  is  only 
at  that  time,  that  any  difference  exists  between  voting  by  States,  and 
voting  per  capita.  And  what  is  more,  this  federal  feature  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, cannot  be  obliterated  A majority  of  three-fourths  of  the  State 
Legislatures,  may  adopt,  at  their  pleasure,  any  amendment  to  the  Consti- 
tution ; but  the  equality  of  suffrage  in  the  Senate,  cannot  be  taken  away, 


93 


but  by  the  consent  of  every  State  in  the  Union.  It  is  time,  then,  for  our 
politicians,  who  have  so  long  been  astray  on  this  subject,  to  come  back  to 
correct  princi  Jes,  and  to  regard  the  Federal  compact,  as  a covenant  be- 
tween separate  and  independent  States.  Let  us  hope  never  again  to  hear 
the  doctrine  asserted,  that  the  State  Legislatures  are  not  to  express  an 
opinion  as  to  the  violation  of  a compact  or  treaty  to  which  the  States  are 
essentially  parties. 

I cannot  take  my  leave  of  Mr.  M’Duffie,  without  acknowledging  to 
him,  as  a citizen  of  the  United  States,  my  grateful  sense  of  his  untiring  ef- 
foits  in  < ongress,  to  restore  the  purity  of  the  Presidential  Election,  and  to 
divest  the  House  of  Representatives  of  a trust,  which  it  had  abused,  and 
thus  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  first  and  greatest  of  Republics.  As  a 
man  of  private  incorruptible  integrity,  I admire  Mr.  M’Duffie,  and  there 
are  few  of  his  devoted  friends,  who  are  more  sensible  of  his  public  merit, 
and  of  his  claim  to  be  regarded  as  an  honest  public  servant,  and  a statesman 
of  no  ordinary  stamp,  than  I am.  He  has  never  advocated,  as  1 believe, 
any  public  measure,  but  from  the  most  exalted  motives  of  patriotism.  His 
speech  on  Internal  Improvements,  breathes  a general  spirit,  and  a feeling, 
of  which  every  American  ought  to  be  proud.  Like  others,  I was  trans- 
ported with  the  perusal  of  it — but  sober  reflection  soon  taught  me,  that  the 
doctrines  there  advanced,  were  incompatible  with  the  safety  of  the  State 
sovereignties — and  I doubt  not,  but  that  the  time  will  come,  if  it  has  not 
already  arrived,  when  Mr.  M’Duffie  will  himself  perceive,  that  he  has 
attached  to  the  general  phrases  in  the  Constitution,  an  importance,  which 
it  was  never  designed  they  should  possess.  He  will,  I hope,  excuse  me, 
for  the  liberty  I have  taken  with  his  opinions,  and  of  necessity  with  his 
name.  Nothing  but  my  conviction  of  the  dangers  that  await  the  Southern 
States,  and  the  recollection  that  these  opinions,  coming  from  such  a man, 
would  have  prodigious  influence,  would,  in  my  own  view,  have  authorized 
me,  to  make  his  speech,  the  subject  of  a public  examination.  I trust,  I 
have  stated  his  positions  with  the  utmost  fairness,  and  my  endeavour  has 
been  to  controvert  them. 

NO,  21. 

The  boundaries  of  power  once  passed  by  a Government,  which  is 
limited  as  to  its  legislation,  there  is  no  saying,  to  what  lengths,  it 
will  not  carry  its  usurpations.  How  true  is  this,  as  regards  the  Fede- 
ral Government.  The  Government,  in  the  commencement  of  its 
career,  was  as  true  and  as  honest  to  the  principles  of  the  Consti- 
tution, as  could  have  been  desired.  But  the  Constitution  was  pre- 
served unbroken,  only  for  the  first  two  years  of  our  history.  When 
the  bill  for  the  Bank  was  carried  in  1791,  the  Government  then  a- 
bandoned  the  clear  paths  of  duty  and  propriety,  and  has  since  devi- 
ated, more  or  less,  oftentimes  innocently,  but  of  late  wilfully,  from 
the  views  which  the  people  entertained,  when  they  formed  the  com- 
pact. General  Washington’s  motives  on  the  Bank  question,  were 
honest  and  patriotic,  as  they  uniformly  were,  during  every  portion- 
of  his  distinguished  life.  But  General  Washington  was  surrounded, 
by  some  of  the  politicians,  who,  in  the  Convention,  had  contended 
for  a NATIONAL,  and  not  a Federal  Government.  Alexander 
Hamilton,  and  Edmrnb  Randolph,  were  in  his  confidence  and  in 

12 


94 


liis  Cabinet.  These  gentlemen,  it  is  well  known,  had  strenuously 
contended,  the  one  that  Congress  should  “ have  a negative  on  al!  the 
State  Laws,  interfering  with  its  own  and  the  other  that  “ a Gov- 
ernor in  each  State,  should  be  appointed  by  the  General  Government , 
with  a negative  upon  the  State  Legislature,”  in  order  the  better  to 
prevent  any  such  laws  being  passed  in  the  first  instance.  There  was 
in  the  Convention,  at  one  time,  a hot  contest,  whether  (in  one  of 
Mr.  Randolph’s  resolutions)  the  word  “ United  States ,”  or  the  word 
“National,”  should  be  used.  It  is  a truth  not  to  be  concealed,  that 
even  General  Washington  sided  somewhat  with  those  gentlemen  in 
the  Convention,  and  it  certainly  is  not  intended,  to  derogate  an  atom 
from  his  high  fame,  when  it  is  said,  that  he  was  in  favour  of  an  ener- 
getic Government,  and  a strong  executive  arm.  Nor  am  I disposed 
to  blame  Messrs.  Hamilton  and  Randolph,  for  opinions,  as  I be- 
lieve, sincerely  entertained  by  them.  Many  of  the  best  men  in  the 
Union,  at  that  time,  thought  with  them,  and  some  of  them  from  our 
own  State.  They  had  all  been  so  sensible  of  the  defects  of  the 
Confederation,  that  it  was  natural,  that  they  should  incline  to  the 
opposite  extreme,  and  believe  a National  Government  as  best  calcu- 
lated for  the  exigencies  of  the  Union.  It  appears,  however,  that 
they  were  all  mistaken,  and  Gen.  Washington  amongst  the  num- 
ber ; and  it  is  fortunate  for  us,  particularly  of  the  South,  that  all  at- 
tempts to  consolidate  us  all  into  one  nation,  failed  in  the  Conven- 
tion. 

On  the  first  question,  therefore,  which  arose  under  the  Constitu- 
tion, respecting  the  powers  of  the  Government,  it  was  not  to  be  ex- 
pected, but  that  with  the  previous  prepossessions  of  Gen  Washing- 
ton on  the  subject,  he  should  have  decided  in  favour  of  a National 
Bank.  But,  amongst  his  followers,  have  been  some,  who  had  not 
his  moderation,  his  prudence,  and  his  sagacity,  and  hence  it  is,  that 
during  the  last,  and  the  present  Administration,  we  have  seen  the 
Government  administered  in  open  violation  of  the  Constitution,  not 
by  any  act  immaterial  as  to  its  effects  upon  public  liberty,  but  by 
acts  impairing  important  and  vital  interests  of  the  States. 

When  a limited  Government,  like  that  of  the  United  States,  has 
passed  all  the  necessary  laws,  for  the  collection  and  distribution  of 
its  revenue,  and  entered  into  all  the  arrangements,  to  provide  for  the 
public  debt ; happy  at  home,  and  respected  abroad,  it  must  soon  find 
itself  in  need  of  more  occupation,  than  the  ordinary  concerns  of  de- 
fence and  commerce  can  furnish.  Commerce  once  regulated,  what 
else  remains  to  be  done,  but  to  leave  the  rest  to  the  industry  and  en- 
terprise of  our  citizens.  Our  policy  too,  being  that  of  friendship 
with  all  nations,  and  entangling  alliances  with  none,  and  amply 
furnished  as  we  are,  with  the  means  of  defence,  what  has  the  Gene- 
ral Government  to  do,  but  to  make  provision  for  its  small  army  and 
navy,  and  to  keep  its  forts  and  arsenals  in  repair.  Can  the  mind  of 
an  American  conceive  a happier  state  of  things  for  his  country, 
than  that  Congress  should  sit  only  five  or  six  weeks,  and  have  as 
little  employment  as  possible,  and  that  to  the  local  Legislatures,  it 
should  be  left,  to  extend  their  care,  to  all  the  objects  which  con- 


95 


cern  the  INTERNAL  order  and  improvement  of  the  States. — 
When,  in  17SS,  the  people  in  most  of  the  States,  were  jealous  of  the 
powers  conferred  on  the  Federal  Government,  and  were  hesitating, 
whether  they  would  accept  the  Constitution,  Mr.  Hamilton,  by 
way  of  reconciling  them  to  the  Constitution,  told  them  in  his  Fede- 
ralist, ( No.  45, ^ “that  the  operations  of  the  Federal  Government 
would  be  most  extensive  and  important  in  times  of  WAR  and  danger; 
those  of  the  State  Governments  in  times  of  PEACE  and  security.” 
No  exposition  of  the  Constitution  can  be  more  true  than  this,  and 
more  calculated  to  shew,  that  in  general,  the  State  Governments, 
would  have  advantage  as  to  legislation,  over  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment, the  times  of  war  in  a country  like  America,  bearing  no  pro- 
portion to  the  times  of  peace.  But  how  stands  the  fact.  Thirty 
years  scarcely  elapse,  before  the  General  Government  commences 
a great  plan  of  steady  operations,  by  which  it  is  to  carry  on  a sys- 
tem of  internal  improvements,  which  will  leave  to  the  States,  little  or 
nothing  to  do  on  the  same  subject,  drawing  immense  sums  out  of 
the  pockets  of  the  people  by  taxation,  without  a possibility,  as  al- 
ready has  been  elsewhere  observed,  of  its  being  expended  amongst 
them,  in  the  same  proportion,  in  which  it  is  taken  from  the  several 
States.  It  is  in  PEACE  then,  as  well  as  in  war,  that  we  observe 
the  operations  of  the  General  Government  IMPORTANT  AND 
EXTENSIVE,  with  a prospect,  at  the  same  time,  rapidly  opening 
upon  us,  that  ere  long,  almost  all  the  subjects  of  legislation,  which 
the  States  now  regard  as  exclusively  belonging  to  them,  will  be  gra- 
dually drawn  towards  Congress,  under  the  powerful  attraction  of 
the  words  the  “ general  welfare.”  Who  could  have  believed,  in 
1789,  that  in  less  than  forty  years,  that  several  State  Legislatures, 
should  even  entreat  that  Congress  would  take  under  its  considera- 
tion, measures  to  remove  as  an  evil  of  the  first  magnitude,  the  FUN- 
DAMENTAL POLITY  of  the  Southern  States — that  even  the  sub- 
ject of  slavery,  should  be  a fit  object  for  the  INDIRECT  legislation 
of  a Government,  instituted  for  the  purpose  of  attending  to  foreign 
relations. 

Let  Congress  be  confined  within  the  proper  and  the  legitimate 
sphere  of  its  action,  and  it  is  manifest,  that  it  would  not  be  occu- 
pied, half  the  time  it  now  consumes  in  its  sessions,  nor  cost  the  peo- 
ple half  of  the  sum,  that  is  annually  spent  at  Washington.  There 
have  been  periods,  when  it  might  be  necessary  that  the  sessions 
should  be  somewhat  protracted.  There  was  at  one  time  much  to 
do.  A system  of  revenue  laws  was  to  be  digested  and  perfected — 
the  Courts  of  the  United  States  were  to  be  organized — the  public 
debt  to  be  provided  for — treaties  of  commerce  to  be  entered  into, 
and  ratified  with  every  nation.  A Government  in  fact,  was  to  be  put 
into  complete  operation.  But,  in  our  day,  the  Government  is  settled 
and  established,  and  were  the  National  Legislature  occupied  as  it 
ought  to  be  with  its  own  business,  and  not  in  assuming  the  business 
of  the  State  Legislatures,  there  would  be  little  to  do.  Bui  it  is  be- 
cause the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  are  without  occupa- 
tion, that  instead  of  adjourning  and  going  in  proper  time  to  their 


96 


homes,  the  members  are  disposed  to  meddle,  with  what  is  not  their 
concern,  and  that  they  are  constantly  in  search,  for  some  new  subject 
for  their  legislation.  This  is  the  true  reason,  why  they  expend  the 
public  money  in  protracted  sessions,  and  sow  the  seeds  oi'  discon- 
tent and  jealousy  amongst  the  States.  But  this  is  natural.  These 
men  “ feel  power  and  forget  right,”  and  he  must  be  an  indifferent 
observer,  who  does  not  perceive,  that  unless  some  check  be  given  to 
the  usurpations  of  Congress, that  there  will  be  no  end  to  the  subjects, 
which,  in  time,  it  may  not  discuss  and  legislate  upon. 

ETC,  22. 

No  general  course  of  proceeding  can  he  more  destructive  of  the 
rights  of  the  States,  or  of  the  people,  than  that  adopted  by  Con- 
gress, when  it  is  about  to  construe  its  powers.  Where  real  doubts 
exist,  as  has  frequently  been  the  case,  whether  any  particular  power 
claimed  by  implication,  is  within  those  intended  to  be  .granted  by 
the  Constitution,  this  body  does  not  condescend  to  solicit  any  aid 
from  its  constituents,  who  are  represented  in  the  State  Legislatures, 
but  it  seizes  at  once  upon  the  doubtful  power.  Certainly  this  is  not 
the  course  which  friendship  and  good  feeling,  and  even  policy  would 
dictate  The  Government  of  the  United  States,  notwithstanding  all 
that  has  been  said  to  the  contrary,  by  the  Supreme  Court,  is  not  a 
Government  of  the  people,  in  the  sense  in  which  the  Supreme  Court 
would  have  it.  If  it  were,  it  would  be  responsible  to  the  people 
alone,  as  ifs  constituents,  as  is  the  case  under  every  consolidated 
Government,  and  there  would  be  no  other  security  against  usurpa- 
tion, excepting  the  power  of  the  people  to  change  their  rulers,  in 
which  case  the  minority  must  abide  by  the  will  of  the  majority.  A 
doctrine  such  as  is  contended  for,  is  subversive  of  the  end  for  which 
the  Union  was  formed.  There  is  an  inconsistency  in  admitting,  that 
the  people  of  the  States,  in  their  corporate  capacities  of  States,  have 
certain  acknowledged  rights  under  the  Constitution,  which  are  gua- 
ranteed to  them,  and  also,  that  they  are  so  clearly  recognized  in  the 
instrument,  as  to  be  prohibited  from  exercising  their  sovereignty  on 
certain  subjects,  and  yet  that  they  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  having 
the  right  to  complain  of  the  usurpations  of  the  Government,  as  if  it 
were  ever  before  heard,  that  those  who  create  a delegated  Govern- 
ment, have  not  lawfully  the  same  power,  to  restrict  it,  within  its 
limits,  after  it  is  created. 

This  doctrine,  of  the  General  Government  being  “truly  and  em- 
phatically a Government  of  the  people”  which  has  been  so  often 
relied  on,  as  excluding  the  right  of  the  State  Legislatures,  to  protect 
the  States  against  the  usurpations  of  Congress,  was  first  suggested  by 
Mr.  Pinckney,  Counsel  for  the  Plaintiff  in  Error,  in  M'  CuUochvs.  The 
State  of  Maryland , and  the  Chief  Justice,  with  his  usual  ability  and 
eloquence,  has  placed  the  position  in  so  masterly  an  aspect,  as  al- 
most to  command  the  universal  assent  of  the  Bar.  But  the  position 
of  the  Court  cannot  be  sustained.  It  is  as  unsound,  as  the  other 
parts  of  this  opinion  already  noticed  in  previous  numbers.  The 
Counsel  for  the  Defendants  in  Error,  in  speaking  of  the  true  nature 


97 


of  the  Federal  compact  took  this  ground  “That  the  terms  of  the 
grant,  did  not  convey  sovereign  power  generally,  Out  sovereign 
power  limited  to  particular  cases,  and  with  restrictive  means  for  ex- 
ecuting such  powers and  further,  that  the  powers  of  the  General 
Government  “ were  delegated,  not  by  the  people  of  the  U.  States  at 
large , but  by  the  people  of  the  respective  States,  and,  that  therefore* 
it  was  a compact  between  the  different  States."  The  Counsel  here 
were  certainly  right,  and  the  Court  as  clearly  wrong  in  not  admit- 
ting the  position.  The  Constitution  IS  a compact  between  the 
States,  and  there  are  no  parties  to  it,  excepting  the  people  of  the 
different  States,  in  their  corporate  capacities.  The  Court,  it  is  true, 
cautiously  disclaims  the  assertion,  that  the  instrument  “ proceeds 
from  the  American  people,  as  compounded  into  one  common  mass,” 
for  that  would  be  too  untenable;  but  still,  its  reasonings  do  artfully 
carry  us  on  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  Constitution  does  not  ema- 
nate from,  and  is  not  the  act  of  sovereign  and  independent  States, 
but  on  the  contrary,  is  as  much  the  act  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  as  if  they  were  assembled  in  an  aggregate  society,  to  distri- 
bute power  between  the  Federal  and  the  State  Governments;  and 
that  all  power  derived  from  such  a source,  is  as  sovereign,  as  if  it 
had  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  people,  and  that  all  the  incidental, 
as  well  as  the  direct  powers,  are  a part  and  parcel  of  any  sovereignty 
conveyed  by  the  instrument.  Let  us  examine  this  doctrine  of  the 
Government  being  a Government  of  the  people. 

In  a former  number,  has  been  stated,  the  obvious  distinction,  be- 
tween the  case  of  a people  without  any  regular  Government,  form- 
ing a Constitution  ; and  that  of  a people  already  associated  in  so 
many  separate  sovereignties,  who  design  to  part  with  power  to  a 
common  head  ; the  Legislators,  in  the  one  case,  possessing  all  power 
not  reserved  by  the  people,  and  in  the  other,  possessing  nothing, but 
what  is  delegated.  Situated  as  were  the  citizens  of  America,  at  the 
close  of  the  Revolution,  there  were  but  two  ways,  in  which  the  peo- 
ple, could  have  formed  a Government.  The  first,  was,  by  being  as- 
sembled in  the  relation  to  each  other,  of  individuals  of  one  great 
political  society.  The  second,  as  associated  in  separate  sovereign- 
ties. Under  one,  or  the  other  of  these  situations  of  our  community* 
was  the  Constitution  formed.  If  the  powers  of  the  Government,  are 
not  derived  from  the  people  of  the  United  States,  as  individuals  ag- 
gregated in  a general  society,  they  must  then  be  created  by  the  peo- 
ple in  their  corporate  capacities,  and  so  vice  versa.  From  no  other 
sources  than  these,  can  they  be  claimed.  Now,  it  is  immaterial 
to  me,  which  of  the  two  modes,  the  Supreme  Court  shall  decide  as 
having  prevailed,  in  1788.  If  it  chooses  the  last,  we  agree.  If  the 
first,  it  is  in  its  own  language,  “ a political  dreamer,  who  is  wild 
enough,  to  think  of  breaking  down  the  lines,  which  separate  the 
States,  and  of  compounding  the  American  people  into  one  common 
mass.”  The  Chief  Justice,  however,  thinks,  he  avoids  a dilemma  of 
this  nature,  by  giving  the  idea,  that  though  the  people  on  this  occa- 
sion, were  not  actually  compounded  into  one  mass  ; yet,  that  in  dis- 
pensing power  to  the  new  Government,  they  did  it  as  effectually,  aa 


98 


if  they  had  constituted  one  great  community,  for  on  no  other  princi- 
ple, than  this,  can  he  establish  the  doctrine,  that  as  to  any  particu- 
lar power  conferred  on  Congress,  it  is  as  supreme,  as  the  people 
th  emseives  would  be  on  the  subject;  a doctrine  which  has  been 
denied  in  these  numbers.  As  n aware,  that  the  assemblage  of  the 
people  in  their  States,  would  imply,  that  the  ratification  in  this  way 
of  the  Constitution,  was  the  act  of  the  States,  and  not  of  the  people, 
he  justifies  this  mode  of  ratification  as  the  most  proper,  under  the 
circumstances.  “ They  acted  upon  it,  in  the  only  manner,  in  which 
they  could  act  safely,  effectively,  and  wisely,  on  such  a subject,  by 
assembling  in  Convention.”  It  is  true,  adds  he  “ they  assembled 
in  their  several  States,  and  where  else  should  they  have  assembled? 
If  they  act,  they  must  act  of  course  in  their  States.  But  the  mea- 
sures they  adopt,  do  not,  on  that  account,  cease  to  be  the  measures 
of  the  people,  or  become  the  measures  of  the  State  Governments.” 
The  answer  to  be  given  here,  is,  that  the  Constitution  might  have 
been  ratified,  (if  the  Convention  had  so  chosen)  in  two  other  ways; 
but  neither  of  them,  would  have  comported,  with  the  general  senti- 
ments, in  and  out  of  the  Convention,  that  the  new  Government 
should  be  Federal , and  not  national  in  its  creation.  What,  for  in- 
stance, could  have  prevented  the  Convention,  from  propooing,  that 
the  State  Legislatures  should  divide  their  States  into  election  dis- 
tricts, upon  some  equitable  plan  agreed  upon,  and  that  each  district 
should  send  a deputy  to  a General  Convention,  or  that  the  people  in 
the  different  States,  should  give  their  assent,  or  dissent,  by  voting  in 
districts  by  a general  ticket,  and  that  in  either  case,  the  votes  of 
three  fourths  of  the  whole,  should  be  an  acceptance  of  the  Consti- 
tution. To  these  last  modes  there  could  be  no  objection,  because 
the  Constitution,  whether  the  subject  of  debate,  or  not,  was  to  be 
accepted,  or  rejected  in  whole.  After  Napoleon  had  assumed  the 
imperial  purple,  he  was  desirous  to  know,  whether  his  subjects  re- 
garded him  as  an  usurper,  and  he  opened  books  in  every  part  of  his 
dominions,  that  Frenchmen  might  inscribe  their  assent  or  dissatis- 
faction of  his  conduct.  This  was  voting  by  general  ticket,  though 
not  by  ballot. 

It  would  be  no  answer,  to  say,  that  either  mode  here  proprosed, would 
have  been  impracticable, because  the  very  fact  of  its  being  impracticable 
to  obtain  the  assent  of  the  people  at  large,  would  be  conclusive  to  shew, 
that  the  assent,  if  given  in  any  other  way,  could  not  possibly  be  the 
act  of  the  people,  but  of  the  States.  That  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  were  regarded,  as  acting  in  their  sovereign  capacities,  as  se- 
parate States,  when  they  ratified  the  Constitution,  clearly  appears, 
from  the  rule  laid  dowrn  in  the  instrument  itself,  for  its  ratification. 
The  assent  of  a majority  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States, 
was  not  made  indispensable,  which  certainly  would  have  been  the 
case,  had  the  design  been  that  the  Constitution  should  not  emanate 
from  the  States.  Under  such  a view,  it  might  have  so  happened, 
that  the  ratification  might  not  have  been  complete,  though  nine 
States  should  have  assented  Four  large  States,  rejecting  the 
Constitution,  might  have  had  a greater  population  than  the  other 


99 


nine.  For  instance,  Massachusetts,  New-York,  Pennsylvania,  and 
Virginia.  These  four  States,  at  the  first  census  in  1790,  one  year 
after  the  Government  went  into  operation,  had  56  members  out  of 
105,  that  number  being  the  whole  representation  in  Congress — They 
were  the  majority  of  fifteen  States.  At  the  second  census  in  1800, 
the  same  four  States  possessed  74  out  of  141  members,  and  formed 
the  majority  of  seventeen  States.  At  the  third  census  in  1810,  they 
formed  exactly  one  half  of  twenty-three  States. 

Amongst  all  the  modes  of  controverting  the  soundness  of  a po- 
sition, there  cannot  be  one  more  effectual,  than  to  shew  the  manifest 
absurdity  to  which  its  results  would  lead.  If  the  Supreme  Court  is 
right,  that  the  ratification  was  the  assent  of  the  people,  and  not  of  ihe 
States,  the  Convention  is  chargeable  with  the  absurd  proposal  of 
having  a Government,  which  is  to  bind  all  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  to  be  put  into  operation,  as  soon  as  a minority  of 
the  same  people  should  ratify  it  Now,  on  the  other  hand, 
if  we  consider  the  Constitution,  as  emanating  from  the  State  sove- 
reignties, and  not  from  the  people,  there  is  no  difficulty  whatever,  in 
any  view  of  the  subject.  The  mode  proposed  by  the  Convention, 
was  not  only  the  best  mode,  but  it  was  the  only  mode,  by  which  the 
people,  acting  as  the  people  of  separate  States,  could  give  their  free 
and  unbiassed  assent  to  the  compact. 

There  was  a manifest  propriety  in  the  Convention’s  submitting 
the  Constitution,  to  the  assent  of  the  people,  in  their  State  Con- 
ventions, and  not  to  the  Stats  Legislatures,  if  it  was  the  intention, 
that  the  new  Government, was  to  be  received  from  the  States.  It  is  only, 
when  the  people  are  assembled  in  their  conventions,  that  they  are  exer- 
cising their  utmost  power  of  sovereignty.  At  no  other  time,  do  they 
wholly  act  in  their  sovereign  capacity  ; for  it  is  then,  that  they  can 
take  away  what  they  before  gave , and  give  what  they  had  previously 
retained.  In  the  State  Legislatures,  the  people,  it  is  true,  exercise  the 
sovereign  power  of  making  laws,  but  the  power  is  limited  by  the 
Constitution.  The  Court  says,  “ from  these  Conventions,  the 
Constitution  derives  its  whole  authority.”  Strange  then  it  is,  that 
at  the  very  moment,  when  the  people  in  the  different  States,  are  act- 
ing in  the  only  possible  known  way  of  exercising  complete  sove- 
reignty, that  this  moment  should  be  selected  by  the  Court,  as  an  oc- 
casion for  considering  their  acts,  not  as  the  acts  of  sovereign  States, 
but  as  those  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  at  large. 

It  is  very  plain,  from  the  reasoning  of  the  Chief  Justice,  that  he 
regards  the  State  Legislatures,  or  the  State  Governments , as  he  also 
terms  them,  essentially,  as  the  State  Sovereignties.  His  words  are 
Cl  The  assent  of  the  States,  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  is  implied, 
in  calling  a Convention,  and  thus  submitting  that  instrument  to  the 
people.  It  required  not  the  affirmance,  and  could  not  be  negatived 
by  the  State  Governments.  The  Constitution,  when  adopted,  was 
of  Complete  obligation,  and  bound  the  State  Sovereignties.”  For 
the  want  of  a distinction  between  a State  Legislature  and  a State 
Sovereignty,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered,  that  the  Court  should  deny 
the  Constitution,  to  be  the  act  of  sovereign  and  independent  States.. 


ICO 


as  States.  There  is  a difference,  and  a very  material  one,  betweea 
a State  Legislature,  and  a State  Sovereignty.  To  speak  of  them  as 
the  same,  is  to  confound  two  things  which  are  opposite.  It  is  to 
call  the  people  the  Government,  and  the  Government  the  people. — 
True  State  Sovereignty,  is  that  supreme  power  in  a State,  which  is 
without  limits.  It  resides  no  where  but  in  the  people.  To  the  peo- 
ple it  belongs,  as  founded  on  the  “ original  inherent  RIGHTS  OF 
MAN.”  The  State  Legislature,  on  the  contrary,  is  nothing  more 
than  that  portion  of  the  supreme  power,  which  the  people  have 
thought  proper  to  delegate,  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  necessary 
laws,  to  regulate  Society  at  home  and  intercourse  abroad.  A State 
Legislature  is  not  even  the  State  Government , but  only  a portion  of 
it.  If  the  State  Legislature,  which  is  only  a part  of  the  Civil  Gov- 
ernment of  the  State,  be  State  sovereignty,  then  the  Executive  and 
the  judicial  powers,  are  also  State  sovereignty.  The  only  possible 
case,  in  which  a State  Legislature  could  be  pretended  to  be  a State 
sovereignty,  would  be,  where,  by  the  terms  of  a written  Constitu- 
tion, all  power  whatever  is  vested  in  the  Legislature,  nothing  be- 
ing reserved  to  the  people.  Such  a written  Constitution,  would  be 
comprised  in  one  or  two  short  sentences,  and  would  be  a novelty. — 
We  have  no  such  in  America  that  I know  of. 

As  we  now  see  the  essential  difference  between  the  Legislature  of 
a State,  and  that  supreme  power,  called  State  sovereignty,  we  shall 
readily  perceive,  in  the  rise,  progress,  and  final  completion  of  the 
Federal  Constitution,  that  every  thing  which  was  done,  was  in  per- 
fect accordance , with  those  notions  of  Government,  which  we  term 
republican,  and  that,  had  it  been  otherwise,  the  rights  of  the  people, 
as  States,  would  have  been  violated. 

The  necessities  of  the  people  in  every  State,  called  for  a change 
in  the  structure  of  the  existing  Governments.  How  was  this  change  to 
be  effected  1 By  the  State  Legislatures!  Certainly  not.  The  State  Le'- 
gislatures  had  no  right  to  form  a new  Constitution.  They  were  com- 
petent to  form  the  Confederation,  for  that  was  in  nature  of  a league, 
and  it  is  within  the  scope  of  all  legislative  power,  to  enter  into 
such  a compact.  But,  when  a Constitution  is  to  be  formed,  Govern- 
ments are  not  to  be  the  actors  in  any  way.  According  to  Mr.  Paine, 
in  his  “RIGHTS  OF  MAN,”  “ Government  has  no  right  to  make 
itself  a party,  in  any  debate,  respecting  the  principles,  or  modes  of 
forming,  or  changing  Constitutions.  It  is  not  for  the  benefit  of 
those  who  exercise  the  powers  of  Government,  that  Constitutions, 
and  the  Governments,  issuing  from  them,  are  established.  In  all 
these  matters,  the  right  of  judging  and  acting,  is  in  those  who  pay — 
the  people  ; and  not  in  those  who  receive.  A Constitution  is  the 
property  of  a nation,  and  not  of  those  who  exercise  the  Govern- 
ment.” 

But  though  no  one  State  Legislature,  could  place  its  own  people, 
under  a new  form  of  Civil  Government,  in  which  Government  they 
were  to  be  associated  with  the  people  of  other  sovereign  States,  yet 
they  had  a right  to  submit  proposals  to  that  effect,  which  they  did 
by  sending  deputies  to  the  General  Convention.  The  work  of  the 


101 


Convention  being  finished,  the  next  inquiry  was  as  to  the  mode  of 
ratification.  There  were  but  two  modes,  proposed  in  the  Conven- 
tion, by  which  the  people  were  to  be  bound  as  the  people  of  sove- 
reign States.  The  first,  to  have  the  assent  of  the  State  Legislatures. 
The  second,  of  the  people  of  the  States  in  State  Conventions.  The 
latter  was  preferred.  Had  the  Convention  considered,  that  the  as- 
sent of  the  State  Legislatures,  could  give  a binding  efficacy  to  the 
new  Constitution,  it  would  have  betrayed  an  extreme  ignorance  of 
the  true  origin  of  all  civil  government,  and  of  that  inherent  right 
of  the  people  alone,  to  make  a Constitution.  The  assent  of  the 
people  in  conventions,  then,  was  the  only  way,  in  which  their  assent 
could  be  obtained,  as  sovereign  and  independent  States.  They  do 
assemble.  In  each  State,  a majority  of  the  people  decide  for  that 
particular  State.  The  vote  is  transmitted  as  one  vote,  out  of  thir- 
teen. Delaware,  the  smallest  State  in  the  Union,  has  the  same  in- 
fluence in  making  up  the  majority,  without  which  the  Con- 
stitution cannot  operate,  as  Virginia,  which  is  the  largest  State.  And 
yet  we  are  told  by  tiie  Supreme  Court,  that  the  binding  efficacy 
which  the  Constitution  received  in  these  proceedings,  was  not  the 
act  of  the  States,  as  States.  But  let  us,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
pervert  terms,  and  say,  that  Legislatures  are  States.  Still  the  acts 
of  the  Convention,  in  such  a view,  must  substantially  be  regarded 
as  the  acts  of  the  States.  That  sovereign  political  body,  which  re- 
quires another  body  to  decide  for  it,  any  question,  which  it  has  the 
power  of  itself  to  decide,  is  certainly  the  power,  that  does  the  act, 
and  not  the  substitute.  Qui  facit  per  alium  facit  per  se. 

Suppose,  that  instead  of  the  present  Constitution,  Mr.  Patter- 
son’s plan  had  been  adopted  in  the  Convention,  which  was  so  to 
have  enlarged  the  power  of  the  old  Government,  as  to  give  it  the 
additional  power  of  imposts  and  stamp  duties,  and  to  regulate  com- 
merce, and  to  have  a Federal  Executive,  and  a Federal  Judiciary, 
&c.  This  Government,  in  the  words  of  the  Court,  would  “be  the 
Government  of  all.  Its  powers  delegated  by  all.  Representing 
all,  and  acting  for  all.”  But  would  any  one  say,  that  because  it 
was  to  act  directly  on  the  people,  that,  on  that  account,  it  must  be 
national  in  its  creation.  The  manner  in  which  a Government  is 
ushered  into  existence,  and  the  nature  of  that  Government,  after  it 
is  created,  are  two  distinct  things.  The  mode,  in  which  a Govern- 
ment is  to  operate  upon  the  people,  has  really  no  more  to  do  with 
an  enquiry,  as  to  the  source  from  which  it  emanates,  than  the  man- 
ner of  its  origin,  has  to  do  with  questions  as  to  the  operation  of  its 
powers.  The  only  question  is,  who  ratified  it.  The  people,  it  is 
true,  did  it.  Who  else  could  ratify  it.  But  did  the  people  ratify  it, 
as  the  people  at  large.  The  answer  has  been  already  given.  The 
votes  were  not  a portion  of  the  aggregate  votes  of  all  the  individuals 
in  the  United  States,  but  the  vote  as  one  people.  It  was  a single 
vote.  Who,  but  a State  can  give  a single  vote.  What  is  the  cha- 
racteristic of  a confederacy  of  States,  according  to  our  own  experi- 
ence ? The  voting  by  States.  If  South-Carolina,  in  giving  her 
assent  to  the  compact,  votes  precisely  as  she  did  in  the  confede- 

13 


102 


ration,  her  influence  being-  one  thirteenth  of  the  whole,  is  it  not 
absurd  to  say,  that  this  ratification  is  not  a federal  act.  The  Court 
is  at  some  pains  to  confute  the  plain  proposition,  insisted  on  by  the 
Counsel  for  the  State  of  Maryland,  that  the  Constitution  is  a com- 
pact between  the  States  in  their  sovereign  capacities.  The  Govern- 
ment, says  the  Court  “proceeds  directly  from  the  people;”  “is  or- 
dained and  established”  in  the  name  of  the  people  ; and  is  declared 
to  be  ordained,  “ in  order  to  form  a more  perfect  union.”  And 
what  then  ? Who  are  the  people  here  meant  1 The  people  of  the 
United  States  as  one  entire  nation,  or  the  people  of  the  Thirteen 
States.  The  title  or  caption  of  the  Constitution,  as  it  is  presented  to 
the  Conventions,  announces  it,  “ as  a Constitution  framed  for  the 
United  States  of  America,  by  a convention  of  deputies  from  the  States 
of  New-Hampshire,”  &.c.  If  an  argument  is  to  he  drawn  from  what 
immediately  follows  in  the  preamble,  “We, the  people  of  the  U.  States, 
do  ordain  and  establish  this  Constitution,”  1 should  suppose,  the 
people  here  meant,  must  be  the  people  of  those  thirteen  named  States 
of  America,  for  which  States  the  Constitution  was  formed,  to  wit, 
New-Hampshire,  &c.  The  Government,  being  a compound  Govern- 
ment, it  would  be  difficult  to  say,  how  it  could,  upon  the  whole,  be 
better  expressed,  supposing  that  its  adoption  was  to  be  the  act  of  in- 
dependent States.  Again  as  to  union.  What  is  meant  by  “more 
perfect  union,”  more  than  an  union  of  sovereign  States  upon  bet- 
ter terms  than  the  confederation  afforded.  The  Court  will  not  say, 
that  a Consolidated  Union  was  the  end  in  view 

The  best  way  to  put  an  end  to  all  argument,  is  to  ask  ourselves 
this  simple  question — Supposing  that  it  was  the  real  design  of  the 
whole  convention,  that  the  new  Constitution  was  to  be  the  act  of  the 
several  States,  as  States,  could  it  have  adopted  any  other  legitimate 
mode,  than  that  of  submitting  the  instrument  to  the  State  Conven- 
tions. This  question  must  be  promptly  answered  in  the  negative, 
unless  we  design  to  maintain  the  absurdity,  that  a State  Legislature 
can  make  a Constitution,  which  is  to  associate  its  people  in  civil 
government,  with  the  people  of  other  States.  If  then,  it  is  clear, 
that  in  a State  Convention  alone,  the  assent  of  the  people  of  a State, 
as  a State,  can  be  givdn  to  a radical  change  in  the  structure  of  the 
Government,  so  as  to  bind  the  people  of  that  State,  the  very  circum- 
stance of  calling  the  Convention,  incontestibly  proves,  that  its  re- 
quired ratification  was  to  be  a State  act.  It  is  a loss  of  time,  to  at- 
tempt to  prove  what  is  so  plain. 

That  the  Government  did  not  emanate  from  the  people,  excepting 
in  their  sovereign  capacities,  as  separate  States,  appears  also  to  be 
the  exposition  of  the  Federalist.  In  speaking  of  the  real  character 
of  the  Government,  considered  in  relation  to  the  foundation,  oh 
which  it  is  to  be  established,  it  is  said,  (Federalist,  No.  39)  “ On  the 
one  hand,  the  Constitution  is  to  be  founded  on  the  assent  and  ratifi- 
cation of  the  people  of  America,  given  by  deputies,  elected  for  the 
special  purpose;  but  on  the  other,  this  assent  and  ratification,  is  to 
be  given  by  the  people,  not  as  individuals,  comprising  one,  entire 
nation,  but,  as  composing  the  distinct  and  independent  States,  to 


103 


which  they  respectively  belong.  It  is  to  be  the  assent  and  ratifi- 
cation of  the  several  States,  derived  from  the  supreme  authority  in 
each  State,  the  authority  of  the  people  themselves.  The  act,  there- 
fore, establishing  the  Constitution,  will  not  be  a National,  but  a 
FEDERAL  act.”  The  Federalist  goes  on  to  say,  “ That  it  will  be 
a federal,  and  not  a national  act,  (as  the  terms  are  understood  by 
the  objectors)  the  act  of  the  people,  as  forming  so  many  independent 
States,  not  as  forming  one  aggregate  nation,  is  obvious  from  this  sin- 
gle consideration,  that  it  is  to  result,  neither  from  a majority  of  the 
people  of  the  Union,  nor  from  that  of  a majority  of  the  States.  It 
must  result  from  the  unanimous  assent  of  the  several  States,  that  are 
parties  to  it,  differing  no  otherwise  from  their  ordinary  assent,  than  in 
its  being  expressed,  not  by  the  legislative  authority,  but  by  the  people 
themselves.  Were  the  people  regarded  in  this  transaction,  as  form- 
ing one  nation,  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  whole  people  of  the 
United  States,  would  bind  the  minority,  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
majority  of  each  State,  must  bind  the  minority  ; and  the  will  of  the 
majority  must  be  determined,  either  by  a comparison  of  the  indi- 
vidual votes,  or  by  considering  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  States, 
as  evidence  of  the  will  of  a majority  of  the  people  of  the  U.  States. 
Neither  of  these  rules  has  been  adopted.  Each  State,  in  ratifying 
the  Constitution,  is  considered  as  a SOVEREIGN  BODY,  indepen- 
dent of  all  others,  and  only  to  be  bound  by  its  voluntary  act.  In  this 
relation,  the  new  Constitution  will,  if  established,  be  a FEDERAL, 
and  not  a National  Constitution.” 

Having  thus  clearly  shewn,  as  I conceive,  that  the  counsel  for  the 
Defendants  in  Error,  were  right  in  saying,  that  the  federal  compact 
was  the  act  of  the  State  sovereignties,  and  that  the  Supreme  Court 
was  decidedly  wrong  in  denying  the  position,  it  may  not  be  unprofit- 
able, to  correct  some  popular  errors  on  the  subject  of  civil  govern- 
ment being  considered  as  a compact  ; as  on  the  correction  of  these, 
a very  important  axiom  is  hereafter  to  be  maintained,  to  wit,  that  to 
the  State  Legislatures,  as  States,  and  not  to  the  people  at  large,  as 
its  constituents,  is  Congress  responsible  for  the  abuse  of  its  powers. 
These  Legislatures  have  the  unquestionable  right  to  keep  Congress 
within  the  limits  of  its  prescribed  powers. 

It  is  an  erroneous  idea,  that  wherever  civil  government  exists,  that 
there  is  any  compact  between  the  people  on  the  one  side,  and  the 
the  Government  on  the  other,  and  that  the  Government  in  conse- 
quence, has  any  rights,  except  when  it  acts  for  the  people.  This 
subject  is  placed  in  an  admirable,  and  an  incontrovertible  point  of 
view,  by  Thomas  Paine,  in  his  “ Rights  of  Man.”  In  the  American 
Constitutions,  of  which  he  was  treating,  lie  maintains  there  is 
no  such  idea.  The  compact,  says  he,  in  “ each  instance,  was  that 
of  the  people  with  each  other,  to  produce  and  constitute  a Govern- 
ment. To  suppose,  that  any  Government,  can  be  a party  in  a com- 
pact, with  the  whole  people,  is  to  suppose  it,  to  have  existence,  be- 
fore it  can  have  a right  to  exist.”  In  the  confederation  then,  we 
must  admit,  that  the  compact  necessarily  was,  that  of  the  people  of 
the  different  States,  with  each  other,  in  the  relation  of  independent 


104 


communities.  In  the  Federal  Constitution,  it  is  a mistake  to  sup- 
pose, that  the  relation  is  in  the  least  altered,  because  the  people  them- 
selves met,  to  make  the  compact,  instead  of  doing  it  through  their 
Legislatures.  The  act  of  ratifying  the  compact  by  such  a mode,  so 
far  from  weakening,  indubitably  strengthened  the  ratification,  as  an 
act  of  an  independent  State,  for  it  is  done  by  the  people  themselves, 
in  the  most  sovereign  character,  in  which  they  can  possibly  be  re- 
cognized. In  no  State  in  this  Union,  is  the  sovereignty  of  the  State 
perfectly  represented  by  its  Government.  The  people  may  con- 
stantly be  in  the  exercise  of  all  the  legislative,  judicial,  and  execu- 
tive powers  of  the  Government,  and  yet,  they  may  not  be  using  their 
utmost  sovereignty.  In  every  American  Constitution,  there  are 
powers  reserved  to  the  people,  which  Government  cannot  exercise. 
It  is  in  convention  alone,  that  State  sovereignty  is  without  limits  or 
controul. 

The  Constitution  then,  being  a compact,  between  the  people  of  the 
different  States,  as  States,  and  not  as  individuals,  it  results,  that  the 
U.  States  Government  is  nothing  more  than  a great  trustee,  under  an 
irrevocable  power  of  attorney,  to  perform  certain  duties,  or  to  exe- 
cute certain  trusts,  prescribed  to  it  by  the  States.  Government,  says 
Mr.  Paine,  “ is  not  a trade,  which  any  man,  or  body  of  men,  have  a 
right  to  set  up,  and  exercise  for  their  own  emolument,  but  is  alto- 
gether A TRUST,  in  right  of  those,  by  whom  the  trust  is  dele- 
gated, and  by  whom  it  is  always  resumeable.  It  has  of  itself  NO 
RIGHTS.  They  are  altogether  duties.  All  power  exercised  over 
a nation,  must  have  some  beginning.  It  must  be  either  delegated, 
or  assumed.  There  are  no  other  sources.  ALL  DELEGATED 
power  is  TRUST,  and  all  assumed  power  is  USURPATION.  Time 
does  not  alter  the  nature  and  quality  of  either.”  If  this  be  not 
truth,  in  the  name  of  reason,  what  shall  we  call  by  that  name.  Let 
us  then,  apply  this  doctrine  to  our  subject.  The  power  of  the 
Federal  Government,  we  all  admit,  is  a delegated  power,  and  all 
delegated  power,  we  must,  as  freely  admit,  is  a trust.  It  is  the 
State  sovereignties  who  confer  this  delegated  power,  and  these 
also,  are  the  only  parties  to  the  federal  compact.  In  this  view, 
what  becomes  of  that  doctrine  so  often  advanced,  that  Congress  is 
not  amenable  to  the  States,  as  State  sovereignties,  for  an  abuse  of 
its  powers.  Was  it  ever  heard,  that  the  parties  who  create  the 
trust,  are  not  to  see  that  the  purposes  of  the  trust  deed  are  ful- 
filled. Who  else  is  to  complain,  and  to  take  the  measures  to  keep 
a trustee  to  the  proper  discharge  of  his  duties,  if  it  be  not  the  con- 
stituents of  the  trust  estate.  Suppose  that  the  directors  of  any  pub- 
lictrading company,  were  to  violate  certain  fundamental  articles  of 
covenant,  between  the  individuals  who  may  compose  such  a com- 
pany, and  are  so  supported  by  the  majority  of  the  stockholders,  to 
the  injury  of  the  minority  ; what  is  the  remedy  ? A Couit  of  Jus- 
tice, by  its  writ  of  prohibition  or  mandamus , or  injunction , or  other 
process,  arrests  their  illegal  proceedings.  The  only  difference  be- 
tween the  abuse  of  a private  trust,  such  as  has  been  stated,  and  that 
of  the  great  public  trusts,  contained  in  delegated  sovereign  powers. 


105 


is,  in  the  nature  of  the  remedy,  to  be  applied.  For  the  first,  there 
are  impartial  tribunals  provided  in  all  regular  Governments.  For 
the  other,  as  regards  the  anomaly  in  ihe  American  plan  o;  Govern- 
ment, it  results,  from  the  very  nature,  of  the  Government,  that  no 
Such  tribunal  can  be  found,  and  that  relief  must  be  sought  by  other 
means.  For  who  is  to  appoint  such  a tribunal  1 Not  surely,  the  dele- 
gated Government.  It  would  be,  to  consent  to  allow  the  trustee, 
not  merely  to  appoint  the  arbiter,  who  is  to  judge,  whether  he  lias 
or  has  not  abused  his  trust,  but  to  name  for  that  purpose,  his  own 
servants,  who  are  fed  and  supported  by  him.  In  this  view,  the 
States  who  constituted  Uie  Federal  Government,  can  never  consent, 
that  the  United  States  tribunals  should  decide,  whether  the  Federal 
Government  had  or  had  not  usurped  its  powers.  Such  an  assent 
would  involve  the  absurdity  just  mentioned.  It  is  to  make  a party 
the  sole  judge  in  its  own  cause. 

I am  aware  that  it  will  be  said,  that  the  mode  of  settling  all  such 
questions,  is  specified  in  the  compact,  and  is  a part  of  it ; and  that 
the  second  section  of  the  third  article  of  the  Constitution,  makes  the 
United  States  Judges,  the  arbiters  in  all  disputes  between  the  States 
and  Congress.  I think  not.  The  only  part  of  the  section  which 
can  be  enlisted  on  the  side  of  such  a construction  is,  that  which 
extends  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States,  to  all  “ cases  aris- 
ing under  this  Constitution,  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
and  also,  that  which  speaks  of  “ controversies  to  which  the  United 
States  shall  be  a party.”  I have  always  thought,  and  do  believe, 
that  had  this  provision  been  for  any  other  purpose,  than  to  enable 
Congress  to  protect  itself,  against  any  exercise  of  power  by  the 
States,  prohibited  to  them  by  the  Constitution,  or  intended  to  em- 
brace great  and  vital  questions  of  sovereignty,  between  the  States 
and  the  United  States,  as  to  constructive  powers,  as  well  as  cases  of 
meum  and  tuum,  that  it  would  not  have  been  so  loosely  expressed. — 
This  view  is  considerably  strengthened  by  the  circumstance,  that  on 
the  introduction  of  these  passages,  on  the  27th  and  2Sth  of  August, 
as  amendments  to  the  reported  draft  of  the  Constitution,  there  was 
no  opposition,  which  can  only  be  accounted  for,  on  the  supposition, 
that  it  was  intended  to  embrace  the  claims  of  individuals  against  the 
United  States,  and  vice  versa.  We  cannot  imagine,  that  so  important 
a provision,  as  that,  by  which  inherent  rights  of  States  were  to  be 
taken  away,  could  pass  unnoticed,  if  it  were  understood  to  refer  to 
disputes  about  sovereignty  ; but  we  can  readily  believe,  that  if  the 
supposed  controversy,  was  to  partake  of  the  general  nature  of  the 
cases  provided  for  in  the  same  section,  which  are  pecuniary  suits  at 
law  and  equity,  that  there  could  be  no  objection. — “ Controversies 
between  two  or  more  States.”  This  part  of  the  clause  was  well 
understood,  and  the  same  reason  which  might  warrant  the  insertion 
of  this  last  power,  to  adjust  ordinary  controversies  between  two  States, 
would  apply  to  the  exclusion  of  the  idea,  that  important  vital  rights 
were  to  be  the  subject  of  cognizance  in  the  Federal  Courts,  under 
the  amendments.  A State  differing  with  a neighbouring  State, 
might  be  perfectly  willing  to  leave  a dispute,  about  boundaries,  &c. 


106 


to  the  decision  of  the  United  States  Courts,  because,  as  between 
such  parties,  the  arbiter  must  be  impartial,  and  this  would  be  the 
case,  in  all  the  other  cases  in  the  section,  allotted  to  the  cognizance 
of  the  Federal  Courts.  But  the  case  is  materially  altered,  when  the 
question  to  be  propounded,  to  the  servants  of  the  Government,  is, 
whether  their  masters  have,  or  have  not  usurped  their  powers.  It 
is  requiring  too  much  of  frail  mortals,  (unless  the  usurpation  be  out- 
rageously gross;  to  ask  of  them,  to  decide  in  the  affirmative.  It  is 
unreasonable,  even  to  require  of  them,  that  if  they  have  honest  doubts 
on  the  subject,  to  throw  those  doubts  into  any  other  scale,  than  that 
of  the  Government,  to  which  they  are  attached  from  interest. 

The  absurdity  and  the  danger  of  any  such  stipulation  on  the  part 
of  the  States,  is  too  apparent,  to  admit  of  the  idea,  of  its  ever  having 
been  intended,  and  unless  its  can  be  shewn  as  clear  as  the  sun  in  the 
firmament,  that  such  was  actually  the  intention  of  the  clause,  such 
a construction  ought  to  be  resisted  by  the  States,  upon  the  principle 
of  self-preservation.  They  have  no  other  recourse.  If  we,  how- 
ever, look  into  the  journals  of  the  Convention,  we  shall  be  satisfied, 
that  it  never  once  entered  into  the  minds  of  the  members  to  pro- 
vide for  any  other  disputes,  than  such  as  might  occur  between 
States  as  to  boundaries  or  territorial  jurisdiction,  or  between  a State 
and  Congress,  where  the  former  might  be  disposed  (as  was  feared) 
to  pass  laws,  clashing  with  the  expressly  delegated  powers  of  Con- 
gress. It  was  anticipated,  that  disputes  between  States  would  occur, 
respecting  territorial  jurisdiction.  In  the  confederation,  a mode  of 
adjustment  had  been  provided.  In  the  first  draft  also,  of  the  Con- 
stitution, proposed  by  Mr.  Pinckney,  a power  for  this  purpose,  was 
invested  in  the  Senate.  In  the  reported  draft  of  the  Constiution, 
by  the  committee  of  detail,  the  same  power  is  invested  in  the  Senate. 
But  in  neither  of  them,  nor  in  any  of  the  Jive  plans  submitted  to  the 
Convention,  is  there  any  provision  proposed  for  disputes,  involving 
rights  of  sovereignty,  between  the  United  States  and  any  one  State. 
None  of  the  proposed  plans,  as  to  the  settlement  of  State  disputes, 
being  agreed  to,  it  was  finally  judged  proper  to  make  the  Federal 
Judiciary,  the  tribunal. 

There  was  a strong  apprehension  in  the  Convention,  that  the  State 
laws  would  interfeie  with  those  of  the  National  Legislature,  and  it  was 
upon  this  expectation,  that  Mr.  Madison  advocated  Mr.  Pinckney’s  pro- 
position, that  a Congress  should  have  a negative  upon  all  State  laws,  and 
because,  he  moreover  believed,  “ that  no  tribunal  could  be  found,  who 
could  impartially  determine  the  line  of  State  powers,  when  drawn  in 
doubtful  ''ases.”  This  proposition  having  been  thrice  lost  in  convention, 
twice  on  the  discussion  of  Mr.  Randolph’s  resolution,  and  once  again  on 
the  23d  of  August,  it  became  necessary  in  the  minds  of  some  members, 
that  provision  should  be  made,  to  prevent  the  States  passing  laws,  which 
••  might  infringe  the  powers  exclusively  delegated  to  Congress,”  for  that 
is  the  expression  in  Mr.  Pinckney’s  draft. 

The  Committee  of  detail  not  having  made  any  such  provision  in  their 
reported  draft  of  the  Constitution,  because  it  would  have  been  repugnant 
to  their  instructions,  and  the  proposition  having  been  repealed  on  the  23d 


107 


of  August,  ns  an  additional  enumerated  power,  there  arose  a necessity  of 
a different  phraseology  of  the  judiciary  clause,  when  it  was  under  conside- 
ration. The  judicial  power  was  then  extended  “ to  all  cases  in  law  and 
Equity,  arising  under  this  Constitution  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States,” 
and  also  to  “ controversies  to  which  the  United  States  shall  be  a party.” — 
The  provision  evidently  was  intended  for  the  cases,  which  might  arise, 
from  the  States,  interfering  with  the  powers  delegated  to  Congress.  It  is 
impossible  to  read  the  secret  journals  of  the  Convention,  without  being 
struck  with  the  unfounded  fears,  which  at  that  day  seized  the  bosoms  of 
the  majority  of  the  members,  as  to  the  danger  of  the  State  Legislatures, 
constantly  embarrassing  the  new  Government.  Thirty-five  years  expe- 
rience has  demonstrated  that  all  their  apprehensions  were  as  “ the  baseless 
fabric  of  a vision.”  To  prevent  the  evils  which  they  anticipated  from 
this  source  was  the  cause  of  those  very  amendments  to  the  judiciar)'  clause, 
which  have  been  supposed  to  give  the  United  States  Courts  cognizance  of 
all  disputes  as  to  the  extent  of  the  constructive  powers  of  Congress — how- 
ever vitally  such  disputes  might  affect  the  sovereignty  and  very  existence 
of  some  of  the  States.  Mr.  Hamilton,  ( Federalist  No.  80 ) sustains  this 
very  motive  for  introducing  the  above  amendments.  In  speaking  of  the 
necessity  of  some  constitutional  mode  of  enforcing  the  observance  of  the 
restrictions  en  the  State  Legislatures,  he  says,  that “ the  power  must  either 
be  a direct  negative  on  the  State  laws,  or  an  authority  in  the  Federal 
Courts  to  overrule  such  as  might  be  in  manifest  contravention  of  the  arti- 
cles of  Union.  The  latter,  appears  to  have  been  thought  by  the  Conven- 
tion, preferable  to  the  former,  and  I presume  will  be  most  agreeable  to  the 
States.” 

In  speaking,  however,  of  the  motives  of  the  Convention,  as  to  the  above 
amendments  to  the  judiciary  section,  I am  not  to  be  understood,  to  say,  that 
it  is  altogether  clear,  that  even  the  construction  here  given  or  admitted,  is 
not  too  liberal,  but  merely  to  contend,  that  whatever  the  words  may  mean, 
they  could  not  mean,  more  than  to  provide  a substitute  for  that  favourite 
measure  of  some  members,  a negative  upon  such  State  laws,  as  might  be 
passed,  in  repugnance  to  the  express  prohibitions  in  the  Constitution. — 
There  is  a view  of  this  subject,  which  at  this  moment  strikes  me  with  some 
force,  and  which  would  shew,  notwithstanding  the  preceding  reasoning, 
and  Mr.  Hamilton’s  exposition  just  quoted,  that  all  these  amendments, 
might  have  been  intended  simply  to  refer  to  pecuniary  claims,  preferred  by 
or  against  the  United  States,  and  also,  to  all  suits  which  must  necessarily 
or  ordinarily  arise,  between  one  citizen  and  another,  out  of  the  general 
proceedings  of  the  Government,  and  the  conduct  of  its  officers,  agents  or 
servants.  The  only  way,  to  come  at  the  intentions  of  the  convention,  is, 
to  go  up  to  the  fountain  head,  for  their  first  meaning,  and  to  observe  whe- 
ther that  meaning  was  altered,  and  how  far  it  was  altered  by  its  subsequent 
acts. 

In  Mr.  Randolph’s  1 6th  resolution,  the  outline  of  the  power  of  the  judi- 
ciary, is  thus  given.  “ To  extend  to  cases,  arising  under  laws,  passed  by 
the  General  Legislature,  and  to  such  other  questions,  as  involve  the  na- 
tional peace  and  harmony.'”  That  by  the  words,  “ national  peace  and 
harmony,”  was  intended,  no  more  than  disputes  between  States  as  to  ter- 
ritorial jurisdiction,  and  hy  the  words,  “cases  arising  under  laws  of  the 
United  States,”  the  clashing  of  jurisdiction  which  might  take  place  between 


108 


the  Federal  and  State  Judges  as  to  admiralty  and  other  jurisdiction,  as  to 
piracies,  captures,  &c.  is  evident,  from  the  simple,  and  yet  important  fact, 
that  the  committee  of  detail,  who  heard  all  the  debates,  certainly  under- 
stood the  resolution  in  this  sense.  In  their  reported  draft  of  a Constitution, 
they  make  provision  for  the  settlement  of  disputes  between  States,  and  for 
other  cases  connected  with  the  national  harmony,  but  none  whatever  as 
regards  collisions  between  the  Federal,  and  the  State  Governments,  as  to 
powers.  We  cannot  therefore  believe,  that  under  these  expressions, 
“ national  peace  and  harmony,”  the  Convention  ever  did  intend  to 
include,  such  important  disputes,  as  collisions  about  sovereignty.  The 
most  rational  construction  would  be,  that  the  cases  arising  under  Legisla- 
tive enactments,  were  such  only,  as  must  ordinarily  occur,  under  every 
Government,  and  no  others.  The  subsequent  amendment  to  this  clause, 
on  the  28th  of  August,  by  adding  the  words  “ at  Law  and  Equity”  seems 
to  establish  this  exposition,  and  as  some  cases  of  pecuniary  interest  proba- 
bly might  occur  under  the  “ Constitution”  as  well  as  of  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  this  may  have  been  the  cause  of  the  addition  of  that  word 
“ Constitution”  also  to  the  section.  The  claim  of  Massachusetts,  against 
Congress,  for  militia  claims  during  the  late  war,  would  have  been  a case 
of  Law  and  Equity,  arising  under  the  Constitution,  had  Congress  not  have 
allowed  these  claims.  Other  instances  might,  no  doubt,  be  cited.  In  the 
Virginia  Convention  and  North-Carolina  Conventions,  (I  have  not  seen 
the  debates  of  any  other)  when  this  clause  was  under  consideration,  great 
as  were  the  objections,  yet,  no  speaker  anticipated  the  evil,  of  any  such 
construction,  that  the  judicial  power  was  to  decide  questions  of  jurisdiction 
and  sovereignty  between  the  United  States  and  any  particular  State.  The 
whole  apprehension  was,  that  in  process  of  time,  the  Federal  Judiciary 
would  sweep  to  its  jurisdiction,  almost  all  the  subjects  of  litigation,  so  as 
finally  to  leave  to  the  State  Courts,  nothing  to  do.  Their  fears  are  likely 
to  be  realized,  by  a decision  of  Judge  Story’s  in  Delovio  & Bait.  The 
introduction  of  the  words  “ controversies,  to  which  the  United  States 
shall  be  a party,”  it  is  true,  would  countenance  the  supposition,  that  ques- 
tions respecting  the  boundaries  of  power,  were  contemplated  as  fit  for  the 
cognizance  of  the  Judiciary.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  extremely  diffi- 
cult to  conceive,  for  the  reasons  already  given,  in  this  and  a previous  num- 
ber, that  disputes  about  vital  sovereignty  were  intended  to  be  referred  to 
any  such  tribunal.  A sovereign  State  can  never  be  presumed,  in  any  com- 
pact which  it  enters  into  with  another  State,  to  yield  inherent  rights  of 
sovereignty.  The  absurdity  and  the  danger  of  any  State  agreeing  to 
entrust  the  decision  of  disputes  about  sovereignty,  to  an  arbiter,  to  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  opposite  party,  is  the  best  of  all  arguments  to  shew,  that  no 
such  intention  w'as  ever  entertained.  What  would  become  of  the  States, 
if,  under  indefinite  phrases  in  the  Constitution,  they  could,  in  this  way,  be 
deprived  of  all  their  rights. 

I have  not  forgotten,  that  as  regards  disputes  relating  to  the  boundary 
between  the  Federal  and  the  State  jurisdictions,  Mr.  Hamilton  considers 
the  Supreme  Court  as  the  tribunal,  which  is  established  for  the  purpose  of 
ultimately  deciding  them,  and  in  his  thirty-ninth  number,  he  justifies  “such 
a tribunal  as  essential  to  prevent  an  appeal  to  the  sword,  and  a dissolution 
of  the  compact.”  But,  against  this  short  and  transitory,  or  accidental 
notice  of  the  subject,  is  to  be  opposed,  the  fact,  that  whenever  he  has 


109 


occasion  to  answer  objections,  to  the  Federal  Government,  as  a Govern- 
ment,  iikelv  to  usurp  power,  and  thus  to  endanger  public  liberty,  he  never 
once  suggests,  that  the  remedy  for  such  a state  of  things,  is  to  be  sought, 
elsewhere,  “ than  in  that  original  right  of  self  defence,  which  is  para- 
mount to  all  positive  forms  of  Government.”  He  calculates,  invariably, 
that  “ all  schemes  of  usurpation,  if  attempted  by  the  national  rulers,  will 
easily  be  defeated  by  the  State  Governments.” 

Nor  ought  there  to  be  any  other  remedy  It  is  proper  that  a tribunal 
should  beat  hand,  to  decide  conti  oveisies  relating  to  the  boundary  of  juris- 
diction, between  Congress  and  the  States,  because  till  parties,  raight.be 
willing,  to  have  the  opinion  of  such  a tribunal,  as  long  as  it  shall  by  its 
proceedings,  and  the  conduct  of  its  members,  inspire  mutual  confidence. — 
The  exposition  of  any  particular  clause  in  the  Constitution,  by  such  a tri- 
bunal, might  have  s > much  weight,  as  to  have  the  effect  of  preserving  the 
harmony  between  both  Governments.  Iris  in  this  view,  and  in  no  other 
that  the  Supreme  Court,  ought  to  be  solicited  for  its  opinion.  It  might  also 
happen,  that  the  decision  of  the  Court  might  be  right,  upon  all  the  princi- 
ples of  construction,  by  which  Courts  are  usually  governed;  and  yet,  there 
may  be  circumstances,  which  would  not  warrant  an  obedience  of  the  States 
to  its  decrees.  The  General  Government  might  so  usurp  power,  as  to  be 
beyond  the  reach  of  any  ground,  on  which  a Court  could  pronounce  its 
acts  unconstitutional.  In  a former  number,  I noticed  the  Tariff,  as  an  in- 
stance. The  “ Woollens’  Bill”  is  perfectly  constitutional,  if  the  Court 
shall  be  called  upon  for  its  opinion  in  relation  to  it,  because  it  must  decide, 
according  to  the  provisions  of  the  Bill,  and  cannot  enter  into  any  notice 
of  the  motives  of  the  Congress  for  passing  such  a bill.  If  it  should  pass, 
it  will,  in  its  shape,  and  all  its  provisions,  bean  act  simply  “to  lay  im- 
posts,” which  is  within  the  enumerated  powers  of  Congress,  whilst  its  design 
would  be  to  promote  a great  local  Th-terest  in  particular  States.  Here  is  a 
case  in  which  a State,  would  commit  an  act  of  SUICIDE,  were  it  to  admit 
of  the  principle,  that  for  so  gtoss  a violation  of  the  spirit  of  the  compact,  it 
was  to  seek  no  redress,  but  in  the  Courts  of  the  United  States.  Other 
illustrations  might  be  adduced.  Let  one  suffice.  According  to  the  letter  of 
the  Constitution,  the  compact  may  at  any  time  be  altered,  with  the  assent 
of  three  fourths  of  the  States.  There  is  but  one  single  restriction,  now  ex- 
isting, on  the  power  to  amend  the  Constitution,  which  is,  that  the  equality 
of  suffrage  in  the  Senate,  shall  be  preserved.  Supposing  now,  that  Eigh- 
teen States  were  willing,  that  the  Constitution  shoulJ  be  so  altered,  that  a 
power  be  conferred  on  Congress  to  promote  the  objects  of  the  Colonization 
Society,  and  to  purchase  and  remove  gradually,  out  of  the  United  States, 
the  slaves  of  the  Southern  States.  This  proposition  is  actually  suggested 
in  the  last  Philadelphia  Quarterly  Review — or  suppose  the  proposed 
amendment  be,  a declaratory  clause,  that  Congress  has  the  right  to  abolish 
slavery  under  the  Constitution,  on  compensation  being  given  to  individuals. 
Other  instances  might  be  added,  such  as  amendments  which  effect  a radi- 
cal change  in  the  Government  as  to  its  structure,  so  as  to  make  it  any  thing 
but  what  the  States  originally  designed  it  to  be.  What  is  there  in 
the  letter  of  the  Constitution  to  prevent  all  these  things  being  done  — 
Were  the  Supreme  Court  called  upon  to  decide,  as  to  the  right  to  make 
such  alterations,  would  it  not  be  compelled  to  say,  that  by  the  terms  of  the 
grant,  there  is  an  unlimited  power  to  amend,  excepting  in  one  solitary  case, 

14 


110 


and  moreover,  mieht  it  not  also  call  to  its  assistance,  that  refined  metaphy- 
sical doctrine  of  its  own  Chief  Justice,  that  “a  power  to  create,  implies 
a power  to  preserve”  and  from  that  power  to  create,  easily  deduce  pow- 
er to  changt J.”  In  such  an  emergency  as  this,  would  any  one  doubt  the 
right  of  the  six  dissentient  States,  to  dissolve  the  compact,  on  the  simple 
ground,  that  an  alteration,  either  in  the  fundamental  polity  of  a State,  or 
in  the  Republican  principles  of  the  Government,  would  be  a gross  violation 
ot  the  spirit,  in  which  the  Constitution  was  formed.  No  one  ran  doubt  it. 

This  subject  might  be  pursued  almost  without  end.  1 have  already 
stated  that  in  all  instances  of  abuse  or  usurpation  of  power,  on  the  part  of 
Congress,  the  State  Sovereignties,  being  parties  to  the  compact,  it  is  their 
right  to  remonstrate,  and  to  resist.  But  some  may  say,  that  according  to 
my  own  previous  reasoning,  it  is  the  people  in  convention , who  have  this 
right,  and  not  the  State  Legislatures,  who  are  not  the  people,  but  only  a 
portion  of  the  sovereign  power  of  the  State.  This  objection  is  thus  remov- 
ed:— LTnder  the  State  constitutions,  all  power,  which  is  not  reserved  to  the 
people  in  a bill  of  rights,  or  by  positive  limitations,  is  invested  in  the  State 
Legislatures.  Not  so  in  the  United  States’  Government.  In  the  exercise 
then,  of  that  portion  of  the  supreme  power,  winch  is  conferred  on  a State 
Legislature,  by  its  Constitution,  that  Body  possesses,  without  a single  ex- 
ception, every  right,  not  expressly  forbidden,  which  the  people  them- 
selves could  possess.  Amongst  those  rights,  stands  pre-eminent,  the  sove- 
reign right  of  demanding  that  all  compacts  entered  into,  with  other  States, 
be  faithfully  fulfilled,  and  of  adopting  such  measures  to  enforce  such 
compacts  as  in  their  wisdom  they  shall  judge  fit.  If  the  people  of  South- 
Carolina,  in  their  collective  capacity  as  a State,  be  a party  to  the  Federal 
compact,  (as  is  the  fact,)  they  have  the  undoubted  right,  to  call  the  Gene- 
ral Government  to  account  for  an  abuse  of  its  delegated  powers.  If  the 
people  have  that  right,  the  same  right  belongs  to  the  Legislature,  that  body 
having  in  this  particular,  all  the  rights,  and  having  imposed  on  it  all  the 
duties  of  the  people.  And  it  is  a right,  which  I trust  they  will  not  only 
exercise,  but  so  use  it,  as  to  preserve  the  State. 

But  view  the  compact  as  we  will.  Let  us  regard  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment, as  it  really  is,  a TRUST;  or  let  us  regaid  it,  as  has  been  suggested,  as 
a deed  TRIPARTITE,  in  which  the  people  en  masse  are  one  party,  the 
people  as  States  another,  and  the  people  in  one  great  political  community 
as  a third  ; or  let  us  call  it  a CONFEDERACY  of  States;  or  by  any 
other  name  we  please,  there  is  yet  one  feature  in  the  system,  which 
every  man  in  the  United  States  has  always  before  his  eyes,  and  that  is, 
that  we  are  governed,  as  one  entire  nation,  and  at  the  same  time  exist  as 
twenty-four  separate  sovereignties,  and  that  a common  friendship,  after  all, 
is  the  gieat  bond  of  our  Union.  On  a difference  of  opinion  then,  ns  to  the 
true  meaning  of  any  particular  provision  in  the  compact,  the  same  course 
ought  to  be  adopted,  as  would  be  proper  between  one  friendly  nation  and 
another.  As  in  the  latter  case,  a conference  would  be  proposed,  before 
any  step  would  be  resorted  to.  as  likely  to  lead  to  serious  misunderstand- 
ing or  war;  so,  in  the  case  before  us,  Congress,  before  it  assumed  any 
great  substantive  power,  such  as  the  power  over  internal  improvements 
ought,  (under  that  provision,  in  the  Constitution,  which  empowers  it  to 
propose  amendments  j to  have  submitted  to  the  State  Legislatures,  the 
question,  whether  such  a power  belonged  to  the  Slates,  or  to  Congress,  and 


Ill 


thus  by  soliciting  their  aid  and  advice,  as  to  the  true  intent  of  all  parties,  it 
would  have  gained  tor  itself,  the  contidenre  and  the  support  or  the  State 
Legislatures.  To  both,  the  power  cannot  belong,  for  I have  demonstrated, 
I trust,  satisfactorily,  in  my  nineteenth  number,  ihat  there  can  be  no  divi- 
sion of  sovereignty . on  the  subject  of  internal  improvements.  If  Congress 
be  not  exclusively  sovereign,  as  to  every  purpose  for  which  the  Federal 
Government  was  created,  it  cannot  be  sovereign  at  all.  The  concurrence 
of  authority  in  Legislation,  is  only  as  to  taxation,  which  is  only  a means  of 
promoting  the  objects,  for  which  Civil  Government  exists , and  not  itself 
an  end  or  object  of  Government.  It  cannot  exist  on  any  other  subject. — 
The  United  States’  Government  is  supreme  within  its  sphere  of  action,  and 
the  States  equally  sovereign  as  to  their  reserved  powers.  This  is  the  deci- 
sion of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  cannot  be  confuted.  The  fault  of  the  Su- 
preme Court,  is  not,  that  it  decides  the  United  States’  Government  to  be 
sovereign  for  the  great  purposes  of  its  creation,  but  because  it  confers  on 
Congress,  as  means  of  executing  those  powers,  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the 
league,  powers  which  have  no  necessary,  and  appropriate  connection  with 
those  expressed  objects,  to  which  their  Legislation  is  expressly  confined  by 
the  terms  of  the  instrument 

Every  patriot  and  friend  to  his  country,  must  freely  admit,  that  where 
there  are  two  rules  of  interpretation,  or  two  modes  of  adjusting  difficulties, 
that  must  always  be  the  best,  and  the  safest,  from  which  no  inconvenience 
or  injustice  can  arise  to  either  party.  The  difference  between  the  two 
modes  is  this — Under  the  construction  here  contended  for,  there  is  scarcely 
an  object  of  any  consequence  to  the  States  generally,  which  mav  not  be 
fairly  referred  to  some  one  or  other  of  the  many  enumerated  powers,  and 
therefore  the  measure  may  be  constitutionally  adopted.  Shoujd  it  so  hap- 
pen, that  there  may  be  an  object,  for  which  the  Constitution  has  not  pro- 
vided, if  such  an  object  be  one  of  general  and  primary  interest,  the  instru- 
ment itself,  has  provided  the  means,  by  which  it  may  be  accomplished. — 
An  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  may,  at  any  time,  be  proposed,  and 
if  the  new  power  asked  for,  be  necessary  to  war,  foreign  negotiation  and 
commerce,  (those  great  ends  of  the  Union,)  there  is  no  fear,  but  what 
three-fourths  of  the  States  will  agree  to  the  amendment.  The  people  will 
always  have  intelligence  enough  to  discover  their  true  interests.  If  the 
assent  of  three-fourths  of  the  State  Legislatures,  for  this  purpose,  cannot 
be  obtained,  it  would  prove  that  the  power  ought  not  to  be  exercised.  It 
is  for  the  happiness  of  the  people  of  the  States,  that  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment is  ordained,  and  not  for  its  own  sake  ; and  the  people,  heard  through 
their  State  Legislatures,  are  the  best  judges,  whether  any  new  contem- 
plated measure  will,  or  will  not,  augment  their  happiness.  If  the  power 
be  necessary,  and  it  be  refused,  the  people  will  suffer,  as  they  ought  to  suf- 
fer. By  this  construction,  the  Federal  Government  will  be  the  sun,  or 
centre  of  a great  political  system,  diffusing  its  light  and  warmth,  to  all  the 
State  Governments,  which  harmoniously  and  beautifully  revolve  around 
it,  and  thus,  the  order  and  design  of  the  Convention,  will  be  preserved. 
But,  under  the  opposite  course,  which  is  the  one  adopted  by  Congress,  viz. 
that  of  seizing  upon  power  in  all  doubtful  cases,  a discretion  is  given  to  se- 
lect objects  for  legislation,  to  which  there  is  no  affixing  any  limits,  and  the 
necessity  of  which  may  not  be  seen  ; a door  may  thus  be  opened  for  ex. 
travagance  and  waste  in  the  public  expenditure;  the  people  may  be  bur 


n 


112 


thened  with  excessive  taxation ; sectional  interests  may  be  promoted  by 
the  majori  y,  under  the  pretext  oi'their  being  national ; sectionalym/,  i‘S 
will  be  fomented  ; an  habitual  disregard  to  the  State  Legislatures  will  he 
encouraged  ; no  amendments  to  the  Constitution  will  be  thought  of;  and 
strifes  and  contentions,  between  the  States  and  Congress,  will  increase  and 
multiply,  until  by  some  great  convulsion,  we  shall  all  be  resolved  again 
into  our  original  elements.  Are  we  not,  under  the  intemperate  measures 
of  Congress,  rapidly  approaching  such  a crisis  ? 

mo.  23. 

If  Co  ngress  had  not  regarded  itself  as  omnipotent  in  legislation, 
it  would  not  have  ventured  to  name  amongst  its  committees, 
“a  committee  on  Agriculture ,”  as  if  it  possessed  an  atom  of  sove- 
reignty to  regulate  Agriculture  any  more  than  it  can  pass  laws  on 
the  subject  of  Negro  Slavery,  or  regulate  descents  at  law.  What 
but  a sense  of  its  own  omnipotence  could  prompt  this  body  to  think 
of  laying  one  section  of  the  Union  under  tribute,  to  encourage  the 
industry  of  another  portion  ? And  shall  we,  in  the  Southern  States, 
who  furnish  such  means  of  commerce  to  the  Union,  by  our  valuable 
products;  shall  an  interest  so  great  and  so  paramount  as  the  Agri- 
cultural interest  of  the  South,  be  prostrated,  that  the  local  interests 
of  Massachusetts  or  Pennsylvania  may  be  promoted  ? I would  in- 
sult you,  my  fellow-citizens,  were  I to  doubt  your  unanimity  in  the 
reply  which  must  be  given.  From  one  extreme  of  the  State  to  the 
other,  your  voice  has  already  been  heard,  and  your  resolutions  ex- 
pressed in  terms  not  to  be  mistaken.  As  for  myself,  I cannot  con- 
ceive a measure  more  fraught  with  permanent  mischief  and  ruin  to 
the  Plantation  States,  than  the  Tariff.  It  is  not  simply  to  tax  us  to 
support  our  Northern  brethren,  but  it  is  also  to  destroy  all  our  means 
to  acquire  the  ability  to  pay  those  taxes.  In  these  States  there  are 
but  two  interests,  and  they  cherish  and  support  each  other.  The 
one  is  AGRICULTURAL;  the  other  COMMERCIAL.  Within 
the  memory  of  man,  and  the  records  of  history,  no  other  interests 
than  these  ever  grew  up  in  our  country,  and  for  a century  at  least  to 
come,  it  is  not  hazarding  too  much  to  assert,  that  no  other  can  exist 
in  South-Carolina.  In  this  respect,  we  not  only  differ  as  to  interest 
from  the  Northern  States,  but  we  differ. from  every  State  and  King- 
dom in  Europe.  The  cause  of  the  difference  is  obvious. 

In  those  countries  the  great  produce  of  the  soil  is  bread  stuffs; 
the  population  is  dense;  the  soil  is  cultivated  by  whites ; labour  is 
more  or  less  cheap;  and  each  being  likely  to  raise  in  abundance, 
those  articles  which  the  others  need  not,  causes  an  anxiety  in  all  to 
seek  amongst  themselves  for  the  means  of  consuming  the  surplus 
produce  of  their  own  soil.  That  a period  may  occur  in  the  future 
history  of  the  Northern,  Middle  and  Western  sections  of  this  Union, 
when  manufactures  may  be  properly  regarded  as  of  primary  impor- 
tance to  them,  it  would  be  as  much  a waste  of  time  to  deny,  as  it 
would  be  to  assert,  that  in  the  past  periods  of  European  history, 
they  were  not  sometimes  most  judiciously  encouraged  by  the  foster- 
ing care  of  Government.  That  there  is  an  opportunity  even  now  of 


113 


encouraging  manufactures  to  a certain  extent  in  the  Northern  States, 
so  as  not  to  interfere  with  others  of  their  local  interest,  of  equal  mag- 
nitude, may  be  true.  I,  therefore,  have  not  the  smallest  disposition 
to  dispute  the  utiiity  of  manufactures  in  general,  as  a source  of 
wealth  and  prosperity,  provided  all  circumstances  suit  for  their  in- 
troduction into  a country.  I feel  the  weight  of  all  that  has  been  said 
in  their  favour;  and  believe  that  where  they  are  permitted  to  grow 
up  alongside  of  other  interests,  under  the  protecting  care  of  a Gov- 
ernment which  has  the  undoubted  power  to  extend  its  patronage 
to  them,  (as  is  the  case  with  every  consolidated  Government)  they 
will  give  activity  and  energy,  to  every  languishing  branch  of  inter- 
nal industry.  But  however  true  it  is,  as  a general  position,  that  do- 
mestic manufactures  is  the  true  policy  of  nations,  who  abound  with 
a dense  and  a crowded  population,  and  in  which  there  is  more  capi- 
tal than  Agriculture  or  Commerce,  or  other  occupations,  can  absorb; 
yet,  as  regards  the  application  of  the  axiom  to  the  Southern  States 
of  this  Union,  and  particularly  to  the  plantation  or  cotton  growing 
States,  there  is  not  one  word  of  truth,  in  all  that  has  been  written  as 
to  the  utility  of  manufactures,  from  the  beginning  of  the  world  until 
the  present  day.  All  the  w; iters  who  have  discussed  the  subject, 
have  discussed  it  with  the  sole  view  to  the  interest  and  circumstan- 
ces of  the  countries  in  which  they  lived  and  wrote — countries,  the 
very  opposite  to  these  Southern  States,  in  climate,  soil,  population^ 
production,  and  agricultural  labour. 

It  is  therefore  false,  under  any  possible  light  in  which  the  subject 
of  manufactures  can  be  viewed,  as  regards  the  South,  that  any  pro- 
tection given  by  Congress  to  the  manufacturers  of  Pennsylvania, 
can  operate  otherwise  than  as  an  indirect  tax  upon  the  people  of  the 
Southern  States,  amounting  exactly  to  the  difference  between  ivhat 
they  now  pay,  and  the  cheaper  price  at  which  they  might  obtain  the 
article,  if  the  three  tanjfs  already  Imposed  icere  removed.  It  is  tri- 
fling with  the  understandings  of  men,  to  tell  them  that  the  Northern 
manufacturer  can  supply  us  with  goods  upon  the  same  terms  as  the 
foreign  merchant.  He  now  furnishes,  it  is  true,  some  coarse  fabrics 
cheaper  than  the  English  dealer;  but  he  is  protected  by  duties  al- 
most amounting  to  prohibition  of  the  rival  article  from  abroad. — 
Take  oft’ all  the  tariffs  of  1816,  1820  and  1824,  and  every  manufac- 
turer in  the  United  States,  for  the  protection  of  whose  fabrics  these 
tariffs  were  imposed,  will  be  a bankrupt  without  a single  exception. 
If  it  were  otherwise,  two  and  two  could  not  make  four ; for  the  pro- 
tection afforded  by  these  Tariffs  is  not  trifling.  It  is  prodigious. 
All  the  bold  assertions,  therefore,  of  these  men,  and  their  adherents 
in  this  southern  country,  are  to  he  disregarded.  Any  man  of  com- 
mon sense  must  know,  that  if  the  home  manufacturer  could  sell  his 
fabrics  for  a lower  price  than  is  demanded  by  the  foreign  dealer  for 
the  same  goods,  that  he  would  not  ask  for  protection.  The  ground 
on  which  further  protection  is  now  asked  for  woollen  goods,  by  the 
Websters,  Everetts  &.  Co.  is,  that  the  British  having  reduced  their 
duty  five  pence  or  foreign  wool,  gives  the  British  capitalist  an  ad- 
vantage in  our  market  over  the  home  manufacturer.  In  the  name 


114 


of  common  sense,  what  is  this  hut  a direct  admission,  that  the  Brit'sh 
are  about  to  undersell  them.  With  the  same  boldness  of  assertion, 
tl>.  v also  tell  our  folks,  (and  surprising  to  say,  it  is  believed  by 
some)  that  the  Eastern  people  can  actually  undersell  the  British  in 
a foreign  market,  whilst  the  British  are  so  underselling  the  Web- 
sters,  Everetts  & Co.  in  Boston,  in  their  own  market , that  they 
are  obliged  to  clamour  for  an  additional  Tariff  upon  woollens  lest 
they  should  be  all  ruined. 

No,  my  fellow-citizens.  All  that  has  been  written  on  the  subject 
of  manufactures,  has  no  more  application  to  the  Southern  country, 
than  it  has  to  the  Sandwich  Islands,  or  any  other  Islands  in  the  Pa- 
cific Ocean.  Our  policy  is  a peculiar  one.  The  great  produce  of 
our  soil  is  Cotton  Wool.  This  material  of  manufactures  not  being 
raised  in  Europe,  the  foreign  demand  of  it,  never  can  bo  partial  or 
occasional , as  is  the  case  with  bread  stuffs,  or  the  fleece  of  sheep, 
or  other  produce  of  the  soil  at  the  North — but  must  be  steady 
and  constant , as  long  as  England  shall  continue  to  manufacture  for 
the  world.  Even  Alexander  Hamilton,  in  his  elaborate  report  on 
manufactures,  admits,  “that  if  one  nation  were  in  a condition  to 
supply  manufactured  articles  on  better  terms  than  another,  that  other 
might  find  an  abundant  indemification  in  a superior  capacity  to  fur- 
nish the  produce  of  the  soil.  And  a free  exchange,  mutually  bene- 
ficial, of  the  commodity  each  was  able  to  supply,  on  the  best  terms, 
might  be  carried  on  between  them — supporting  in  full  vigor,  the  in 
dustry  of  each.”  Mr.  Hamilton  had  here,  in  his  view,  two  coun- 
tries, each  of  whom  could  manufacture.  His  reasoning  would,  I 
think,  well  apply  to  the  United  States  and  England,  for,  as  to  the 
great  agricultural  products  of  the  United  States,  which  is  cotton, 
there  is  a capacity  to  produce  it  only  in  one  country.  But,  Mr.  Ha- 
milton’s reasoning  must  be  much  more  conclusive,  where  one  country 
can  manufacture,  and  the  other  cannot.  This  is  the  case  as  regards 
■Great  Britain  and  the  Plantation  States.  We  can  raise  the  raw  ma- 
terial— she  cannot.  She  can  manufacture — we  cannot.  But  how 
vain  are  the  speculations  often  of  the  wisest  men.  Alexander  Ha- 
milton never  committed  a more  egregious  blunder,  than  when  he 
hazarded  before  Congress,  in  his  report,  the  opinion,  “ That  the 
EXTENSIVE  cultivation  of  cotton  in  the  United  States,  could,  per- 
haps, hardly  be  expected,  but  from  the  previous  establishment  of  do- 
mestic manufactories  of  the  article.” 

Every  Planter  knows,  that  for  his  cotton,  he  must  look  to  Europe, 
and  to  England  particularly,  fora  market.  England  is  the  princi- 
pal customer,  with  whom  we  can  expect  to  deal  upon  reciprocal 
terms,  and  to  our  greatest  advantage.  There  is  no  rivalry,  nor  is 
there  likely  to  be  any,  between  Europe  and  the  Plantation  States — 
as  there  is,  and  always  must  be,  between  OLD  England  and  NEW 
England.  We  are  exactly  in  the  situation  of  two  shop-keepers,  who 
do  not  vend,  or  deal  in,  the  same  articles — and  between  whom,  there 
is  no  prospect  of  competition — and  between  whom,  there  of  course, 
never  can  be  jealousy.  Only  close  the  European  trade  against  us^ 
and  where  shall  we  look  for  a market  ? Not  certainly  to  the  Northt 


115 


which  does  not  probably  consume  a seventh  of  what  we  raise.  No. 
Should  that  day  ever  arrive,  that  England  shall  not  want  our  cot- 
ton— then  may  we  despair. 

Our  true  interest,  I repeat,  which  is  a distinct  interest  from  an. 
Eastern  interest,  is  a free  and  uninterrupted  commerce  with  the 
whole  world,  and  particularly  with  England,  where  are  the  work 
shops  of  sufficient  extent,  to  work  up  the  raw  material  which  we 
raise,  and  are  in  danger  of  raising  in  too  great  abundance.  Take 
from  us  this  market,  by  clogging  the  trade  with  protecting  or  prohibi- 
tory duties,  and  we  drive  our  best  customers  to  seek  the  raw  mate- 
rial elsewhere,  and  to  encourage  other  countries  to  grow  cotton 
wool  for  them.  With  the  exception  of  the  fine  brands  of  Sea  Island 
cotton,  it  must  be  remembered,  that  a third  of  the  globe  is  capable 
of  producing  cotton.  To  imagine,  therefore,  that  England  will  take 
our  cotton,  if  she  is  to  go  to  South  America  and  bring  gold  and  sil- 
ver for  it,  and  not  her  own  manufactures,  betrays  extreme  ignorance. 
The  experiment  once  hazarded,  it  may  be  fatal  to  us  for  ever.  Com- 
merce is  a shy  damsel,  and  must  be  caressed.  Once  slighted  by  a 
nation,  she  returns  no  more.  What  then  will  be  the  situation  of 
South-Carolina  1 Will  it  be  any  consolation  to  us,  that  the  time 
may  come,  in  some  hundred  years  hence,  that  the  Eastern  folks 
shall  realize  their  visions  of  manufacturing  for  the  world — and  drive 
England  and  France  entirely  out  of  the  market — when,  in  the  mean 
time,  we,  our  families  and  friends,  shall  have  been  impoverished — 
and  more  generations  than  the  present,  be  reduced  to  beggary,  and 
be  involved  in  one  common  ruin.  This  cannot,  and  MUST  NOT 
be.  We  have  but  one  interest,  and  that  is,  the  Agriculture  that  pro- 
duces, and  the  Commerce  that  wafts  our  cotton  and  rice  to  the  shores 
of  Europe.  No  other  interest  can  flourish,  or  even  take  root  in  our 
land.  Nature  has  decreed,  by  an  immutable  decree,  that  in  foreign 
commerce,  shall  South-Carolina  seek  for  the  sources  of  her  pros- 
perity, and  her  importance  as  a member  of  the  great  American  fami- 
ly. The  Government,  therefore,  which  places  upon  that  commerce 
any  restraint,  is  not  the  Government  that  would,  but  the  Govern- 
ment which  ALREADY  HAS  RIVETED  the  CHAINS  around 
the  neck  and  the  feet  of  Southern  industry.  That  Government  is 
not  the  Federal,  but  the  NATIONAL  Government  of  the  United 
States. 

This  is  strong  language,  but  not  too  strong  for  the  crisis.  Never, 
never  since  the  colonization  of  the  country,  has  any  measure  been 
adopted,  no,  not  the  odious  stamp  act  of  England,  which  demands 
from  the  Southern  States,  a more  steady  and  a more  determined  re- 
sistance than  this  tariff ; not  a resistance  by  resolutions  of  town 
meetings,  but  by  such  acts  and  measures  of  the  local  Legislatures, 
as  shall  cause  the  usurpers  at  Washington,  to  tremble  at  what  they 
are  doing,  and  to  pause,  ere  they  plunge  this  people,  hitherto  so 
happy  and  so  united,  into  discord  and  disunion.  Disunion  did  I 
say  1 Whether  disunion  shall  approach  us,  rests  not  with  ourselves, 
but  with  our  Northern  brethren.  Forbearance  and  misillanimity  in 
the  South,  may  retard,  but  cannot  finally  prevent  disunion.  There 


116 


is  a point,  beyond  which,  we  never  can  endure  the  oppression  of 
Congress.  The  “ veriest  worm  will  turn  when  trodden  on,”  and 
sooner  or  later,  we  must  turn  on  those,  who  would  lay  us  under  per- 
petual tribute.  It  is  firmness  alone — the  same  firmness,  with  which 
as  a colony,  we  resisted  with  such  success,  the  aggressions  of  Bri- 
tain, that  is  to  carry  us  triumphantly  through  all  the  perils  which 
assail  and  surround  us,  and  which  in  the  end,  will,  in  my  humble 
view,  lead  to  the  regeneration  of  the  liberties  and  the  sovereignties 
of  the  States,  as  secured  by  the  Federal  Constitution.  Let  there  be 
but  one  mind  and  one  soul  in  the  South,  and  we  shall  have  more 
perfect  union,  and  with  our  Northern  brethren,  better  friendship  and 
better  feelings.  There  is  no  Congress  that  has  yet  been  convened, 
or  thatwill  it  in  our  day,  that  will  dare  to  trifle  with  freemen,  who 
know  their  rights,  and  know  too  how  to  maintain  them  ; who  have 
within  themselves,  the  resources  for  empire,  the  same  resources 
which  give  to  this  Union,  its  extended  commerce,  and  which  is  con- 
stantly aggrandizing  the  Northern  States,  whilst  it  impoverishes 
ourselves;  whose  half  a million  ol  cotton  bags  are  a circulating  me- 
dium, or  as  so  many  Bank  of  England  Notes,  in  the  marts  of  Europe, 
when  the  Pearl  and  the  Pot  Ashes,  and  Flour  of  the  North,  are  dull 
and  heavy  merchandize.  Let  Congress  then,  be  told  distinctly , 
that  though  the  “ current  of  the  public  Treasury,  has  always  run  as 
steadily  and  unceasingly  to  the  North  and  East,  as  the  Gulf  Stream , 
and  with  as  little  prospect  of  its  ever  changing  its  course,”  yet  that, 
when  by  some  great  political  convulsion,  it  shall  change  its  course, 
all  those  regions  of  the  North,  hitherto  improved  by  the  commerce 
created  by  our  products,  and  by  the  rich  contents  of  our  Custom 
H ouses,  borne  year  after  year,  on  the  bosom  of  the  fertilizing  stream, 
will  become  comparatively  barren  and  unproductive,  whilst  South 
Carolina,  like  a Phoenix,  will  rise  from  the  ashes  in  which  she  is 
humbled.  Let  Congress  beware,  how  it  approaches  us  with  any  ex- 
tension of  the  Tariff,  or  it  may  tread  upon  the  RATTLESNAKE 
of  the  South.  “It  is  SLOW  in  its  resistance,  GENEROUS  in  its 
warning,  but  may  be  DEADLY  in  its  BLOW.” 

MO.  24. 

If  the  power  to  establish  a Tariff  to  protect  manufactures,  were  even 
a power  warranted  by  the  Conslitution,  still  the  motives  for  abstaining 
from  its  exercise,  at  the  present  time,  are  so  many,  and  so  powerful,  that 
the  mind  would  be  at  a loss  to  conceive,  how  an  impartial  Congress,  legis- 
lating for  the  whole  Union,  and  not  a part,  should  be  so  fatally  bent  upon 
its  adoption,  did  we  not  know  from  experience,  that  where  suggestions  of 
interest  are  at  all  attended  to,  the  judgment  must  be  in  unison  with  that  in- 
terst.  Such  is  the  case  with  the  present,  and  I believe  will,  every  day,  be 
more  and  more  the  case,  with  the  majority  of  every  Congress,  which  shall 
hereafter  be  assembled  at  Washington.  Whether  an  extensive  protection 
to  manufactures,  will,  or  will  not  be,  productive  of  the  general  good, 
which  is  anticipated,  even  in  those  parts  of  the  Union,  where  the  clamour 
for  protection  is  so  great,  is  not  a question  for  us  in  the  South  to  decide. 
It  is  no  concern  of  ours.  It  will  be  enough  for  the  purposes  of  our  argu- 


117 


ment,  that  the  great  body  of  the  people  in  those  States,  are  in  favour  of 
manufactures.  As  long  as  this  opinion  shall  prevail,  and  it  will  never  sub- 
side, it  is  quite  natural,  that  these  people  should,  through  their  represent- 
atives in  Congress,  advocate  “ the  American  Policy,”  as  it  is  termed.  To 
expect,  that  with  all  the  bright  prospects  of  a general  activity  in  business 
before  their  eyes,  they  should  not  combine  their  efforts,  or  that  they  will 
turn  aside  to  ask  themselves,  whether  the  same  measures,  by  which  they 
are  to  be  aggrandized,  may  not  ruin  other  States,  is  so  far  from  being  ra- 
tional, that  it  is  contrary  to  all  experience.  It  is  rare,  to  find  men  in  pri- 
vate life,  practising  that  wholesome  Christian  precept,  to  do  as  they  would 
be  done  by.  In  political  societies,  it  is  still  moie  rare,  and  hence  it  is, 
that  considerations  of  policy,  so  often  suspend  or  supersede  those  of  jus- 
tice. If,  therefore,  we  desire  to  know,  how  this,  or  that  community  will 
act,  under  any  particular  circumstances,  there  is  no  better  way  of  coming 
at  the  truth,  than  to  ask  ourselves,  in  what  does  the  interest,  or  the  sup- 
posed inteiest  of  such  a community  consist.  The  answer  being  given,  it 
will  he  seen  that  its  opinions  accord  with  their  interest. 

Now  the  opinion  of  the  North  is,  (whether  right  or  wrong  is  immaterial) 
that  manufactures  is  their  true  and  proper  policy,  and  artful  men  have 
persuaded  many  of  their  good  people  into  the  happy  belief,  that  in  pro- 
moting their  own  interest,  they  advance  at  the  same  time,  the  interest  of 
all  the  States.  Thus  we  account  for  the  majority  of  the  members  of  Con- 
gress, voting  for  the  tariffs,  and  as  this  opinion  will  prevail  more  and  more 
every  day,  as  these  people  shall  taste  the  sweets  of  an  extensive  monopoly, 
so  we  in  the  South,  must  make  up  our  minds,  that  in  the  natural  course  of 
events,  there  necessarily  must  be  in  every  Congress  hereafter,  more  and 
more  of  that  influence,  which  will  raise  up  Manufactures,  at  the  expense  of 
our  Agriculture  and  our  Commerce.  Unless  then,  we  resist  the  tariff  on 
principle,  so  as  to  be  done  with  it  for  ever,  it  will  be  a subject  constantly 
before  Congress,  and  we  shall  never  have  any  repose.  The  tariff  question 
will  no  more  die  away  in  our  country,  than  Catholic  Emancipation  or  Par- 
liamentary Reform  will  in  England.  It  is  a mistake  to  suppose,  that  the 
tariff  question,  is  the  measure  of  this  or  that  political  party.  It  is  not  got  up 
for  the  purposes  of  the  Presidential  Election.  It  is  a movement  of  the  peo- 
ple in  the  Northern,  Middle,  and  Western  States,  who  feeling  the  depressed 
state  of  their  agriculture  from  competition  with  Europe,  and  the  want  of  an 
adequate  market,  are  taught  to  look  up  to  Manufactures,  as  best  calculated 
to  create  a home  market  for  their  grain,  wool,  iron,  and  other  products  of 
their  soil,  regardless  of  the  evil  to  us  in  the  South.  That  political  charac- 
ters will  take  advantage  of  this  feeling  at  the  North,  and  make  it  a stepping 
stone  to  their  preferment,  it  would  be  folly  to  deny  ; and  that  Mr.  Adams 
and  Mr.  Clay,  are  using  this  feeling  for  their  own  purposes.  I do  as  sin- 
cerely believe,  as  I must  confess,  that  on  the  opposite  side,  there  are  also 
some  men,  who  will,  if  they  have  the  opportunity,  use  the  excitement 
against  the  Tariff,  for  similar  purposes.  It  is  paying  too  great  a compli- 
ment to  the  politicians  on  either  side,  to  suppose  that  they  have  created 
these  opposite  feelings  in  the  North  and  in  the  South.  The  knowing  poli- 
ticians on  both  sides,  one  and  all,  are  not  leading , but  they  are  following 
public  opinion. 

Opposed  as  I always  have  been,  and  now  am,  heart  and  mind,  to  Mr. 
Adams,  vet  I would-scorn  to  make  a charge  upon  his  Administration,  which. 


118 


it  does  not  merit.  The  odium  of  the  tariff  belongs  not  to  him,  but  to  Mr. 
Monroe,  and  neither  Mr.  Adams,  nor  Gen  Jackson,  nor  any  other  Presi- 
dent hereafter  to  be  elected,  can  ever  suppress  the  clamour  at  the  North  for 
domestic  manufactures.  The  firm  resolution  of  the  South,  to  oppose  it  on 
principle , and  at  every  hazard  can  alone  exempt  us  from  its  operations. 

Let  us  then,  not  deal  unfairly  to  our  political  antagonists.  Let  our  op- 
position to  Mr.  Adams,  be  steady,  manly,  and  honorable.  There  are  suf- 
ficient grounds,  on  which,  as  Americans , we  may  oppose  him,  and  1 hope 
successfully.  But  the  tariff  question  must  not  be  entangled  with  the  politics 
of  Jackson  or  of  Adams  It  may  suit  some  crafty  politicians,  on  both  sides, 
who  are  thinking  more  of  their  own  interests,  than  either  of  the  North  or  the 
South,  to  blend  two  subjects,  which  have  no  connection  with  each  other. 
The  tariff  question  is  a sacred  question,  and  it  belongs  to  the  sons  of  the 
South  alone,  as  Southern  men,  to  consider  it.  The  man  amongst  us,  who 
would  approach  such  a grave  and  solemn  question,  with  any  other  feelings, 
than  those  of  a South-Cat  olinian,  or  who,  before  he  would  decide,  upon 
this  or  that  measure  to  be  taken  at  this  crisis,  would  ask,  what  effect  it 
would  have  upon  the  Presidential  election,  is  unfit  to  be  a counsellor  or  an 
actor  in  times  like  these.  Me  may  be  an  American , but  he  is  not  a Ca- 
rolinian- 

It  is  the  excitement  of  the  Presidential  elections,  which,  hitherto,  has  pre- 
vented us  from  looking  carefully  into  our  own  situation,  and  has  at  length 
brought  us  to  the  unpleasant  dilemma  in  which  we  find  ourselves.  It  is 
an  excitement,  which  promises  to  be  perpetual  in  our  country,  and  if  we 
suffer  it  to  engross  our  thoughts,  as  we  hitherto  have  done,  South-Carolina 
MUST  perish.  Let  us  then  give  to  this  qustion  a portion  of  our  interest, 
and  not  our  whole  interest.  The  vote  of  South-Carolina  is  inevocabiy 
fixed  for  the  Hero  of  New-Orieans.  As  Americans,  let  us,  without  noise, 
support  him  in  1828.  As  South-Carolinians,  we  may  possibly  have  to  op- 
pose his  Administration,  as  we  do  Mr.  Adams’.  General  Jackson  may 
be  as  much  a Tariff  President,  as  is  Mr.  Adams.  As  far  as  the  acts  of 
an  individual  indicate  his  sentiments,  he  is  in  principle,  a Tariff  man. — 
General  J ackson  voted  for  the  Tariff  upon  principle — Mr.  Adams  now 
supports  it  with  a view  to  his  men  interest.  We  have  it  on  the  unquestion- 
able authority  of  Mr.  M’Duffie,  that  Gen.  Jackson  is  for  the  Tariff  on 
principle,  and  also  on  the  authority  ol  Mr,  Dickerson,  the  respectable 
Senator  from  New-Jersey  Mr.  Dickerson  is  a friend  of  the  General,  and 
mentions  the  fact,  to  his  praise,  that  his  election  in  Pennsylvania  may  not 
suffer  ft om  a contrary  impression.  The  real  difference  between  the  two  can- 
didates is  this — Mr.  Adams,  who  in  1820,  voted  against  the  tariff  and  in- 
ternal improvements,  now  advocates  all  these  measures,  with  a view  to  his 
re-election  to  the  Presidency.  So  unstable  a man  as  this,  is  not  to  be  re 
lied  on.  General  Jackson  having  approved  of  the  tariff  of  i 824,  not  from 
motives  of  personal  aggrandizement,  but  from  an  honest  conviction  of  its 
necessity  at  the  time,  possibly,  may  alter  that  opinion.  His  refusal  to  take 
the  Presidency  from  the  hands  of  Henry  < 'day,  is  a magnanimous  instance 
of  self  denial.  Such  a man  as  this,  will  never  administer  the  Government 
to  his  re-election,  but  solely  with  a view  to  his  own  honest  fame,  and  the  good 
of  his  country.  From  such  a Ptesident  there  is  every  thing  to  hope  and 
little  to  fear.  Once  convinced  that  an  extension  of  the  tariff  would  disturb 
the  harmony  of  the  States,  he  would  be  apt  to  discountenance  it,  by  further 


119 


support,  and  this  too,  at  all  hazards  to  himself.  This,  however,  is  mere 
opinion,  t ie  may  or  may  not  disappoint  his  friends.  Let  us  ail  hope  for 
the  best,  but  in  the  mean  time,  let  us  so  act,  as  not  to  be  diverted  from 
what  ought  to  constitute  our  main  object,  which  is,  to  oppose  the  tariff 
upon  the  right , and  not  on  the  ivrong  grounds.  It  is  throwing  dust  in  the 
people’s  eyes,  to  make  them  believe,  that  on  Jackson’s  being  elected,  all 
will  certainly  be  right,  or  that  South-Carolina  will  be  benefited  by  the 
change  as  to  her  situation  with  the  North.  Such  opinions  are  fatal,  mischiev- 
ously fatal  to  us.  It  is  not  with  this,  or  that  Administration,  that  we  are 
to  contend.  We  shall  have  to  oppose  every  future  Administration,  as  we 
now  oppose  Adams’,  until  the  tariff  be  put  down,  and  put  down  for 
ever.  Let  us  no  longer  be  as  cards  in  a pack,  to  be  shuffled  backwards 
and  forwards,  in  a game,  in  which  we  can  gain  nothing,  but  will  lose  all 
that  is  valuable  and  dear  to  us. 

Under  these  circumstances,  and  with  every  prospect  before  their  eyes, 
that  the  manufacturing  policy,  would  acquire  strength  and  vigour  as  the 
Government  would  wax  older,  and  that  in  a few  years  more,  we  shall  be 
an  insignificant  minority  in  Congiess,  it  has  often  amazed  me,  that  the 
Southern  Representatives  should  have  occupied  in  the  debate  upon  the 
Tariff,  almost  every  ground  of  opposition,  excepting  the  true  and  the  only 
ground  upon  which  South-Carolina  is  to  stand  or  to  fall.  The  Represen- 
tatives from  this  State  have  zealously  and  ably  discharged  their  duty. — 
They  have  done  as  much,  nay  more,  than  the  rest  of  the  Southern  minority 
in  Congress ; but  yet  1 ask,  and  I ask  it  with  the  most  profound  respect 
and  deference  to  them  all,  what  has  been  done,  compared  with  what  might 
have  been  done , had  they  brought  their  legal  acquirements,  their  profound 
research,  their  knowledge  of  Constitutional  law,  and  that  phalanx  of  gene- 
ral talents  of  which  they  had  the  command,  and  that  weight  of  character 
for  which  they  are  distinguished,  to  bear,  not  upon  the  secondary  and  to 
us  unimportant  question  of  expediency,  but  upon  the  great  and  paramount 
question  of  the  Constitutional  powers  of  Congress — a question  so  full  of 
interest  to  us,  who  have  no  safety,  but  in  the  integrity  and  sovereignty  of 
the  States.  The  Southern  members  generally,  urged  the  impolicy  of  the 
measure,  as  it  regarded  the  interests  even  of  the  Northern  Slates.  They  de- 
monstrated its  folly  in  various  ways,  and  they  brought  to  the  argument  all 
the  aids  which  genius,  high  intellect,  and  their  profound  knowledge  of  the 
subject  could  furnish.  They  failed  not  to  entrench  themselves  behind 
such  names  as  Huskisson  in  the  old , and  Franklin  in  the  new  worlds. — 
Their  whole  effort,  was,  in  truth,  a splendid  display  of  talent,  and  a rich 
repast.  But  had  all  the  speeches  which  wer  e made,  to  the  South  of  the 
Potomac,  been  the  speeches  of  a Burke  or  a Canning;  had  they  been 
“an  irradiating  beam  of  light,  a continued  blaze  of  eloquence”  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end  ; yet,  the  light  that  was  shed  in  that  discussion,  was 
not  the  light,  to  lighten  their  constituents  to  the  spot,  where  their  liberties 
were  violated,  and  their  wrongs  inflicted.  It  was  not  that  pillar  of  fire, 
by  which,  in  the  dark  and  dismal  night  which  is  fast  coming  upon  the 
South,  we  are  to  be  guided  through  a wilderness  of  unsettled  opinions  as  to 
the  Constitutional  right,  into  paths,  where  we  might  find  some  rock,  on 
which  we  might  build  for  our  safety,  and  defy  all  the  tempests,  with  which 
the  constructive  powers  of  Congress,  with  the  fury  of  a desolating  and  over- 
whelming flood,  are  sweeping  away  the  rights  of  the  States. 


120 


To  dwell  so  much  on  the  impolicy  of  the  Tariff  as  a national  measure, 
and  scarcely  more,  than  to  hint  at  its  unconstitutionality,  >.as.  for  iis,  most 
unfortunate  The  tenacity  too,  with  which  the  Southern  members  clung 
to  this  ground,  implied,  that  in  their  minds,  it  was  the  strongest  nd  the 
best  ground.  But  they  were  all  mistaken.  The  inexpediency  of  the 
Tariff  is  a ground  which  must  forever  slip  from  under  ns.  To  rely  on 
such  a ground  as  this,  is  to  build  upon  the  sands,  for  we  are  the  minority, 
and  must  continue  a minority,  and  as  a minority  we  must  submit,  in  such  a 
view  of  the  subject  Why  not,  when  the  Constitution  was  about  to  be  vio- 
lated, by  a clear  and  unequivocal  act  of  usurpation,  as  ever  was  pracdsed, 
why  did  not  all  the  members  South  of  the  Potomac,  with  one  soul  and  one 
mind,  when  they  perceived  a measure  proposed  so  “ big  with  the  fate’?  of 
the  Southern  States,  as  is  the  Tariff ; why  did  they  not,  I repeat,  bring  all 
the  power  of  their  minds,  in  demonstrating  to  the  world,  that  neither  the 
letter,  nor  the  s,  irit  of  the  Constitution,  could  authorize  such  a system  of 
robbery,  upon  their  constituents  ! The  unconstitutionality  of  the  measure 

Alone  should  live 

Within  the  book  and  volume  of  their  brain, 

Unmixed  with  baser  matter. 

I declare  most  solemnly,  that  if  I thought  no  better  ground  could  be  tak* 
en  against  the  Tariff,  than  its  impolicy,  as  a measure  of  State;  or  if  I 
were  inspired  with  no  better  hope  of  ridding  my  country  of  this  mill  stone 
an  ti-sd  :ts  neck,  than  the  forbearance  of  the  North,  I would  yield 
the  question  in  dispute,  between  the  North  and  the  South.  1 would  yield 
it,  and  forever  sit  down,  and  be  content  to  wear  the  chains,  which,  with 
our  own  consent  in  1789,  we  fastened  upon  ourselves.  If  by  that  family 
compact,  called  the  Constitution,  South  Carolina  ever  surrendered,  ex- 
pressly or  impliedly,  any  power  to  Congress,  to  legislate  unequally  upon 
the  States,  or  to  touch  any  subject,  in  which  one  State  did  not  possess  an 
interest  in  common  with  every  other  State,  I would  give  up  my  State  in 
despair.  And  which  of  us  would  not  despair ! Take  from  us  the  ground  of 
the  unconstitutionality  of  the  measure,  and  what  remains  for  us  to  do,  but 
to  submit,  as  is  the  duty  of  every  good  and  patriotic  citizen.  What  are 
fine  speeches,  what  the  powers  of  argument,  when  they  are  addressed  to 
men,  whose  constituents  have,  perhaps,  an  hundred  millions  of  dollars  at 
hazard,  unless  protected  by  Tariffs  ! What  are  the  sayings  and  doctrines 
of  the  political  economists  ! What  the  authorities  of  Smith,  Say  and 
Ricardo,  when  you  address  a body,  the  interest  of  whose  constituents 
consists  in  differing  from  you,  who 

Were  they  to  assent  against  their  will, 

Would  be  of  the  same  opinion  still. 

JVlen.  with  whom,  if  we  except  the  recollections  which  the  glories  of  our 
Revolution  inspire,  have  not,  nor  never  can  have  the  feelings,  the  sympa- 
thies, or  the  associations  that  are  in  common  with  us  in  the  South.  I would 
as  soon  address  myself  to  the  Khan  of  Tartary,  or  as  Mr.  Jefferson  says, 
to  the  marble  columns  of  the  Legislative  Halls,  with  a hope  of  success,  as 
to  expect  to  operate  upon  the  minds  of  a majority  of  Congress,  sent  from 
Tariff  States  to  protect  their  local  interests.  No.  If  we  are  to  be  relieved 


121 


from  the  usurpations  that  are  pressing  us  to  the  dust,  we  must  not  go  to 
Washington,  with  arguments  to  convince  the  YYkbsters  and  the  Eve- 
retts, that  by  the  I ariff  policy,  they  will  injuie  themselves  as  well  as 
us.  Such  a ground  is  not  tenable.  The  Bostonians  desire  no  lights  from 
the  schuols.  They  understand  the  science  of  political  economy  better 
than  those  who  have  written  on  the  subject  Their  sagacity  in  discern- 
ing their  true  interests,  is  b v a kind  of  instinct,  and  the  success  of  their  es- 
tablishments, and  the  activity  that  has  been  given  to  the  industry  of  the 
country  around  Boston,  by  a spirit  for  manufactures,  has  caused  even  their 
farmers  to  be  enamoured  with  the  “ American  Policy;”  and  thus,  we  have 
a signal  and  a splendid  triumph  of  the  intelligence  and  good  sense  of  a few 
plain  woollen  weavers  of  Massachusetts,  over  the  metaphysical  subtleties 
of  the  school  of  the  economists. 

Let  us  then,  not  think  of  going  to  Congress  as  suppliants  for  their  fa- 
vour, but  let  our  representatives  repair  thither,  with  the  HISTORY  of  our 
Revolution  in  the  one  hand,  and  the  DECLARATION  of  Independence 
in  the  other.  By  the  ONE  document,  Congress  may  be  reminded  of  what 
it  has  forgotten ; namely,  the  separation  of  valuable  colonies  from  a mother 
country,  brought  about  by  the  tyranny  of  a King  and  his  Parliament,  and 
therefrom,  they  may  learn  lessons  of  wisdom  and  moderation.  By  the 
OTHER,  it  will  be  astounded  at  the  manner  in  which  freemen  can  speak 
of  their  wrongs,  and  when  it  recollects,  that  the  descendants  of  those  free- 
men, inherit  all  the  principles  and  the  chivalry  of  their  sires,  such  a recol- 
lection will  be  worth  more  than  all  the  speeches  from  Maine  to  Florida. 


MO.  25. 

There  is  another  contemplated  exercise  of  power,  which  sooner 
or  later,  will  take  place  in  Congress,  and  which,  in  my  view,  must 
be  resisted  at  every  cost,  about  which  there  must  be  no  empty  reso- 
lutions, no  parleying,  no  compromise.  That  subject,  is  the  claim  of 
the  American  Colonization  Society,  to  be  supported  from  the  Na- 
tional Treasury. 

I know,  that  many  of  my  fellow-citizens,  in  some  parts  of  the 
State,  will  not  at  once  fall  into  the  opinion  here  advanced  ; but  it 
is,  because  they  have  not  reflected  on  the  movements  of  this  dan-' 
gerous  association  of  individuals.  1 intreat,  therefore,  that  they  par- 
tially bear  with  me  forawhile,  and  if  I do  not  satisfy  all, I hope  at  least, 
to  shew  to  the  greater  number,  that  whilst  internal  improvements 
are  drawing  off  our  resources  to  the  North,  and  tariffs  are  reducing 
us  rapidly  into  colonial  vassalage,  here  is  an  insidious  atttack  me- 
ditated at  the  domestic  tranquillity  of  the  South,  which  is  to  be  re- 
garded in  a more  serious  light,  than  if  an  hostile  foreign  army,  in 
great  force,  were  to  invade  our  territory.  The  bold  and  the  daring 
invader  attacks  openly.  In  the  bravery  and  devoted  patriotism  of 
our  citizens,  we  have,  under  the  worst  of  circumstances,  a hope  of 
ultimate  success  and  safety.  But  against  the  secret  dagger  of  the 
midnight  assassin,  no  precaution  can  guard  us.  He  enters  our  pre- 
mises undiscovered.  He  advances,  or  he  recedes  in  his  softly  steal- 
ing steps,  as  prudence  would  dictate,  and  he  strikes  the  fatal  blow, 
when  it  is  too  late  for  us  to  avert  it.  Thus  it  will  be  with  the 
American  Colonization  Society. 


122 


This  Society  was  established  at  the  SEAT  of  Government  in 
1817,  that  in  its  very  formation,  it  might  be  regarded  as  NATION- 
AL. Its  ostensible  object  is  the  colonization  of  the  free  persons  of 
colour  of  the  United  States,  on  the  continent  of  Africa.  The 
scheme  at  the  outset,  was  thought  to  be  so  visionary,  that  the  won- 
der was  expressed,  that  so  many  intelligent  members  of  Congres,  at 
Washington,  could  be  persuaded  to  attend  the  first  meeting.  The 
idea,  that  a class  of  people,  who  in  the  Northern  and  Eastern  States, 
were  enjoying  in  common  with  the  white  inhabitants,  so  great  a 
portion  of  civil  liberty,  should  voluntarily  exile  themselves,  and  en- 
counter all  the  diseases  of  an  African  climate,  and  the  hostility  of 
savage  neighbours,  was  so  preposterous,  that  many  persons  suspect- 
ed, that  there  was  more  meant  by  this  Society,  than  met  either  the 
eye  or  the  ear.  It  therefore  became  necessary  to  know,  whether 
the  Society  had  an  ulterior  design,  not  stated  in  its  Constitution,  and 
a question  to  this  end,  was  distinctly  put  by  some  Southern  gentle- 
men from  Virginia.  To  all  questions,  as  to  the  true  design  of  the 
Society,  the  reply  was,  that  colonization  of  the  free  persons  of  co- 
lour was  the  sole  object.  With  many  persons,  however,  from  what 
accidentally  transpired  at  the  time,  the  suspicion  still  existed,  that  a 
Colonization  Society  was  but  another  name  for  an  Abolition  Society  ; 
and  certainly,  if  there  be  one  fact,  in  regard  to  this  Society,  about 
which  there  never  did  exist  a contrariety  of  opinion,  it  is  this — that 
from  the  day  of  its  institution  until  the  present  time,  the  Society  has 
been  publicly  assailed  by  some,  as  a Society  of  doubtful  character, 
and  by  others,  as  having  a favourite  ulterior  object,  to  wit,  the 
emancipation  and  removal  in  due  time,  of  all  the  slaves  of  the  United 
States — a scheme  so  utterly  impracticable  for  any  private  Society  to 
accomplish,  and  to  which  it  is  doubted,  whether  the  National  Gov- 
erment  itself,  with  all  its  resources,  is  competent;  that  it  is  difficult 
to  decide,  whether,  in  the  contemplation  and  formation  of  the  Colo- 
nization Society,  folly,  or  fanaticism,  or  wickedness,  has  had  the 
greatest  influence. 

With  the  fact  always  before  their  eyes,  that  their  Society  was  ori- 
ginally, and  has  always  since  been  suspected  by  thousands  and 
thousands,  rather  as  intending  to  bring  about  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
than  of  colonizing  the  free  persons  of  colour,  under  the  hope  of 
voluntary  exile,  what  have  been  the  movements  of  the  friends  and 
members  of  the  association  ? Under  these  public  imputations,  as  to 
their  motives,  constantly  existing  in  the  public  prints  of  Virginia 
and  elsewhere,  what  has  been  their  course  of  conduct  ? Have  they 
been  careful  in  their  speeches  at  anniversary  meetings,  or  in  their 
annual  reports,  to  avoid  touching  a subject,  producing  to  us  in  the 
South,  such  exquisite  sensitiveness,  as  the  emancipation  of  our 
slaves?  The  coutrary  of  this  is  the  truth.  In  less  than  four  years, 
we  find  the  true  feeling  and  the  spirit,  which  characterizes  the  Abo- 
lition Societies,  manifesting  itself  in  this  association,  in  terms  too 
strong  to  be  misunderstood.  Their  speeches  breathe  a spirit,  which 
if  it  were  to  become  general,  would  soon  bring  to  ruin  the  State,  in 
which  we  live.  Let  it.  not  be  replied,  that  the  Colonization  Society 


123 


is  not  reponsible  for  the  sayings  and  the  speeches  of  its  members. — 
It  is  responsible  for  them  all,  tor  it  has,  by  its  own  deliberate  act, 
circulated  as  part  of  its  annual  reports,  all  these  speeches  through- 
out the  United  States,  together,  with  offensive  extracts  from  Reviews, 
and  other  publications,  and  thus  it  recognizes  the  doctrines  they 
contain.  What  difference  can  it  make  to  us  in  the  South,  whether 
these  inflammatory  sentiments,  are  the  sentiments  of  a Society,  as  a 
Society,  or  as  those  of  the  individuals  of  that  Society,  expressed  at 
its  meetings?  What  stronger  proof  need  we  require,  of  a Society 
being  an  Abolition  Society,  than  when  the  speeches  of  its  most  dis- 
tinguished members,  are  characterized  by  animated  pictures  of  the 
horrors  of  slavery,  and  their  deep  settled  conviction  that  the  whole 
system  must  be  rooted  out  of  the  laud?  If  speeches,  and  toasts,  and 
sentiments  of  men  assembled  together  for  business  or  conviviality, 
do  not  shew  the  spirit  and  character  of  the  particular  Societies,  or 
companies,  in  which  they  are  uttered  ; if  these  be  not  infallible  cri- 
teria, by  which  we  are  to  come  at  the  scope  and  object  of  these  So- 
cieties, I know  not  what  are.  It  is  not  necessary  to  introduce  all 
that  has  been  said  against  us  in  these  Societies.  Let,  however,  Gen. 
Harper  be  first  heard  at  the  seventh  anniversary  meeting.  After 
depicting  in  glowing  colours,  the  great  social  evil,  that  is  eating  its 
way  to  the  vitals  of  the  State,  and  the  folly  of  a partial  removal; 
and  after  estimating  the  number  of  slaves  in  the  United  States,  at  a 
million  and  an  half  of  persons — “ How  then,  (says  he)  is  that  MORE 
EXTENSIVE  operation,  which  alone  CAN  COMPLETE  the 
SCOPE  of  our  design,  to  be  ultimately , or  ever  accomplished.  How 
is  this  vast  mass  of  a vicious  population,  to  be  safely  withdrawn 
from  among  us,  and  with  justice  to  those,  more  immediately  inter- 
ested in  their  present  condition.”  He  then  proceeds  to  shew,  the 
qualifying  circumstances  which  must  attend  the  removal  of  these 
people.  General  Mercer  followed.  He  only  differed  from  his 
distinguished  friend,  in  point  of  time,  when  application  ought  to  be 
made  to  the  National  Councils,  as  the  affairs  of  the  Society  were 
not  yet  ripe  for  such  a measure.  “ The  policy  is  AMERICAN, 
throughout.”  (The  tariff  over  again.)  “ The  North  has  a deep  inter- 
est in  he  emancipation  and  colonization  of  the  slave  population  of 
the  Southern  States.”  Next  rises  George  Washington  Park  Custis, 
Esq.  who  contends,  that  they  must  go  at  once,  to  the  great  Council 
of  the  Nation,  as  the  guardians  of  American  liberty,  and  he  would 
tell  them,  “ You  are  the  last  of  Republics  : You  boast  that  it  is  the 
seat  of  freedom,  of  justice,  of  honour,  of  high  and  magnanimous- 
feeling.  The  evil  we  would  remedy,  is  none  of  ours.  It  was  done 
before  we  were  born,  and  it  is  left  for  us  to  undo  Lend  us  your 
aid  to  strike  th e fetters  from  the  slave,  and  to  spread  the  enjoyment 
of  unfettered  freedom  over  the  whole  of  our  favoured  and  happy 
land.”  In  another  speech  of  Mr.  Custis’,  which  I cannot  lay  my 
hands  upon,  he  says,  that  “ when  the  Society  shall  see  the  stern  of 
the  last  ship,  carrying  the  last  of  the  free  negroes,  its  business  will 
be  but  begun.”  In  all  the  speeches,  the  doctrine  is  inculcated,  that 
“if  they  are  defeated  again  and  again, in  their  addresses  to  Congress, 


124 


this  should  not  damp  their  ardour,  but  give  new  courage  for  new  at- 
tacks." “We  ought,  (adds  Gen.  Harper,)  to  explain  our  views  and 
plan,  soon  and  fully  ; so  that  they  may  be  seen  and  understood  by 
the  nation.  The  sooner,  and  the  more  fully  this  is  done,  the  better; 
and  in  no  way  can  it  be  so  well  done,  as  by  an  application  to  Con- 
gress, and  THE  DISCUSSIONS  (mark  that)  to  which  it  will  give 
rise.” 

Thus  terminates  the  seventh  Anniversary  Meeting  of  the  Coloni- 
zation Society.  Now,  I ask  my  fellow-citizens,  if  these  are  the 
sentiments  which  are  to  promote  the  happiness  and  security  of  the 
Southern  States.  Domestic  servitude  is  the  policy  of  our  country, 
and  has  been  so  from  time  immemorial.  It  is  so  intimately  inter- 
woven with  our  prosperity,  as  a member  of  the  confederacy,  and 
with  our  comfort  as  a society,  that  to  talk  of  its  abolition,  is  to  speak 
of  striking  us  out  of  our  civil  and  political  existence.  It  is  to  re- 
move from  us  the  only  labourers  who  can  cultivate  our  soil.  It  is 
to  cut  oft'  all  the  resources  of  our  wealth.  It  is  to  consent  to  give 
up  our  valuable  plantations,  our  tide  swamps,  and  our  prime  cotton 
lands.  In  a word,  it  is  to  surrender  the  whole  of  our  valuable  lower 
country,  to  the  “ beasts  of  the  field”  and  the  wild  men  of  the  forest. 
And  how  dare  the  people  of  this  Society,  the  greater  part  of  whom 
at  this  day,  form  their  crude,  and  their  undigested,  and  their  abstract 
ideas  in  their  closets,  with  no  knowledge  of  our  country,  no  ac- 
quaintance with  the  habits  and  pursuits  of  our  people,  no  experience 
of  our  peculiar  wants,  no  consideration  of  the  difficulties  of  emanci- 
pation, be  it  sudden  or  gradual — how  dare  such  men,  the  men  of 
Ohio  and  the  Wabash,  &c.  professing  as  they  do,  friendship  and 
good  feelings  towards  us,  presume  to  discuss  a subject  of  which  they 
know  nothing,  and  when  their  discussions  can  produce  no  other 
fruit  than  the  bitter  apple  of  discord  and  disunion.  Do  these  en- 
thusiasts think  it  a trifling  matter  to  hold  out  to  our  slave  population 
prospects  which  never  can  be  realized  ; or  do  they  believe,  that  when 
by  the  discussions  in  Congress,  they  shall  have  kindled  up  amongst 
these  people  dissatisfaction,  discontent  and  insubordination,  that 
they  can  at  all  times  so  regulate  its  heat,  that  it  shall  not  come  to 
an  awful  and  a wide  spreading  conflagration  ? Are  they  to  scatter 
firebrands,  and  say  they  mean  well.  But,  not  content  with  indulg- 
ing in  its  wild  and  mischievous  schemes  of  the  revolution  in  public 
sentiment,  which  it  hopes  to  bring  about  by  circulating  the  speeches 
of  its  members,  the  Society  employs  the  Press  in  another  way,  as  a 
still  more  efficient  means  of  bringing  about  emancipation.  It  causes 
to  be  published  at  the  Seat  of  Government,  under  its  immediate  aus- 
pices, and  for  its  exclusive  emolument,  a Monthly  Journal,  which  it 
styles  the  “ African  Repository,”  published  “ by  order  of  the  Mana- 
gers of  the  \merican  Colonization  Society.”  It  is  in  this  periodical, 
that  are  constantly  disseminated  the  sentiments  which  are  to  make 
the  slave  dissatisfied  with  his  condition,  and  the  master  doubtful, 
whether  he  ought  to  hold  in  subjection  his  slave.  It  is  here  that  we 
have  essays,  in  which  the  system  of  servitude  is  pourtrayed  in  colors 
the  most  frightful  and  disgusting.  It  is  this  journal  in  which  the 


125 


tales  are  to  be  told,  and  the  anecdotes  related,  of  the  cruelty  of  own* 
ers  to  their  slaves.  And  it  is  here  again,  that  are  recorded  the  exam- 
ples of  those  silly  mortals  who  sacrificed  their  wealth  upon  the  altars 
of  a moral  enthusiasm  ; who  think  they  aggrandize  their  country  by 
manumitting  their  slaves,  and  thus  letting  loose  beings,  neither  fitted 
by  education  or  by  habit  for  freedom,  and  who  must  be  a walking 
pestilence  wherever  they  go.  It  is  in  this  journal,  that  are  constantly 
expressed,  those  mischievous  forebodings,  “that  the  time  must  come 
when  the  oppressed  shall  rise  against  the  oppressor  with  a desolat- 
ing vengeance.” 

I know  that  some  of  our  citizens  will  be  disposed  to  treat  with 
contempt  such  predictions,  as  the  effusions  of  the  distempered  minds 
of  weak  fanatics  ; but  let  them  not  deceive  themselves.  The  Colo- 
nization Society,  under  the  specious  pretext  of  eradicating  from  our 
country  what  the  people  of  so  many  States  regard  as  an  evil  of  the 
first  magnitude,  daily  acquires  strength,  particularly  in  the  Middle 
and  Western  States,  and  it  has  some  adherents,  strange  to  say,  even 
in  the  plantation  States.  It  has  even  an  “ Hieronymus”*  from 
South-Carolina  to  advocate  its  cause  in  Northern  journals.  By 
means  of  the  Press,  it  daily  becomes  more  and  more  known  to  the 
ultra  religious  of  all  denominations,  and  the  clergy  in  general,  with- 
out being  aware  of  what  they  are  doing,  give  it  their  cordial  support. 
To  these  last,  it  has  been  recommended  to  preach  sermons  on  the 
anniversary  of  Independence ; but  none  have  been  bold  enough  in 
the  South  to  comply  with  the  request.  The  Society  is  not  in  the 
hands  of  weak  men.  Henry  Clay  is  one  of  its  patrons,  and  a very 
distinguished  anniversary  orator.  Judge  Washington,  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  is  its  President.  By  his  circular 
of  the  14th  of  March  last  past,  we  are  informed  that  the  Society  is  to 
make  application  to  Congress  at  its  ensuing  session.  It  is  the  Judge 
who  transmits  all  over  the  United  States  “the  form  of  a memorial 
to  which  signatures  are  to  be  solicited,  and  to  be  forwarded  to  the 
Congress.”  Should  a question  ever  be  made  in  the  Supreme  Court, 
whether  under  the  words  “general  welfare,”  money  can  be  voted  to 
a negro  society,  or  a negro  colony  on  the  coast  of  Africa,  we  may 
conjecture  how  this  Judge  will  decide  the  question,  for  by  his  circu- 
lar, it  appears  that  he  has  already  made  up  his  mind.  He  declares 
in  it  “ that  the  object  of  the  Society  is  one  of  NATIONAL  interest.” 

After  so  many  declarations,  and  from  a quarter  so  respectable, 
can  any  man  doubt  but  that  this  Society  will  present  itself  before 
the  National  Legislature.  These  abolitionists,  it  is  true,  are  not 
as  well  confederated  and  combined  as  the  manufacturers.  In  the 
one  case,  great  pecuniary  interests  are  involved,  and  injudicious  in- 
vestments to  the  amount  of  many  millions  of  dollars  are  at  hazard, 
in  consequence  of  “ Mr.  Canning’s  untaxing  the  British  nation.”  In 
the  other  case,  there  are  no  millions  of  dollars  it  is  true,  but  there 
are  a million  and  a half  of  poor  degraded  human  souls  who  need 
restoration  to  the  rights  of  freemen.  The  manufacturers  may  excel 

* In  the  controversy  in  the  Boston  papers,  this  writer  does  m*re  harm  t#  Soutfe- 
Garolina  than  “ Vigornius,”  the  open  enemy  of  slavery, 

16 


126 


in  the  talent  which  they  will  bring  to  their  aid,  but  the  abolition  men 
will  not  be  behind  them  in  their  zeal,  and  their  perseverance  to  ac- 
complish their  ends.  They  both  wiil  have  their  special  friends  in 
the  lobbies  and  in  the  House.  They  all  have  their  plans  of  attack 
well  arranged,  and  they  both  design  to  make  the  South  feel  its  pre- 
sent colonial  dependance. 

The  day  then  is  at  hand.  The  crisis  approaches,  when  Congress 
is  to  be  called  upon  to  discuss  a subject  upon  which  no  vote  can  be 
taken,  which  will  not  amount  to  an  expression  oi  its  opinion  on  the 
subject  of  domestic  slavery.  Are  the  plantation  States  disposed  to 
submit  to  any  such  expression  of  opinion.  I trust  they  are  not  pre- 
pared, and  my  sincere  hope  is,  that  should  this  body  presume  to 
legislate  on,  or  discuss  this  subject  in  any  way,  that  there  may  be 
but  one  heart  and  one  mind,  and  that  we  should  cut  the  knot  for- 
ever that  would  bind  us  to  the  worst  of  enemies.  Of  the  dangers 
of  such  a discussion  I shall  speak  in  my  next. 

mo.  26. 

Our  Senator,  Mr.  Hayne,  has  not  been  an  indifferent  spectator  of 
the  movements  of  the  Colonization  Society.  With  the  sagacity  for 
which  he  is  distinguished,  lie  early  perceived  that  these  movements 
indicated  a spirit  which  was  hostile  to  Southern  interests.  He 
has  expressed  this  opinion  publicly  and  privately.  To  the  inhabi- 
tants of  St.  Paul’s  Parish,  he  has  recently  stated  “that  the  whole 
course  and  tendency  of  the  Colonization  Society  demonstrated,  (what 
indeed  was  openly  acknowledged  by  some  of  its  members,  and  is 
hardly  now  denied  by  any)  that  the  colonization  of  the  class  of  per- 
sons, whose  removal  was  originally  declared  to  be  the  exclusive  ob- 
ject of  the  Society,  was  but  the  first  step  towards  another  great  object, 
which,  in  his  opinion,  could  never  be  attempted,  (and  least  of  all  by 
the  Federal  Government)  without  aiming  a blow  at  our  peace  aud 
security."  To  this  sentiment,  Mr.  Hayne  added  his  firm  and  unal- 
terable determination,  to  resist  to  the  utmost  of  his  power,  the  right 
of  the  General  Government  “ to  embrace  a subject  which  belongs 
exclusively  to  the  States,  and  which,  in  his  view,  could  never  be 
touched  by  Congress,  (whether  with  good  or  evil  intentions)  without 
producing  the  HEAVIEST  calamities.”  As  far  as  Mr.  Hayne  has 
had  an  opportunity,  he  has  acted  in  conformity  v/ith  this  opinion. 
When  Rufus  King  laid  upon  the  table  of  the  Senate  his  resolution  to 
empowerCongress  to  establish  a fund  for  purchasing  and  emancipat- 
ing slaves,  our  Senator  submitted  his  protest,  toget  her  with  a counter 
resolution.  On  the  petition  of  the  Colonization  Society  being  pre- 
sented to  the  Senate,  Mr.  Hayne  again  protested.  So  far  has  this 
Senator  discharged  his  duty  to  his  country,  and  further  than  this  he 
could  not  well  go  under  the  circumstances. 

In  the  co-operation  and  assistance  of  such  a colleague  as  Judge 
Smith,  we  have  the  most  flattering  hopes.  The  services  of  this  lat- 
ter gentleman  on  the  Missouri  question,  are  universally  acknowledg- 
ed, and  the  impression,  which  it  is  admitted  he  then  made  by  his 
open  and  manly  avowal  of  his  sentiments,  and  the  firmness  with 


127 


which,  on  that,  occasion,  he  stood  his  ground  in  the  debate,  can  ue- 
ver  be  forgotten  by  the  people  of  South-Carolina.  The  success  of 
Judge  Smith’s  resolutions  in  our  State  Legislature,  on  the  subject 
of  State  Rights,  was  a remarkable  triumph  of  the  good  sense  of  the 
people  over  that  most  unhappy  influence  in  favour  of  Messrs.  Mon- 
roe and  Calhoun’s  politics,  which  before  had  been  insensibly  car- 
rying on  the  State,  to  the  maintenance  of  doctrines,  in  which  any 
thing  but  safety  was  to  be  sought  I intend  no  reflections  on  the 
small  minority  on  those  resolutions.  In  their  ranks,  I count  names 
personally  known  to  me,  and  for  whom  I have  always  entertained 
no  common  respect.  But  the  best  men  are  often  mistaken, — and  far 
be  it  from  me,  to  consider  our  countryman,  Mr.  Calhoun,  as  not 
entitled  to  the  esteem  and  respect  of  his  fellow-citizens.  His  ser- 
vices have,  on  some  occasions,  been  most  distinguished,  and  1 feel 
them.  But  let  us  hope  never  to  see  the  doctrines  of  Mr.  Monroe’s 
administration,  in  which  he  bore  so  conspicuous  a part,  again  in 
fashion  South  of  the  Potomac.  South-Carolina,  in  consequence  of 
those  politics,  has  been  the  sole  cause  of  a want  of  cordial  Union 
between  the  Southern  States,  as  to  common  interests,  to  the  morti- 
fication of  Virginia,  North-Carol ina  and  Georgia  ; and  to  this  may 
be  ascribed  their  apparent  lukewarmness  on  the  present  question  of 
the  Tariff.  It  was  this  same  influence,  (with  shame  be  it  spoken) 
which  caused,  three  years  ago,  an  outcry  against  that  first  of  South- 
ern patriots,  Governor  Troup,  of  Georgia,  when,  like  an  Ajax,  he 
was  covering  the  sovereign  rights  of  his  own  State,  and  of  all  the 
Southern  States,  with  the  shield  of  a most  unparalleled  and  un- 
daunted firmness.  The  venerable  Patriarch  of  ’76,  who  had  al- 
ways deplored  the  secession  of  South-Carolina  from  the  pale  of  State 
Rights,  was  delighted  when  he  heard  of  the  movements  of  our  Le- 
gislature on  Judge  Smith’s  resolutions.  It  was  like  the  dawn  of  a 
new  day,  opening  upon  the  prospects  of  Union  in  the  South,  and  in 
his  correspondence  with  his  friends,  he  hailed  it  as  such,  and  antici- 
pated the  happiest  results  from  a beginning  to  be  made  in  that  very 
State,  which  had  so  unaccountably  abandoned  a principle  common 
to  all.  He  thought  that  Virginia  had  taken  the  lead  long  enough, 
and  that  she  had  better  thereafter  follow. 

But,  faithful  as  Mr.  Hayne  has  been  in  the  Senate,  and  as  certain 
as  he  is  of  the  co-operation,  heart  and  mind,  of  his  colleague, 
it  is  not  to  be  conceded,  that  the  firebrands  w <ich  have  been  prepar- 
ed to  light  up  discord  in  the  South,  are  in  readiness,  for  any  mem- 
ber to  take  them  up;  and  let  them  be  taken  up  when  they  will,  a 
beginning  will  thereby  be  made  by  Congress  to  legislate  on  a subject 
which  cannot  be  mentioned  in  the  Halls  of  Congress  without  mani- 
fest mischief  to  these  States — a beginning  did  I say  1 Why  the  be- 
ginning has  already  taken  place.  A door  for  discussing  of  the  sub- 
ject of  slavery  has  been  opened  in  both  Houses  of  Congress.  Their 
tables  are  already  polluted  with  resolutions  and  petitions  on  the 
subject  of  negro  societies.  If  South-Carolina  does  not  close  these 
doors,  and  close  them  forever  against  the  intrusion  of  such  subjects 
for  debate,  she  can  expect  no  other  than  the  most  seripus  results.  In 


128 


the  Senate,  the  door  was  not  opened,  without  an  opposing  effort  on 
the  part  of  Col.  H ay.ne  ; but,  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  I do 
not  recollect  of  any  sensation  amongst  the  Southern  members,  either 
at  the  time  when  the  subject  was  first  brought  up  before  the  House, 
or  when  the  resolutions  of  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky,  recently 
brought  up  by  Mr.  Clauk,  were  submitted. 

But  how  is  it,  that  our  citizens  generally  are  not  alarmed  at  these 
indications  of  a disposition  in  Congress  to  meddle  witli  what  does 
not  belong  to  it.  Except  from  Edisto,  St.  John’s,  Colleton,  and  a few 
more  parishes,  we  scarcely  hear  of  the  Colonization  Society;  and 
yet  I do  firmly  and  conscientiously  believe,  that  unless  our  Legisla- 
ture shall,  at  its  next  session,  or  at  some  other, early  period  adopt 
some  measure,  which  shall  at  once  bring  it  to  the  test,  whether  Con- 
gress shall  discuss  the  subject  of  slavery  directly  or  indirectly,  we 
shall,  in  less  than  twenty  years,  be  in  a situation  not  much  better 
than  the  people  of  the  British  West-India  Islands. 

Let  us  only  look  to  the  first  causes  of  inquietude  of  these  most 
harrassed  Colonists ; their  early  want  of  confidence  in  negro  pro- 
perty ; the  depreciation  of  that  property,  and  the  signs  of  decay, 
which  are  every  where  now  visible  in  those  Islands,  and  we  shall  see 
that  they  are  all  to  be  traced  to  the  interference  of  the  British  Par- 
liament on  the  subject  of  slavery,  and  that  from  the  smallest  begin- 
nings, have  resulted  those  transactions  which  have  brought  these 
people  to  their  present  deplorable  condition.  When  Mr.  Wilbep.- 
force  first  brought  forward  his  bill  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave 
trade,  he  was  even  more  cautious  than  the  Colonization  Society.  He 
took  especial  care  not  to  profess  that  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade 
was  but  the  first  step  towards  an  object  which  he  then  most  deeply 
had  at  heart ; but  which,  at  that  time,  it  would  have  been  most  im- 
prudent to  proclaim,  to-wit : the  emancipation  of  the  negroes  in  the 
West-Indies.  Indeed,  he  and  his  friends  avowed  that  their  sole  ob- 
ject was  abolition  of  the  trade,  and  no  more  : and  yet  we  have  seen 
that  he  no  sooner  succeeded  in  the  ostensible  object,  than  he  was 
observed  to  come  out  of  his  concealment,  and  to  commence  an  indi- 
rect attack  upon  the  whole  system  of  slavery.  Now,  in  the  fulness 
of  time,  he  openly  advocates  a general  emancipation. 

As  great  interests  of  the  British  Empire  were  at  stake,  from  the 
capital  invested  in  West-India  estates,  and  the  trade  it  then  furnish- 
ed, it  was  not  an  easy  matter  for  Mr.  W'ilrerforce,  at  first,  to  find 
many  adherents  for  his  ultimate  plans.  He  was,  therefore,  at  an 
early  stage  of  the  discussions,  in  small  minorities  ; but  small  as  these 
minorities  were,  yet  the  Colonists  immediately  felt  and  feared,  that 
with  such  a mighty  subject  in  his  hands  as  that  of  the  liberty  of  the 
British  subject,  and  the  appeals  he  could  make  to  a people,  whose 
prejudices  and  habits  were  adverse  to  slavery,  he  must  rather  gain 
than  lose  his  influence,  and  they  began  from  that  moment  to  des- 
pond. Year  after  year,  for  the  last  forty  years,  as  these  topics  were 
renewed  in  Parliament,  the  minorities  became  more  respectable,  and 
the  hopes  of  the  Colonists  continued  to  sink.  As  their  hopes  were 
gradually  weakened,  so  their  property  gradually  depreciated  in  va- 


129 


lue.  The  point  of  depression  to  which  it  has  at  this  day  arrived,  is 
most  depiorable.  So  unceasing  have  been  the  interferences  of  Par- 
liament, that  their  negroes  are,  to  them,  almost  worse  than  worth- 
less. Tiie  object  of  the  abolitionists  by  holding  out  emancipation, 
has  uniformly  been,  first  to  depress  the  value  of  negro  property,  and 
when  it  shall  have  arrived  at  its  minimum. , say  some  thirty  or  forty 
dollars  a head,  then  to  advocate  a general  emanc  pation,  with  a re- 
muneration to  individuals  at  a trifling  cost  to  the  Government. 

The  unfortunate  fate  of  the  people  of  the  West  Indies  may  be 
our  lot,  or  it  may  not.  This  will  depend  entirely  on  ourselves. — 
If  we  are  patient  and  submissive  before  Congress,  the  points  of  re- 
semblance between  us  and  the  British  Colonists,  will  soon  strike  the 
most  common  observer.  But  if  we  shali  only  exert  the  powers  which 
God  and  nature  has  given  us,  the  resemblance  can  never  for  an  in- 
stant exist.  These  colonists  are  to  be  pitied,  and  not  to  be  reproached. 
They  have  not  within  themselves,  as  we  have  in  the  Southern  States, 
resources  for  empire  ; and,  they  are  on  this  account,  doomed  to  the 
end  of  time,  probably,  to  have  some  European  master.  Unfortu- 
nately for  them,  they  have  no  power  to  struggle  with  the  mother 
country.  They  are  weak  colonists.  But  WE  have  the  POWER 
to  grapple  with  any  set  of  usurpers,  or  any  enemies,  foreign  or 
domestic.  We  are  Sovereign  and  Independent  States. — Infinitely 
more  independent  of  those,  who  desire  to  bring  us  back  to  colonial 
dependence,  than  they  would  be  of  us.  Let  us  then  decide  at  once, 
that  Congress  shall  not  meddle  with  the  subject  of  negroes,  and  let 
our  Legislature  be  solicited,  to  interpose  its  powers  between  this 
species  of  legislation,  and  our  ultimate  ruin.  There  is  no  time  for 
delay.  If  our  Legislature  refrains  from  expressing  its  sense  of  the 
wrongs  of  Congress  in  this  particular,  or  prescribes  to  itself,  no 
course  of  conduct,  to  defeat  this  tendency  in  the  General  Govern- 
ment, thus  GROSSLY  to  IMPINGE  upon  a concern,  so  CON- 
FESSEDLY LOCAL,  it  will  have  no  other  effect,  than  to  invite 
Congress,  to  repeat  aggression  upon  aggression,  upon  the  sove- 
reignty of  the  State.  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves.  The  claims  of 
the  Colonization  Society,  will  assuredly  be  pressed  before  Congress. 
It  has  in  its  train,  upwards  of  an  hundred  auxiliary  Societies,  as  I 
believe.  It  is  a subject  which  will  NEVER  slumber  or  sleep.  A 
paper  called  “ The  Genius  of  Universal  Emancipation,”  for  the 
avowed  purpose  of  abolishing  slavery  in  the  South,  is  established 
at  New-York.  A new  periodical,  on  the  same  subject,  is  just  es- 
tablished in  Philadelphia.  Sooner  or  later,  therefore,  the  merits  of 
this  Association,  will  be  discussed  in  the  Halls  of  the  National  Le- 
gislature. Are  we  prepared,  my  fellow-citizens,  to  submit  to  a public 
discussion  of  this  subject  ? Are  we  to  stand  by,  and  look  on  uncon- 
cerned, at  men,  who  would  in  this  way,  lay  the  axe  to  the  root  of 
our  whole  system  of  civil  polity.  Forbid  it  patriotism.  Let  it  be  re- 
membered, that  the  claims  of  the  Colonization  Society  cannot  pos- 
sibly be  discussed, without  giving  to  Congress  an  occasion,  officially  to 
express  its  opinion  against  slavery  as  an  evil,  and  the  profession  of 
a desire  to  eradicate  it  from  the  land.  It  will  afford  us,  my  fellow- 


130 


citizens,  not  ONE  atom  of  security,  that  Congress  does  not  intend 
emancipation.  This  it  DARES  not  do  at  THIS  time.  As  rapidly 
as  it  is  advancing,  in  its  attempts  to  put  down  the  sovereignty  of 
the  States,  it  would  scarcely  venture  upon  a measure,  so  premature 
or  unseasonable,  as  this  would  be.  But  it  is  not  enough  for  us,  to 
have  a pledge  of  this  nature.  Congress  mast  not  be  permitted  to 
express  any  opinion , that  slavery  (which  is  the  fundamental  policy  of 
this  State)  is  an  EVIL.  The  expression  of  any  such  opinion,  would 
be  an  interference  with  a subject,  which  is  not  theirs.  It  would  be 
an  intolerably  IMPERTINENT  intermeddling  with  a concern, 
peculiarly  OUR  OWN.  If  there  be  an  evil  in  slavery,  the  evil  is 
ours.  But  our  laws  recognize  it  not  as  an  evil,  and  it  is  the  height 
of  insolence  in  any  other  body,  than  our  own  Legislature,  to  decide 
what  is,  or  is  not,  beneficial  to  South-Carolina.  The  interference 
of  Congress,  by  an  expression  of  its  opinion,  moreover,  will  have  a 
tendency  to  weaken  the  attachment  of  our  citizens  to  the  policy, 
which  is  the  LIFE  BLOOD  of  the  State,  and  without  which,  we 
must  cease  to  exist  as  a State , excepting  in  name.  An  expression 
of  such  an  opinion,  would  alarm  the  timid  amongst  us.  It  would 
cause  those,  who  are  wavering  and  in  doubt,  to  give  up  their  opini- 
ons. It  would  deter  capitalists  from  investments  in  plantations  and 
negroes,  from  the  impression  it  would  give,  of  a want  of  perma- 
nency in  our  systems,  from  a fear  that  Congress,  at  some  future 
day,  might  legislate  still  further  on  the  subject.  As  regards  our  do- 
mestics, the  effect  upon  their  minds,  by  any  such  opinion  by  the 
National  Legislature,  would  be  such,  as  to  till  us  all  with  the 
DEEPEST  apprehensions.  Not  for  our  safety , for  that  will  be  a 
concern , to  which,  thank  God,  we  feel  ourselves  competent,  under 
any  circumstances,  and  without  any  assistance  from  Congress ; 
but  on  account  of  the  discontent  and  uneasiness  which  might  thereby 
be  produced  in  the  minds  of  those,  who  are  now  contented  and 
happy. 

The  Legislatures  of  Ohio,  New-Jersey,  <fcc.  in  the  paroxysms  of 
their  folly  and  their  fanaticism,  may  pour  forth  their  phials  of  wrath, 
upon  the  system  of  slavery,  and  so  may  Wilberforce  and  Buxton 
thunder  forth  their  anathemas  in  the  British  Parliament.  Our  do- 
mestics have  the  intelligence  to  know,  that  South-Carolina  is  not 
under  the  dominion  of  the  one,  more  than  of  the  other  ; and,  there- 
fore, any  such  expression  of  the  public  opinion  in  these  countries, 
if  it  were  ten  times  as  strong,  can  do  us  no  possible  harm.  But, 
my  fellow-citizens,  the  case  will  be  entirely  changed,  when  such  a 
legislative  body,  as  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  shall  begin 
to  DENOUNCE  our  systems.  When  so  many  weak  white  men 
amongst  us  (I  beg  their  pardon)  regard  Congress  as  omnipotent,  and 
are  of  opinion,  that  all  the  efforts  of  the  States  to  confine  this  body 
within  its  limits, ’will  be  in  vain,  and  moreover,  are  treasonable,  it 
would  indeed  be  strange,  if  the  untutored  slave  were  to  think  other- 
wise. The  truth  is,  that  our  slaves  do  regard  Congress  as  uncon- 
troulable  in  its  authority  over  the  States;  and  the  only  way  to  re- 
move these  false  impressions  from  the  minds  of  our  own  timid  citizens 


131 


and  to  cut  oft’  all  the  hopes  of  mischievous  and  designing  slaves  for- 
ever, is  to  give  some  STRIKING  demonstration  to  them,  that  Con- 
gress can  no  more  interfere  with  this  subject,  than  Ohio  and  New- 
Jersey  can  make  laws  for  us.  Let  these  people,  one  and  all,  see 
with  their  own  eyes,  that  the  instant  Congress  PRESUMES  to  ex- 
press its  opinion,  that  South-Carolina  will  also  resolve  not  to  talk, 
but  to  ACT.  The  salutary  effects  of  such  a course  upon  their 
minds,  will  be  such  as  words  are  not  adequate  to  describe.  On  the 
contrary,  let  our  slaves  observe  tameness  and  acquiescence  on  our 
part,  in  these  usurpations  of  the  Government,  and  they  will  feel,  as 
as  they  are  justified  in  feeling,  that  their  future  destiny  belongs  not 
to  South-Carolina,  but  to  Congress. 

Congress  then,  must  pass  no  opinion  respecting  the  peculiar 
policy  of  our  State.  It  must  not  denounce  the  system  of  slavery,  as 
it  exists  in  the  Southern  States,  as  an  evil,  or  so  act,  as  to  be  under- 
stood to  desire  to  eradicate  it  from  the  land,  unless  it  intends  to 
make  war  upon  the  South.  The  laws  of  South-Carolina  have  for- 
bidden its  own  citizens  from  emancipating  their  slaves.  No  slave, 
in  consequence,  can  be  emancipated  without  an  act  of  the  Legis- 
lature, and  the  Legislature  have  refused  numberless  applications  for 
such  purposes.  It  is  perfectly  competent  for  the  Legislature  to  pass 
this  law.  It  is  acting  within  its  reserved  powers,  under  the  Consti- 
tution, when  it  is  regulating  its  slaves  ; and  Congress,  on  the  con- 
trary, will  usurp  power,  when  it  would  interfere  with  emancipation, 
directly  or  indirectly  To  countenance  the  American  Colonization 
Society,  will  be  to  proceed  upon  the  principle,  that  slavery  is  a 
rank  weed  in  our  land.  Thus  to  denounce  the  whole  Southern 
system,  will  be  neither  more  nor  less,  than  to  excite  in  the  bosoms 
of  all  the  slaves  in  the  United  States,  illusory  hopes,  that  Congress 
may  adopt  some  measures  to  mitigate  their  condition,  and  remedy 
their  grievances.  It  will  be  an  act  of  decided,  unequivocal  hostility. 
It  will  be  a declaration  of  WAR,  and  MUST  be  treated  and  resisted 
&s  such.  It  will  be  the  ENTERING  WEDGE,  with  which,  at 
some  future  day,  our  VITAL  interests  are  to  be  SPLIT  asunder. — 
It  will  be  the  LANDING  of  an  enemy,  and  a bitter  enemy  too,  on 
our  soil.  To  take  no  steps,  will  be  to  see  that  enemy  gain  a foot- 
hold in  our  very  dwellings.  He  must  be  resisted.  There  must  be 
no  discussion.  Discussion  will  cause  DEATH  and  DESTRUC- 
TION to  our  negro  property.  Discussion  will  be  equivalent  to  an 
act  of  emancipation,  for  it  will  universally  inspire  amongst  the 
slaves,  that  hope.  It  will  be  to  teach  the  slave,  that  for  a gradual 
amelioration  of  his  condition,  he  is  not  to  look  to  his  master,  or  to 
what  time,  and  circumstances,  or  a wise  Providence  may  bring  about 
in  its  own  good  appointed  time  ; but  will  encourage  him  to  look  to 
Congress  alone,  in  every  movement  of  which  body,  our  slaves  will 
take  an  interest,  and  though  any  particular  measure  cannot  afford 
any  relief,  even  to  the  present  generation,  yet  it  will  at  once  be  mis- 
construed by  them  into  something  for  their  immediate  benefit,  and 
thus  induce  them  to  believe,  that  rights  are  withheld  from  them,  con- 
trary to  the  intent  *f  Congress.  It  is  the  discussions  in  the  British 


1C2 


Parliament,  which  have  caused  from  time  to  time,  the  insurrectionary 
movements  in  the  West  indies,  and  brought  the  colonists  from 
tvealth  to  despondence , and  from  despondence  almost  to  despair  ; and 
it  will  be  discussion  of  the  subject  by  Congress,  which  will  bring 
us,  one  and  all,  to  complete  ruin,  if  we  are  weak  enough  not  to 
check  it  at  the  outset,  and  at  every  hazard,  aye,  at  the  hazard  of 
DISSOLVING  THE  UNION.  Can  it  reasonably  be  hoped,  that 
when  our  citizens  shall  be  constantly  worried  on  this  subject,  and 
constantly  uncertain  as  to  what  Congress  can,  or  cannot,  constitution- 
ally do,  as  to  our  slaves  ; that  all  will  not  be  more  or  less  anxious 
to  be  relieved  from  a property,  the  tenure  of  which  is  to  depend 
upon  the  capricious  will  of  a body,  whom  they  know  to  be  foreign 
to  us  in  their  feelings,  and  in  their  education  and  modes  of  thinking. 

It  is  no  consolation  to  say  to  us,  that  on  any  petition  to  be  present- 
ed before  Congress,  the  votes  shall  be  in  our  favour , even  if  those 
votes  be  in  the  proportion  of  ten  to  one.  If  Congress  can  entertain 
such  petitions,  and  discuss  such  subjects  at  one  time,  it  can  do  so  at 
another  time.  The  small  minority  this  year,  may  become  more  re- 
pectable  the  next,  and  so  on,  until  it  shall  become  alarming  to  the 
most  sceptical  amongst  us.  When  Mr.  M’Duffie,  in  some  recent 
address  to  his  constituents,  most  sincerely  told  them,  in  reference 
to  the  expected  interference  of  Congress  with  our  slaves,  and  by  way 
of  consolation  too,  that  he  did  not  believe,  there  were  in  both  Houses , 
twenty  men  who  would  not  vote  as  South-Carolina  would  wish  on 
such  a question,  it  struck  many  of  us,  that  this  intelligence  would 
not  be  received  as  consolation  by  those  who  pondered  the  subject. — 
To  me  it  is  most  alarming,  that  there  should  be  found  twenty,  or 
even  five  members,  with  such  sentiments ; for,  if  by  this,  1 am  to 
understand  any  thing,  it  is  this,  that  in  some  twenty  or  thirty  years, 
this  minority  must  be  very  respectable,  as  by  every  new  census,  the 
Northern  strength  will  be  augmented,  perhaps,  in  the  same  pro- 
portion as  ours  will  diminish.  The  West  India  colonists  had,  some 
forty  years  ago,  all  the  consolation  which  Mr.  M’Duffie  now  dis- 
penses to  us.  The  minority  in  the  British  Parliament  was  at  first 
trifling.  I doubt  if  there  were  even  twenty  or  ten  in  both  Houses  of 
Parliament,  who  were  for  emancipation.  But  yet  the  West  Indies 
are  hastening,  with  a very  quick  step,  towards  complete  ruin  ; a ca- 
tastrophe, hitherto,  only  protracted  by  the  good  sense  and  discretion 
of  Mr.  Canning,  and  by  his  ability  in  stemming  the  torrent  of  Bri- 
tish feeling,  in  and  out  of  Parliament,  on  the  subject.  And  so  will 
South-Carolina  assuredly  he  ruined,  if  at  this  day,  there  are  twenty 
men  in  Congress,  who  are  for  emancipation,  sudden  or  gradual,  and 
the  right  of  Congress  to  take  even  a vote , is  not  RESISTED  as  an 
ACT  OF  WAR  by  South-Carolina.  No.  Those  who  would  give 
the  Southern  Agriculturist  real  and  substantial  comfort,  must  assure 
him  that  a petition  shall  never  be  received,  and  a vote  NEVER 
shall  be  taken  in  Congress,  on  any  subject  connected  with  slaves, 
without  its  being  followed  by  an  immediate  dissolution  of  the  Union, 
and  then  would  be  seen  a CONFIDENCE  abroad  in  our  land,  to 


133 

which  we  have  been  entire  strangers,  since  the  unfortunate  Missouri 
question  was  agitated. 

That  question,  we  all  know,  was  attended  with  its  evils,  and  as  I al- 
ready have  stated,  the  most  prominent  of  all  the  evils  which  attend 
these  discussions,  is,  that  our  slaves  instantly  misconceive  the  object 
of  the  discussions,  and  turn  it  to  mischievous  purposes.  By  the 
Missouri  question,  our  slaves  thought,  there  was  a charter  of  liberties 
granted  them  by  Congress,  and  the  events  of  the  summer  of  1822, 
as  will  appear  by  the  records  of  the  trials,  and  the  dying  confessions 
of  the  misguided  wretches,  will  long  be  remembered,  as  amongst  the 
choicest  fruits  of  the  agitation  of  that  question  in  Congress.  Simi- 
lar results  have  followed  all  discussions  in  the  British  Parliament. 
So  alive  are  the  negroes  to  the  proceedings  in  Parliament,  that  if  a 
regulation  of  trade  be  adopted,  it  is  subject  to  misconception.  Not 
three  years  ago,  George  IV.  was  compelled  to  issue  his  Boyal  Pro- 
clamation, and  to  publish  it  throughout  the  West  Indies,  that  no 
act  of  emancipation  had  been  passed  by  Parliament.  It  was  the  dis- 
cussions in  the  National  Convention  at  Paris,  that  first  lighted  up 
the  fires  of  revolt  in  St.  Domingo  ; and  if  we,  in  South-Carolina, 
are  ever  to  witness  any  thing  of  the  kind  in  our  country,  it  will 
solely  be  owing  to  our  DASTARDLY  pusillanimity,  and  our  BASE 
TREACHERY  to  our  vital  interests,  by  suffering  Congress  to  sup- 
port the  Colonization  Society,  and  thus  to  acknowledge  the  juris- 
diction over  the  subject,  by  a body,  who  will  make  us  at  some  future 
period,  if  we  thus  place  ourselves  in  their  power,  CURSE  the  day 
that  ever  ice  entered  into  union  with  the  Northern  States. 

The  Colonization  Society  must  then  be  driven  out  of  the  Halls  of 
Congress,  and  driven  out  with  DISGRACE.  It  is,  as  has  been  well 
observed,  “the  nucleus,  around  which,  will  be  gathered  the  worst 
elements  of  discord.”  It  is  the  NEST  EGG,  placed  there  by  the 
Northern  abolitionists,  and  therefrom  will  be  hatched  and  raised  for 
the  South,  anxiety,  and  inquietude  and  troubles,  to  which  there  can 
be  no  end.  It  will  be  the  opening  upon  us,  of  Pandora’s  Box.  Let 
it  not  be  so.  Let  it  be  remembered,  that  when  Congress  claims 
legislation  in  any  way  upon  the  subject  of  negroes , it  assumes  the 
character  of  the  enemy  that  would  invade  your  territory.  There 
must  be  “NO  STANDING  at  your  arms,”  as  Mr.  Jefferson  says. 
Suffer  him  not  to  effect  a landing.  Meet  him  on  the  beach,  and  at 
the  water’s  edge,  “FOOT  TO  FOOT,”  as  the  same  immortal  Patriot 
expresses  himself;  and  here  let  it  be  decided,  whether  our  State  is 
to  be  independent  or  not,  or  our  safety  put  at  hazard  by  KNAVES, 
MADMEN,  AND  FANATICS.  Should  that  day  ever  arrive, 
when  Congress,  deaf  to  all  intreaty,  shall,  in  the  extravagancy  and 
insolency  of  its  pretensions,  to  unlimited  sovereignty,  (I  repeat 
insolency  of  its  pretensions,  for  the  occasion  demands  strong  lan- 
guage) attempt  to  interfere  with  the  policy  so  peculiarly  our  own, 
by  expressing  its  opinion,  that  such  a policy  is  a national  evil,  and 
ought  to  be  rooted  out  of  South-Carolina ; which  it  must  do,  if  it 
countenances  the  Colonization  Society,  my  wishes  will  be,  that 
there  may  be  DISUNION,  and  that  by  the  opening  of  our  ports  to 

17 


134 


the  whole  world,  we  may  avail  ourselves  of  our  natural  and  abun* 
dant  resources  for  commerce,  and  thus  gain  the  WEALTH  AND 
THE  STRENGTH,  to  defend  ourselves  against  all  our  enemies 
from  WITHIN  and  without. 


®ST©.  27. 

I have,  as  yet,  said  nothing  as  to  the  flagrant  injustice  of  a national  pro- 
tection to  the  American  Colonization  Society.  Were  this  Society  honest 
and  undisguised  as  to  its  object,  and  its  purpose  was  simply  to  relieve  the 
United  States  of  all  the  free  persons  of  colour,  by  their  voluntary  exile,  an 
objection  of  no  ordinary  magnitude,  even  in  this  view  of  the  subject,  pre- 
sents itself,  which  is,  that  its  purposes  cannot  be  accomplished  without  tax- 
ing the  people  of  those  States,  who  are  without  any  interest  in  the  subject 
matter,  for  the  relief  of  such  States  as  have  a very  deep  interest. 

It  is  perfectly  natural  for  the  people  of  some  States  to  regard  free  ne- 
groes as  a grievous  nuisance,  and  for  very  obvious  reasons.  According  to 
the  last  census,  New-York  and  Pennsylvania  contained  about  sixty  thou- 
sand of  this  class,  and  their  rapidly  increasing  numbers,  and  their  extreme 
indolence  as  well  as  insolence,  has  occasioned  a general  desire  in  the  peo- 
ple of  those  States  to  be  relieved  of  them.  Their  laws  and  police  regula- 
tions are,  at  the  same  time  so  framed,  as  to  encourage  the  fugitive  slaves  of 
the  South  to  seek  an  asylum  amongst  them,  so  that  their  whole  policy 
seems  to  be,  first,  to  entice  from  the  Southern  planter  his  slaves;  secondly, 
to  emancipate  them  after  they  are  enticed,  by  means  of  their  Societies  or 
their  laws  ; and,  thirdly,  to  get  rid  of  them,  not  at  their  own  entire  expense, 
but  at  the  expense  also  of  the  South,  by  a system  called  the  “ American 
system,”  and  in  the  same  manner  as  they  would  encourage  their  manufac- 
tures, (another  “ American  system,”)  by  cansing  the  Southern  States  to 
contribute,  by  taxation,  their  portion  of  the  cost.  Now,  really,  to  us  in  the 
South,  it  is  a matter  ot  indifference,  whether  the  citizens  of  New-York  or 
Philadelphia  are  tormented  or  not  with  this  species  of  population.  In 
truth,  if  we  were  to  express  any  desite  on  the  subject,  it  would  be,  that  they 
should  be  more  and  more  tormented  with  them  every  day,  that  they  might 
be  induced  to  aid,  rather  than  oppose  the  Southron,  when  he  demands 
the  restoration  of  his  fugitive  slaves,  and  that  they  might  indulge  towards 
us,  in  general,  some  little  more  kind  sympathy,  when  they  are  contemplat- 
ing the  system  of  slavery.  In  this  portion  of  the  Union,  free  persons  of 
colour  are  not  a pest  to  us.  In  the  four  States  of  South-Carolina,  Georgia, 
Alabama  and  Mississippi,  there  are  only  9,506  of  such  persons,  not  one 
third  of  the  number,  either  of  New-York  or  Pennsylvania  ; and  our  laws 
are  such,  that  these  persons  are  regulated  with  the  same  facility  as  if  they 
were  slaves.  They  give  us  yet  no  trouble,  and  our  laws  prevent  any  fur- 
ther increase  of  them,  excepting  by  natural  means,  emancipation  being  ex- 
pressly forbidden. 

On  the  subject  of  free  negroes,  there  is  here,  as  there  always  has  been, 
and  must  ever  be,  in  many  respects,  an  opposition  of  interest  between  the 
North  and  the  South.  At  the  North,  these  people  are  under  wo  discipline, 
and  consequently  are  insolent  to  the  whites,  whenever  an  occasion  offers 
itself,  and  their  occupation,  a great  portion  of  the  year, is  that  of  thieving  or 
begging.  Their  jails  and  poor  houses  are  filled  with  negroes.  At  the 
South,  they  are  well  disciplined,  and  are  civil  to  the  whites,  and  in  their 


135 


way  useful.  They  are  peaceable  and  industrious,  and  always  to  be  seen 
at  their  honest  employments.  They  are  not  the  inmates  of  penitentiaries 
or  alms-houses.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  but  that  if  we  in  the  South 
were  relieved  of  this  population,  it  would  be  better  for  our  Southern  cities, 
where  they  principally  reside.  But  as  yet,  we  have  heard  of  no  feasible 
plan  to  which  there  are  not  some  objections.  We,  in  the  South,  know 
these  people  too  well,  to  believe  that  we  can  ever  be  relieved  of  them  un- 
der any  plan  which  proposes  to  them  voluntary  exile  from  South-Carolina. 
Let  our  ports  only  be  opened,  and  free  negroes  will  flock  hence  from  the  JNorth 
in  great  numbers,  and  submit  themselves,  even  to  those  laws  which  re- 
cognize no  distinction,  as  to  trial,  &c.  between  them  and  the  slaves.  Our 
great  difficulty  is,  in  keeping  them  from  secretly  coming  to  reside  in  our 
cities.  Should  the  time  ever  arrive,  when  they  shall  become  troublesome 
to  us,  we  shall  not  (like  the  Colonization  Society)  stupidly  propose  to 
them  to  quit  us,  and  to  go  and  fight  for  a home  in  Africa,  but  we  shall  ex- 
pel them  from  the  State,  whether  they  like  it  or  not.  In  the  South  then,  it 
is  perceived,  we  have  no  interest  whatever  in  the  views  of  the  Colonization 
Society,  and  laying  aside  the  unconstitutionality  of  the  measure,  there  can 
be  no  propriety  in  our  being  taxed  for  such  a purpose. 

I would  be  very  thankful  to  some  of  those  ultra  consolidation  men,  who 
think  that  Congress  ought  to  adopt  every  measure  which  can  promote  the 
general  welfare,  if  they  would  approve  of  Congress  making  provision  for 
the  voluntary  removal  of  all  paupers  from  the  United  States.  Here  is  a 
class  of  people,  who  may  not  inaptly  be  compared  as  to  condition,  (l  mean 
no  offence  to  the  real  sons  and  daughters  of  adversity)  ,.0  the  free  negroes 
in  the  Northern  States.  The  law  in  many  countries,  deprives  paupers  of 
some  of  their  civil  rights,  and  in  others,  they  are  placed  in  some  respects 
upon  the  footing  of  vagrants.  Whether,  however,  they  are  incapable  of 
labour,  from  bodily  infirmity,  or  are  wilfully  indolent,  they  are  not  a greater 
burthen  to  the  Northern  communities  than  free  negroes  are.  The  free  ne- 
groes, it  may  be  said,  are  the  paupers  of  the  North,  and  as  paupers  they 
are  supported  by  the  public.  The  pretext  for  their  removal,  cannot  be, 
that  these  people  are  a dangerous  portion  of  the  community,  for  they  can- 
not be  so,  where  they  enjoy  all  the  essentia!  civil  rights  in  common  with 
the  whites,  and  if  the  scheme  of  transporting  them  to  Africa  is  professed  to 
arise  from  the  great  interest  which  our  Northern  brethren  feel  for  our 
safety  in  the  South,  we  have  only  to  reply,  that  we  are  quite  competent  on 
that  score  to  take  care  of  ourselves,  and  would  rather  distrust  than  follow 
counsels  from  abroad. 

Tirneo  Danaos,  et  dona  ferentes. 

The  only  good  that  can  reasonably  be  anticipated  from  the  institution 
of  the  Colonization  Society,  (if  the  free  negroes  in  New- York  and  Penn- 
sylvania can  be  supposed  to  he  fools  enough  to  banish  themselves)  is,  that 
it  will  enable  these  States  to  be  relieved  of  a considerable  body  of  paupers 
and  vagabonds  out  of  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States.  As  for  any  relief 
to  South-Carolina,  I would  venture  from  my  personal  knowledge  of  thpse 
people,  to  predict,  that  not  ten  in  a period  of  ten  years,  would  voluntarily 
go  to  Africa. 


136 


What  greater  right  has  Congress  to  provide  for  the  removal  of  free  ne- 
groes than  for  the  removal  of  paupers  in  the  different  States,  by  providing 
a fund  for  the  passage  money  of  all  who  might  choose  to  leave  the  United 
States.  If  there  be  one  subject  which  can  be  more  local  than  another,  that 
subject  is  PAUPERISM.  So  strictly  local  is  it,  that  in  all  countries  with 
which  I am  acquainted,  each  parish,  is  compelled  to  maintain  its  own  poor. 
Upon  the  same  principle  ought  each  Northern  State  to  provide  lor  the  re- 
moval of  free  negroes,  if  such  persons  are  regarded  as  a nuisance  to  society. 
Congress  has  no  right  to  expend  the  funds  of  the  United  States  for  local 
objects 

When,  however,  we  come  to  regard  the  Colonization  Society  as  to  its 
real  objects,  to-wit,  the  gradual  emancipation  and  removal  of  the  slaves  of 
the  United  States,  the  injustice  of  providing  a national  fund  for  such  a pur- 
pose, becomes  more  manifestly  glaring.  It  will  be  to  tax  us,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  emancipating  against  our  free  will,  our  own  slaves,  which  areas 
much  our  property  as  our  lands  or  houses.  About  three-fourths  of  the 
slaves  of  the  United  States  are  contained  in  the  seven  States  South  of  the 
Potomac  and  Tennessee,  and  were  a direct  tax  laid  for  the  purpose  of  pay- 
ing for  them,  their  proportion  of  this  tax,  by  calculation,  would  be  at  ieast 
one-fourth.  The  1,200,000  slaves  in  these  States,  valued  even  at 
the  average  price  of  $300,  would  amount  to  360  millions  of  dollars,  of 
which  sum  we  should  have  to  pay  ninety  millions,  and  thus,  instead  of  re- 
ceiving $300  round,  we  should  receive  only  $225.  But  how  we  are  to  be 
compensated  for  our  lands,  which,  without  labourers  to  till  them,  must  be 
valueless  to  us,  we  are  not  informed.  It  is  not  stated  in  any  project  I have 
yet  seen,  whether  that  most  puissant  Body,  Congress,  is  to  give  us  any 
thing  for  our  lands  or  not. 

If  there  be  any  view  of  this  subject  which  is  positively  insulting  to  a 
Southern  understanding,  it  is  that  pretext  which  would  regard  emancipa- 
tion, as  strengthening  the  Southern  country  against  an  external  enemy,  as 
if  to  us,  it  would  make  any  difference  after  the  slaves  are  all  removed, 
whether  the  French,  or  English,  or  Russians  had  South-Carolma  : or 
whether  it  existed  at  all. 

Planters  of  South-Carolina,  where  are  you,  that  you  are  so  silent  on  this 
subject ! Bear  with  me,  when  I say  to  you,  that  if  you  are  hereafter  to  ac- 
quiesce, as  hitherto  you  have  done,  in  the  usurpations  of  Congress,  it  would 
be  better  for  each  of  you  to  sleep  under  a roof  of  bayonets,  loosely  put  to- 
gether, with  a chance  of  rising  to  another  morn,  than  to  expect  to  come 
out  safe  and  sound  from  the  dangers  that  thicken  upon  you  on  all  sides  by 
your  present  apathy.  The  more  you  reflect  upon  the  operations  of  the 
Colonization  Society,  the  better  you  will  be  satisfied,  that  its  ostensible  ob- 
ject is  so  wholly  impracticable,  as  to  preclude  the  idea  that  it  ever  could 
have  been  formed,  except  for  other  objects  than  it  professes  to  attain.  In 
the  United  States,  there  are  223,698  free  persons  of  colour.  The  natural 
increase  of  these  might  be  computed  to  be  at  least  8,000  per  annum.  Who 
can  believe  that  this  number  can  ever  be  reduced  within  its  present  limits, 
when  so  many  are  born,  and  so  few  emigrate.  The  negro  colony  has  been 
established  ten  years,  and  now  consists  of  about  600  poor  wretches  who  would 
be  very  glad,  no  doubt,  to  return,  if  they  could.  I do  not  understand  that 
the  Colonization  Society  would  pay  the  expenses  of  any  such  who  desire 
To  return  to  America.  There  is  a tact  which  it  behoves  you  all  to  know, 


137 


Slid  it  is  this.  As  long  as  the  Colonization  Society  openly  professed  n® 
other  object  than  the  removal  of  free  negroes,  it  had  but  little  support,  and 
was  confined  in  its  operations  to  few  States  There  is  nothing  in  the  ori- 
ginal plan  which  is  captivating  to  such  a man  as  Mr,  Wilberforce,  or  as 
calculated  to  take , with  the  great  body  of  the  people  to  the  North.  No 
emancipation  was  held  out,  and  the  abolitionists  were  of  course  indifferent  as 
to  its  success.  The  leading  members  of  the  Society,  perceiving  this  defect 
in  the  plan,  took  the  earliest  opportunity  of  correcting  the  public  impression 
in  this  particular;  and  to  make  their  schememore  palatable,  they  then  openly 
avowed,  that  though  coloni' ation  of  the  free  negroes  was  the  first  object, 
yet,  that  the  great  object  was  emancipation.  The  declaration  is  no  sooner 
made,  than  there  is  an  increase  of  zeal  every  where,  and  it  is  on  the  ground 
of  its  being  an  Abolition  Society,  that  it  now  increases  in  its  popularity 
throughout  the  Northern,  Middle  and  Western  States.  Wherever  the  sub- 
ject has  been  taken  up,  in  any  local  Legislature,  foreign  colonization  has 
uniformly  been  recommended  to  Congress,  as  connected  with  the  emanci- 
pation of  the  slaves  of  the  United  States,  and  thus  to  remove,  what  they 
term  ,!a  national  evil  ” This  was  the  case  with  New- Jersey,  and  I be- 
lieve of  Rhode  Island  and  Indiana,  and  the  Legislature  of  Ohio  in  1824, 
even  proposed  “ the  passage  of  a law  by  the  General  Government,  with 
the  consent  of  the  slave  holding  States,”  providing,  that  “all  children  born 
of  slaves  thereafter,  should  be  free  at  the  age  of  twenty  one.”  One  would 
suppose,  that  if  we  had  any  desire  to  emancipate  our  slaves,  we  should  not 
need  a law  of  the  “ General  Government”  to  that  effect. 

But,  is  it  surprising  that  Ohio  should  venture  thus  far,  when,  instead 
of  looking  to  our  own  State  concerns,  we  have  been  so  incessantly  busying 
Ourselves  in  the  Presidential  contests  for  some  years  past.  Drilled  as  our 
communities  have  been  in  the  general  politics  of  the  country,  and  being 
moved  like  the  heads  of  Chinese  figures,  to  the  right  or  to  the  left , by  the 
word  of  command,  from  men  on  both  sides,  who  are  really  doing  no  more 
than  playing  the  game,  with  the  view  to  the  honours  at  Washington  ; the 
wonder  rather  is,  considering  our  negligence  of  our  own  business,  that 
Congress  has  not  practised  greater  usurpations  of  power. 

Let  us,  however,  now  change  our  whole  course.  It  is  time  so  to  d<e». — ■ 
We  have  no  power,  it  is  true,  to  prevent  the  Legislature  of  Ohio,  or  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  from  being  offensive  and  indecorous  in  its 
proceedings  towards  us,  but  we  have  the  power  to  say  to  the  latter,  that  if 
it  meddles  with  the  subject  of  slavery,  it  must  do  so  at  its  peril.  In  all 
cases  where  slavery  is  proposed  to  be  brought  into  discussion,  let  us  say 
distinctly  to  Congress,  “ HANDS  OFF — mind  your  own  business — attend 
to  your  post-ojfice  and  such  matters.”  If  this  fails,  let  us  separate.  It  is 
not  a case  for  reasoning  or  for  negotiation.  It  must  be  a word  and  a blow. 
The  man  who  comes  into  my  yard  and  preaches  to  my  slaves,  that  they 
ought  to  be  free,  must  not  expect  to  go  out  with  whole  bones.  So,  also,  if 
South-Carolina  desires  domestic  tranquillity,  she  must  separate  from  the 
Union  if  Congress  insists  upon  the  right  to  touch  the  subject  of  slavery, 
on  the  ground  of  its  being  an  evil.  I do  not  anticipate  any  such  issue,  be- 
cause I do  hope,  and  trust,  that  the  State  will  soon  act  in  a manner  worthy 
of  her,  on  this  as  well  as  on  the  subject  of  the  Tariff. 

Fellow-Citizens — This  is  no  trifling  matter.  To  those  of  us  who 
hold  negro  property,  there  is  but  little  difference  between  the  case 


138 


of  Congress  forcibly  taking  from  our  pockets,  three  or  four  hundred 
dollars  for  every  slave  we  own,  and  that  of  their  so  legislating,  as 
to  make  this  property  valueless  to  us.  The  value  of  a slave  arises 
not  merely  from  his  bodily  capacity  for  labour,  (for  he  has  vo- 
lition, and  may  abscond  from  the  service  of  his  owner,)  but  from  his 
contentment  with  his  condition,  and  his  attachment  to  his  master’s 
household.  Once  restive  and  discontented,  under  the  cruelly  fal- 
lacious hope,  that  Congress  is  to  take  them  and  their  whole  race, 
under  its  special  cognizance  and  care,  our  slaves  will  not  only 
become  a present  burden  to  us  all,  but  they  will  create  in  all  of  us, 
whose  lot  is  to  live  in  this  country,  a solicitude  as  to  future  con- 
sequences, which  will  be  the  worse  species  of  slavery  for  us  to  en- 
dure. Never  let  us  forget  the  West  India  colonists.  In  their  lament- 
able history  we  have  seen  the  consequences  of  the  interference  with 
the  subject  of  slavery  on  the  part  of  the  British  Parliament.  What 
would  not  these  colonists  give,  had  they  but  the  means  of  resisting  the 
mother  country,  which  are  so  ample  in  our  hands,  for  keeping  Con- 
gress within  the  legitimate  bounds  of  its  authority.  Let  any  one 
only  read  the  proceedings  of  these  colonists  a few  years  ago,  when 
they  assembled  for  the  purpose  of  devising,  if  possible,  some  mode 
by  which  they  could  be  relieved  from  the  evils  which  beset  them  on 
all  sides,  and  say  whether,  from  the  bosoms  of  men,  there  could 
spring  better  and  nobler  feelings,  and  whether  from  such  a people, 
all  that  courage  could  accomplish,  or  patriotism  and  fortitude  en- 
dure, might  not  be  expected  from  them.  But  alas,  what  will 
avail,  at  any  time,  their  courage.  Theirs  will  be  the  courage  of 
men  in  despair.  Not  so  with  us.  The  abolitionists  of  Philadelphia, 
by  a great  effort,  have  just  returned  as  a member  to  Congress,  Mr. 
Sergeant,  and  that  the  labours  of  this  Wilberfouce  of  the  West- 
-ern  world,  in  the  next  Congress,  may  not  be  in  vain,  the  seat  of  the 
operations  of  the  Abolition  Society,  is  to  be  transferred  from  Phila- 
delphia to  Washington,  that,  in  conjunction  with  the  Colonization 
Society,  and  the  influence  of  Judge  Washington,  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  that  great  NATIONAL  object  may  be  accomplished,  THE 
RUIN  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  STATES. 

It  is  for  you,  planters  of  South-Carolina,  to  rouse  yourselves,  and 
to  make  known  to  your  Legislature,  your  full  sentiments  on  this, 
the  most  important  of  all  the  subjects  which  can  come  under  your 
consideration.  Without  noise,  you  can  quietly  at  your  military  mus- 
ters, and  ordinary  parish  meetings,  prepare  petitions,  not  to  the  body 
who  would  be  deaf  to  all  entreaties  of  the  kind  from  you,  but  to 
your  own  Legislature.  Ask  of  it,  whether  Congress  shall  regard  an 
Abolition  Society  as  an  object  of  national  interest,  and  slavery  as  an 
evil  to  be  rooted  out  of  your  land.  Ask  of  it,  to  interpose  its  powers 
to  protect  its  own  citizens  and  their  property,  and  you  will,  I be- 
lieve, not  ask  in  vain. 


139 


MO.  28. 

We  have  thus  seen  the  situation  to  which  the  Southern  country 
will  be  reduced,  if,  by  any  want  of  firmness  amongst  ourselves,  we 
shall  submit,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  exactions  of  Congress  on  our 
purses,  and  on  the  other,  to  its  interference  directly  or  indirectly, 
with  the  subject  of  slavery.  On  the  subject  of  the  tariff,  there  ap- 
pears to  be  no  fear  of  a due  and  proper  resistance  to  the  usurpations 
of  Congress.  There  is  a spirit  gone  forth,  which  I trust  will  not 
easily  subside.  But  on  other  subjects,  there  is  not  that  feeling  which 
ought  to  prevail.  The  extensive  internal  improvements  that  are  pro- 
posed to  be  carried  on  by  Congress,  will  be  a certain  drain  for  our  re- 
sources to  flow  Northwardly.  But  this  is  not  the  only  important  evil. 
Acquiescence  in  these  measures,  on  the  part  of  the  State  sovereignties, 
sanctions  the  precedent,  that  the  General  Government  has  the  con- 
stitutional right  to  legislate  on  the  local  concerns  of  the  States,  a 
principle  so  fraught  with  danger  to  the  States,  that  if  it  be  not  re- 
sisted by  the  States  now,  they  may  not  have  the  opportunity  or  the 
ability  to  do  so,  when  they  shall  be  sensible  of  a result  which  they 
now  do  not  perceive.  It  is  because  the  effects  of  internal  improve- 
ments are  not  so  perceptible  as  those  of  the  tariff,  that  they  are  so 
little  regarded  by  the  people  at  large.  One  reason  is,  these  im- 
provements are  but  begun.  When  some  progress  shall  have  been 
made  in  them  by  the  Government,  the  injury  to  the  Southern  States 
will  be  prodigious,  in  finally  disarming  them  of  the  power  to  keep 
the  Supreme  Government  within  its  limits.  Every  considerate  per- 
son must  know,  that  an  exercise  of  power  which  puts  it  in  the 
power  of  the  Government  to  disburse  such  immense  national  trea- 
sures, as  will  be  voted  for  internal  improvements,  will  give  that  Gov- 
ernment an  immense  stock  of  patronage,  and  in  the  same  proportion 
in  which  patronage  is  given  to  the  General  Government,  must  it  be 
withdrawn  from  the  States.  Such  a patronage  not  only  will  enable 
a corrupt  Administration  to  have  large  sums  placed  at  its  disposal, 
(as  actually  has  been  the  case)  and  so  to  expend  it  in  particular  sec- 
tions of  the  country,  as  to  coax  and  conciliate  into  its  views,  persons 
who  are  opposed  to  it ; but  it  actually  deprives  the  States  of  that 
which  alone  can  enable  them  to  preserve  their  sovereignties,  to  wit, 
INFLUENCE.  Who  can  look  at  the  Federal  compact,  and  not  be 
struck  with  the  unequal  distribution  of  the  power  between  the  com- 
mon head  and  the  subordinate  members.  The  powers  given  to  the 
first,  are,  it  is  true,  few,  but  they  are  all  the  important  powers,  and 
such  as  are  calculated  to  give  great  influence,  as  well  as  physical 
strength,  to  the  Government  which  possesses  them.  The  sword  and 
th q purse  are  in  the  hands  of  Congress.  To  the  States,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  reserved  a large  mass  of  undefined  powers,  but  they  aro 
no  farther  important,  than  from  the  influence  which  they  might  cre- 
ate in  favour  of  the  State  Governments. 

As  long  as  this  influence  shall  be  preserved  in  the  States,  the  State 
sovereignties  must  be  secure.  They  cannot  possibly  be  subverted, 
whilst  the  patronage  of  Congress  shall  be  confined  within  the  pre- 
scribed subjects  on  which  its  power  is  to  operate  ; for  great  as  is  its 


140 


patronage  in  the  constitutional  exercise  of  its  powers,  it  is  not  such 
as  to  cause,  as  yet,  any  alarm.  But  there  is  a material  difference 
between  what  the  patronage  of  the  General  Government  now  is,  and 
what  it  may  be,  when  it  begins  to  extend  its  power  and  legislation 
over  the  local  concerns  of  the  States.  The  moment  the  time  ar- 
rives, when  by  the  jobs  which  will  be  at  its  disposal  for  roads  and 
canals,  commercial  and  military,  and  by  the  monies  which  it  shall 
expend  in  various  ways  in  the  States,  and  by  the  offices  and  honours 
which  it  shall  distribute,  it  shall  have  more  talent  enlisted  on  its 
behalf,  and  a thousand  times  more  persons  to  support  from  its  trea- 
sury, than  the  State  Governments  from  theirs  ; from  that  moment, 
the  General  Government  will  become  supreme  in  influence , and  conse- 
quently supreme  in  power.  In  all  collisions  between  the  one  Gov- 
ernment and  the  other,  as  to  constructive  powers,  the  General 
Government  will  have  this  incalculable  advantage,  that  in  its  coun- 
cils, there  will  be  but  one  feeling,  that  of  a desire  of  supremacy, 
whilst  the  States  will  be  always  divided ; a large  proportion  of  its 
talent  and  influence  of  its  best  men,  always  siding  with  the  General 
Government  as  the  stronger  party.  The  States,  thus  feebly  opposing 
their  distracted  councils  to  every  usurpation  of  the  General  Govern- 
ment, must  always  fail,  and  consolidation  will  follow  as  a matter 
of  course.  Influence  in  a State  Government  is  therefore  indispen- 
sable to  its  existence  in  a sovereign  character.  If  it  cannot  com- 
mand the  aid  of  its  own  citizens,  by  creating  amongst  them,  an 
interest  to  support  its  measures,  it  will  be  in  vain  to  hope  for  a pre- 
servation of  our  happy  Constitution.  Influence  is  the  weapon  of 
of  defence  provided  for  the  States,  and  considering  how  little  the 
States  possess,  compared  with  what  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  General 
Government  to  create  for  itself,  he  can  be  no  patriot  who  would 
desire  to  see  this  little  still  less.  All  those,  therefore,  who  advocate 
internal  improvements,  are  not  aware  of  the  dangerous  tendency  of 
their  own  doctrines.  The  sovereignty  of  the  States,  existing  in  in- 
fluence, as  well  as  on  the  parchment,  is  the  redeeming  spirit  of  the 
Constitution.  He  who  would  wilfully  deprive  the  States  of  their 
patronage,  is  an  enemy  to  the  Republic. 

Supposing  that  the  General  Government  were  even  just  in  its 
dealings  towards  the  States,  and  were  to  give  to  us  our  full  pro- 
portion of  its  kindnesses,  by  some  ocular  demonstration  of  internal 
improvements  in  our  own  State,  and  all  this  at  the  same,  or  a little 
less  cost,  than  the  works  could  be  completed  for,  if  constructed  by 
ourselves;  who  can  doubt,  but  that  it  would  be  better,  that  our  own 
money  should  be  expended  by  ourselves  It  would  be  more  pleasant, 
that  we  should  have  our  oion  civil  engineers,  than  to  have  persons 
sent  on  from  the  North,  to  do  for  us  that,  to  which  we  would  be 
competent,  if  we  only  had  the  same  means.  That  the  States  are  as 
competent  to  the  work  of  internal  improvements,  as  Congress,  can- 
not be  denied.  We  have,  it  it  true,  in  South-Carolina,  been  inju- 
dicious in  our  expenditures,  but  the  experience  we  have  thereby  ob- 
tained, is  a pledge  that  we  shall  not  waste  money  again.  New-York 
is  a memorable  example  of  the  ability  of  a State  to  make  its  canals. 


141 


Maryland  is  also  zealously  engaged  in  this  work,  and  in  many  of 
the  States,  private  companies  are  accomplishing  all  that  are  at  pre- 
sent necessary. 

There  is  one  view  of  the  subject  of  internal  improvements,  which 
merits  some  attention,  on  account  of  the  extreme  injustice  which  is 
likely  to  be  done  to  particular  sections  of  the  Union.  Amongst  all  the 
ends  for  which  the  Union  was  formed,  it  will  hardly  be  believed,  that 
it  was  ever  intended  that  Congress  should  so  legislate,  as  to  take 
from  some  States  the  advantages  given  them  by  nature,  and  to  trans- 
fer them  to  others.  And  yet,  this  will  be  one  of  the  effects  of  the 
interference  of  Congress  with  this  subject.  As  the  States  are  now 
situated,  L\ew-Orleans  is  destined  to  be  the  emporium  for  the  pro- 
ducts of  the  Western  country.  This  is  an  advantage  she  possesses 
by  nature.  It  is,  however,  a part  of  the  design  of  Providence,  that 
intelligence  and  art  should  be  made  to  triumph  over  certain  ob- 
stacles of  nature,  as  a means  of  stimulating  the  industry  of  man,  and 
it  is  perfectly  fair  that  Pennsylvania,  or  New-York,  or  Maryland, 
should  level  mountains,  and  intersect  them  with  fine  roads  and  ca- 
nals, so  as  to  draw  from  New-Orleans  a part  of  the  valuable  com- 
merce of  the  West.  This  is  no  more  than  what  New-York  does  to 
all  the  cities  in  the  Union.  By  the  superior  intelligence,  or  industry, 
or  capital,  or  something  else,  (not  forgetting  the  good  luck  to  her 
of  the  Federal  Union,  which  enables  her  to  do  our  business'  she  in- 
creases her  own  commerce,  by  taking  from  all  the  other  ports,  and 
is  flourishing  upon  the  ruins  of  us  all.  This  is  all  fair  in  trade. — ■ 
But  I do  humbly  conceive,  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
has  not  aright  so  to  expend  its  resources,  as  to  do  for  Pennsylvania 
or  Maryland,  what  those  States  cannot  do  for  themselves.  Canals 
cut  across  the  Alleghany  ridge,  in  various  directions,  might  cause  a 
serious  diminution  in  the  trade  of  Louisiana  ; and  this  diversion  in 
trade  is  not  effected  by  private  capital  or  industry,  but  by  the  agency 
of  a Government,  whose  duty  it  is,  to  leave  the  States  to  their  own 
resources  for  extending  their  interior  commerce.  If  Congress  can- 
not “ by  any  regulation  of  revenue,  give  a preference  of  one  port  in 
the  United  States  over  another,”  without  violating  the  compact,  I 
do  not  see,  why  it  should  be  permitted  to  do  so,  by  national  roads 
or  national  canals,  or  by  any  other  regulation  of  internal  improve- 
ment. 

Let  the  business  of  internal  improvements  be  left  to  the  States. — ■ 
Here  it  can  be  carried  on  without  a possibility  of  objection.  I can- 
not conceive  of  any  measure  that  will  hurry  us  so  rapidly  towards 
a consolidated  Government,  as  to  take  from  the  States  in  this  way, 
the  patronage  which  so  properly  belongs  to  them,  and  to  confer  it 
on  Congress.  If  our  citizens  are  to  look  to  Washington,  and  not  to 
Columbia,  for  their  honours,  their  preferment,  or  their  employment, 
the  States  must  daily  become  more  and  more  insignificant,  and  the 
General  Government  will  acquire  by  such  means,  a moral  power, 
that  will  set  at  naught  all  attempts  in  future,  to  keep  it  within  its 
limited  sphere  of  action. 


18 


142 


It  alters  not  the  case,  that  these  improvements  in  a State,  are 
made  with  the  assent  of  its  Legislature.  It  is  still  subject  to  ail  the 
objections  heretofore  stated.  The  money  of  the  Government  can- 
not be  applied  to  the  general  welfare  of  “ the  people  of  the  United 
States,”  considered  in  mass,  but  must  be  expended  for  their  general 
welfare,  regarded  as  a confederacy  of  States,  or  in  other  words,  for 
national  objects.  No  object  can  be  national,  which  is  not  expressed 
as  such,  by  the  terms  of  the  compact.  In  my  next,  I will  consider 
more  at  large  this  doctrine  of  internal  improvements  by  Congress, 
with  the  assent  of  a State. 

23TO.  29. 

[Th  is  Number  is  not  one  of  the  series  of  Brutus.  On  the  5th  of  Oct.  it 

ivas  published  in  the  Columbia  Telescope , under  the  signature  of 

“ A Radical  Republican.'''  Its  merit , 1 think , more  than  sufficient 

to  warrant  its  insertion  here.] 

When,  in  1817,  President  Madison  returned  the  bill  setting  apart 
the  bonus  of  the  United  States’  Bank,  for  constructing  roads  and  ca- 
nals, and  improving  inland  navigation,  he  assigned  as  grounds  of 
Constitutional  objection  to  it,  that  the  Constitution  contained  no 
provision  authorizing  the  measure;  and  that  the  assent  of  a State 
could  not  confer  on  Congress  the  power  to  make  roads  and  canals, 
or  improve  water  courses  in  the  body  of  such  State — 12  Niles'  W.  Reg.  25. 
Afterwards,  in  the  same  Session,  a committee  of  the  House  of  Re- 
presentatives asserted  a power  in  Congress,  1st.  To  lay  out,  con- 
struct, and  improve  post-roads  through  a State,  with  its  assent;  Hd. 
To  make  and  improve  military  roads  in  a State,  with  its  assent ; 3d. 
To  cut  Canals  through  a State,  with  its  assent , in  order  to  enhance 
and  secure  its  internal  commerce,  and  to  improve  the  means  of 
transporting  military  stores,  &c  in  war : Provided , in  all  these  cases, 
the  jurisdictional  right  be  not  in  the  State  assenting  and  affected. — 
13  Niles'  Weekly  Reg.  287. 

And  here,  I apprehend,  is  the  origin  of  this  subtlety,  by  which  it 
was  attempted  to  whip  the  devil  round  the  stump,  and  to  make  that 
constitutional  which  was  not  so,  by  virtue  of  the  assent  of  a State. — 
Let  us,  for  a moment,  examine  the  doctrine,  and  see  how  far  it  is 
grounded  in  reason.  I take  it  as  clear  that  all  the  powers  intended 
to  be  vested  in  Congress  are  either  expressed  in  the  Constitution,  or 
vested  in  Congress  as  necessary  to  effectuate  the  express  grants. — 
The  express  powers,  then,  and  those  necessary  to  their  execution, 
are  all  that  the  framers  of  that  instrument  judged  it  safe,  proper,  or 
convenient  to  lodge  in  Congress.  But  if  a State,  by  its  assent,  can 
vest  additional  powers,  then  is  the  dangerous  prerogative  vested  in  a 
single  State,  (and  that  State,  too,  in  the  condition  of  one  receiving  a 
bribe)  of  conferring  authority  on  the  General  Government,  which 
the  whole  of  the  States  withheld  as  unsafe,  improper,  or  inconve- 
nient. This  view  might  easily  be  amplified  ; and  other  instances 
given  where  the  assent  of  a State  would  be  equally  efficacious  in 
giving  powers  to  the  General  Government,  which  would  be  univer- 
sally admitted  to  be  dangerous  in  our  hands. 


148 


Again.  How  was  the  Constitution,  by  its  provisions,  to  be  adopt- 
«d  at  first?  By  nine  States.  Can  an  additional  article  be  inserted 
by  one  State?  Or  view  this  additional  power  as  it  ought  to  be  viewed, 
as  an  amendment.  Can  one  State  amend  the  Constitution  ? How 
would  the  generation  who  thought  they  had  adopted  the  Constitu- 
tion, if  now  permitted  to  revisit  this  earth,  be  surprised  to  find  they 
had  not  adopted  it:  but  that  each  single  State  had  a right  to  add  to 
an  instrument  which  its  framers  foolishly  supposed  complete?  If 
it  be  said  that  the  assent  of  a State,  in  the  cases  referred  to  by  the 
committee,  is  a cessiou  of  State  sovereignty,  which  Congress  simply 
accepts;  where  is  the  constitutional  power  in  Congress  to  do  that ? 
Or,  can  Congress  take  that  into  their  hands,  which  they  are  not  con- 
stitutionally empowered  to  wield  ? Does  the  Constitution  consider 
it  safe  to  vest  in  them  any  thing  like  State  sovereignty,  except  for 
the  ten  miles  square.  Can  a State,  constitutionally,  divest  itself  of 
any  portion  of  its  sovereignty,  so  as  to  make  itself,  (as  far  as  a State 
is  permitted  by  the  Constitution  to  remain  sovereign)  less  than  a 
complete  sovereignty?  Must  not  all  the  States  in  this  Union  stand 
upon  a perfect  equality  as  relates  to  sovereignty  ? If  a State  can  part 
from  a portion  of  its  sovereignty,  what  is  to  prevent  its  giving  up  the 
whole?  If  so,  can  Congress  take  it  from  the  State  as  a gift?  For 
instance,  could  South-Carolina,  or  the  people  of  South-Carolina, 
choose  Congress  for  its  Legislature;  the  President  for  its  Governor, 
and  the  United  States’  Judges  for  its  own,  and  abolish  all  these 
State  functionaries? 

Again-  There  is  no  instance  in  the  Constitution,  of  incomplete 
powers,  except  such  as  are  therein  declared  such.  In  all  other  in- 
stances, when  Congress  has  power,  it  is  complete.  For  instance, 
the  power  of  Congress  to  declare  war,  may  be  exercised  without  con- 
sulting a single  State.  If  Congress  possesses  the  power  of  making- 
roads,  &c.  it  needs  not  the  assent  of  a State  : if  it  does  not,  that  as- 
sent cannot  confer  it.  What  folly  to  be  asking  the  assent  of  a State, 
to  maike  a good  road  or  canal  for  it,  or  to  open  its  rivers  ! Would 
any  State  refuse  it  ? It  is  a singular  prerequisite,  which  is  to  come 
from  the  party  benefitted.  But  it  is  the  other  States  who  pay  the  mo- 
ney, whose  leave  ought  to  be  asked. 

It  will  be  observed  that  I have  considered  a State  in  giving  its  as- 
sent to  make  roads,  <fcc.  through  it,  as  yielding  sovereignty , and 
Congress  as  acquiring  it.  I know  that  the  committee  provided, 
what  they  considered,  a salvo  against  this  objection,  by  saving  the 
jurisdictional  right  to  the  State.  But  this  is  all  a mere  fudge.  If 
the  State,  in  giving  its  assent,  was  parting  with  nothing,  why  ask 
that  assent  ? Could  the  private  owners  of  the  soil  give  Congress 
their  assent  to  make  a road  over  it  ? No.  The  State  might  still  re- 
fuse theirs.  The  State  would  still  possess  that  species  of  sovereignty 
called  the  eminent  domain ; which  consists,  so  far  as  concerns  this 
argument,  in  a right  to  employ  such  portions  of  the  soil  of  citizens 
as  may  be  necessary  for  roads.  The  State  might  want,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  a canal,  this  very  line  of  road,  a part  of  it  ceded  by  the  citi- 
zens to  the  United  States.  When  a State,  therefore,  gives  to  Con- 


144 


gress  her  assent  to  make  a road  or  canal,  she  parts  with  this  very 
sovereignty  called  the  eminent  domain.  True,  the  committee  reserve 
to  the  State  the  jurisdiction  over  the  road  after  it  is  made  ; but  this 
is  another  and  distinct  portion  of  sovereignty.  Is  there  no  sove- 
reignty in  opening  a road  through  my  land  1 If  there  is,  it  is  that 
which  a State  gives  to  Congress. 

A citizen  could  not  convey  to  the  General  Government  his  lands, 
in  the  body  of  a State.  (Commonwealth  vs.  Young;  1 Hall’s  Jour. 
Jurisp.)  The  United  States  could  not  hold  such  property.  If  they 
could  not  hold  the  land,  how  could  they  hold  a right  of  way,  which 
is  nothing  but  an  incorporeal  hereditament  issuing  out  of  it?  Their 
laws  could  not  be  extended  to  it.  Neither  could  the  assent  of  the 
State  mend  the  matter.  It  has  been  decided  that  Congress  cannot 
extend  their  laws  to  a fortress,  not  owned  by  the  United  States,  but 
occupied  by  their  troops,  in  the  body  of  a State,  even  with  the  as- 
sent of  the  State.  (People  vs.  Godfrey;  11  Johns.  225.) 

Again.  By  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
it  is  declared  that  private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public  use 
without  just  compensation.  But  this  prohibition  in  the  opinion  of 
some,  does  not  apply  to  a State  Government ; it  only  applies  to  the 
General  Government : the  States  are  as  sovereign  and  unrestrained 
in  this  respect  as  before  the  United  States’  Constitution  was  framed. 
Now,  if  a State  gives  Congress  a right  to  make  a road  over  my  land, 
who  is  to  pay  me  for  it  ? The  State  is  not  bound  to  do  it.  Cannot 
Congress;  which  is  not  lame  at  an  excuse,  say  we  did  not  take  your 
property  ? Your  State  took  it,  and  gave  it  to  us  ; look  to  the 
State. 

JETO.  3®. 

Our  ancestors  of  1788,  foresaw  the  evils  with  which  we  are  now 
afflicted.  When  Patrick  Henry,  of  Virginia,  and  Rawlins 
Lowndes,  of  South-Carolina,  in  their  respective  State  Conventions, 
opposed  the  Constitution  in  its  present  form,  they  feared  that  the 
States  would  daily  lose  their  power  and  their  influence,  and  that 
the  time  was  not  distant  when  the  people  would  be  consolidated  into 
one  Government.  “You  have  given  to  Congress  the  sword  and  the 
purse”  exclaims  the  Virginia  Statesman,  “and  they  will  take  the 
rest,  whether  you  will  it  or  not “ Upon  my  tombstone,”  concludes 
the  venerable  Patriarch  of  South-Carolina,  after  being  exhausted 
with  the  debate,  “upon  my  tombstone,  I desire  no  other  inscription 
than,  that  THIS  IS  THE  MIN  who  opposed  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion,because  he  foresaw  that  it  would  finally  RUIN  THE  SOUTH- 
ERN COUNTRY.” 

Those  who  remember  Mr.  Lowndes,  as  well  as  I do,  can  bear  tes- 
timony to  his  virtues  as  a Patriot,  and  his  rank  as  a Statesman  of 
solid  rather  than  brilliant  acquirements.  He  was  identified,  soul 
and  body,  with  the  Colony,  and  the  State  from  which  he  received  so 
many  honours  ; and  it  was  his  strong  attachment  to  that  State,  whose 
independence  he  contributed  to  rear,  which  caused  him  to  struggle 
fro  the  last  against  a form  of  Government,  which,  in  his  view,  would 


145 


bring  it  back  again  to  a colonial  dependance  upon  sections  of  the 
Union,  who  were  opposed  to  our  peculiar  interests  by  education  and 
by  prejudice.  Amongst  the  objections  of  Mr.  Low  des  to  the  Con- 
stitution, he  thought  that  the  character  of  the  confederacy  had  not 
been  sufficiently  preserved  ; nor  could  be  be  reconciled  to  that  poli- 
cy, by  which  his  State  was  to  yield  to  die  General  Government  its 
ENTIRE  Custom-house.  He  was  one  of  those  who  believed,  and 
believed  rightly,  that  a country,  which,  for  its  cultivation,  must  de- 
pend upon  the  labour  of  slaves,  ought  to  possess,  within  itself,  the 
power  to  keep  in  subjection  those  slaves  under  any  circumstances. 
The  government  of  our  slaves,  it  is  true,  may  be  maintained  by  an 
habitual  sense  in  their  minds  of  their  own  inferiority,  and  of  their 
obligation  to  perfect  obedience.  But  Mr.  Lowndes  had  too  much 
sagacity  not  to  perceive,  that  any  distribution  of  power  which  did 
not  enable  South-Carolina  to  contain  within  itself  a more  permanent 
principle  of  obedience  from  the  slaves,  than  the  influence,  which 
certain  habits  of  thinking,  (always  liable  to  fluctuation  or  change) 
might  furnish,  could  not  be  a judicious  or  a safe  one.  The  coercion 
of  ARMS  is  the  only  principle  of  force  upon  which  the  submission 
of  the  slave  is  permanently  to  be  calculated.  The  power  of  keep- 
ing up  a regular  force  was  therefore  one,  which,  under  no  circum- 
stances, South-Carolina  ought  to  have  given  up.  But  when  she 
parted  with  the  PURSE,  in  giving  up  her  Custom-house,  it  perhaps 
became  afterwards,  immaterial  to  her  whether  she  had  or  had  not 
the  power  of  raising  troops,  for  we  surrendered  the  means  of  so  doing. 
VVe  have,  ourselves,  lived  to  see  the  necessity  of  a municipal  guard 
of  one  or  two  hundred  men  to  protect  our  citizens  from  sudden  dan- 
ger, and  we  behold  the  sovereign  state  of  South-Carolina  unable  to 
raise  such  a guard,  without  the  license  of  the  General  Government. — . 
Was  it  surprising  then,  that  such  a man  as  was  Mr.  Lowndes,  born 
and  bred  in  a country,  cultivated  by  slaves,  should  have  struggled 
as  he  did,  for  the  only  power  by  which  his  State  could  maintain  her 
consequence  and  ensure  her  permanent  tranquillity — the  power  of 
raising  a revenue  by  the  easiest  possible\  means,  and  without  its 
being  felt  by  the  people.  Who  can  look  around  him  and  perceive  a 
section  of  the  Union  like  ours,  blessed  by  Providence  with  the  rich- 
est products,  and  so  fortunately  situated  for  an  extensive  and  profit- 
able commerce  with  Europe  and  the  world,  and  not  feel  indignant 
that  the  people  of  the  North,  not  content  with  having  all  the  fruits  of 
this  lucrative  commerce  poured  into  their  own  laps,  should  exact  of 
us  still  greater  sacrifices  than  we  consented  to  pay  as  the  price  of  our 
dear  bought  Union.  Let  any  man  only  take  up  and  peruse  Mr. 
M’Cord’s  speech,  delivered  at  Columbia,  and  ask  himself  whether 
the  General  Government  has  been  paternal  to  the  South.  So  far 
from  it,  he  will  perceive  by  the  irrefragable  evidence  which  this 
speech  contains,  that  from  the  foundation  of  the  Government  to  this 
hour,  the  ichole  policy  of  the  Government  has  been  so  directed  as  to 
cause  the  weight  of  the  indirect  taxes  to  fall  upon  the  South.  Whe- 
ther manufactures  were  to  be  encouraged  under  imposts,  which  were 
necessaiy  or  not  necessary  to  revenue  ; whether  bounties  were  grant- 


146 


ed  on  the  exportation  of  dried,  pickled  and  salted  fish,  or  whether 
their  shipping  interests  were  protected  by  exorbitant  tonnage  duties, 
or  a diminution  of  duties  on  goods  imported  in  American  ships,  the 
South  still  has  been  the  beast  of  burthen  for  the  North.  In  the 
words  of  Mr.  M’Cord,  “ we  have  been  paying  a heavy,  destructive 
tribute,  worse  than  that  which  Ireland  lias  paid  to  Great-Britain. — 
From  the  very  commencement  of  our  political  existence  under  the 
Union,  the  Federal  Government  has  been  a continued  and  an  op- 
pressive drain  upon  the  South,”  whilst  not  a single  interest  in  which 
the  South  could  participate,  has  ever  received  the  least  protection 
from  Congress.  Mr.  M’Cord  ably  refutes,  by  facts  and  by  reason- 
ing, that  most  unfounded  assertion  of  the  Manufacturers,  which  has 
been  thoughtlessly  taken  up  even  by  “ the  American  Quarterly  Re- 
view,” that  the  cultivation  of  cotton  was  originally  protected  by  a 
Tariff.  Southern  interests  have  never  received  protection  from  the 
Federal  Government. 

Mr.  Lowndes  foresaw,  no  doubt,  all  these  evils.  His  intellect  was 
of  an  high  order,  and  his  wisdom  was  of  a character  which  almost 
amounted  to  prescience.  But  did  he,  in  this,  his  last  effort,  for  the 
sovereignty  of  the  States,  speak  with  the  spirit  of  prophecy!  Let  us 
decide,  my  fellow-citizens,  that  he  did  not.  Let  us  by  our  acts  and 
our  measures,  demonstrate,  that  when  he  predicted  the  fate  of  South- 
Carolina,  he  was  for  once  mistaken.  Let  us  use  his  epitaph,  as  the 
warning  voice  of  the  best  of  friends.  Let  us  profit  by  the  counsel  it 
contains.  Let  us  remember,  that  “ the  strength  and  powers  of  usur- 
pation, consist  WHOLLY  in  the  FEAR  of  RESISTING  it,  and 
that  in  order  to  be  FREE,  it  is  only  sufficient  that  we  WILL  it .” — 
That  done,  let  not  Mr.  Lowndes’  prophecy  remain  with  its  falsifi- 
cation, but  let  us,  in  kindness  to  the  memory  of  our  deceased  patriot 
and  friend,  and  in  gratitude  for  his  legacy,  destroy  his  tombstoue 
and  his  epitaph,  and  substitute  one  commemorative  of  his  services. 
Be  ours  now,  the  duty  to  avert  by  our  firmness,  the  ruin  that  he  pre- 
dicted was  in  preparation  for  us ; and  upon  the  heads  of  our  op- 
pressors, let  us  break  those  new  chains  which  both  Houses  of  Con- 
gress, with  a corrupt  and  corrupting  administration,  are  now  forging 
for  us  at  Washington. 

The  safety  of  the  republic  is  in  the  integrity  and  sovereignty  of 
the  States.  It  is  here  and  here  alone,  that  the  great  principles  of 
eivil  liberty  are  safe  from  the  hands  of  violence  and  ambition.  In 
the  hands  of  Congress  they  cannot  be  deposited,  but  at  the  risk  of 
their  being  abused  and  destroyed.  Congress  aims  at,  and  is  in  the 
exercise  of  great  constructive  powers.  Under  the  confederation 
even,  Congress  aimed  at  sovereignty.  Mr.  Martin  in  the  conven- 
tion, “ confessed  that  when  the  confederation  was  formed,  Congress 
ought  to  have  been  invested  with  more  extensive  powers ; but  when 
the  States  saw  that  Congress  indirectly  aimed  at  sovereignty,  they 
were  jealous,  and  therefore  it  was,  that  they  refused  further  con- 
cessions.” 

Under  the  present  Constitution,  Congress  has  so  much  power,  that 
it  seizes  with  more  ease  upon  what  it  wants.  The  powers  which 


147 


it  now  assumes,  and  the  principles  upon  which  it  claims  them,  are 
such  as  necessarily  lead  to  consolidation,  and  from  consolidation, 
as  Mr.  Madison  well  observes,  we  shall  pass  to  monarchy — not 
monarchy  in  name , but  monarchy  in  substance;  and  liberty  once 
driven  from  the  spot  where  she  would  delight  to  dwell,  will  con- 
tinue to  wing  its  flight,  more  and  more  westward.  As  regards  the 
peculiar  rights  and  interests  of  the  South,  I can  see  no  political  sal- 
vation for  us,  but  in  the  undiminished  sovereignty  of  our  State.  At 
every  cost  and  hazard  we  must  maintain  that  sovereignty.  Through 
“ good  report  and  bad  report,”  we  must  not  surrender  one  atom  of 
it  to  Congress,  unless  we  intend  to  yield  all  that  is  dear  and  valu- 
able to  us.  The  sovereignty  of  the  State,  is  the  ARK,  into  which 
the  gradual  swelling  of  the  floods  of  usurpation,  of  avarice  and  fa- 
naticism around  us,  admonish  us  to  retire  with  our  families  and  our 
goods,  ere  it  shall  be  too  late.  Let  us  then,  cling  to  this  ark,  and 
when  in  that  great  deluge  of  the  constructive  powers  of  Congress, 
which  is  now  coming  upon  the  States,  shall  be  engulphed  every 
principle  of  liberty,  for  which  our  fathers  fought  and  bled,  and  every 
right  of  self-government,  secured  to  us  by  the  Constitution,  we  shall 
still  float  upon  the  bosom  of  the  mighty  flood,  and  on  the  subsiding 
of  the  waters,  shall  find  a secure  spot  to  rest  upon,  and  we  shall 
come  out  with  our  little  ones,  and  our  floeks  and  herds,  safe  and 
sound.  To  pursue  any  other  course,  or  to  fly  for  succour,  to  any 
other  refuge  but  our  own  resources,  or  to  the  means  so  kindly  pro- 
vided for  us,  is  to  immolate  our  country  on  the  altars  of  folly  and 
crime.  To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  wc  can  no  longer 
look  for  protection.  Instead  of  protecting  us  from  danger,  Congress 
itself  is  the  invader.  In  such  a case,  says  the  sage  of  Monticello, 
“ the  States  must  shield  themselves,  and  meet  the  invader  foot  to 
foot."  There  can  be  no  compromise — No  half  way  measures. — 
When  the  rights  of  one  sovereign  are  invaded  by  another  sovereign, 
there  is  no  course  but  resistance.  If  resistance  produces  Disunion, 
let  Disunion  come.  Better  that  it  should  come  now,  than  some 
twenty  years  hence,  when  our  trade  shall  have  been  destroyed , our 
policy  crumbled  to  ruins , our  citizens  mined , and  our  spirits  broken 
down  by  wrongs  upon  wrongs  heaped  upon  us,  by  a Government,  in 
the  hands  of  manufacturers,  fanatics  and  abolitionists. 

As  to  union,  who  is  there  that  has  a family  or  property  to  protect, 
who  does  not  value,  and  who  does  not  want  union,  and  want  it  too, 
as  much,  if  not  more,  than  those  who  make  such  an  outcry  about 
it  ? God  knows  I value  union  as  much,  and  believe  I am  as 
deeply  interested  in  it,  as  men  in  general;  but  I am  not  so  silly,  or 
so  sentimental,  as  to  regard  union  above  all  price.  On  the  con- 
trary, I think  the  price  we  have  already  paid  for  union,  is  more  than 
a fair  and  a sound  price  for  the  commodity,  and  were  the  bargain  to 
be  made  over  again,  I would  not  give  as  much.  Give  me  union 
upon  the  terms,  and  in  the  spirit  of  1789.  Give  me  this  blessing,  as 
it  is  secured  to  me  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Give 
me  equal  laws  and  equal  burthens,  as  was  stipulated,  and  I will 
defend  the  Constitution,  as  is  my  duty,  with  my  “ life,  my  fortune, 


148 


and  my  sacred  honour.”  I will  adhere  to  the  oath  I have  taken, 
and  I will  redeem  the  sacred  pledge  I have  given  to  support  it.  But 
place  before  me  union  upon  the  terms  of  the  manufacturers,  and  the 
Colonization  and  Abolition  Societies  of  the  North,  and  I will  spurn 
it  as  a thing  grossly  offensive  to  me.  Such  an  union,  I will,  to  the 
latest  hour  of  my  life,  oppose. 

I am  not  to  be  amused  with  a name,  as  a child  would  be  with  a 
toy.  God  has  blessed  me  with  intelligence  enough  to  distinguish 
between  the  substance  and  the  shadow  of  the  things  of  this  world, 
and  I too  well  know,  what  contributes  to  the  health  and  vigour  of 
my  native  State,  and  what  is  eating  out  its  very  vitals,  not  to  be 
alarmed  at  the  usurpations  of  the  Government.  As  to  the  Consti- 
tution of  the  United  States,  if  a thousand  such  were  placed 
before  me,  in  which  Congress  is  to  have  no  limitation  but  its  will, 
and  in  which  my  State  is  not  to  have  and  use  at  her  discretion, 
her  own  resources,  and  in  the  way  in  which  it  was  intended  they 
should  be  used,  I would  break  down  the  pillars  of  them  all,  and 
rejoice,  and  triumphantly  rejoice,  in  the  deed  I had  done.  Away 
then,  away  with  all  this  unmeaning  cant  and  jargon  of  union,  which 
at  all  times,  and  under  all  ciicumstances,  are  in  the  mouths  of  some 
self-constituted  patriots.  We  all  know,  and  feel  the  necessity  of 
union.  We  all  desire  union.  In  proper  union,  we  are  sensible 
that  our  interest  and  our  safety  consists,  and  to  preserve  union,  we 
are  ready  to  make  reasonable  sacrifices.  But  there  is  a point  in  ad- 
justing differences  and  collisions  between  nations,  as  well  as  be- 
tween individuals,  beyond  which,  neither  religion  nor  prudence,  nor 
a regard  to  our  safety,  would  require  us  to  go.  The  crisis  ap- 
proaches, when  it  shall  be  demanded  of  us  to  surrender  rights,  which 
we  never  can  surrender,  without  impairing  our  prosperity  as  a State, 
and  diminishing  our  security  and  our  comfort  as  a Society.  The 
tariff  is  an  OPEN  blow  aimed  at  our  agriculture  and  our  commerce. 
The  proposed  protection  to  the  Northern  abolitionists,  is  an  insidious, 
a CONCEALED,  and  a dangerous  attack  upon  the  domestic  tran- 
quillity of  the  South.  Our  citizens  have  seen  the  uplifted  arm  of 
the  manufacturers  to  cripple  their  industry,  and  they  seem  both  ready 
and  willing  to  avert  the  blow.  But  the  approach  of  the  other  enemy 
lias  been  so  slow  and  cautious,  that  it  has  been  unobserved.  The 
cause  of  African  emancipation  has  slyly  crept  into  the  Federal  coun- 
cils. It  will  there  advance  or  recede,  as  the  policy  of  its  friends  and 
adherents  shall  dictate.  But  it  is  there,  and  if  this  hydra  be  not 
crushed,  and  with  it,  all  the  hopes  of  the  Abolition  Society,  we  may 
bid  adieu  to  the  peace  of  the  Southern  States.  A beginning  once 
made  by  Congress,  no  man  can  see  the  end  of  it.  Give  me  dis- 
union. Make  me  a colonist,  not  of  England,  (for  that  would  be 
going  “ from  the  frying-pan  into  the  fire”)  but,  if  you  please,  of 
Spain,  France,  or  Holland,  rather  than  compel  me  to  be  a perma- 
nent resident  of  South-Carolina,  with  a power  on  the  part  of  an 
American  Congress,  to  legislate,  directly  or  indirectly,  on  the  sub- 
ject of  slavery. 


149 


TZO.  31. 

So  much  has  been  said  in  Town  and  Parish  meetings,  of  the  usur- 
pations of  Congress,  and  of  the  determination  of  the  people  to  resist 
any  further  Tariff,  that  we  are  to  take  it  for  granted,  that  we  now 
intend  to  do  something  more,  than  we  have  done  on  former  occa- 
sions, of  complaint  against  the  Government. 

This  is  not  the  first  time  that  the  Constitution  has  been  violated 
by  grossly  taxing  the  South  to  support  the  North.  In  IS16,  the 
Manufacturers  succeeded  in  obtaining  protecting  duties  for  their  fa- 
brics. We,  however,  did  not  then  take  the  alarm,  though  the  taxes 
imposed  upon  consumption  by  the  revenue  laws  of  that  year,  were 
considerable.  In  1820,  the  Manufacturers  again  pressed  forward, 
and  made  very  exorbitant  demands  for  protection.  We  then  re- 
monstrated A very  able  memorial  of  the  citizens  of  Charleston, 
drawn  by  Mr.  Stephen  Elliott,  who  was  the  Chairman  of  a most 
respectable  committee,  was  transmitted  to  Congress.  But  the  Ta- 
riff men  succeeded,  and  the  Bill  laying  additional  duties  on  articles 
of  consumption,  was  passed  by  Congress.  In  1824,  these  voracious 
Manufacturers, 

As  if  increase  of  appetite,  had  grown 

By  what  it  fed  on, 

j^gain  demanded  a higher  rate  of  duties  on  foreign  manufactures. — • 
The  city  of  Charleston  again  remonstrates  by  a spirited  memorial, 
and  its  example  was  followed  in  other  parts  of  the  State.  But  all 
our  remonstrances  were  disregarded,  and  the  bill  was  passed.  It  was 
easy  to  foresee,  and  there  were  not  wanting  persons  who  predicted 
it  in  1820,  (when  there  was  the  first  alarm)  that  a quiet  submission,  at 
that  time,  to  these  usurpations,  would  produce  no  other  effect  than 
to  invite  a repetition  of  them,  and,  that  unless  the  remonstrances  of 
the  people  were  followed  up  by  some  decisive  measures  on  the  part 
of  our  State  Legislature,  we  should  have  Tariff  upon  Tariff,  until 
our  whole  foreign  commerce  was  destroyed.  The  prophecy  soon 
began  to  be  fulfilled.  In  1824,  the  South  is  again  plundered  of  the 
fruits  of  its  industry  to  pamper  Northern  monopolists.  In  1827,  a 
fresh  attempt  is  made  to  plunder  us  again,  and  it  is  this  attempt  that 
has  called  forth  the  present  expression  of  the  public  feelings  and 
sentiment  on  the  subject  of  the  Tariff. 

Now,  1 do  most  humbly  conceive,  that  unless  some  very  strong 
and  decisive  measures,  on  the  part  of  South-Carolina,  shall  grow 
out  of  all  this  public  excitement,  it  will  have  been  idle  for  the  peo- 
ple to  have  assembled  at  all.  Resolutions  of  Town  and  Parish 
meetings  have  hitherto  had  no  more  effect  than  if  they  had  not  been 
entered  into.  Nay,  more, — Resolutions  of  STATE  Legislatures 
have  had  no  effect.  Our  own  Legislature  has  already  resolved  that 
the  Tariff  is  an  unconstitutional  measure  ; and  yet,  I do  believe,  that 
any  such  legislative  proceeding  as  this,  never  produces  any  other 
sensation  at  Washington,  than  a smile  from  the  majority  of  the  mem- 
bers. that  a State  Legislature  should  undertake  to  decide  whether 

19 


150 


their  HIGH  MIGHTINESSES  were  in  the  exercise  of  their  pow- 
ers. I do  venture  to  assert  that  we  shall,  every  four  years,  lor  a 
century  to  come,  (if  wc  last  a fourth  of  the  time  as  an  independent 
State,)  resolve  in  our  Town  and  Parish  meetings,  (and  our  Legisla- 
ture shall  do  the  same,)  that  all  these  acts  of  Congress  are  acts  of 
usurpation,  and  we  shall  talk  of  equality  of  rights  and  equality  of 
laws  under  the  Constitution  ; and  of  what  our  ancestors  did  ; and 
we  shall  remind  our  oppressors  of  the  consequences  w hich  followed 
the  tax  upon  tea  during  the  Revolution;  and,  that  their  descendants 
know  how  to  value  the  rich  inheritance  bequeathed  to  them  ; and 
that  after  all  this  shall  have  been  resolved  over  and  over  again,  and 
a great  deal  more,  it  will  have  no  effect  whatever  in  restraining  Con- 
gress within  its  limited  sovereignty.  Men,  whose  constituents  have 
got  so  many  millions  of  dollars  at  hazard,  and  who,  from  habitual 
usurpation,  have  such  a sense  of  their  omnipotence,  are  not  to  be 
ecarecl  by  these  kind  of  bullets,  from  their  own  paper  manufactories; 
these  pop  guns,  let  off  at  Congress,  from  every  crook  and  corner  of 
our  State.  The  Northern  people  have  been  so  accustomed  to  this 
sort  of  thing,  that  they  will  regard  all  these  proceedings  as  the  mode 
or  vent  by  which  Southern  spirit  evaporates , and  they  have  a right 
so  to  consider  it,  because  all  such  proceedings  hitherto,  have  termi- 
nated and  settled  down,  on  our  part,  in  MOST  TRANQUIL  SUB- 
MISSION ; though  we,  ourselves,  know  full  well,  it  has  proceeded 
from  the  extreme  desire  we  have  for  peace  and  Union. 

He  is  but  a superficial  observer,  who  does  not  see  that  all  that  has 
been  done  by  us  will  amount  to  nothing,  and  that  all  this  manifesta- 
tion of  the  public  feeling  will  have  been  useless,  unless  the  Legisla- 
ture shall  embody  that  feeling — not  simply  by  resolving,  but  BY 
ACTING  ; by  acts  and  measures  which  cannot  be  misunderstood, 
and  which,  on  being  made  known  to  Congress,  must  cause  that  body 
to  reflect  as  to  the  extent  of  its  powers,  and  to  pause  before  it  shall 
wantonly  come  into  direct  collision  with  a member  of  the  confede- 
racy, hitherto  devoted  to  Union,  but  whose  attachment  to  the  great 
head  has  been  weakened  by  the  inconsiderate  folly  and  extravagancy 
of  its  pretensions  to  unlimited  power.  If  any  other  course  than  this 
is  to  be  taken ; or  if,  in  plainer  words,  our  Legislature  is  to  resolve, 
and  after  it  has  resolved,  is  not  to  be  prepared  to  resort  to  other 
measures,  in  case  Congress  shall  not  abandon  the  principle  of  the 
Tariff,  then  South-Carolina  is  gone,  IRRECOVERABLY  GONE. 
Let  us  never  again  bluster  about  the  Tariff,  and  talk  big  on  the  sub- 
ject of  State  rights,  but  let  us  ever  hereafter  endeavour  to  get  by  our 
extreme  civility  and  our  passive  obedience,  what  we  are  afraid  to  at- 
tempt to  gain,  by  a firm  and  a manly  resistance.  As  I am  one  of 
those  who  never  for  an  instant  could  believe  that  my  countrymen, 
like  the  Neapolitans,  are  only  valiant  in  speech,  and  submissive  as 
soon  as  a soldier’s  bayonet  shall  be  in  sight,  I take  occasion  to  re- 
peat, that  if  we  are  to  contend  with  the  General  Government  for  our 
rights,  we  must  contend  on  PRINCIPLE.  I have  been  mortified 
over  and  over  again  to  observe,  that  almost  all  the  reasonings  against 
the  Tariff,  in  and  out  of  Congress,  have  been  grounded  on  its  inex- 


151 


pediency  and  inequality  as  a national  measure.  If  this  be  fhe  ground, 
we  are  to  take,  we  are  undone.  If  Congress  has  the  Constitutional 
right  to  protect  Northern  manufactures,  that  body  alone  is  to  decide 
on  the  expediency  or  impolicy  of  the  measure.  We  may  differ  with 
Congress  on  this  question  ; but,  after  Congress  has  decided  that  the 
measure  is  politic  and  proper , we  must  submit,  however  injurious  it 
may  be  to  our  particular  interests.  In  England,  it  is  common  for 
the  Government  to  sustain  particular  interests  at  the  expense  of  other 
interests.  But  no  one  doubts  the  power  of  Parliament  to  pass  com 
laws , and  navigation  laws,  and  laws  to  prevent  the  exportation  of 
wool.  All  the  people  of  England  are  under  a consolidated  Govern- 
ment, and  if  those  who  suffer  by  unequal  laws  cannot  obtain  a suc- 
cessful hearing  from  Parliament,  they  must  be  without  redress. 
Though  we  are  not,  in  America,  under  a consolidated  Government, 
yet,  submission  is  as  clearly  due  to  the  Federal  Government,  where 
it  is  in  the  exercise  of  its  legitimate  sovereignty,  as  if  there  were  no 
State  Governments.  If,  then,  we  oppose  the  Taviff,  on  the  ground  of 
its  impolicy,  the  instant  Congress  decides  that  it  is  not  impolitic,  our 
opposition  ought  to  cease.  It  is,  therefore  wrong,  decidedly  wrong, 
to  oppose  the  Tariff  upon  a weak  ground,  when  we  have  that  best  of 
all  grounds,  that  it  is  a violation  of  the  compact,  for  Congress  to 
protect  a local  interest  of  particular  States  at  the  expense  of  all  the 
people  of  the  United  States. 

Congress  either  has  or  it  has  not  the  right  to  protect  Northern  ma- 
nufactures. If  it  has  the  right,  we  all  must  believe,  that  it  will 
sooner  or  later,  extend  that  protection  still  further.  Under  this  view 
of  the  subject,  the  first  duty  of  every  good  citizen  of  South-Carolina 
is,  to  make  up  his  mind  on  the  great  question  of  the  RIGHT  of 
Congress  to  impose  the  Tariff;  for  by  the  decision  of  this  question, 
in  his  own  mind,  is  his  conduct  to  be  regulated.  To  perplex  his 
mind  about  the  impolicy  of  restrictions  on  commerce  to  promote 
manufactures,  and  thus  to  go  into  the  metaphysical  subtleties  of  the 
school  of  the  economists,  can  answer  no  other  end,  than  to  bewilder 
him,  as  thousands  before  him  have  been  bewildered.  And  after  all, 
he  must  at  last,  come  again  to  the  question  as  to  the  right  of  Con- 
gress to  adopt  the  measure.  If  Congress  has  the  right  which  it 
claims,  the  path  of  duty  is  clear  to  every  citizen  It  is  to  submit. 
I,  for  one,  would  be  the  firs!  to  submit,  were  that  my  opinion.  But 
again,  if  Congress  has  not  the  right,  the  path  of  duty  is  equally 
clear.  It  is  for  the  State  to  take  care  of  her  rights  of  sovereignty, 
and  thus  to  protect  her  citizens.  Every  man,  I now  hope,  perceives 
the  injudiciousness  and  folly  of  opposing  the  tariff,  excepting  upon 
the  true  ground,  to  wit,  that  it  is  an  unconstitutional  act. 

To  talk  too,  of  resistance  to  the  tariff,  by  all  constitutional  means, 
is  to  talk  to  no  purpose.  It  would  be  better  to  say  nothing.  It  is 
to  talk  of  submission,  and  not  resistance.  When  many  sovereign 
States  are  parties  to  a league  or  compact  between  themselves,  mutu- 
ally fixing  the  boundaries  of  power,  beyond  which,  neither  party 
shail  go,  and  some  of  the  parties  violate  that  compact,  so  as  to  en- 
danger the  existence  of  the  others,  can  the  mind  of  man  conceive 


152 


any  other  mode  of  settling  such  a dispute,  excepting  by  negotiation 
or  the  sword.  Were  any  point  in  dispute  between  such  parties, 
not  important,  a case  might  be  made  up  by  counsel,  for  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  and  its  decision  might,  by  com- 
mon consent,  be  received  as  final.  But  on  a point  involving  vital 
interests,  a State  would  not  be  authorized,  as  lias  already  been 
observed,  from  its  obligation  to  its  own  citizens,  to  submit  such  a 
point  to  the  decision  of  any  arbiter  whatever,  much  less  to  the  award 
and  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court,  which  is  the  tribunal  of  the 
General  Government,  and  consequently  cannot  be  impartial  on  a 
question  of  disputed  sovereignty. 

My  fellow-citizens,  you  may  view  this  subject  as  you  please. — 
First,  to  the  right,  and  then  to  the  left.  Turn  it  every  way  in  your 
thoughts,  and  if  there  be  in  South-Carolina,  a patriot,  who  can  de- 
vise a practicable  plan,  by  which,  in  our  present  deplorable  situ- 
ation, we  can  rid  ourselves  of  the  leeches  that  are  drawing  from  us 
our  life  blood,  I hope,  in  God,  he  will  come  forward  and  recommend 
it.  1 have  heard  of  several  plans,  but  I will,  in  another  number, 
shew  their  inutility.  1 can,  myself,  see  no  hope  for  our  domestic 
safety,  or  for  our  agricultural  interests,  but  in  RESISTANCE. — 
Resistance,  and  firm  resistance,  is  the  only  course  to  preserve  the 
Federal  Constitution  in  its  pristine  purity,  and  with  it,  the  hopes  of 
freedom.  Let  me  not,  however,  be  understood  by  resistance,  that  I 
mean  an  hasty  or  an  intemperate  resistance.  I mean  no  such  thing. 
I would  hope,  that  our  Legislature  will  first  remonstrate,  and  remon- 
strate with  the  respect,  and  the  temper,  and  the  dignity,  which 
belongs  to  the  solemn  occasion.  That  she  will  cause  the  sentiments 
of  the  people  to  be  laid  before  the  great  council  of  the  nation,  not 
in  the  ordinary  mode  in  which  resolutions  from  State  Legislatures 
are  there  carried,  but  in  some  other  manner  so  imposing,  as 
to  evince,  without  conveying  a threat,  that  whilst  from  the  bot- 
tom of  their  hearts,  the  people  of  South-Carolina  desire  Union,  they 
cannot,  and  WILL  not  submit,  to  unequal  and  oppressive  taxation, 
or  to  have  the  fundamental  policy  of  their  State,  officially  denounced 
by  Congress  as  an  evil,  which  ought  to  he  rooted  out  of  their  land. 
Let  our  Legislature  not  adjourn,  excepting  for  the  purpose  of  meeting 
again,  to  receive  the  determination  of  Congress.  But  whatever  may 
he  done  at  Columbia,  “ let  the  members  consider  the  issue.- — 
Let  them  look  to  the  end.  Let  them  weigh  and  consider  well,  before 
they  advance  to  those  measures,  which  (should  Congress  not  recede) 
must  bring  on  the  most  trying  and  terrible  struggle  South-Carolina 
ever  saw” — not  however,  a struggle  for  our  sovereignty  or  safety, 
for  I here  fear  not  the  result,  but  that  more  painful  struggle  in  out 
own  bosoms,  whether  we  shall  continue  in  firm  friendship  with,  or 
he  separated  forever  from  our  Northern  brethren. 

XffO.  32. 

That  the  present  is  the  proper  and  the  only  time,  for  South-Carp- 
lina  to  commence,  and  to  perfect  a plan  of  measures,  for  counter- 
acting the  progress  of  the  General  Government  to  inordinate  power. 


153 


must  be  obvious  to  every  man,  who  coincides  in  the  opinion,  that  i» 
resistance,  in  some  shape  or  other,  is  to  be  found  our  ultimate  secu- 
rity. At  present,  we  are  a more  respectable  minority,  than  we  shall 
ever  be  again;  and,  if  we  have  made  up  our  minds,  that  sooner  or 
later,  we  must,  from  necessity,  take  a stand  in  defence  of  our  State 
sovereignty,  is  it  not  the  extreme  of  folly  to  postpone  to  a future  period, 
that,  which  can  be  done  at  the  present  time  ; and  when,  by  delay,  no 
possible  advantage  can  be  gained,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a certainty 
that  we  shall  be  weaker  than  we  now  are. 

At  the  commencement  of  our  political  existence,  South-Carolina 
had  in  Congress,  five  representatives  out  of  sixty-five,  which  is  one 
thirteenth.  In  1799,  she  had  six  members  out  of  105,  a little  less  than 
an  eighteenth  in  1800,  she  had  eight  out  of  141.  In  1810,  nine 
out  of  181;  and  in  18*20,  nine  out  of  212,  a little  less  than  one 
twenty-fourth.  So  that  from  being  a thirteenth  of  the  whole,  origi- 
nally, and  at  the  taking  of  the  first  census  an  eighteenth , she  became 
a twenty-fourth  in  1820,  thus  losing  in  thirty  years,  by  the  census,  one 
third  of  her  influence.  Nearly  in  the  same  proportion,  has  she  lost 
her  influence,  in  conjunction  with  her  sister  Southern  States.  For  in- 
stance— the  four  States  of  Virginia,  North-Carolina,  South-Caro- 
lina, and  Georgia,  had  originally,  twenty-three  delegates  out  of  65, 
a iitle  more  than  a third  ; and  were  Maryland  to  be  added,  which 
then  was  a Southern  State,  nearly  one  half  of  the  whole.  In  1790, 
the  same  four  States  possessed  thirty-seven  representatives  out  of 
105,  which  was  more  than  one  third  of  the  whole — a respectable 
standing  this.  In  1800,  they  stood  forty-six  out  of  141.  In  1810, 
fifty-one  out  of  181 — and  in  1820,  fifty-one  out  of  202 — a little  more 
than  one  fourth — thus  falling  oft'  in  thirty  years,  about  one  third. — 
But  if  we  even  add  to  these  four  States,  the  three  new  States  of  Ala- 
bama, Mississippi,  and  Louisiana,  still  in  1810,  they  would  stand  as 
fifty-four  out  of  105,  and  in  1820,  as  fifty-seven  out  of  212.  So  that 
the  seven  Southern  States  above  named,  at  the  last  census  in  1820, 
were  only  a fraction  more  than  one  fourth  of  the  whole.  What  they 
are  to  be  three  years  hence,  when  another  census  is  to  be  taken,  we 
can  easily  imagine.  Probably  not  a fifth  or  a sixth. 

But  discouraging  as  are  the  prospects  before  us,  as  to  our  future 
strength,  (in  the  Senate  too,  as  well  its  in  the  Representatives) yet  when 
we  consider  the  real  strength  we  bring  to  the  Union,  we  have  every 
cause  for  congratulation,  and  every  inducement  not  to  suffer  thtfc 
strength  to  be  diminished,  by  the  assaults  of  Congress  on  the  Con- 
stitution. I have  not  all  the  documents  at  hand,  by  which  to  deve- 
lope  the  resources  of  the  Southern  States,  which  have  contributed 
so  much  to  the  flourishing  commerce  of  the  United  Stales,  and  which 
have  created  its  navy,  the  pride  of  its  friends,  and  the  terror  of  its 
foes.  Nor  is  it  material.  It  is  known  to  every  one  conversant  with 
our  statistics,  that  these  resources  are  immense.  I will  take  for  ex- 
ample, the  last  fiscal  year  ending  the  30th  September,  1826.  The 
exports  of  the  growth,  produce  and  manufactures  of  the  United 
States,  were  $53,055,710,  of  which,  the  article  of  Cotton  alone, 
amounted  to  $25,025,214,  and  Rice,  $1,917,445.  So  that  the  cotton 


154 


alone,  the  produce  (with  some  trifling  exceptions)  of  the  five  Plan- 
tation States  of  South-Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Mississippi, 
and  Louisiana,  nearly  equalled  HALF  of  the  total  exports  of  the 
TWENTY-FOUR  States,  whilst  the  Rice  and  Cotton  exceeded 
that  moiety.  If  the  article  of  Tobacco,  which  belongs  more  properly 
to  Virginia,  &c.  be  added,  the  three  articles  of  Cotton,  Tobacco  and 
Rice,  would  amount  to  $32,289,667.  The  products  of  the  Forest, 
which  also  partly  belong  to  these  States,  are  not  included.  Nor  is 
vegetable  food,  which  amounts  to  $7,527,257,  and  a part  also  of 
which,  belongs  to  Virginia  and  North-Carolina.  In  truth,  the  jive 
Plantation  States,  furnish  more  than  half  of  the  total  exports,  and  the 
seven  Southern  States,  probably  three-fourths. 

What  proud  and  triumphant  facts  are  these  ! Those  same  five 
Plantation  States,  which,  three  years  hence,  will  be  of  so  little  con- 
sequence on  the  floors  of  Congress,  and  are  doomed  to  be  more  and 
more  insignificant  in  the  representation,  with  every  subsequent  cen- 
sus, are  yet  of  more  consequence  to  this  Union  than  the  other  NINE- 
TEEN put  together.  Look  upon  these  facts,  ye  little  men  of  South- 
Carolina,  whose  habit  it  is  to  underrate  your  own  Southern  country, 
by  talking  of  its  weakness,  as  compared  with  the  North;  who  are  ig- 
norant that  the  physical  strength  of  a country,  consists  in  its  capa- 
bility for  wealth  as  well  as  in  its  population  ; who  would  seek  for  se- 
curity in  the  forbearance  and  magnanimity  of  the  majority ; who 
brand,  as  traitors,  all  those  who  differ  from  you,  or  who  contend 
for  resistance  in  deed  as  well  as  in  words,  when  our  sovereignty  is 
to  be  assailed,  and  our  vital  rights  to  be  wrested  from  us — who  would 
calmly  shoot  down  the  sentinel  on  the  watch  tower,  because  he  faith- 
fully informs  the  garrison  that  the  enemy  is  in  motion.  What  think 
ye  ! Did  the  God  of  nature  ever  design  that  a country  so  situated  as 
is  this  Southern  country,  with  such  rich  products,  and  such  a capa- 
bility of  employing  forever,  millions  and  millions  of  tons  of  ship- 
ping should  be  held  in  colonial  vassalage  by  a class  of  greedy  ma- 
nufacturers; or,  that  its  local  policy  and  concern  should  so  engross 
the  attraction  and  interest  of  the  public  mind  at  the  North,  as  inces- 
santly to  become  the  subject  matter  of  their  pamphlets,  magazines 
and  elaborate  Reviews,  as  if  we  in  the  South,  and  all  our  institutions 
were  at  their  disposal — or,  as  if  there  were  no  other  difficulty  as  to  the 
final  disposal  of  us  all,  than  that  there  is  a want  of  unanimity 
amongst  our  good  friends  North  ofthe  Potomac,  as  to  any  one  plan 
by  which,  with  the  aid  of  Congress,  our  slaves  are  to  be  rendered 
worthless  to  us. 

Only  take  from  this  Union  the  resources  of  wealth  and  commerce, 
furnished  by  the  Southern  States,  and  what  will  be  the  situation  of 
Boston,  New-York  and  Philadelphia.  What  have  the  Northern 
States  to  give  to  Great-Britain  and  France  as  an  equivalent  for  the 
manufactures  they  send  to  the  United  States,  the  imposts  on  which 
fill  their  Custom-houses  to  overflowing,  whilst  our  own  are  daily  di- 
minishing. Would  their  flour  and  other  vegetable  food,  and  the 
produce  of  their  forests  and  fisheries,  answer  the  purposes  of  our 
cotton  wool,  the  growth  of  the  South.  What  would  become  of  the 


155 


shipping  of  the  Eastern  States  if  the  Southern  States  were  under  a 
separate  Federal  Government.  Take  off  the  immense  protection 
we  now  give  to  their  navigation  interests,  to  our  own  serious  injury, 
for  what  nation  would  they  be  the  carriers  as  they  now  are  for  us. 
Where  would  be  their  Commerce?  On  the  contrary,  what  would 
not  Charleston,  what  would  not  South-Carolina  be,  were  all  Tariffs 
removed,  and  our  ports  opened,  and  a free  intercourse  opened  with 
all  the  world,  with  capitalists  flocking  to  our  cities,  great  importing 
merchants  residing  amongst  us,  with  their  retinue  of  clerks,  servants 
and  dependants  ; and  with  our  own  Custom-houses  and  millions  of 
dollars  collected  and  expended  amongst  ourselves.  Charleston,  at 
one  period,  before  the  Revolution,  had  a greater  trade  than  New- 
York  or  Philadelphia,  and  let  the  people  of  the  North  only  be  so 
unwise  as  to  drive  us  to  extremities,  and  they  will  see  their  own  ci- 
ties dwindle  into  insignificance,  compared  with  what  they  now  are, 
whilst  all  the  Southern  cities  would  be  regenerated  with  an  increase 
of  trade,  and  with  an  abundant  population.  How  can  it  be  otherwise. 
We  are  so  happily  situated,  that  in  Union,  or  out  of  the  Union,  we 
are  without  competitors,  as  to  our  great  staple  products,  and  on  this 
account,  our  friendship  must  always  be  courted  by  all  nations.  Let 
us  enter  into  a few  particulars,  as  to  the  advantages  possessed  by  the 
Northern  people,  by  their  union  with  us,  that  they  may  thereby  learn 
to  appreciate  the  value  of  the  South  to  them.  It  is  the  North,  and 
not  the  South,  that  in  disunion,  will  first  cry  out  “ Peccavi." 

The  foreign  exports  of  S. Carolina  in  1826,  were  $7,468,966,  and  her 
imports  only  $1 ,534,483,  whilst  the  exports  of  New-York  were 
$11,496,719,  and  her  imports,  the  enormous  amount  of  $38,115,603, 
nearly  half  the  total  exports  of  the  United  States.  The  exports  of 
Massachusetts  for  the  same  period  were,  the  great  sum  of  $3,888,138, 
whilst  her  imports  were  $17,063,482.  It  thus  appears,  that  South- 
Carolina  only  imports  a little  more  than  one  fifth  of  what  she  ex-? 
ports,  whilst  New-York  imports  nearly  four  times,  and  Massa- 
chusetts more  than  four  times  as  much  as  they  export.  If  we  take 
the  four  States  of  South-Carolina,  Georgia,  Louisiana  and  Alabama, 
their  total  exports  are  $22,402,803,  whilst  their  total  imports  are 
only  $6,210,551,  less  than  a third.  But  there  is  another  view  of  the 
subject.  Though  New-York  exports  produce  to  the  amount  of 
upwards  of  eleven  millions  of  dollars,  it  must  be  remembered,  that 
a great  proportion  of  these  exports,  are  the  products  of  the  Southern 
States.  The  cotton  and  rice  which  goes  from  Southern  ports  to 
New-York,  and  from  thence  to  foreign  countries,  is  very  great,  whilst 
from  Sout  hern  ports,  scarcely  an  article  is  shipped,  but  the  product 
of  the  South.  If  I had  any  means  at  hand,  to  come  at  the  value  of 
New-York  products,  shipped  from  New-York,  it  might,  probably, 
appear,  notwithstanding  her  great  canals,  and  her  great  population, 
to  be  trifling  ; perhaps,  not  above  four  millions : so  that,  in  fact,  she 
actually  may  import  ten  times  what  she  exports.  New-York  and 
Massachusetts  tog-ether,  import  $55,179,112,  out  of  $84,974,477, 
total  imports  of  the  United  States. 


156 


Let  us  now  suppose  that  there  is  a separation  of  the  States,  and  that 
New- York  is  to  be  placed  upon  no  better  footing-  than  that  of  other 
nations.  How  could  it  be  possible  for  her  to  import  38  millions  of 
dollars  worth  of  foreign  manufactures,  with  products  of  her  own  to 
give  in  exchange,  not  a tenth  of  that  value.  Then  as  to  Boston, 
the  duties  on  goods  imported  from  the  1st  to  the  llth  of  September, 
last  past,  a period  of  ten  days,  amounted  to  upwards  of  half  a mil- 
lion of  dollars,  nearly  equal  to  the  amount  accruing  at  our  Cus- 
tom-house for  one  year.  Could  Massachusetts  in  case  of  disunion, 
with  her  whole  exports,  not  amounting  to  four  millions,  expect  to 
import  upwards  of  seventeen  millions.  To  know  what  would  be 
the  difference  in  our  condition,  as  to  trade,  between  union  and  disu- 
nion, requires  no  mercantile  sagacity  or  experience.  Every  man 
must  know,  that  in  such  an  event,  all  the  business  which  is  now 
done  for  us  in  New- York  would  be  done  by  ourselves.  For  the  27 
millions  of  dollars  which  our  cotton  and  rice  would  be  worth,  the 
four  Southern  States  could  import,  at  least,  the  same  amount,  if  not 
much  more,  instead  of  six  millions.  In  disunion,  the  annual  cus- 
toms of  New-York  would  not  exceed,  as  they  now  do,  ten  millions  of 
dollars,  being  nearly  twenty  times  those  of  Charleston;  nor  would 
Charleston  be  a place  of  deposit  for  goods  in  transitu,  a port  of  agen- 
cies, as  she  is  now.  They  who  suppose  Charleston  declines  on  ac- 
count of  the  yellow  fever,  are  egregiously  mistaken.  Let  the  North- 
ern people  only  force  the  Southern  States  into  independence,  and 
New-York  and  Charleston  will  begin  to  think  of  changing  places. 
Charleston  would  soon  count  her  hundred  thousand  inhabitants  as 
well  as  the  Havana,  which  is  a more  fatal  climate  to  foreigners,  and 
would  not  have  the  same  trade.  Only  contemplate  the  injury  done 
to  the  trade  of  Charleston,  by  the  course  of  business  as  it  is  pursued 
by  Northern  ship-owners,  whose  vessels  come  hither  not  only  with 
all  their  own  supplies  for  a voyage  to  Europe,  but  with  cordage, 
provisions,  sail  duck,  &c.  for  the  use  of  their  vessels  expected 
here  from  abroad.  Formerly,  more  foreign  vessels  came  to  this 
port,  whose  outfits  in  stores  and  cordage  and  the  like,  were 
obtained  here,  and  thus  furnished  support  to  many  of  our  citi- 
zens. Foreign  vessels,  making  long  voyasre  from  Europe,  were 
not  in  the  habit  of  being  furnished  with  more  stores,  &c.  than  were 
necessary  for  their  outward  passage  to  this  port.  It  is  amazing  t» 
see  how  Charleston  has  suffered  in  various  ways,  from  the  prodi- 
gious advantages  which  the  North  has  over  us,  by  tonnage  duties 
and  discriminating  duties  in  favour  of  their  own  vessels.  I could 
dwell  longer  on  this  topic  were  it  necessary,  but  I have  said  enough 
for  such  persons,  as  are  in  the  habit  of  underrating  the  importance 
of  the  South.  It  is  time  for  us  all  to  take  other  ground,  and  to  feel 
that  confidence  in  our  strength  and  our  resources,  which  becomes  us 
at  all  times,  and  more  especially  at  a conjuncture,  when  all  that  is 
valuable  to  us  is  about  to  be  immolated  upon  the  altars  of  an  un- 
principled avarice,  and  a bold  usurpation  of  Federal  authority.  It 
becomes  the  more  necessary  to  look  into  our  means,  because  the 
•ime  approaches,  when,  if  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  shall 


157 


continue  deaf  to  the  admonitions  of  reason  and  justice,  the  Legisla- 
ture of  this  State  must  put  out  its  sovereign  arm,  and  with  the  shield 
of  its  authority,  protect  its  own  citizens.  If  that  protection  shall  be  with- 
held from  any  mistaken  notion  of  danger  to  ourselves,  from  collision  w ith 
the  Government,  all  will  be  lost,  irrecoverably  lost.  It  will  be  in  vain  for 
the  people  ever  to  meet  again,  if  we  are  quietly  to  sit  down  under  a new 
Tariff,  All  the  valour  that  we  have  displayed  at  our  meetings;  all  our 
spirited  resolutions  : all  our  “ startling  memorials ; all  the  resolutions  of 
our  Senate  and  Representatives;  all  the  able  expositions  of  our  Constitu- 
tion in  our  favour;”  all  these  will  have  been  but  ‘‘as  a sounding  brass  and 
a tinkling  cymbal” — vox  et  preeteria  nihil , if  at  the  time  we  uttered  them, 
we  did  not  make  up  our  minds  to  be  prepared  for  other  and  ulterior  mea- 
sures. 

The  conspiracy  that  exists  against  the  South  is  not  a trifling  one.  It  is 
wide  spread,  and  embraces  a larger  portion  of  the  Union  than  we  think 
for  We  are  deceived  if  we  think  because  some  Northern  and  Western 
members  opposed  the  “ woollens’  bill'’  that  they  are  opposed  to  the  great 
principle  of  the  Tariff.  This  partial  opposition  is  not  founded  on  any 
friendship  for  us,  but  arises  from  a cause,  the  very  opposite,  and  ought  to 
alarm  us  the  more.  That  cause,  is  the  want  of  agreement  amongst  the 
Manufacturers,  as  to  the  mode  in  which  the  South  ought  to  be  taxed  for 
their  emolument.  New-England,  for  instance,  has  a great  capital  embark- 
ed in  manufactures,  and  carries  on  her  business  in  incorporated  companies, 
whilst  in  Pennsylvania,  the  business  is  done  chiefly  by  private  and  smaller 
capitalists.  In  the  western  country,  from  the  population  not  being  dense, 
there  is  a still  greater  inability  to  sustain  a competition  with  New-England. 
When,  therefore,  Mr.  Buchanan,  of  Pennsylvania,  (whose  speech  was 
without  thought,  lauded  in  some  of  our  journals.)  saw  that  it  was  the  poli- 
cy of  New-England  to  diminish  largely  at  once,  if  it  could,  the  foreign  im- 
portation, because  it  would  give  her  the  advantage  (from  her  capital  and 
machinery  being  all  ready,)  of  the  whole  market,  and  thus  come  in  for  all 
the  profits,  before  the  smaller  capitalists  in  his  own  State  could  get  ready 
their  goods,  he  valiantly  opposes  the  Tariff,  taking  care  at  the  same  time 
to  tell  us  that  he  is  friendly,  and  always  has  been  to  the  Tariff  policy, 
and  that  no  slight  difference  of  opinion  would  have  separated  him  from  the 
friends  of  the  -‘woollens'  bill.”  What  then  is  the  difference  of  opinion  between 
Mr.  Buchanan  and  Mt  Webster,  par  nobile  fratrum?  Brother  Jona- 
than, it  seems,  wished  the  extension  of  the  Tariff  to  be  confined  to  the 
woollen  manufactures;  but,  if  possible,  not  to  protect  the  growers  of  do- 
mestic wool.  It  was  no  part  of  his  plan  to  impose  a duty  on  foreign  wool, 
for  the  cheaper  the  price  at  which  wool  could  be  bought,  the  better  would 
it  be  for  Jonathan.  But,  when  this  is  insisted  on  by  some  Pittsburg  man, 
what  does  Mr.  Webster  next  do  He  places  such  a minimum  per  lb.  on 
foreign  wool,  as  increases  considerably  the  ad  valorem  duty  near  forty  per 
cent;  but,  at  the  same  time,  permits  the  import  of  wool  upon  the  skin 
without  a minimum,  which  discriminating  duty,  in  favour  of  such  fleeces, 
would  have  had  the  effect  of  stocking  the  American  market  with  them,  and 
thus  have  kept  down  the  price  of  domestic  wool : but  there  was  another 
trick  which  was  to  have  been  played  off  against  the  Pennsylvania  wool 
growers.  The  Tariff  upon  foreign  woollens  was  to  have  gone  into  opera- 

20 


158 


tion  the  first  day  of  August,  1827,  but  the  protection  to  domestic  wool 
was  not  to  be  afforded  for  nearly  a year  after,  and  not  fully  afforded  until 
the  1st  of  June,  1829,  so  as  to  give  the  Eastern  Manufacturers  time  to  lay 
in  a good  stock  of  foreign  wool. 

Messrs.  Buchanan  & Co.  however,  have  other  reasons  than  the  above 
for  opposing  Webster,  Everett  & Co.  Pennsylvania  being  a grain 
growing  State,  and  her  agriculture  declining,  wishes  a Tariff  on  foreign 
spirits,  that  ivhiskey  might  be  substituted  for  New-England  Particular , and 
thus  increase  the  demand  for  the  grain  of  the  former.  No,  says  Webster, 
that  will  hurt  our  trade  in  foreign  spirits  Give  us  then  a Tariff  upon  fo- 
reign hemp,  so  as  to  give  the  farmers  of  Lancaster  county,  or  the  Kentucky 
farmer  a chance  of  competition  with  Russia.  Jonathan  opposes  this  also. 
The  Pennsylvanian,  seeing  too  sharply  that  the  “woollens’  bill,”  as  it  stood, 
would  give  the  New-England  folks  such  a monopoly  of  the  market  of  the 
whole  Union , that  Pennsylvania  and  Kentucky  would  soon  stand  as  much 
in  need  of  a Tariff' against  New  England  as  New-England  needs  it  against 
Old  England,  quits  copartnership  with  Jonathan  ; and,  for  the  first  time  in 
his  life,  most  magnanimously  votes  against  a bill  taxing  the  South,  and  for 
this  act  he  is  praised  in  one  of  our  journals.  Our  former  Tariff,  says  Mr. 
Buchanan,  “ rested  upon  BROAD  NATIONAL  foundations.  (What 
assurance  !)  They  embraced  every  article,  which  required  protection. 
The  BLESSINGS  and  burdens  of  the  system  were  thus  diffused  over  the 
Union  (This  is  most  unparalled  affrontry.)  A pack  of  avaricious  manu- 
facturers, with  all  the  activity  of  ravenous  vultures  about  a fresh  carcase, 
scrambling  for  the  tit  bits,  venture  to  talk  of  their  benefiting  the  Union. 
With  whom  can  we  so  well  compare  Mr.  Buchanan,  as  with  the  unright- 
eous Cornwal  Parson,  who.  when  he  heard  the  words  “ a wreck  !” 
whispered  amongst  his  congregation,  and  too  plainly  saw,  from  the  restless- 
ness of  a few,  not  quite  so  pious  as  the  rest,  that  they  would  quit  the 
church  and  arrive  at  the  wreck  too  soon,  concluded  his  discourse,  and  en- 
joined upon  his  hearers,  that  they  should  all  START  FAIR  Had  Mr. 
Webster  consented  to  have  given  Pennsylvania  a fair  start,  in  the  lace 
for  plunder,  we  should  have  heard  of  no  speeches  against  the  “ woollens’ 
bill”  from  Pennsylvania,  or  elsewhere  in  the  North  and  West. 

The  more  this  “American  system,”  as  it  is  called,  is  looked  into,  the  more 
it  will  be  regarded  as  a well  digested  system  of  PIRACY  upon  the  South. 
If,  hitherto,  my  fellow-citizens,  we  have  not  been  more  grievously  taxed, 
than  bv  having  some  fifty  or  an  hundred  per  centum,  put  upon  some  articles 
of  consumption,  we  must  ascribe  it  to  the  fortunate  circumstance  of  the 
THIEVES  not  being  yet  FELLY  agreed  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the 
spoil  is  to  be  divided.  Ever  y proposition  at  the  North  for  a new  Tariff  is  in 
the  nature  of  a grand  plundering  expedition  upon  ihe  property  of  the  South, 
fitted  out  in  Northern  and  Eastern  ports  It  is  a faithful  delineation  of 
some  of  those  broils  or  s<  eru  s which  are  sometimes  exhibited  in  the  nume- 
rous hiding  places  between  the  Havana  and  the  Matanzas,  where  a part  of 
the  Cuba  pirates,  from  some  dissatisfaction,  from  previous  distributions  of 
the  plunder,  are  unwilling  to  join  in  ihe  risk  of  another  expedition  until 
the  termsrJbe  well  settled,  and  their  proportion  ot  the  spoil  be  previously 
agreed  on.  The  late  intended  piratical  excursion,  fitted  out  in  Boston, 
under  the  command  of  Webster  & Everett,  failed  for  the  want  of  a suf- 
ficient crew  to  sail  under  such  a flag,  as  that  of  the  “ Woollens'’  Bill.” — 


159 


But  will  these  parties  always  quarrel  ? No  ! A common  interest,  in 
most  matters,  still  binds  them,  and  sooner  or  later,  they  wilt  make  up  heir 
differences,  and  again  cruise  against  us  in  Company. 

Fellow  Citizens  ! We  are  precisely  in  the  situation  of  a family  who 
have  listened  to,  and  overheard  from  their  windows,  the  conversations  of 
robbers  in  the  streets,  and  fortunately,  know  that  its  own  dwelling  is  to 
be  the  scene  of  their  villainous  operations.  What  is  the  course  which 
prudence  would  dictate  to  that  family  ? Certainly,  to  be  prepared  with 
blunderbusses,  and  to  BLOW  OUT  their  BRAINS:  So  must  it  be 
with  the  Tariff.  If  the  people  of  the  North,  will  attempt  to  force  it  upon 
ns,  let  us  in  the  South,  not  argue  the  matter  with  them,  but  distinctly  tell 
them,  we  regard  them  as  Pirates,  and  as  such  we  will  resist  them.  This 
is  the  only  way  we  can  get  rid  of  the  PRINCIPLE  of  the  Tariff  FOR- 
£ V S i R . Any  course  of  conduct  which  is  not  founded  on  views  and  feel- 
ings of  this  kind,  will  be  insufficient,  unwise  and  unsafe. 

mo.  33. 

I have  no  more  to  say,  on  the  subject  of  the  dangers  which  have  for 
some  time  past,  been  thickening  upon  the  Southern  States,  I hope,  I have 
succeeded  in  shewing,  that  they  are  dangers  of  no  ordinary  character,  and 
to  the  “ Plantation  States’'  in  particular,  serious  in  their  consequences,  and 
awful,  perhaps,  in  their  issue.  If  the  views  I have  taken,  as  to  the  best 
means  of  aveiting  those  dangers,  are  not  just,  I would  hope,  that  the  public 
will  be  favoured  with  the  sentiments  of  others.  The  subject  is  full  of  deep 
interest  to  us  all.  If  I have  spoken  the  truth  too  plainly,  it  is  better  that  I 
should  err  on  this  extreme,  than  on  the  other.  The  peo.de  of  South-Caro- 
lina  have  been  too  little  accustomed,  of  late  years,  to  have  the  truth  told 
them  in  the  public  prints,  as  to  their  real  situation,  not  to  profit  somewhat, 
by  what  is  now  said.  My  design,  from  the  beginning,  has  been  to  call 
their  serious  attention  to  their  LOCAL  affairs.  From  their  own  proper 
concerns,  they  are  constantly  in  danger  of  being  diverted,  bv  the  conflicts 
that  are  perpetually  taking  place  in  general  politics.  It  is  time  that  this 
should  be  at  an  end.  Under  such  a state  of  excited  feeling,  as  the  Presi- 
dential contest  must,  from  its  very  nature,  forever  call  forth,  we  must  perish 
at  last  as  a Sovereign  State. 

In  the  present  disposition  which  exists  to  support  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  State,  a good  deal  has  been  written  and  said,  about  OPPOSING  the 
Tariff  law.  Whilst  some  are  for  a steady  opposition,  by  acts  as  well  as 
by  language,  many  cautious  people  profess  the  firm  purpose  of  counter- 
acting the  General  Government,  in  its  advance  to  usurpation,  by  all  con- 
stitutional means  in  their  power.  Let  us  examine  into  these  means,  such 
as  they  have  been  stated  to  be,  and  we  shall  discover,  that  the}'  are  no 
means  at  all ; and  that  it  would  be  better  to  do  nothing,  than  to  think  of 
such  ineffectual  remedies,  against  tyranny  and  oppression, 

The  fiist  scheme,  is  that  recommended  by  the  Charleston  Committee, 
which  is  a non-consumption  agreement.  On  this  same  committee,  are 
men,  generally  of  very  firm  purpose  of  mind,  and  of  sound  judgment  and 
observation,  which  makes  it  the  more  surprising,  that  a recommendation, 
so  perfectly  inefficient  as  this,  should  come  from  such  a quarter.  Without 
stopping  to  inquire,  whether  it  becomes  the  independent  freemen  of  a 


160 


Sovereign  State,  whose  rights  are  grossly  violated,  to  assume  a ground, 
which  implies  fear  and  weakness,  in  those  who  take  it,  I would  ask,  whether 
it  be  possible,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  a voluntary  non-consumption 
agreement,  can  ever  take  place  in  the  City  of  Charleston.  In  the  first 
place,  if  it  be  difficult  to  bring  the  people  of  this  city  into  one  mind,  on  the 
principle  even,  of  opposing  an  usurpation  of  the  Government,  and  we 
even  observe,  amongst  the  editors  of  public  journals,  a disposition  to 
ascribe  all  opposition  to  the  Tariff,  as  a trick  only  of  party,  how  can  we 
ever  expect,  that  unanimity  in  sentiment,  which  is  positively  essentia!  to 
create  a non-consumption  agreement  And,  secondly,  if  such  an  agreement 
were  entered  into,  can  we  believe,  that  in  a population  of  thirty-five 
thousand  souls,  all  men  are  honourable,  nd  all  would  feel  themselves  equally 
bound  to  perform  what  they  promise?  Men  of  honour,  under  such  an  ar- 
rangement, would  legard  their  stipulations,  to  their  utmost  inconvenience, 
whilst  those  who  are  without  honour,  would  not  hesitate  to  buy  the  pro- 
hibited articles.  Many  poor  people  too,  might,  from  necessity , be  com- 
pelled to  violate  their  pledge,  and  we  could  not,  perhaps,  blame  them.  We 
thus  see  clearly,  that  a non-consumption  agreement,  would  be  impracticable 
in  our  own  community  ; and  if  so  in  one  community,  it  must  be  more  so, 
when  extended  to  many  communities.  Still  more  impracticable  will  it  bp, 
when  extended  to  a whole  State.  But  when  we  come  to  propose  a non- 
consumption agreement,  which  is  to  bind  the  people  of  many  States,  com- 
prising many  millions  of  people,  both  good  anti  bad,  the  plan  immediately 
strikes  every  citizen,  as  being  utterly  useless  and  impracticable. 

Another  plan  proposed  at  some  meetings,  is,  that  we  should  commence 
manufactures  amongst  ourselves.  This,  I confess,  would  be  a very  good 
plan,  if  we  had  the  right  to  impose  a Tariff,  so  as  to  prevent  the  impor- 
tation of  Northern  goods  into  our  State.  But  this  we  are  precluded  from 
doing,  no  State  having  a right  to  lay  imposts,  without  the  consent  of  Con- 
gress, and  the  citizens  of  one  State,  being  the  citizens  of  every  other  Slate, 
and  having  a right  of  ingress  and  egress,  every  where  with  their  goods.  If 
the  plan  of  manufacturing  for  ourselves,  be  predicated  on  the  idea  that  we 
can  undersell  the  Boston  folks,  it  would  be  better  for  those,  who  have  any 
such  visionary  hopes,  to  throw  their  money  into  the  docks,  than  to  invest 
it  in  manufactures.  If  the  Websters  and  Everetts  are  so  far  ahead 
already,  that  Pennsylvania  cannot  manufacture  a certain  description  of 
goods  as  cheap,  what  hope  can  we  have  ? It  will,  at  all  times,  be  just  as 
easy  for  New-England  to  undersell  us,  in  our  own  market,  as  it  is  for  Old 
England  to  undersell  New-England  in  every  part  of  the  world.  So  that 
this  plan  will  not  answer.  If  by  home  manufactures  is  meant,  that  every 
planter  shall  turn  his  hands  to  spinning  and  weaving,  what  are  those  to  do 
who  have  no  plantations.  Planters  are  not  the  only  persons  who  consume 
goods  ; and  how  again,  are  we  to  complete  an  arrangement  which  is  to  bind 
all  men,  good  and  bad. 

A third  plan  has  been  spoken  of  in  private  circles,  and  merits  some  little 
attention.  It  is,  that  we  should  lay  an  EXCISE,  and  apply  the  proceeds 
of  the  tax,  as  bounties  for  foreign  manufactures,  and  thus  cause  a prefe- 
rence to  be  given  to  these  manufactures,  over  Northern  goods.  This 
would  undoubtedly  answer,  if  we  could  compel  persons,  vending  Northern 
goods,  to  take  out  a license:  but  a question  here  arises,  have  we  such  a power 
under  the  Constitution.  I think  we  have  not,  and  do  not  doubt,  but  that 


161 


the  Supreme  Court  would  so  decide.  We  have  the  clear  right  for  instance, 
to  say,  that  all  persons  selling  spirituous  liqu  rs,  shall  take  out  a license; 
but  I doubt  our  right  to  tax  a man  for  selling  New-England  spirits,  eo  no- 
mine. If  Northern  goods  could  be  so  distinguished  from  all  other  goods, 
as  to  answer  to  a certain  description  of  them,  without  being  named  as 
Northern  goods,  an  excise  migbt  be  laid  generally  on  such  a description  of 
manufactures,  so  as  to  include  the  home  manufacture,  and  exclude  the  fo- 
reign. But  this  is  not  wholly  practicable.  The  provisions  of  such  a law 
would  not  be  beyond  the  contrivance  of  the  Eastern  people  to  evade  them. 

A fourth  expedient  is,  a general  understanding  by  resolutions  at  town 
meetings,  to  encourage  smuggling  by  all  the  means  in  our  power,  and  thus 
to  be  supplied  with  foreign  goods.  I should  blush  for  my  country,  to  see 
the  exhibition  of  so  shocking  a spectacle,  as  that  of  a whole  community  de- 
liberately resolving  to  do  an  immoral  act  upon  a grand  scale.  But  there 
is  a stronger  objection  to  this  course  of  proceeding  It  would  imply,  that 
we  are  opposed  to  the  Tariff,  merely  because  it  takes  from  the  pockets  of 
every  man,  some  few  dollars;  whereas,  our  opposition  arises,  from  its 
being  a violation  of  our  constitutional  rights.  So  that  this  plan  is  out  of 
the  question.  It  is,  to  sav  the  least  of  it,  a mean  expedient.  Let  it  never 
be  forgotten  by  us.  that  in  this  collision  throughout,  there  has  been  a mani- 
fest distinction  as  to  motive  between  the  North  and  the  South,  which  has 
placed  us  upon  a proud  and  a lofty  eminence  ; and  that  if  we  quit  this 
vantage  ground,  we  shall  have  to  descend  to  the  lowness  of  our  adversaries. 
The  motive  which  goads  on  the  North  to  insist  on  the  tariff,  is  the  meanest 
motive  which  springs  from  the  human  heart.  It  is  avarice — rank  ava- 
rice. But  the  bosoms  of  the  South,  as  they  become  more  and  more  swelled 
into  honest  indignation  against  the  tribute  of  the  Tariff,  are  actuated  by 
the  noblest  feelings  which  can  influence  the  actions  of  men  and  of  socie- 
ties— an  adherence  to  the  principles  of  Liberty  and  of  the  Constitution. — 
The  North  supports  the  Tariff  from  INTEREST,  mean,  sordid  interest. 
The  South  resists  it  ON  PRINCIPLE.  Then  let  us  so  shape  our  pro- 
ceedings, that  in  this  great  contest,  we  shall  be  admired  and  respected, 
whilst  onr  adversaries  shall  be  despised.  Let  us,  over  again,  act  the  same 
part,  in  which  we  appeared  to  such  decided  advantage  in  our  revolutionary 
struggle  with  Britain.  If  ever  history  furnished  the  example  in  any  coun- 
try, of  a pure  devotion  to  principle,  and  principle  alone,  apart  from  every 
other  consideration,  that  example  is  to  be  sought  in  the  determination  of 
the  Southern  Colonies  to  resist  the  aggressions  of  Biitain.  These  colo- 
nies, at  the  beginning,  had  no  motive  to  quarrel  with  the  mother  country. 
Not  so  with  the  Eastern  States.  They  had,  or  in  a short  time  would  have 
many.  They  saw  that  the  measures  of  Britain  were  all  calculated  to  check 
or  to  stifle  their  growing  navigation  interests,  and  hence,  plainly  arose  that 
first  cause  of  uneasiness,  which  afterwards  extended  itself  to  serious  discon- 
tents, and  at  length  to  revolution.  It  was  not  the  tax  on  tea  alone.  Mr. 
Quincv  was  early  sent  on  to  sound  the  people  in  the  South,  as  to  their  dis- 
position to  make  a common  cause  with  them.  The  proposal  was  accept- 
able to  our  principal  characters,  and  when  we  entered  into  the  cause,  it  was 
with  a certainty,  that  our  country  would  be  the  principal  seat  of  war,  and 
that  the  great  evils  of  war  would  be  felt  at  the  South  We  were  not  mistaken. 
We  suffered  greatly,  but  we  suffered  happily,  for  we  have  obtained  our 
independence.  We  have  struggled  for  it  on  principle  alone,  and  not  be- 


162 


vause  we  felt  the  oppressions  of  the  mother  country.  The  Eastern  States 
are  doomed  by  nature,  to  be  competitors  with  England,  as  to  navigation 
and  trade.  We  never  were,  and  probably,  never  will  be. 

The  fifth,  and  the  last  means  spoken  of,  is  to  resort  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States.  This,  as  I have  already  shewn,  would  be  to  go  on  a 
FORLORN  HOPE.  The  Tariff  laws  are,  in  their  form,  perfectly  con- 
stitutional. They  would  come  before  this  Court  as  revenue  bills,  and  as 
the  Judges  cannot  enter  into  the  motives  of  legislators,  they  could  not  do 
otherwise,  than  to  decide,  that  Congress  has  a right  to  pass  such  laws. — 
Where  the  spirit  of  the  league  is  broken,  though  the  form  of  the  compact 
be  preserved,  this  is  a matter  of  arrangement  between  the  sovereign  parties 
to  that  compact.  Sovereigns  sometimes  appoint  arbiters  between  them,  to 
settle  unimportant  boundaries,  where  territory  is  no  g eat  object ; but  points 
of  vital  importance  they  discuss,  and  settle  amongst  themselves. 

All  the  proposed  plans  being  either  inefficient,  or  impracticable,  or  im- 
moral, we  must  at  last  come  to  the  only  mode  of  redress  which  is  left  for 
us.  I have  pondered  the  subject,  over  and  over  again,  and  situated  as  we 
are,  and  must  forever  be,  to  wit,  in  a minority,  and  with  no  hope  of  chang- 
ing the  national  councils  in  our  favour,  I cannot  see  how  we  are  to  get  rid 
of  the  growing  usurpations  of  Congress,  but  by  RESISTANCE.  The 
word  resistance,  is  a startling  expression.  Men  shudder  at  the  thought, 
and  disunion,  bloody  civil  wars,  and  a thousand  chimeras  dire,  immedi- 
ately pass  in  review  before  the  minds  of  the  timid,  the  quiet,  and  the  good 
of  the  community.  This  is  natural.  But  let  people  have  a little  time  to  be 
restored  to  their  sober  reflections,  and  they  may  begin  to  believe,  that  it  is  a 
mode,  by  which  Males,  can  sometimes  come  to  their  chartered  rights  and 
liberties,  without  bloodshed  and  without  noise  ; although  at  the  same  time, 
resistance  ought  not  to  be  thought  of,  unless  those  who  propose  it,  are  pre- 
pared for  a/I  the  consequences.  They  must  not  calculate  upon  the  fears 
of  the  opposite  party  T his,  no  honourable  man  does,  in  private  disputes. 
States  to  be  respected,  must  act  as  individuals  would,  under  the  same  cir- 
cumstances. Nothing  must  be  said  or  done  for  effect,  or  to  intimidate. — 
This  is  the  course  of  a coward,  who,  if  he  happens  to  form  a wrong  esti- 
mate of  his  antagonist,  has  to  retrace  all  his  steps  with  disgrace. 

But  the  consequences  of  resistance  may  not  be  60  awful  as  some  would 
anticipate.  In  this  Union,  there  are  twenty-four  States ; the  people  of 
which,  are  spread  over  a most  extensive  fate  of  country,  embracing  a va- 
riety of  climates.  They  are,  moreover,  greatly  diversified  in  their  agri- 
culture, pursuits,  habits,  occupations,  and  prejudices.  But  yet  these  twenty- 
fout  Sovereignties,  most  wonderfully  “ move  together,  in  concerted  and 
harmonious  action.”  What  is  the  link  by  which  they  are  so  intimately  con- 
nected. It  is  friendship.  It  is  the  principle  of  a common  affection,  and  a 
common  feeling,  inspired  by  the  Revolution,  upon  which,  as  yet,  rests  the 
whole  strength  and  the  powet  of  the  Federal  Government  To  this,  and 
this  alone,  must  it  look  for  its  security  and  its  permanency.  As  regards 
the  external  enemies,  of  this  league  of  republics,  it  must,  for  the  above  rea- 
son, always  he  a Government  of  prodigious  physical  force  and  resources. 
History  may  never  furnish  such  another  example.  But,  as  regards  the 
power  of  this  Government  over  the  States,  it  is  ol  a different  character. — 
What  its  destiny  is  to  be  a century  hence,  it  is  not  for  us  to  say.  It  may, 
perhaps,  be  physically  strong  within,  as  well  as  without  But,  at  pre- 


163 


sent,  it  rests  on  public  opinion.  It  wields,  even  now,  a tremendous  pow- 
er ; but  the  power  is  altogether  a moral  power,  conveyed  to  it,  by  the 
affections  of  the  people.  Let  these  affections  be  alienated  in  one  or  more 
sections  of  the  Union,  and  the  Government  is  without  power.  It  becomes 
impotent.  Of  this,  we  had  a memorable  example  only  the  other  day.  A 
neighbouring  State,  was  in  serious  collision  with  the  Government,  and  on 
a point  of  sovereignty.  The  dispute  had  arrived  at  a crisis,  when  nothing 
was  apprehended,  but  bloodshed  and  a civil  war.  The  Government  of 
the  United  States  threatened  military  coercion , and  Georgia  was  to  be  put 
down  by  the  bayonet.  With  a promptitude,  that  ought,  in  my  view,  to  en- 
title him  to  the  gratitude  of  the  Southern  States,  and  to  hand  down  to  the 
latest  posterity,  the  name  of  TROUP,  as  the  most  distinguished  of  ALL 
the  names  ENROLLED  in  favour  of  STATE  RIGHTS,  the  interpid 
GOVERNOR  of  Georgia,  orders  outtheSYafe  Militia,  to  support  and  vin- 
dicate its  outraged  sovereignty.  The  issue  is  known.  Georgia,  by  THIS 
DECISIVE  example  of  firmness,  preserved  her  Sovereignty  Had  Mr. 
Adams,  and  his  thoughtless  Secretary  of  War,  reflected  before  they  spoke, 
they  would  have  known  that  the  United  States  have  not  yet  advanced  far 
enough  towards  Consolidation,  to  possess  the  power,  to  coerce  a State — 
and  it  was  not  until  force  was  called  for,  to  put  down  the  rebellious  Geor- 
gians, that  the  wise  folks  at  Washington,  discovered,  for  the  first  time  in 
their  lives,  that  the  power  of  the  Government  was  a moral  and  not  a physi- 
cal force,  and  that  this  same  moral  power,  springing  from  the  affections  of 
the  peo,  le  of  Georgia,  was  likely  to  be  withdrawn,  as  soon  as  the  Gov- 
ernment should  speak  of  sending  troops  to  coerce  them. 

So  will  it  be  with  South-Carolina.  Let  her  only  WILL  that  she 
will  not  submit  to  the  tariff,  and  to  impertinent  interferences  of  Con- 
gress, with  her  policy,  and  the  business  is  three-fourths  finished. — 
There  will,  perhaps,  be  no  necessity  for  calling  out  the  militia  — 
There  will,  probably,  be  no  civil  war.  If  an  adherence  to  our  rights 
is  likely  to  cause  civil  war,  our  citizens  will  then  have  to  decide 
whether  they  prefer  colonial  vassalage  to  resistance,  and  to  civil  war. 
I should  hope  that  there  are  none  such  amongst  us,  who  would  hesi- 
tate in  their  choice.  If  war  be  the  result,  and  the  neighbouring 
States,  who  have  a common  interest  with  us,  look  on  and  withhold 
their  assistance,  even  then,  the  Government  could  NOT  PUT  US 
DOWN.  The  only  event  in  which  we  could  be  subjugated,  would 
be  in  case  the  Southern  States,  were  most  unnaturally  in  league 
against  us.  I am  opposed  to  all  conventions  of  States,  at  the  present 
crisis.  In  peace  even,  I will  not  embarass  the  Government.  I 
will  not  wage  war  in  disguise.  I am  for  open,  undisguised  hostility, 
as  soon  as  resistance  shall  become  necessary.  Let  South-Carolina 
act  for  herself,  and  the  other  States  for  themselves.  It  is  time 
enough  to  enter  into  league  when  war  shall  be  declared.  Should 
we  be  even  subjugated,  what  then?  We  shall  have  the  proud  con- 
solation of  not  having  submitted  without  a struggle,  and  I shall 
then,  I presume,  make  as  good  a colonist  as  any  of  my  neighbours 
There  is  not  an  atom  of  disgrace  in  being  vanquished.  But  there 
is  meanness  in  submission.  The  Polander,  in  his  adversity,  is  re- 
spectable. The  Neapolitan  despised.  He  talked  and  blustered  and 


164 

the  sight  of  the  first  Austrian  bayonet,  scared  him  into  perfect  sub- 
mission. 

If  there  be  in  our  system  of  Government,  one  feature,  which  is 
delightful  for  the  real  patriot  to  contemplate,  it  is  that,  which  shews 
the  inability  of  the  Government  to  coerce  one  of  its  confederated 
members.  If  friendship  cannot  hold  us  together,  force  never  can. 
He  is  much  mistaken,  who  can  imagine,  that  the  same  physical 
force,  which  could  enable  the  Government  to  put  down  one  of  the 
twenty-four  Republics,  would  not  so  endanger  the  whole,  as  to 
make  our  government,  any  thing  than  what  it  now  is.  Into  my 
mind  any  such  idea  of  any  one  State  being  in  rebellion  against  the 
Government,  never  once  entered.  I do  not  admit  the  monstrous 
doctrine  that  a State  can  rebel.  Whenever  a State  comes  in  collision 
with  the  Government,  it  will  be  on  auihz/point,  otherwise  the  State 
would  not  be  supported  in  its  pretensions,  by  its  oion  people.  A 
State  can  have  no  possible  motive,  to  dispute  the  great  powers  of 
Congress,  for  these  are  expressly  delegated,  and  are  beyond  all 
dispute  ; but  the  General  Government  has  motives  in  abundance  to 
crib  and  steal  power  from  the  States.  It  may,  therefore,  safely  be 
affirmed  that  a State  can  never  be  wrong,  in  its  disputes  about  sove- 
reignty. The  weak  are  not  willing  to  provoke  the  strong,  but  the 
strong  are  always  apt  to  impose  upon  the  weak.  A sovereign  and 
independent  State,  then,  in  opposition  to  the  Government  is  not  to  be 
treated,  as  we  would  treat  a band  of  insurgents,  who  are  acting  with- 
out the  authority  of  a State  Legislature.  Such  a State  is  asmuch  to 
be  respected  by  Congress,  as  if  it  were  a foreign  nation.  Negotiation 
is  to  be  resorted  to.  The  Federal  Government  is  a copartnership 
between  States,  as  to  the  exercise  of  power  for  the  common  benefit, 
and  if  the  partners  cannot  agree,  let  them  separate  peaceably.  If 
the  copartnership  shall  ever  be  dissolved,  the  fault  will  not  be  with 

the  States,  but  with  Congress. Power  is  always  stealing  from 

the  MANY  to  the  FEW.” 

I am  well  assured,  that  the  sentiments  of  these  numbers,  have  not 
been  palatable  to  some.  To  all  such,  I have  only  to  say,  that  if  I 
am  to  blame,  then  some  of  our  most  distinguished  men  are  also  to 
blame,  for  they  have  inculcated  the  idea,  that  to  submit  to  the  tariff 
is  degrading,  and  their  speeches  imply  resistance.  When  such  men 
as  Col.  Drayton,  and  Mr.  M’Duffie,  and  others,  utter  their  senti- 
ments in  public,  we  are  to  presume,  from  their  high  character,  that 
they  would  utter  what  they  do  not  feel.  Colonel  Drayton,  to 
the  inhabitants  of  St.  Paul’s  Parish,  said  “that  if  Congress  could 
impose  the  Tariff,  then  is  our  i [dependence  but  a phantom;  then 
have  the  patriots  of  the  Revolution,  toiled  and  bled  in  vain;  then 
would  it  be  better  for  us  to  return  to  our  former  colonial  vassalage. 
when,  if  unjustly  taxed,  the  burthen  was  imposed  without  discrimi- 
nation, upon  ail  our  countrymen  : when,  if  oppressed,  our  oppres- 
sors were  not  our  representatives;  when  if  enslaved,  we  were  guilt- 
less of  forging  the  chains  ourselves,  with  which  our  liberty  was  man- 
acled.” Mr.  M’Duffie  regards  “ the  spirit,  which  would  convert 
the  mass  of  the  people  into  the  tributary  vassals  of  a few  lordly 


165 


manufacturers,  as  not  more  odious,  than  would  be  the  degradation  of 
silently,  and  patiently  submitting  to  the  measure  01  the  Tariff.” 
He  thinks  it  “idle  to  talk  of  moderation  and  tempt  ranee  and  dis- 
passionate deliberation.  They  do  not  belong  to  the  occasion.” 
Mr.  M’Duffie  adds,  that  he  “has  carefully  weighed  his  words, 
and  has  uttered  none  which  the  occasion  did  not,  in  his  judgment, 
imperatively  demand,  and  which  he  is  not  fully  prepared  to  vindi- 
cate and  maintain.”  Others  have  spoken  to  the  same  effect,  but  I have 
not  their  words. 

But  let  me  not  be  understood  by  quoting  these  authorities,  as  of- 
fering any  apology  for  what  I have  written.  I take  shelter  under  no 
man’s  opinions,  not  even  of  such  men  as  Col.  Drayton,  &c.  My 
object  has  been  freely  to  write  what  I freely  thought,  regardless  of 
what  might  be  said  of  me  by  this  or  that  man.  When,  therefore,  I 
have  been  told  of  the  epithets  of  “ Treason  ” and  “ Sedition  ” being 
in  the  mouths  of  some  tnen  who  have  read  these  numbers,  I could 
not  but  smile,  that  such  folks  as  these,  should  think,  that  in  a mat- 
ter which  so  vitally  affects  my  country,  as  the  Tariff  ,1  should  give 
the  least  heed  to  what  they  could  say  of  me.  I have  written  for 
the  Planters  of  South-Carolina,  and  for  the  Merchants,  Mechanics 
and  other  freemen  of  our  State,  who  live  amongst  us  and  who  are 
to  sink  or  swim  with  the  Southern  Country  ; and  not  for  those  men 
who  in  every  dispute  between  the  North  and  the  South,  on  subjects 
peculiarly  connected  with  our  safety  or  our  interests,  look  to  Bos- 
ton for  their  instructions.  If  there  be  another  set  of  men  amongst 
us,  whose  opinions  I do  disregard,  it  is  those  natives,  who  are  for 
placing  under  the  ban  of  the  Empire,  every  citizen  and  every  prin- 
ter too,  who  shall  presume  to  name,  or  even  to  hint  at  dis-union , as 
if  there  can  be  any  other  ulterior  recource,  for  a State,  whose  sove- 
reignty is  assailed,  than  the  dissolution  of  that  compact,  already 
broken  by  other  parties.  Least  of  all  do  I care,  whether  I please  those 
busy  politicians,  who  are  moving  heaven  and  earth  for  Jackson  or 
for  Adams,  and  who  are  alarmed  at  any  sentiment,  which  can  divert 
the  public  mind,  from  a subject,  in  which  they  themselves  may  have 
a strong  interest,  and  the  people  of  South-Carolina  little  or  none, 
compared  to  the  subject  of  these  numbers.  To  those  of  the  first 
class,  I offer  no  advice,  excepting  that  when  they  send  oft’  their  in- 
telligence to  their  employers,  as  to  the  state  of  public  feeling  in  the 
South,  they  take  especial  care  not  to  lull  them  in  the  belief  that  the 
feeling  against  the  Tar  ff  is  not  a general  feelingin  South-Carolina, 
lest  they  lead  them  into  difficulties.  To  the  second  class,  I recom- 
mend  the  frequent  perusal  of  that  fine  passage  in  rhe  Constitutions 
of  New-Hampshire,  and  other  States:  “ The  doctrine  of  Non  Resist- 
ance against  arbitrary  power  and  oppression,  is  absurd,  SLAVISH, 
and  destructive  of  the  good  and  happiness  of  mankind.”  To  the 
third,  I offer  a sincere  request,  that  they  would  look  a little  more 
towards  home.  South-Carolina  needs- at  this  time  the  services,  and 
the  entire  devotion  of  every  native  and  adopted  Son  of  the  South. 
And  now  one  question  at  parting  t all  those,  who  in  our  coir, 
munity,  think  Brutus  a traitor — Do  ye  think,  there  is  a general 

9\ 


16G 


aequiesence  in  your  opinions?  I assure  you  not,  “ Because  half  a 
dozen  grasshoppers  under  a fern,  make  the  field  ring  with  their  im- 
portunate chink,  whilst  thousand  of  great  cattle,  reposed  beneath 
the  shadow  of  the  native  Live  oak,  chew  the  cud  and  are  silent, 
pray  do  not  imagine,  that  those  who  make  the  noise,  are  the  only 
inhabitants  of  the  field  ; or  that  of  course,  they  are  many  in  number ; 
pr  that  after  all,  they  are  other  than^tlie~fttrle,  shrivelled,  meagre, 
hopping,  though  loud  and  troublesome  insects  of  the  hour.” 

And  of  my  fellow-citizens  in  general,  I now  take  my  leave,  with 
pn  earnest  entreaty,  that  they  will  at  least  ponder  in  their  thoughts, 
the  things  that  are  herein  written.  But, 


“If  Cassandra-like,  amidst  the  din 
“ Of  conflict,  NONE  will  hear,  or  hearing  heed 
“ This  voice  frornou*  of  the  wilderness,  the  sin 
BE  THEIRS-,  and  my  OWN  feelings  be  my  meed.” 


BRUTUS 


